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Alba Sosa v Andre Sosa [2020] BZSC 31 (8 December 2020)
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BELIZE A.D. 2003 (DIVORCE)
ACTION NO. 49 OF 2003 BETWEEN
ALBA ARGENTINA SOSA AND
ANDRE BRYAN SOSA
PETITIONER
RESPONDENT
Before: Delivered:
The Hon Mr Justice Westmin R.A. James (Ag) 18th December 2020
Appearances: Robertha Magnus Usher SC for the Petitioner Darlene M. Vernon for
the Respondent
DECISION ON VARIATION OF MAINTENANCE ORDER
- This
is an application by way of summons filed on the 18th March 2020 by
the Petitioner, Alba Argentina Sosa for a variation of a maintenance Order made
on the 15th day of May, 2008. The application was for the variation
of the Maintenance Order in respect of Eoin Sosa the youngest of the three
children between the Petitioner and the Respondent.
- The
starting point for the consideration of this type of application is that a
parent is obligated to maintain and educate their child.1 A
maintenance order is valid until the child attains the age of 18 except in
certain circumstances outlined in the Act.2 Section 71 of the
Families and Children Act ('the Act') provides for the extension of the time for
maintenance beyond the age of
18. It states:
71.-(l)jf, on the ar,plication cf the parent or guardian cf a
child, it ar,pears to the court that the child is or will be engaged
in a course
cf education or training cfter attaining the age eighteen years, or that the
child is siJfering from a mental or
1 Families and Children Act secs 5-6,
48-49
2 Families and Children Act sec 70
physical disability, and that it is therlfore eJ1.pedientfor payments to be
made under the order cfter the child attains that age,
then sulject to
subsection (2) below, the court may by order direct that payments be so made for
such period not exceeding three
years from the date cf the order as may be
JpecJied in the order.
(2) The period JpecJied in an order made under subsection (1) may from time
to time be extended by a subsequent order so made, but
shall not in any case
extend beyond the date when the child attains the age cf twenty-one years exa:pt
in the case cf a disabled
child or a child pursuing full time education.
- The
child in question, Eoin Edoardo Sosa attained the age of 18 on 19th
March 2020 and is currently enrolled in the Universidad del Valle de Guatemala
pursuing a degree in mechatronic engineering and therefore
falls under this
provision.
- Pursuant
to section 77 of the Act the sum of maintenance that should be awarded by the
Court is based on the general maintenance and
education needs ofEoin Sosa
subject to the personal circumstances and ability to pay of the
parents.3 Overarching consideration in making any of these
determinations is that the Court will consider the best interest of the
child.4
- The
evidence from the Petitioner was not entirely consistent as to what was
necessary for the maintenance of Eoin. The expenses varied
in her various
affidavits. The first Affidavit estimated those expenses which included
University fees, food, books, clothing and
other expenses at $2,790.00 which was
revised to $1,780.00 then revised again to $5,500.00 in her third Affidavit
wherein she requested
the Petitioner pay half or $2,750.00 and revised again to
$3,910.00 in an affidavit which was filed late.
- There
is no question that the Petitioner has borne the majority of the maintenance of
the three children between the Petitioner and
the Respondent over the past
sixteen years. On 29th October 2004, the Court awarded maintenance of
$400.00 per child to be paid by the Respondent to the Petitioner for the
maintenance
of each of the children between them. The youngest child Eoin was 2
years old at the time. The children lived with the Petitioner
and considering
inflation, the costs of growing children for housing, transportation,
3 See also Arthur Lockwood v Adelaida Lockwood, SCC No 72 of
2008
4 See .....
medical, school fees and the fact that the two older children went on to
University one studied medicine and the other law, there
can be no contention of
this fact. While the Petitioner has never sought a variation of that order until
now this cannot be held
against the Respondent as that was a choice of the
Petitioner. However, the Respondent likewise who having benefited from paying
only $400.00 per month for 16 years and in fact stopped in December 2019 for a
child who is now at University would agree that $400.00
is incredibly inadequate
now. Even if the Petitioner didn't have her current health challenges a Court
looking at this case now would
find that a variation is absolutely necessary.
- In
2019, the Petitioner who like the Respondent was a doctor, fell seriously ill
and was diagnosed with Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis
(ALS). This incredibly
debilitating condition left the Petitioner a quadriplegic, wheel chair bound,
unable to work and require full
time care. There has thus been an incredible
change in circumstances which would necessitate a variation of the 16-year-old
order.
The principal not the sole responsibility for the maintenance of the Eoin
will now have to be borne by the Respondent.
- The
Petitioner has indicated that she is currently living with her mother but has
some assets which include an unencumbered property
in Belize, property in
Guatemala and vehicle she is seeking to sell. The Petitioner is completely
reliant on others and unable to
work. The Petitioner as a result of her illness
have serious medical expenses and has indicated she needs to be assisted
financially
by her relatives.
- The
Respondent is a doctor who remarried and has two minor children with his second
wife. The Respondent's career and finances improved
since the first maintenance
order. He has an active medical practice at several establishments. He was
appointed the Chief of Staff
of one of the hospitals he is engaged
with.
- The
Respondent indicated his income was $21,975.43. He said that before March 2020
he was earning an extra $4,500.00 in rental income.
The Respondent indicated
that his monthly expenses were $24,103.46 which includes
- a mortgage for
the primary residence of $4,711.00
- a mortgage of
$6,358.51 for a second residence
- two vehicle
loans of $1,198.10 and $1,245.50 a secondary loan of $499.57 per month
- School tuition
for his two minor children totally $670.00
- Groceries in the
amount of $2,000.00
- Two electricity
bills totally $680.00 per month
- Two water bills
totally $110.00
- Two
phone/internet bills totally $617.00
- Cable $67.00
- Yard maintenance
for two properties $400.00
- Gas in the
amount of $500.00
- Higher Purchase
items with Courts $438.00
- Miscellaneous
which he describes as clothing medicine extra-curricular and credit card totally
$2,500.00
- The
Respondent submits that his expenses are more than his income and he has been
using his savings which he laid out as $71,171.21
to meet his monthly expenses.
The Respondent also indicates that his current wife is unemployed.
- My
assessment of the Affidavits is that neither of the parties was completely open
with the Court. The Petitioner was not completely
open with the actual expenses
of the Eoin and in fact could be said to have exaggerated his needs while the
Respondent has understated
his income. I find that the Respondent was evasive
about some details of his income and the documents he submitted showed that
there
were further streams of income like a commercial property and other income
stated as salary on his statements not being from one
of the sources he
indicated. Further the documents displayed showed expenses that do not accord
with the fact that he is earning
less than his basic expenses. In fact, the
Respondent during the pandemic obtained a $60,000.00 loan from Atlantic Bank in
June 2020,
a Scotia bank loan in February/March 2020 for $23,517.92 one of which
was for a new vehicle.
- I
am fortified in that view since the Respondent has not provided evidence of his
tax returns which would give a fuller picture of
income and expenses. Further
from the Respondent's evidence he has $14,000.00 in loan obligations and if you
take his income as the
highest, it would put his income to debt service to ratio
at almost 50%. It is very unlikely that a financial institution would grant
loans to someone with such a high income to debt to service ratio during a time
that the Respondent is indicting that he was earning
less than his expenses.
That therefore means that the Respondent's income is much more than he is
letting on. Despite the exaggeration
of the Petitioner and understatement by the
Respondent, I got some impressions about the income of the parties and the needs
of the
child.
- In
Mc Ewan vMcEwan 19721 WLR 1217 at 1223 Rees J. stated:
"Whether the man is in employment or not it is cpen to justices in an
ar,prcpriate case i1pon direct evidence or justJiable irference
to make an order
on the basis cf potential earning capacity. An order may more readily be made
where justices are sati fied that
a husband has not been frank in his evidence
bEfore them. "
- In
Mc Ewan it was held, inter alia, that since the justices had
concluded that the husband had not been frank as to his financial position, they
were entitled to have regard to the realities and to draw the inference that his
actual or potential earning capacity was greater
than he had stated and they
were entitled to find on the whole of the evidence that the husband's earning
capacity justified the
order which they had made.
- In
Gengler v Gengler [1976] 2 All ER 81 the Family Division of
England approved of the one-third rule on an application of this nature. At page
84 Latey J. stated:
"I entirely and respecfully agree with what Sir George Baker P. has said
about the one third calculation being a fair and usEful starting
point in
proceedings in the Magistrate's Court as it is in proceedings in this division.
It is to be remembered that it is only a
starting point. It may and cften does
end i1p also as the finishing point. But in many cases it does not ... "
- In
Rodewald v Rodewald [1977] 2 WLR 191 Omrod LJ stated at p.
197
"the Divisional Court following on Wachtel v Wachtel [
1973] EWCA Civ 10; 1973 Fam.
72
invariably takes the two gross incomes to arrive at the joint
incomes".
- I
am therefore entitled to have regard to the realities and to draw the inference
about the Respondent's actual or potential earning
capacity.
- I
do accept that the Respondent's income has decreased to some extent due to the
pandemic which is very difficult time for everyone.
While this is the case, as
indicated the Respondent has not been totally honest with the Court as to all
his streams of income.
- The
Respondent has indicated that he is approaching retirement age and so his income
would decrease. The Respondent being a medical
practitioner can work well after
the retirement age for public servants. In fact, the Respondent's expenses for
mortgages and car
loans carry him well beyond his retirement age. I find it
highly unlikely that a financial institution would grant the Respondent
loans
including some that were taken out this year to go well beyond his retirement
age if the Respondent could not show an ability
to pay beyond that
time.
- I
estimate on the whole of the evidence that the Respondent's income or earning
potential is likely to be more in the region of $30,000.00
a month and justifies
the order I am about to make. Having regard to the current circumstances I am
willing to base my calculation
on an income of $25,000.00
- I
am of the view that 20% of the Respondent's gross income is a very fair,
reasonable and quite frankly conservative starting point
for maintenance of his
three remaining children. Based on the Respondent's income he could afford
$1500.00 per child. This amount
is only
$300.00 more than he was he accustomed paying in totality for the three children
he shared with the Petitioner. This court therefore
finds that the amount would
not be considered to stretch the Respondent to an extent way more than he was
already used to paying.
- Having
taken all the circumstances of the case into account bearing in mind the factors
set out in various pieces of legislation.
In addition to the nature and source
of the respondent's income and expenses which include support for two other
minor children.
I also considered
the income and expenses of the Petitioner, the Petitioner's current health
circumstances, and the amount needed for Eoin schooling
and the assistance
received.
- The
application is therefore allowed to the extent limited by my assessment of the
maintenance sum and hold that
- The
Respondent do pay or cause to be paid to the Petitioner for the maintenance and
education ofEoin Edoardo Sosa, the sum of $1,500.00
per month from the March
2020 until he turns 21 years or until further order.
- Each
of the said sums to be paid by the end of every calendar month commencing
December 2020.
- The
Respondent to pay the arrears of maintenance for Eoin Edoardo Sosa from December
2019 to February 2020 and from March 2020 to
November 2020;
- The
payment of the arrears to be determined at the next hearing 22nd
January 2021
- The
respondent to pay the petitioner her costs in the amount of $5,500.00 to be paid
in two parts, the first to be paid prior to
the next hearing date of January
22nd 2021
Judgment accordingly.
Westmin R.A. James
Justice of the Supreme Court (Ag)
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