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Court of Appeal of Sri Lanka |
] [Hide Context] 73
1965 Present:
Sansoni, C.J., H. N. G. Fernando, S.P.J., T. S. Fernando, J.,
Tambiah, J., and Sri Skanda Rajah, J.
WALKER SONS & CO., LTD., and others, Appellants, and F. C. W. FRY
and others, Respondents
S. C.No.9 of 1962 (LT/1/6209), S. C. Nos. 18-23 of 1962 (LT/6/9088-9093),
S. C. Application No. 319 of 1963, S. C. Application No. 144 of 1964,
S. C. Application No. 158
of 1964, and S. C. Application No. 37 of 1965
Industrial disputes-Labour
Tribunals, Industrial Courts and Arbitrators-Mode of appointment-Labour
Tribunals exercising judicial
powers-Requirement of appointment by Judicial
Service Commission-" Judicial power "-" Judicial officer "-Difference
between
arbitral power and judicial power-Power of Court to make a "just and equitable
order "-Effect-Industrial Disputes
Act (Cap. 131), as amended by Act No. 62 of
1957, ss. 3 (7), 4, 4 (7) (2), 5-31A, 31B (1) (4) (5) (S), 310 (7) (2), 31D, 33
(l)
Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council, 1946 (Cap. 379), as amended by
Ceylon Independence Act of 1947, as. 3, 53, 55 (1) (5).
Held by SANSONI, C.J., H. N. G. FERNANDO, S.P. J., and T. S. FERNANDO, J.
(TAMBIAH, J., and SRI SKANDA RAJAH, J., dissenting), that a
Labour Tribunal
exercises judicial power when it acts under Part IVA, particularly section 3IB,
of the Industrial Disputes Act
(as amended by Act No. 62 of 1957). Therefore, as
it is also a holder of a public office, it is a " judicial officer "
within the
meaning of section 55 of the Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council, 1946, and
has no jurisdiction to exercise its judicial
power unless it has been appointed
by the Judicial Service Commission.
Ceylon Transport Board v. Samastha Lanka Motor Sevaka Samithiya (65 N. L. R.
185) overruled.
When a Labour Tribunal hears and determines an application under section 31B of
the Industrial Disputes Act, it exercises, in respect
of a contract of service
entered into between a workman and his employer, a jurisdiction concurrently
vested in the ordinary Courts.
Provisions similar to those which state that a
Labour Tribunal has, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, power (a) to grant
relief
or redress to a workman notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the
contract of service (section 31B (4)), (6) to make such
order as may appear to
the tribunal to be " just and equitable " (section 31C (1) ), and (c) to grant
the new remedy
of re-instatement, and other ancillary or alternative remedies
(sections 31B and 33 (1) ), do not make the Tribunal any the less
a tribunal
exercising judicial functions or judicial power.
The jurisdiction of Labour Tribunals set out in Part IVA of the Industrial
Disputes Act is not the only power given to them. The
Act, in sections 3 (1) (d)
and 4 (1), contemplates a Labour Tribunal acting as an arbitrator. A Labour
Tribunal need not be appointed
by the Judicial Service Commission if it performs
only arbitral functions.
The invalidity of the appointment of a Labour Tribunal authorising it to
exercise judicial functions in a question of law in respect
of which an appeal
to the Supreme Court lies under section 31D of the Industrial Disputes Act. In
such a case, it cannot be contended
that the appointment can only be challenged
by an application for a writ of Quo Warranto and in no other way.
74
Section 340 (2) of the Criminal
Procedure Code (Cap. 20), which requires a statement of the matter of law and a
certificate by an
Advocate or Proctor, does not apply to the form of a petition
of appeal filed under section 31D of the Industrial Disputes Act.
Held further (by the whole Court), (i) that an Industrial Court to
whom an industrial dispute is referred by the Minister under section 4 (2)
of
the Industrial Disputes Act exercises only arbitral power when it acts within
the terms of sections 22 to 31. Even though it
holds a paid office, it is not a
" judicial officer " within the meaning of section 55 of the Ceylon
(Constitution) Order
in Council, 1946. It does not, therefore, require to be
appointed by the Judicial Service Commission.
(ii) that an arbitrator to whom an industrial dispute is referred by the
Minister under section 4 (1) of the Industrial Disputes
Act or by the
Commissioner of Labour under section 3 (1) (d) acts under sections 15A to 21. He
holds no office and is not a "
judicial officer ". He does not, therefore,
require to be appointed by the Judicial Service Commission.
APPEALS
and applications against orders made in
respect of certain industrial disputes. They were referred to a Bench of five
Judges under
section 51 of the Courts Ordinance.
S. C. No. 9 of 1962 (LT/1/6209)-
H. F. Perera, Q.C., with R. A. Kannangam, Lakshman Kadirgamar and R. L.
Jayasuriya, for the Employer-Appellant.
G. E. Chitty, Q.C., with George Candappa, K. Thevarajah, Norman Weerasooria and
Kumar Amarasekera, for the Applicant-Respondent.
F. Tennekoon, Q.C., Solicitor-General, with R. S. Wanasundera, V. S. A
Puttenayegum, H. L. de Silva and G. G. D. de Silva, Crown
Counsel, as amicus
curiae.
H. W. Jayewardene, Q.C. with G. T. Samerawickreme, Q.C., N. R. M. Daluwatte and
Mark Fernando, as amicus curiae.
S. C. No. 18-23 of 1962 (LT/6/9088-9093)-
C. Ranganathan, Q.C., with S. C. Crossette-Thambiah, for the Employer-Appellant.
N. Satyendra, with J. Perisunderam, for the Applicant-Respondent.
F. Tennekoon, Q.C., Solicitor-General, with R. S. Wanasundera, V.S.
A.Pullenayegum, H.L.de Silva and G. G. D. de Silva, Crown Counsel,
as amicus
curiae.
S. C. Application No. 319 of 1963-
If. V. Perera, Q.C., with S. J. Kadirgamar, Lakshman Kadirgamar, K. Viknarajah,
R. Illeyperuma, Mark Fernando and D. C. Amarasekera.
for the Petitioner.
75
Colvin R. de Silva, with Nimal
Senanayake, Prins Rajasooriya, (Miss) Manouri de Silva, Bala Nadarajah and /. S.
de Silva, for the
2nd Respondent.
F. Tennekoon, Q.C., Solicitor-General, with R. S. Wanasundera, V. S. A.
Pullenayegum, H. L. de Silva and G. G. D. de Silva, Crown
Counsel, for the 1st
and 3rd Respondents.
S. C. Application No. 144 of 1964-
H. V. Perera, Q.C., with Lakshman Kadirgamar and Mark Fernando, for the
Petitioner
Nimal Senanayake, for the 2nd Respondent.
F. Tennekoon, Q.C., Solicitor-General, with R. S. Wanasundera V. S. A.
Pullenayegum, H. L. de Silva and G. G. D. de Silva, Crown
Counsel, for the 3rd
Respondent.
S. C. Application No. 158 of 1964-
H. V. Perera, Q.C., with Lakshman Kadirgamar and Mark Fernando, for the
Petitioner.
Nimal Senanayake, for the 2nd Respondent.
F. Tennekoon, Q.C., Solicitor-General, with R. S. Wanasundera, V. S. A.
Pullenayegum, H. L. de Silva and G. G. D. de Silva, Crown
Counsel, for the 3rd
Respondent.
S. C. Application No. 37 of 1965-
H. W. Jayewardene, Q.G., with G. T. Samerawickreme, Q.C., and
N, R. M. Daluwatte, for the Petitioner.
S. S. Sahabandu for the 2nd Respondent.
Cur. adv. vult.
November 30, 1965. SANSONI,
C.J.-
These six cases were referred by me under section 51 of the Courts Ordinance to
a Bench of five Judges. The question that has been
argued is whether the
Tribunals concerned, all of which are mentioned in the Industrial Disputes Act,
Cap. 131, have been validly
appointed. In S. C. No. 9 of 1962 and S. C. Nos. 18
to 23 of 1962, the Tribunals concerned are Labour Tribunals. In S. C. No. 319
of
1963 the Tribunal is an arbitrator to whom the dispute was referred by the
Minister of Labour and Nationalised Services under
section 4 (1) of the Act. In
S. C. No. 144 of 1964 and S. C. No. 158 of 1964, the Tribunal concerned is an
Industrial
76
Court of one person to whom the
dispute was referred by the Minister under section 4 (2) of the Act. In S. C.
No. 37 of 1965 the
Tribunal is an arbitrator to whom the dispute was referred by
the Commissioner of Labour under section 3 (1) (d) of the Act.
The arguments of counsel appearing in each case were directed to the question
whether each Tribunal was a judicial officer as that
term is used in the Ceylon
(Constitution) Order in Council, 1946, Cap. 379 ; and if so, whether it was
validly constituted in that
it had not been appointed by the Judicial Service
Commission.
The Industrial Disputes Act No. 43 of 1950 was the first legislative enactment
in Ceylon to contain legislation " for the prevention,
investigation and
settlement of industrial disputes, and for matters connected therewith or
incidental thereto "- to quote
the long title. Ceylon came very late into this
field, which covers collective agreements and settlement by conciliation and
arbitration.
Before 1950 practically all countries had established some form of
conciliation or arbitration for dealing with industrial disputes.
It had been
known for a long time that parties to such disputes should be assisted by the
State in arriving at amicable settlements
through conciliation and arbitration
procedures.
The Act No. 43 of 1950, after providing in Part III for collective agreements,
and settlement by conciliation and arbitration, provided
in Part IV for the
constitution of Industrial Courts, from a panel of not less than five persons
appointed by the Governor-General,
to whom such disputes might be referred for
settlement. The original Act provided also for the reference of disputes for
settlement
by arbitration. An amending Act No. 62 of 1957 which introduced
Labour Tribunals also gave them in Part IVA, and particularly section
31B, power
which, it has been argued, amounts to judicial power. By the same amending Act,
Labour Tribunals were included among
those to whom disputes could be referred
for arbitration, but that amendment merely added one more kind of arbitrator to
those
already in existence.
Since the first two cases we were dealing with, viz., S. C. No. 9 and S. C. Nos.
18 to 23 concern Labour Tribunals, I shall deal
with them at this stage. Section
31B of the Act enables a workman, or a trade union on behalf of a workman who is
a member of it,
to apply in writing to a Labour Tribunal for relief or redress
in respect of any of the following matters :-
(a) the termination of his services by his employer ;
(b) the question whether any gratuity or other benefits are due to him from his
employer on termination of his services and the
amount of such gratuity and the
nature and extent of any such benefits;
(c) such other matters relating to the terms of employment or the conditions of
labour of a workman as may be prescribed.
77
It will be seen that the
application is made directly to the Tribunal, and in this respect is similar to
the procedure prescribed
for filing a plaint in a civil Court. In the case of
Industrial Courts or arbitrators there is no such provision enabling a workman
to make such a direct application for relief, and an order of reference to an
arbitrator or an Industrial Court can only be made
by the Commissioner of Labour
or the Minister.
An application to a Labour Tribunal is described as one " for relief or redress
". In this respect also it resembles an
action in a civil Court which, according
to section 5 of the Civil Procedure Code, is " a proceeding for the prevention
or
redress of a wrong "; and according to section 6 of the Code is an "
application to a Court for relief or remedy obtainable
through the exercise of
the Court's power or authority ".
Items (a), (b) and (c) already set out cover the whole range of matters which
come within a contract of service entered into between
a workman and his
employer. Although the subject of wages is not specifically mentioned, I have no
doubt that a Labour Tribunal
can make an order in respect of wages as well.
Section 31B (6) states that notwithstanding that any person has ceased to be an
employer, a Labour Tribunal may, on an application under sub-section (1), order
such person to pay the workman any sum as wages
in respect of any period during
which that workman was employed by such person.
Section 31B (5) provides that when a Labour Tribunal has concluded the hearing
of an application under sub-section (1), the workman
shall not be entitled to
any other legal remedy in respect of that particular matter; and where the
workman has first resorted
to any other legal remedy, he shall not thereafter be
entitled to the remedy under subsection (1). Thus Labour Tribunals have been
given concurrent jurisdiction with the ordinary Courts over matters which form
the subject of dispute between a workman and his
employer.
Section 31D provides that an order of a Labour Tribunal shall be final and shall
not be called in question in any Court, though
a party dissatisfied with the
order may appeal to the Supreme Court on a question of law. This means, in
effect, that a Labour
Tribunal is empowered to make an order which finally
determines the dispute between the parties to the contract.
Section 31B (4) provides that any relief or redress may be granted by a Labour
Tribunal to a workman notwithstanding anything to
the contrary in any contract
of service between him and his employer. Much time was spent during the
arguments on an elucidation
of the meaning of this provision. One view which was
expressed was that a Labour Tribunal need not determine the rights of the
parties as known to the civil law; that the contract could be entirely ignored
by the Tribunal; and that matters of policy could
also be considered by it. I do
not read the provision in that way. It certainly does not say that the contract
should, or
78
even may, be ignored. It seems to
me to empower the Tribunal to give relief against any harsh terms that the
employer may have imposed
in the contract. The Tribunal has been given, I think,
a discretion to be exercised judicially to give relief against such terms.
It is
similar to the relief a Court of equity would give when it has before it an
unconseientious or oppressive contract; this
is sometimes done in cases of
specific performance ; similarly, in cases covered by the Money Lending
Ordinance a Court can relieve
a borrower against unconscionable terms appearing
in the contract. The point I make is that a provision such as sub-section (4)
is
entirely consistent with the Tribunal that is exercising the power of granting
equitable relief being one that exercises judicial
functions or judicial power.
Section 31C (1) empowers the Labour Tribunal, after making inquiries and hearing
evidence, " to make such order as may appear
to the tribunal to be just and
equitable ". It was sought to be argued that a Tribunal which makes an order
that is just and
equitable is not analogous to a Court of justice exercising
judicial functions, but is a tribunal exercising arbitrary functions
of an
entirely different order from judicial functions. On the other hand, it was
pointed out that an order which is just and equitable
is the very sort of order
which is often made by the ordinary Courts of justice. We were referred to the
Partnership Act and the
Companies Act, by which the Court is empowered to make
an order of dissolution or winding up when it considers such a course to
be "
just and equitable ". Such an order is clearly one which can only be made by a
tribunal exercising judicial and
not arbitrary power.
All persons exercising judicial power and responsibility must act so as to
produce a result which is both' bonum' and' aequum',
and if a statute reminds a
tribunal of that duty it is no argument to say that the tribunal is by that
circumstance given jurisdiction
to make a purely arbitrary decision. Dr. J.
Duncan M. Derrett has said, when writing of justice, equity, and good
conscience: "
Contrasted with the office of the Judge is the so-called arbitrium
rusticorum, which seems to have been the Komanic counterpart
of' palm tree
justice', whereby ' the arbiter' divided the disputed property equally between
the two parties; here no juridical
activity can be seen and he splits it between
them like the monkey in Aesop's fable, as the simplest way of appeasing the
noisier
party. It is not even 'rough justice' or 'substantial justice', forno
judicial discretion whatever has been used, and where there
is no judicial
discretion there is no justitia." To enact that a Labour Tribunal should
exercise its power according to justice
and equity, for that is what the phrase
"just and equitable" connotes, is to remind it of the maxim "bonus judex
secundum aequum et bonum judicat aequitatem stricto juri praefert" (Co. Litt. 24
B). "I commend the Judge that seems
fine and ingenious, so it tend to right and
equity", observed Lord Hobart. (Hob. 125). I find it impossible to treat
seriously
an argument that suggests that a Tribunal that is empowered to make a
just and equitable order is not, for that reason, exercising
judicial power. On
the contrary, it is by those very words
79
required to do what a Court of
law and equity is required to do, and that is to hold an even hand between
conflicting interests.
It must conform to that standard, and has no power to act
in a purely arbitrary manner.
Mr. Satyendra, in support of his argument that a Labour Tribunal is not a Court
and does not exercise judicial functions, relied
on the Privy Council decision
in Moses v. Parker [1 (1896) A. C. 245. ]. That case dealt with a Statute of
1858, which vested in
the Supreme Court of Tasmania jurisdiction to deal with
disputes regarding claims to grants of land. Such disputes had, prior to
the
Statute, been dealt with by certain Commissioners, and they reported to the
Governor who was, "in equity and good conscience",
entitled to make a grant. It
was expressly provided in the Statute that the Supreme Court should not "be
bound by the strict
rules of law or equity in any case, or by any technicalities
or legal forms whatever". In an appeal from an order of the Supreme
Court, the
Privy Council held that the decision of the Supreme Court was not a judicial
decision. The Privy Council in the later
case of Canadian Pacific Railway v.
Toronto Corporation[2(1911) A. C. 461.] explained the earlier decision, and said
that "as
the tribunal from which it was desired to appeal was expressly
exonerated from all rules of law or practice, and certain affairs
were placed in
the hands of the Judges as the persons from whom the best opinions might be
obtained, and not as a Court administering
justice between the litigants, such
functions do not attract the prerogative of the Crown to grant appeals ". I do
not think
that the functions of a Labour Tribunal acting under Part IVA bear any
resemblance to the functions performed by the Supreme Court
of Tasmania in the
case relied on.
Thus when one considers the manner of making the application to a Labour
Tribunal, the subject matters which may be covered by such
an application, the
order which may be made by the Tribunal, and the final effect of such an order,
it is plain that disputes which
had always fallen within the jurisdiction of
ordinary Courts of law have been assigned to Labour Tribunals for hearing and
determination.
The Tribunal is required to determine facts in dispute, to
interpret contracts, to apply the relevant rules of law, to adjudicate
on the
respective rights of the parties, and to make a just and equitable order which
finally binds them. This is what any ordinary
Court does when hearing a dispute
that goes up before it. After all these years, during which contracts of service
were justiciable
by the ordinary Courts, the Legislature chose in 1957 to take
them out of the jurisdiction of those Courts, or at any rate to establish
Courts
of concurrent jurisdiction calling them Labour Tribunals. True it is that the
Act in terms enables a Labour Tribunal to
grant equitable relief,
notwithstanding the express terms of the contract, and requires it to make a
just and equitable order :
it could well have imposed the same terms on the
ordinary Courts which dealt with such disputes. The imposition of such terms
would
not have
80
changed the character of such
Courts in any way ; they would still have been exercising judicial power. And I
do not see how the
conferment of the power to grant equitable relief and to make
a just and equitable order on a Labour Tribunal makes the power it
exercises
anything other than judicial. Section 31C (2) makes the Tribunal master of its
own procedure, just as Bribery Tribunals
were made, in another Act enacted at
about this time, the masters of their procedure.
What we have to consider is whether a Labour Tribunal is a judicial officer
within section 55 (1) of the Order in Council, that
is to say, the holder of any
judicial office, for section 55 (5) defines "judicial officer " for the purposes
of this
section as the holder of any judicial office except a Judge of the
Supreme Court or a Commissioner of Assize.
Labour Tribunals are appointed, we were informed by the Solicitor-General, by
the Public Service Commission, and they are permanent
officers drawing salaries.
I have no doubt therefore that they are the holders of an office, as that term
was defined by the Privy
Council in the Bribery Commissioner v. Eanasinghe [1
(1964) 66 N. L. R. 73. ]
Apart from being holders of an office, I hold that when acting under Part IV A
of the Act they act as holders of judicial office.
They are given power in that
Part to try disputes, to modify existing legal relationships, to make orders
which confer legal rights
and impose Iegal liabilities, and to determine, as
between a woil man and his employer, whether one of them possesses as against
the other some existing legal right or is subject to some existing legal
liability. As Isaacs J. said in Federal Commissioner of
Taxation v. Munro[2
(192S) 38 C. L. R. 173.] " some functions are appropriate exclusively to the
judicial power, for example,
the punishment of crime, or adjudication in actions
in tort or contract." And as Dixon, C.J. and MeTiernan J. said in The Queen
v.
Davison [(1954) 90 C. L. R. 353 at 369.], "The truth is that the ascertainment
of existing rights by the judicial determination
of issues of fact or law falls
exclusively within judicial power."
It is true that Labour Tribunals have jurisdiction to inquire into and determine
only disputes of a particular class, viz. those
arising between a workman and
his employer. But the fact remains that a Labour Tribunal is given jurisdiction
to apply the law,
to interpret the agreement, to decide the facts, and by its
adjudication to create an instant right or liability, on the basis of
some
previously existing legal standard. It is not merely under a duty to act
judicially and observe the principles of natural
justice: that is a feature
common to all tribunals, whether they exercise judicial or arbitral power. A
Labour Tribunal under Part
IV A of the Act corresponds in every respect to a
Court as described by Blackstone in his Commentaries (Vol. 3, p. 23) : "
In
every court there must beat least three constituent parts, the actor, reus, and
judex : the actor, or plaintiff, who complains
of an injury
81
done; the reus, or defendant, who
is called upon to make satisfaction for it; and the judex, or judicial power,
which is to examine
the truth of the fact, to determine the law arising upon the
fact, and, if any injury appears to have been done, to ascertain, and
by its
officers to apply the remedy." I adopt and apply the view of Isaacs J. that
Blackstone's Commentaries are " a
legitimate source of instruction for the
purposes of our own Constitution .... a key to the meaning of the terms we are
now considering."
A Labour Tribunal has " power, by its determination within
jurisdiction, to impose liability or affect rights. By this I mean
that the
liability is imposed, or the right affected, by the determination only, and not
by the fact determined, and so that the
liability will exist, or the right will
be affected, although the determination be wrong in law or in fact." This is the
famous
dictum of Palles C.B. in The Queen v. Local Government Board[1 (1902) 2
f. B. 349 at 373. ], where the learned judge had to consider
what made a
tribunal a " Court " or " jurisdiction " so as to make it a determination
judicial. As the Privy
Council tersely put it in Attorney-General for Australia
v. The Queen [2 (1957) A. G. 288.]: " The exercise of the judicial
function is
concerned, as the arbitral function is not, with the determination of a
justiciable issue."
The Solicitor-General argued that the Order in Council vested only jurisdiction
and not judicial power in Part VI which is entitled
" The Judicature ". He also
argued that only the Courts existing at the time the Constitution was enacted
were contemplated.
It is not necessary to decide the first point. I cannot
accept the second. In Part III which is entitled " The Legislature
", Parliament
and the power and procedure appertaining to Parliament are dealt with. In Part V
the Executive and the executive
power are referred to. Part VI makes no specific
mention of the judicial power (unlike the case of some other written
Constitutions)
but I have no doubt that one essential characteristic of the
authorities mentioned in Part VI, viz. the Supreme Court, Commissioners
of
Assize, and " judicial officers " is that they exercise judicial power.
The judicial power is the power " which every Sovereign must of necessity have
to decide controversies between its subjects,
or between itself and its
subjects, whether the rights relate to life, liberty or property. The exercise
of this power does not
begin until some tribunal which has power to give a
binding and authoritative decision (whether subject to appeal or not) is called
upon to take action." This is the definition given by Griffiths C.J. in Huddart,
Parker & Co. Proprietary Lid. v. Moorehead[3(1908)
8 C. L. R. 330 at 357.], and
is the one most frequently cited. It has been approved more than once by the
Privy Council.
Jurisdiction, on the other hand, denotes the type of case, according to
subject-matter or value or situation or the character of
the parties, with
respect to which a Court can judicially act. Judicial power is the
82
whole mass of the judicial
authority which can be exercised by the Court within the area of its
jurisdiction : it is the power with
which the Court is clothed in order to try
and determine causes, to determine rights and obligations, and to grant a
remedy. It
is enough for me to point out that the judgment of the Privy Council
in The Bribery Commissioner v. Ranasinghe[1 (1964) 66 N. L.
R. 73.] is decisive
against any argument that the jurisdiction which the Courts earlier possessed
can validly be superseded by
creating new tribunals which are not appointed by
the Judicial Service Commission. There is no room now for anybody to argue that
the jurisdiction of the Courts can be eroded in such a fashion.
I derive no assistance from being told that there are many trappings of a
tribunal which do not make it a Court exercising judicial
power. This negative
approach does not help me to decide the question whether a particular tribunal
is exercising judicial power.
I take the view that the tribunal which is required to be appointed by the
Judicial Service Commission must be the holder of a paid
judicial office, in the
sense that it exercises judicial power, and a Labour Tribunal acting under Part
IVA of the Act clearly
falls within this category. In the result, the orders
made in S. C. No. 9 of 1962 and S. C. Nos. 18 to 23 of 1962 must be set aside
since the tribunals were not appointed by the Judicial Service Commission.
I shall now turn to the earlier provisions of the Act which appear to me to
indicate that the whole purpose of the Act, as the long
title indicates, was to
provide for the settlement of industrial disputes. Part II sets out that such
disputes may be referred
by the Commissioner or the Minister for settlement by
conciliation or by arbitration or by an Industrial Court. Indeed, the heading
of
Part II of the Act specifically mentions " settlement by conciliation or by
arbitration or by an Industrial Court",
and the provisions of this Part which
deal with these matters put the issue beyond doubt.
When the Commissioner of Labour apprehends or is satisfied that an industrial
dispute exists he may (according to section 3) use
one of four methods, viz.-
(a) use the machinery of a collective agreement, if such an agreement exists
between the employers and workmen;
(b) and (c) endeavour to settle the dispute himself by conciliation or refer it
to an authorised officer for that purpose;
(d) with the consent of the parties refer the dispute for settlement by
arbitration to an arbitrator nominated by them, or in the
absence of such
nomination to an arbitrator or a body of arbitrators appointed by himself or to
a Labour Tribunal.
83
I draw attention again to this
reference to a Labour Tribunal acting as an arbitrator because it shows that the
jurisdiction of
Labour Tribunals set out in Part IVA, which I have already dealt
with earlier in this judgment, is not the only power given to them.
The Act in
section 3 (1) (d) contemplates a Labour Tribunal acting as an arbitrator to
settle an industrial dispute.
Section 4 gives further instances of how a dispute may be settled when the
Minister chooses to intervene. Under section. 4 (1) he
may refer a minor dispute
for settlement by arbitration to an arbitrator appointed by himself or to a
Labour Tribunal-note the
function allotted again to a. Labour Tribunal-even if
the parties do not consent. He may also, under section 4 (2), refer any
industrial
dispute to an Industrial Court for settlement.
I need not refer to the provisions of sections 5 to 15 which deal with
collective agreements and settlement by conciliation, because
they do not arise
for consideration on the cases before us.
Sections 15A to 21 deal with settlement by arbitration. Under section 17, an
arbitrator is required to make all such inquiries as
he may consider necessary,
and hear such evidence as may be tendered by the parties and thereafter make
such award as may appear
to him just and equitable. Under section 18 the award
must be transmitted to the Commissioner to be published in the Gazette, and
it
comes into force on the date it was made or on such date, if any, as may be
specified therein, but " not being earlier
than the date on which the industrial
dispute to which the award relates first arose." Where the award specifies the
period
for which it shall have effect, it "shall continue in force with effect
from the date on which it comes into force until the
end of the period," unless
it ceases to have effect under section 20. If no period is specified it
continues in force indefinitely
again unless it ceases to have effect under
section 20. Under section 19 an award shall be binding on the parties, trade
unions,
employers and workmen referred to in it, " and the terms of the award
shall be implied terms in the contract of employment
between the employers and
workmen bound by the award." It seems clear to me from the provisions of
sections 18 and 19, which
I have just set out, that an award is to have effect
only in the future and not for any period prior to the date on which the dispute
first arose, and it continues in force for such future period, which may be
either definite or indefinite. Its terms become, because
of the peremptory
provisions of section 19, implied terms of the contract of employment, and bind
the parties to it.
All these characteristics of an award which I have just set out are entirely
consistent with the view that what is exercised by
an arbitrator in settlement
of industrial disputes is purely arbitral power, the function of which is " to
ascertain and declare,
but not enforce, what in the opinion of the arbitrator
ought to be the respective rights and liabilities of the parties in relation
to
each other." This is an entirely different power
84
from the judicial power which is
concerned with " the ascertainment, declaration and enforcement of the rights
and liabilities
of the parties as they exist or are deemed to exist, at the
moment the proceedings are instituted "-see the judgment of Isaacs
and Rich JJ.
in Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia v. J. W. Alexander Ltd.[1 (1918)
25 O. L. R. at 462 and 463]. These
dicta were approved in The Queen v. Kirby and
Others [2(1955-66) 94 C. L. R. at 281.], and also cited with approval in
Attorney-General
for Australia v. The Queen [. 3 (1957) A. C. 288 at 310.].
Isaacs and Rich JJ. went on to say in their judgment that an industrial
dispute
is a claim by one of the disputants that existing relations should be altered,
and by the other that the claim should not
be conceded. It is therefore a claim
for new rights, and the duty of the arbitrator is to determine whether the new
rights ought
to be conceded in whole or in part. As Professor Sawer has said, "
the doctrine that it is not judicial power to determine
whether a rule should be
created, or shall be brought into operation in particular circumstances, has had
and will have a powerful
influence in limiting the scope of the doctrine of
separation of judicial power " : see Essays on the Australian Constitution
(2nd
Edition) p. 74.
As provided in our Act in section 19, the arbitrator's decision is given the
character of a legal right or obligation. The arbitrator's
power is to say what,
in his opinion, ought to be the respective rights and liabilities, and when he
says so they become their
mutual rights and liabilities because the award is
given binding force by the statute. That is why it has been said that it
partakes
of the character of legislative power. The creation of such rights or
liabilities is not the ordinary work of a court of law. The
arbitrator declares
what he thinks just and expedient. The functions exercised by a judge and an
industrial arbitrator are quite
distinct. To quote from the same judgment of
Isaacs and Rich JJ., " the arbitral function is ancillary to the legislative
function, and provides the factum upon which the law operates to create the
right or duty. The judicial function is an entirely
separate branch, and first
ascertains whether the alleged right or duty exists in law, and, if it binds it,
then proceeds if necessary
to enforce the law. "
The distinction drawn between the two functions is plain to see. The industrial
arbitrator creates a new contract for the future,
a judge enforces the rights or
liabilities arising out of an existing contract. This distinction has been drawn
over and over again
in judgments which have dealt with the distinct and separate
nature of the two powers. An industrial arbitrator settles disputes
by dictating
new conditions of employment to come into force in the future where he cannot
get the parties to agree on them ; a
judge determines the existing rights and
liabilities of the parties. This is no new theory. As Isaacs J. said in
Federated Saw
Mill &c. Employees of Australasia v. James Moore & Son Proprietary
Ltd. [ 4 (1900) 8 C. L. R. at 521.] : "As far back
as 1882 Professor Jevons, in
distinguishing this class of arbitration (in settlement of trade disputes) from
85
arbitration relating to past
contracts, states : ' Here the freedom of industry is at stake, for the
arbitrator will now have to
decide, not what agreement was made, but what is to
be made......' ' in regard to the future an arbitrator in assigning the terms
on
which the disputants are to agree necessarily restricts their liberty. ' Isaacs
J. said : " If the dispute is as to the
relative rights of parties as they rest
on past or present circumstances, the award is in the nature of a judgment,
which might
have been the decree of an ordinary judicial tribunal acting under
the ordinary judicial power. There the law applicable must be
observed. If,
however, the dispute is as to what shall in the future be the mutual rights and
responsibilities of the parties-in
other words, if no present rights are
asserted or denied, but a future rule of conduct is to be prescribed, thus
creating new rights
and obligations, with sanctions for nonconformity- then the
determination that so prescribes, call it an award, or arbitrament,
determination, or decision or what you will, is essentially of a legislative
character, and limited only by the law which authorized
it. "......Then the
learned judge says : " If a dispute is industrial, it is not an ordinary legal
dispute, i.e., it
is not a dispute as to what are the rights and liabilities of
the parties with respect to past or existing facts. It necessarily
looks to the
future, and therefore it is not, as I conceive, legally possible to say that all
disputes lead to an ordinary judicial
decree, and therefore that every
settlement of every dispute is necessarily an ordinary judicial decree "......"
A federal
award prescribing industrial conditions expounds nothing and
interprets nothing, but introduces new obligations. This is legislation
by means
of a subordinate body...... there is not, and never can be, any resemblance
between,-an ordinary judgment and such an
award, except in the procedure by
which they are arrived at."
Under section 20 of the Act, any party, trade union, employer or workman bound
by an arbitrator's award may repudiate it by notice
given to the Commissioner
and the other parties. Upon the expiration of 3 months succeeding the month on
which the notice is so
given, or upon the expiration of 12 months from the date
on which the award came into force, whichever is later, the award ceases
to have
effect. The principle underlying this provision is that an arbitrator's award is
a mere temporary settlement of an industrial
dispute, which does not have the
effect of preventing new disputes arising or new conditions of work, wages,
etc., being laid down
in the future.
Part IV of the Act deals with Industrial Courts and consists of sections 22 to
31. Section 22 provides for the appointment by the
Governor-General of a panel
of not less than five persons from which Industrial Courts shall be constituted.
Such persons hold
office for a period not exceeding 3 years. The Minister in his
discretion selects from the panel either one person or three persons
to
constitute the Industrial Court.
86
The provisions of sections 23,
24, 25, 26 and 27 contain provisions corresponding to sections 16, 17, 18, 19
and 20 which refer
to arbitrators. Section 23, like section 16, requires the
order referring the dispute for settlement by an Industrial Court to be
accompanied by a statement setting out each of the matters in dispute between
the parties. Section 24 requires the Industrial Court
to make all such inquiries
and hear all such evidence as it may consider necessary, and make such award as
appears to it to be
just and equitable. The Court may lay down its own procedure
for the conduct of the inquiry. This section corresponds to section
17 which
applies to arbitrators.
Section 25 requires the award of the Industrial Court to be transmitted to the
Commissioner, who shall cause it to be published
in the Gazette. The award comes
into force on the date it was made or on such date, if any, as may be specified
therein "
not being earlier than the date on which the industrial dispute to
which the award relates first arose." Where the award provides
that it shall
have effect for any period or until any dates specified in it, it continues in
force until the end of that period
or the dates so specified, otherwise it
continues in force indefinitely. Under section 26 evety award of an Industrial
Court is
binding on the parties, trade unions, employers and workmen referred to
in it, " and the terms of the award shall be implied
terms in the contract of
employment between the employers and workmen bound by the award."
Sections 25 and 26, like sections 18 and 19 which apply to an arbitrator's
award, make it clear that the award of an Industrial
Court is to have effect
only for the future and not for any period prior to the date on which the
dispute first arose. It continues
in force for a future period, which is
definite or indefinite according to the period specified in it. Its terms are
made binding
on the parties, and become implied terms of the contract of
employment by reason of the provisions of section 26.
As in the case of an arbitrator, I am satisfied that an Industrial Court, when
it acts within the terms of these sections, exercises
only arbitral power, viz.,
the power of examining the circumstances of a particular dispute and making an
award which provides
for the variation of the terms of a, contract of employment
in the interests of industrial peace, such variation to take effect
at some date
after the date on which the dispute arose between the parties. The Industrial
Court, like an arbitrator, decides only
what agreement should be made in regard
to the future.
Section 27 provides, as does section 20 (which applies to an arbitrator's award)
for any party, trade union, employer or workman
bound by an award of an
Industrial Court, who desires such award to be set aside or replaced or modified
or altered, to apply to
the Minister, who may then ask the Industrial Court to
review the award and make a decision on such an application in terms of sections
28, 29 and 30.
87
All these provisions indicate
plainly that an Industrial Court was never intended to exercise judicial power
in the sense in which
that expression has always been used. It follows that such
a Court is not a judicial officer, even though it holds a paid office.
But a
perusal of the orders made in S. C. No. 144 of 1964 and S. C. No. 158 of 1964
shows that the Industrial Court, misapprehending
its functions and powers and
the true nature of the duties it was authorised to perform under the Act, heard
evidence and ultimately
made orders which only a duly appointed judicial officer
is entitled to make. In S. C. No. 144 it decided certain disputed questions
of
fact, viz., (1) whether certain workmen were in fact employed by the petitioner,
(2) whether the discontinuance of certain workmen
was justified or not, (3)
whether the claim of the petitioner ci that of the workmen was correct in regard
to the rates of wages
to be paid. It then made order giving relief on these
matters which only a duly appointed judicial officer could have done. Indeed,
the Industrial Court appears to have acted in much the same way as a Labour
Tribunal functioning under Part IVA of the Act.
A similar misconception of its functions appears from the proceedings and the
order made by it in S. C. No. 158 of 1964. There also
there were disputed
questions of fact which arose for decision, viz., (1) whether certain workmen
were employed by the petitioner
or not, (2) whether the discontinuance of
certain workmen was justified or not, and if not, what relief they were entitled
to,
(3) what compensation should be paid to certain workmen. The Industrial
Court, having decided these issues, made an order granting
relief on these
matters. Its order is one which a Court of law alone can make, for the
declaration and enforcement of rights, and
the imposition of liabilities, under
a contract, is of the essence of judicial power.
What remedy is the petitioner entitled to against such an unwarranted assumption
of jurisdiction ? We have here a statutory body,
holding a paid office, whose
powers are strictly defined by the Act, acting completely outside the ambit of
those powers. The Industrial
Court which is expected to act and did act
quasi-judicially, but which was never intended or authorised to exercise
judicial power,
has wrongly assumed jurisdiction and exercised such power. The
petitioner in each such case, subject to any arguments that may be
urged against
this view, would be entitled to the grant of Certiorari to have the orders so
made quashed on the ground that they
were made without jurisdiction. But since
this aspect of the matter was not argued before us, but only the question
whether an
Industrial Court is under the Act authorized to exercise judicial
power, I would set these two applications down for further argument
before a
Bench of two Judges.
88
There remain the two applications
No. 319 of 1963 and No. 37 of 1965. In each of these cases an industrial dispute
was referred
to arbitration, under section 4(1) and section 3(1) (d)
respectively. The order made by each arbitrator has been attacked on the
ground
that the appointment of the arbitrator was not made by the Judicial Service
Commission, and the application for Certiorari
to quash it is based on that
ground. The short, and I think adequate, answer to this argument is that an
arbitrator appointed under
either section 4(1) or section 3(1) (d) does not hold
an office, and in view of the test set out in the Privy Council decision in
The
Bribery Commissioner v. Ranasinghe [1 (1R64) 63 N. L. R. 73.] no doubt can exist
on this point.
The submission for the petitioners was that since he has in fact exercised
judicial power he should have been appointed by the Judicial
Service Commission.
But the Commission cannot appoint anyone and everyone who exercises judicial
power: it appoints only those
who hold any judicial office.
There is one aspect of the matter that I have already adverted to in dealing
with the impugned orders of the Industrial Court, which
concerns these orders of
the arbitrators as well, and it is this. Whether it is an Industrial Court or an
arbitrator acting under
this Act, that is concerned, it seems to me that the
only power they are authorized to exercise is arbitral power, that is, to make
an award which decides what the agreement between the parties should be in the
future. They are not authorized to exercise judicial
power, which is what they
have done in the cases before us. But since this particular point was not argued
before us, I would set
these two applications also down for further argument
before a Bench of two Judges.
Before I conclude there are two objections in the nature of preliminary
objections which I have to deal with.
Mr. Chitty argued that no appeal lay in S. C. No. 9 of 1962 because (1) the
appellant was attacking the order of the Labour Tribunal
as having been made by
a tribunal which was not validly appointed, and (2) the petition of appeal did
not set out the questions
of law on which the order of the Labour Tribunal was
challenged. I do not think there is substance in either objection. With regard
to the first, the appellant was exercising a right of appeal on a question of
law which section 31D conferred upon him. The invalidity
of the appointment of
the Labour
89
Tribunal is such a question. It
is not the whole Act that is attacked as invalid, and 7this distinction makes
the Privy Council
decision from India, which Mr. Chitty cited, inapplicable.
With regard to the second, nowhere does section 31D require that the
petition of
appeal should state the question of law. Nor does the manner of drawing up a
petition of appeal come within the expression
" the hearing and disposal of an
appeal"; consequently section 340 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, Cap. 20,
which
requires a statement of the matter of law and a certificate, by an
advocate or proctor, does not apply to the form of a petition
of appeal filed
under section 3ID, Cap. 131.
The Solicitor-General referred us to the judgments in Re Toronto Railway Co. v.
City of Toronto[1(1919) 46 D. L. R. 547. ] and Parameswaran
v. State
Prosecutor[2A. I. R. (1951) Travancore 45.] and argued that the validity of the
appointment of the Labour Tribunals, Industrial
Courts and arbitrators in these
cases before us could only be challenged by applications for a writ of Quo
Warranto and in no other
way. In view of my earlier findings, this objection is
relevant now only to the attack on the appointment of the Labour Tribunals,
since I hold that the other tribunals do not require to be appointed by the
Judicial Service Commission because they are not the
holders of judicial office.
But even the objection to the attack on the appointment of the Labour Tribunals
must fail because,
as I have shown, a Labour Tribunal has other functions to
perform apart from those in Part IVA. It can act as an arbitrator, as
it did in
No. 319 of 1963. When so appointed to act it need not be appointed by the
Judicial Service Commission. In short, a Labour
Tribunal must be appointed by
that Commission only when it performs judicial function- under Part IVA. It need
not be appointed
by that Commission if it performs only arbitral functions.
There is thug no total lack of validity in the manner of its appointment,
such
as, on the two decisions cited, could only be shown by a writ of Quo Warranto to
which the Labour Tribunal would also be a
party.
A further answer to the Solicitor-General's argument is that this Court and the
Privy Council have previously entertained, in appeal,
objections to the validity
of the appointment of Bribery Tribunals. The practice in other countries may be
different.
To sum up my findings, I would allow the appeals in S.C. Nos. 9 and 18 to 23 of
1962 with costs. I would set down the applications
in S. C. Nos. 144 and 158 of
1964 and S. C. Nos. 319 of 1963 and 37 of 1965 for further argument, on the
point indicated by me,
before a Bench of two Judges.
90
H. N. G. FERNANDO, S.P.J.-
As a sequel to the recent decisions of this Court concerning the validity of
appointments to Bribery Tribunals and Quazi Courts,
there has been a number of
other cases in which the exercise of what is said to be judicial power by
officers or tribunals not
appointed by the Judicial Service Commission has been
challenged. These cases were reserved by order of His Lordship the Chief Justice
for consideration by a Bench of five Judges. After arguments commenced, however,
it was decided to hear only cases affecting tribunals
functioning under the
Industrial Disputes Act. It is to be hoped that the decision of this Bench of
those cases will enable Benches
constituted in the ordinary manner to dispose of
the other cases in which the same question arises for determination.
What has now to be decided is whether any of the different tribunals established
under the Industrial Disputes Act is or is not
a " judicial officer " within the
meaning of Section 55 of the Constitution, If any such tribunal is a " judicial
officer ", then in accordance with the decisions of this Court which were
affirmed by the Privy Council in Bribery Commissioner
v. Ranasinghe[1 (7964) 66
N. L. R. 73.], the tribunal must be held to have no jurisdiction on the ground
that the appointment to
the tribunal was not made by the Judicial Service
Commission.
It is helpful in the first instance to examine the provisions of the Industrial
Disputes Act as originally enacted in 1950, read
with amendments thereto enacted
prior to Act No. 62 of 1957. The purpose of the principal Act, as stated in its
long title, was
" to provide for the Prevention, Investigation and Settlement of
Industrial Disputes.". For this purpose, the Act recognises
" collective
agreements " between employers and workmen or trade unions and workmen as to the
terms and conditions of
employment, which agreements, obviously, tend to prevent
disputes ; it authorised the Commissioner of Labour to investigate existing
or
apprehended disputes and to endeavour to settle such disputes by conciliation ;
it provided for reference of such disputes for
settlement to arbitrators or to
the Industrial Court. The Minister had the power in Section 4 to make such a
reference, but Section
3 (1) shows that the Minister's power is one of last
resort exercisable only if conciliation fails, and if the parties themselves
do
not agree to reference to abritration. Settlement of a dispute by conciliation
is only possible if the parties agree to a settlement,
the terms of which have
to be set out in a memorandum of settlement. In the case of arbitration, whether
voluntary or compulsory,
or in the case of a reference to the Industrial Court,
the object in each case being settlement of the dispute, what follows is
an
award of the arbitrator or the Industrial Court.
Turning now to the effect of collective agreements, settlement by conciliation,
and awards of arbitrators or of the Industrial Court,
it is clear that the most
important purpose secured by such means is that the
91
terms and conditions of
employment are determined for the future-In each of these cases, the Act
provides (Sections 8, 14, 19 and
26) that the agreement, settlement, and award
will be binding on specified employers and workmen, and will be implied terms of
their contracts.
The arguments of counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, that the object
of the Act was to enable disputes to be settled
by means of what have been
described in the Australian Cases as " arbitral awards ", are borne out by a
consideration
of Section 33 which sets out (although not exhaustively) the
decisions which an award may contain. Subsection (1) (a) mentions the
most
important and most common decision, namely " as to wages and all other
conditions of service ". Manifestly, such
a decision will be operative for the
future. The decision may also provide that the specified wages or conditions
shall be payable
or applicable from a date earlier than the date of the award ;
this earlier date, in my opinion, cannot be earlier than the date
on which the
relevant dispute arose, since that is the limit set by Section 25 (2) for the
retrospective operation of an award.
In thus making new terms and conditions
effective retrospectively, an award clearly does not determine pre-existing
rights, and
has instead the character of a legislative or administrative act
creating rights and duties.
Much of the argument was based upon Section 33 (1) (6), which authorises
provision in an award for the re-instatement or dis-conticuance
of workmen. On
the one hand it was argued that, since a Court cannot order re-instatement, the
power to provide for re-instatement
in an award is of a legislative or
administrative character. For the appellants, it was argued that Section 33 (1)
(6) has altered
the Common Law in permitting provision for re-instatement to be
made in an award. In my opinion, there has been no such alteration
of the Common
Law : the appropriate mode of making such an alteration would be to declare that
specific performance may be granted
of contracts of employment. Section 33 (1)
(b) contains provision also for the discontinuance of workmen from service, i.e.
for
a prima facie arbitrary power to terminate a contract which neither employer
nor employee had voluntarily terminated. Considered
together, these powers to
provide for re-instatement and discontinuance can be explained only on the basis
that the Legislature
intended them to be used as a just and equitable means of
settling industrial disputes, but did not intend to confer rights capable
of
determination and enforcement by the Courts. If a contract of employment does
not provide for re-instatement, and if neither
the common law nor the statute
law confers a right of re instatement in specified circumstances the existence
or non-existence
of which are capable of being determined by a tribunal, then
there is no pre-existing right to re-instatement, and the decision
of the
tribunal upon the question of re-instatement lacks the essential characteristics
of a judicial determination. Instances
such as Section 2 of the Money Lending
Ordinance (and such instances are comparatively few), which empowers a Court to
re-write
a
92
contract considered to be harsh
and unconscionable, are in my opinion merely exceptions to the general principle
that the function
of the judicial office is the determination of pre-existing
rights. In such an exceptional instance, the power though in character
not
judicial, may nevertheless be regarded by the Courts as being judicial, on
application of the " historical criterion "
discussed by Dean Roscoe Pound :-
" We ask whether, at the time our Constitutions were adopted, the power in
question was exercisable by the Crown, by Parliament,
or the Judges."
The same question, if asked in respect of the power to order re-instatement and
thus to create a new contract of employment, cannot
receive the answer that the
power was exercisable by the Judges, since the power is itself the creation of a
new statute and was
not previously exercisable by any authority. Indeed, the
matter of discontinuance (which is linked with re instatement in Section
33 (1)
(6) of the Act) well illustrates how vitally such a decision lacks the character
of being "judicial". The power
to decide in favour of discontinuance would not
only be in conflict with the desire of both employer and workmen to maintain
their
contractual relationship. Far from ascertaining facts from the existence
of which pre-existing rights are determined, such a decision
abolishes
pre-existing contractual rights.
The other provisions of Section 33 are well suited to the concept of a
settlement. When new terms and conditions of employment are
set out in an
arbitral award, it is only reasonable that those terms and conditions can be
made applicable from the time when the
dispute arose, i.e. when the new terms
and conditions were formally demanded. So also, if a dispute is settled by an
award, it
may be appropriate that absence from work during a strike or lock-out
arising in the course of the dispute should be disregarded.
It is well to repeat at this stage that I have been considering the Industrial
Disputes Act without reference to the amendments
made by Act No. 62 of 1957 and
thereafter. In its unamended form, the Act did not in my opinion create a new
judicial power, in
providing that in the course of " settling " an industrial
dispute, the Industrial Court or an arbitrator may decide not
only upon new
terms and conditions of employment, but also on re-instatement. back wages and
similar matters.
The Amending Act No. 62 of 1957 made many changes in the principal Act. The most
important of these was the addition of a new Part
IVA providing for the
establishment of Labour Tribunals and for the special and primary purpose of
their establishment. That purpose
is to be ascertained from Section 31B,
although amendments in other parts of the Act secured in addition that Labour
Tribunals
may be utilised for the purpose of settlement by arbitration
previously contemplated in the principal Act.
93
Compared with the machinery and
the powers of settlement contained in the principal Act, the innovations
introduced in Part IVA
are significant:-
(1) Recourse may be had by a workman direct to the Tribunal as of right, whereas
recourse to the machinery of settlement can be
had only of consent, and through
the intervention of the Minister under Section 4 acting presumably in the public
interest and
in a " neutral " capacity.
(2) The application to the Tribunal is for relief or redress. According to the
Concise Oxford Dictionary the primary meaning of
" relief " is " alleviation of
or deliverance from pain, distress, anxiety ". But it is clear that in the
present
context the only Dictionary meaning which can reasonably attach to the
word is " redress of hardship or grievance". In
substance therefore the
application is for " redress ", which means " to remedy, get rid of, or rectify
some distress,
wrong, damage or grievance "; the noun " redress " means "
reparation for a wrong ".
If then the purpose of the application is to secure reparation for a wrong, and
whether the application relates to the termination
of services (paragraph (a) of
Section 31 (B)) or to gratuity or other benefits due (paragraph (6), what is
involved is the allegation
of a wrong suffered in the past in respect of the
subject-matter of the application. The investigation of such an allegation is
surely different from the process of settlement of industrial disputes by
arbitral awards, which are concerned not with reparation
for wrongs, but instead
with the determination of future terms and conditions.
(3) It is clear beyond doubt that the redress claimed in an application to a
Tribunal can be identical with that claimed by a workman
in a civil court, e.g.
damages for breach of contract, payment of a gratuity due under contract, etc.
As Mr. H. V. Pereira suggested,
the sole purpose of an application under Section
31B can well be to obtain a decision on a question of fact, e.g. whether a
workman
had been guilty of theft or incompetence and therefore rightly
dismissed, or whether a contract of employment expressly or impliedly
provides
for the payment of a gratuity on retirement. In application No. 9 of 1962,
wrongful and unlawful dismissal was alleged,
and a good part of the order of the
Tribunal is devoted to a discussion of the actual or implied terms of the
contract of employment;
some redress granted by the order is referable to a
finding as to the implied terms of the contract. In application No. 21 of 1962,
the order relates almost wholly to the question whether the workman was guilty
of insubordination and whether his contract was
terminated on that ground, and
the ultimate finding is that the workman was guilty of disobedience, but not
wilful disobedience.
Arbitral awards under the principal Act could not
ordinarily, and would only incidentally, provide for " redress " of
the nature
which might commonly be granted by a Labour Tribunal under the new Part IVA of
the Act.
94
(4) The term " industrial dispute
" is widely defined in Section 48, but Section 31B specifies as the subject
matter of
an application to a Labour Tribunal two precisely stated matters
having reference to existing or past facts. In Richard Pieris v.
Wijesiriwardene[1 (1960) 62 N. L. R. 233.] it was held that paragraph (b) of
Section 31B permitted an application only in respect
of a gratuity or other
benefit legally due to a workman. The Concise Oxford Dictionary states the
primary meaning of " due
" to be " Owing, payable as a debt or obligation".
Other meanings attach to the word only when used in special contexts
mentioned
in the Dictionary. I know of no statute in which reference to a thing due to or
from a person has been construed otherwise
than in the primary sense of the
word. It is fallacious to argue that the decision in the case just cited
involves the interpolation
of the word "legally" before the word "due". The word
" due" carries the intrinsic connotation of
something owing or payable as a debt
or obligation, that is, something owing or payable legally.
(5) A workman who makes an application under Section 31B is debarred by
sub-section (5) from claiming a legal remedy in a civil
court in respect of the
same matter; so too, an application under Section 31B cannot be made by a
workman who has already sought
another legal remedy. In regard to the process of
settlement by arbitration by an Industrial Court, there was and is no
corresponding
exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Courts in matters referred
for settlement under the principal Act. (This appears to be a significant
expression of the intention of the Legislature to commit for determination by
the Labour Tribunals matters which are within the
scope of the jurisdiction of
Civil Courts.) The absence from the original Act of provision similar to
sub-section (5) of Section
31B shows that the reference of a dispute for
settlement by arbitration would not, in the intention of the Legislature,
involve
the determination of matters in respect of which civil actions lie.
(6) Part IVA introduced into the Act the term "order", which was not previously
used in the Act in connection with the
machinery for the settlement of disputes,
and which indeed is inconsistent with the concept of "settlement". In cases
of
the nature which I mention at paragraph (3) above, "order" is perfectly
appropriate as an alternative for "decree",
having regard to the fact that there
is not available to a Labour Tribunal its own machinery for execution.
I have thus far examined features in the new part IVA of the Act which
distinguish the case of a workman's application to a Labour
Tribunal under
Section 31B from the modes of settlement of disputes originally prescribed in
the Act. It is perfectly clear that
a workman, who is aggrieved by what he
regards as wrongful termination of his employment or the wrongful failure of his
employer
to pay him a gratuity or other benefit legally due to him, is given by
Section 31B a right of recourse to a Labour Tribunal in lieu
of his existing
right of action in a
95
Civil Court. It is equally clear
that a Labour Tribunal can in such a case determine the facts and rights of the
parties in just
the same way as would a Court. While Section 31C (1) requires a
Tribunal to make a just and equitable order, it does not follow
that a
determination of a Tribunal will often be different from those of a Civil Court;
for a Tribunal may often consider it just
and equitable to make an order merely
giving effect to the contractual rights and obligations of the parties.
The argument that a Labour Tribunal does not exercise judicial power depended
heavily on the provision in Section 31C that a tribunal
shall make a " just and
equitable order ". I cannot agree that the criterion which distinguishes an
administrative tribunal
from a judicial tribunal is that the former makes just
and equitable orders, while the latter does not. The Courts surely administer
justice and equity, save that in so doing they adhere to standards of justice
and equity set by written or unwritten law.
Some instances were cited during the argument of statutory provisions requiring
established judicial tribunals to make orders consistent
with equity and good
conscience. But the best example has been brought to notice only after the
conclusion of the arguments. Ordinance
No. 10 of 1843 was our earliest statute
which provided for the establishment of Courts of Requests of Inferior Civil
Jurisdiction.
Section 5 of this Ordinance provided that these Courts shall be
Courts of Record, " and shall hear and determine in a summary
way, and according
to equity and good conscience, all actions, plaints and suits for the payment
and recovery of any debts, demands
or damages or matter not exceeding five
pounds in value ". Here then was a clear instance of a tribunal bound to act in
accordance
with equity and good conscience, but which was in all respects a
judicial tribunal. The provisions of the Ordinance show that in
determining
whether or not a particular tribunal is judicial, mere labels like "justice and
equity " and " good
conscience " are apt to mislead, and that it is necessary to
examine what precisely is the nature and scope of the powers conferred
on the
tribunal.
In the first place, I have already stated my opinion that an order of a Labour
Tribunal granting redress to which a workman is entitled
under the Common Law
governing his contract can be a just and equitable order. But what other orders
could lawfully be made by
a Tribunal ? Let me take for example a case where, in
terms of a contract, the employment of a workman paid a salary of Rs. 200
a
month is terminated upon his reaching the final retirement age and he is granted
the full retirement benefits for which the contract
provided. Can a Labour
Tribunal in such a case make order that some small extra payment or benefit must
be paid or provided ? Suppose
that on identical facts one Tribunal makes such an
order, while another does not, can it be said that both Tribunals have made just
and equitable orders ? Or if it must be said that one has acted rightly and the
other wrongly, then which tribunal was right and
which wrong ? The absurdities
which can arise on the basis that
96
a Tribunal can lawfully make
orders for some small ex gratia relief are the same in principle as the
absurdity of orders which might
require the employer of a workman to purchase a
residence with a swimming pool for the retired workman, or to entertain him
periodically
in the employer's home, or to provide employment to all his sons,
or to dower his daughters, or to pay him a capital sum of a million
rupees ex
gratia ? No counsel contended that Section 31C enabled a Tribunal to make such
orders, and it seems to me that such a
wide and absurd construction of Section
31C is precluded in two different ways by the Act itself.
Firstly, there are the terms of Section 31B which define the scope of a
application to a Labour Tribunal. Under paragraph (a), the
workman can raise the
question of the termination of his employment; and under paragraph (b) he can
raise the question whether
any gratuity or benefit is due to him. Consideration
of paragraph (c) does not arise because no additional matters of dispute have
been prescribed under the Act. When therefore, Section 31C requires a just and
equitable order to be made, it has in contemplation
an order which allows relief
or redress reasonably connected with the subject matter of the workman's
application. Section 31B
does not permit him to raise the question of dowries
for his daughters, and equally Section 31C does not contemplate that justice
and
equity require his employer to provide such dowries, or other benefits not
legally due to the workman. The scope of the relief
or redress required by
Section 31C to be granted in any case is in my opinion limited to the matters in
respect of which relief
or redress may be claimed under Section 31 B.
While it was conceded in some arguments for the respondents that a workman
cannot in an application under Section 31B ask for any
benefit not due under his
contract, it was nevertheless contended that in disposing of such an application
a Tribunal has power
to grant some benefit not sought by the applicant. With
respect, I know of no tribunal, judicial or administrative, which has such
power, nor can I see any sense in the intention thus imputed to the Legislature
that a workman who asks for a stone may instead
receive bread.
Secondly, there is Section 33 in which the Legislature has attempted to set down
the nature of the relief or redress which a Labour
Tribunal may grant in an
order made under Section 31C. Let me first take paragraph (b) of the Section 33
(1), which provides for
re-instatement or for discontinuance from service.
Clearly re-instatement is relief or redress of a character connected with an
application which raises the question of the termination of a workman's services
(cf. Section 31B (1) (a)). But although Section
33 (1) appears to contemplate
that such an order may provide for discontinuance from service, it is manifest
that an order under
Section 31C can never include such a provision. The
possibility of ordering discontinuance upon an application under Section 31B
can
never arise, because the application can only be made after termination of a
workman's service.
97
It will be seen that paragraph
(c) of Section 33 (1) is only incidental to paragraph (6). It provides only that
where re-instatement
is ordered, a period of absence from work shall be either
taken into account or else disregarded for certain purposes. In other
words,
paragraph (c) merely enables an order of reinstatement to be made fully
effective.
Paragraph (d) of Section 33 (1) is also connected with paragraph (6). This point
is expressly illustrated in Section 33, sub-sections
(3) and (4), which provide
for compensation as an alternative to re-instatement. Having regard to the
limitation in Section 31B
of the subject-matter of an application to a Labour
Tribunal, the " compensation " specified in Section 33 (1) (d) is
only
appropriate as a relief alternative to the relief of re-instatement.
Compensation means " amends or recompense for something
", and the subject
matter of an application under Section 31B cannot involve anything, other than
termination of employment,
which requires to be compensated.
Paragraph (e) of Section 33 (1) provides for an order for payment of a gratuity
or pension or bonus. Such an order can be made when
the question raised in an
application under Section 31B is " whether any gratuity or other benefit is due
" to a workman.
I have already stated my opinion that a workman may thus raise
only the question whether a gratuity or other benefit is legally
due, i.e. due
under his contract. Paragraph (a) of Section 33 (1) appears to empower a
Tribunal to make an order as to wages and
other conditions of service. Here
again, there is little connection between this apparent power and the
subject-matter of an application
under Section 31B, for wages and conditions are
not in terms of Section 31B, the subject of such an application. But where
re-instatement
is ordered, then paragraph (a) of Section 33 (1) will permit the
Tribunal also to make order as to the wages and conditions of service
to be
applicable on reinstatement. It will be seen therefore that in practice
paragraph (a) has a much more limited and incidental
scope than appears on its
face, in so far as it operates in cases of applications to Labour Tribunals
under Section 31 B.
To summarise the scope of Section 33 in cases of applications under Section 31B,
and reading the two Sections together :-
(1) A Tribunal may (Section 33 (1) (a)) order a gratuity, bonus or pension to a
retired employee if a gratuity, bonus or pension
is due.
(2) A Tribunal may order re-instatement of a workman whose employment has been
terminated.
(3) Where re-instatement is ordered, but not otherwise, a Tribunal may in
addition prescribe (Section 33 (1) (a)) the wages and
conditions of employment,
order that absence from work may be disregarded (Section (1) (c)), or order
payment of compensation in
lieu of re-instatement.
98
There is to my mind a simple
explanation for the appearance that the powers of a Labour Tribunal are wider
than I hold them to be.
Section 33 in its original form applied only to awards
made in the process of settlement of disputes, and it was undoubtedly intended
to state very widely in Section 33 the decisions which an award may contain.
When, however, the new Part IVA was introduced, there
was no separate statement
of the powers of a Labour Tribunal under that Part. Instead the draftsman
adopted the method of merely
adding, in the first lines of Section 33, the words
" or in any order of a labour tribunal ", without considering whether
each and
every power already specified in Section 33 could be exercised by a Tribunal
under Part IVA. Thus I have shown already
the absurdity of the apparent power of
a Tribunal to order discontinuance from service, when in fact the possibility of
discontinuance
can never arise upon an application under Section 31B. While this
method was perfectly appropriate to provide for awards which the
new Tribunals
may make when required to undertake the process of settlement of disputes, it
leaves room for misconception as to
the scope of the orders which a Labour
Tribunal may make upon an application under Section 31B. " Patchwork "
legislation
(such as was the Amending Act of 1962) not uncommonly gives occasion
for such misconceptions.
I have referred to the fact that in many cases the just and equitable order
which a Labour Tribunal may make can be precisely the
same order as a Civil
Court would make in an ordinary action for breach of contract. An order for the
payment of a gratuity, bonus
or pension would also be of the same character.
Hence it will be seen that the only new power conferred on a Tribunal is to
order
reinstatement and to make other orders ancillary to a re-instatement
order. Now if the Legislaturs had chosen to make a general
amendment of the law
relating to contract of employment by conferring on all employees a right to
re-instatement, it could not
reasonably have been argued that a Civil Court
which applies the new law in deciding an action would not be doing so in
exercise
of judicial powers. What the amending Act of 1962 did was to vest in
Labour Tribunals powers to make orders of precisely the same
character as a
Court may make in the same circumstances with the addition of a new power to
order re-instatement. In substance
the Act set up new Tribunals to administer
some part of the law relating to contracts of employment, while at the same time
amending
that law in order to permit such tribunals to grant reinstatement. But
even this new power is circumscribed ; sub-section 3 of Section
33 selects cases
in which orders for re-instatement must compulsorily include the alternative of
compensation, thus limiting the
apparently wide power conferred by the terms of
Section 31C.
99
Another pro vision upon which the
respondents depended was sub-section (4) of Section 31B :-
"Any relief or redress may be granted by a labour tribunal to a workman upon an
application made under subsection (1) notwithstanding
anything to the contrary
in any contract of service between him and his employer."
It was assumed on all sides during the argument that this subsection means that
the content of the relief or redress granted by
a tribunal may be something not
contemplated or something even prohibited by the contract of service between a
workman and his
employer; and that accordingly a tribunal, not being bound to
accept the rights and obligations created by contracts of service,
does not
merely determine preexisting rights.
It is unfortunate that a quite different construction of this sub-section
occurred to me only after conclusion of the hearing of
these cases, and that it
would be highly inconvenient (particularly when Election Petitions have been
fixed for trial), for the
Bench to re-assemble to hear further argument on this
point. But without benefit of argument, I venture with some confidence to
adopt
this different construction.
In my opinion, sub-section (4) of Section 31B was intended to overcome objection
to the jurisdiction of a Labour Tribunal which
might otherwise have been taken
on the ground that a contract of service precluded recourse to that
jurisdiction. Such an objection
would have been tenable in the case of a
contract which expressly provides for reference of disputes to arbitration or to
a Civil
Court, or which expressly excludes the jurisdiction of a Labour
Tribunal.
The powers of a Labour Tribunal, as opposed to its jurisdiction, are conferred
by Section 31C and Section 33 ; and if the provision
in subsection (4) of
Section 31B was intended to reinforce those powers, one would expect the
reinforcing provision to be placed
together with or after Sections 31C and 33.
Instead this provision in fact occurs in Section 31B which deals with
applications
to a Tribunal and their entertainment by the Tribunal. What
immediately follows subsection (4) of Section 31B is subsection (5)
which itself
quite clearly deals with a question of jurisdiction.
I have previously stated what is in effect the opinion that Section 31C, in
requiring " just and equitable " orders to
be made by Labour Tribunals, does not
allow to such a Tribunal the freedom of the wild ass in making its orders, and
that the scope
of a " just and equitable order " is limited by the nature of the
matters which may be submitted to a Tribunal in an application
under Secton 31B,
and by the provisions in Section 33 as to the
100
content of orders of such
Tribunals. Section 31B (4), if given the meaning which was assumed for it during
the argument, would lend
support to the contention that the Legislature did
intend to vest Labour Tribunals with unbridled, unreasonable and unnecessary
powers. I much prefer, in the context, to attribute to the Legislature the
moderate and reasonable intention which appears from
the interpretation which I
place on Section 31B (4).
I hold that a Labour Tribunal, hearing and determining an application under
Section 31B, exercises judicial power, and is therefore
a judicial tribunal. A
Labour Tribunal is admittedly a paid office. Nevertheless, the learned
Solicitor-General argued that the
person appointed to a Labour Tribunal, even if
he does exercise judicial power, is not a " judicial officer " within the
meaning of Section 55 of the Constitution. The argument was, briefly, that
Section 55 only entrenched the jurisdiction of the Courts
in existence at the
time of the enactment of the Constitution, and required that appointments to
those Courts should be governed
by Section 55. That argument was rejected by the
Judicial Committee in Bribery Commissioner v. Ranasinghe[1(1964) 66 N.L. R.
73.].
The effect of that decision is (in my understanding) that if any
jurisdiction hitherto vested in any Court, is to be vested in some
new tribunal
which is a paid office established for the purpose of exercising that
jurisdiction, then appointments to that office
will be governed by Section 55.
For the reasons set out at length above, I am of opinion that a Labour Tribunal
is by Part IVA
of the Industrial Disputes Act established for the purpose of
exercising a jurisdiction concurrently vested in the District Courts
and Courts
of Requests. The fact that a Labour Tribunal has in the exercise of that
jurisdiction power to grant the new remedy
of re-instatement, and other
ancillary or alternative remedies, makes no difference of substance. If for
instance, the Bribery
Act, in its form as considered by the Judicial Committee,
had contained some special provision for a Bribery Tribunal to make some
order
imposing some new civil liability, in addition to fine and imprisonment, on a
person convicted of bribery, their Lordships
would surely not have held on that
score that members of Bribery Tribunals are not " judicial officers ".
In one of the applications before us, a Labour Tribunal established under Part
IVA of the Act functioned as arbitrator by virtue
of a reference made by the
Minister under Section 4 of the Act. Since the Minister has the power to refer a
dispute to any person
for arbitration, it does not appear to me that any
irregularity in the appointment of the member of that Labour Tribunal can affect
the validity of that reference.
In two of the applications, reference to arbitration had been made to Industrial
Courts. As stated in earlier parts of this judgement,
Industrial Courts were
established for the purpose of making " arbitral awards " within the meaning of
that expression
in decisions of the Australian Courts. An Industrial Court is
therefore not a " judicial office ".
101
In the case of one of the
applications, a dispute had been referred to the arbitration of a selected
individual. Even though the
individual was paid by the state for his services in
that connection, he held no office and was not a " judicial officer ".
The four applications to which I have just referred fail on the ground that the
functions of arbitration were in each case exercised
by a person or body not
being the holder of a " paid judicial office ". Nevertheless, I feel bound to
direct attention
to the fact that, in all these cases, the terms of reference to
arbitration did not involve matters which properly call for the
making of "
arbitral awards " in the sense understood in the Australian Cases. On the
contrary, each of those cases involves
a question whether a termination of a
contract of service had been wrongful, and was therefore not different in
character from
the case of an application made to a Labour Tribunal under
Section 31B of the Act. For that reason, each such case called for the
exercise
of judicial power in the same way (as I hold) as a Labour Tribunal exercises
judicial power under an application under
Section 31B, and was also one in which
an ordinary civil court would have had jurisdiction. Each of these cases called
for the
determination of contested questions of fact as to the conduct of
workmen or employers or as to the terms and conditions of pre-existing
contracts
of service. In my view, the framers of our Constitution expected that
determinations of that nature should ordinarily
be made by Judges of Courts,
whose appointments should be made under Section 55 of the Constitution. That
expectation has not been
fully realized in the brief terms of Section 55. But it
is at least discordant with the spirit of Section 55 that a considerable
number
of disputes between employers and employees, ordinarily justiciable by the
established Courts, should be regularly determined
by tribunals which are not
appointed under that section. The Solicitor-General argued that the purpose of
Section 55 was only to
secure that the choice of persons to be appointed as
Judges should be made by a Commission the members of which have special
knowledge
of the ability and capacity of persons competent to function as
Judges. Accepting that argument for present purposes, I see in these
four cases
a practice whereby persons chosen by some other authority have functioned as
substitutes for Judges of ordinary Courts.
Section 55 of the Constitution, as I have indicated, failed to preclude the
possibility of the entrustment of judicial power to
some authority bona fide
established for administrative purposes. If administrative officials, the
majority of whose powers and
functions are administrative, are in addition
entrusted on grounds of expediency with judicial power, there would not in my
opinion
be conflict with Section 55. But if, under cover of expediency, judicial
powers are vested in an office administrative only in name,
then the principle
that you cannot do indirectly that which you cannot do directly will apply. That
principle will also apply if
there is frequent entrustment of judicial power to
unpaid functionaries. I do not hold that the practice of entrusting to
102
Industrial Courts and to
arbitrators the power to adjudicate in cases of termination of an individual's
employment and upon rights
alleged to arise on such termination calls for the
application of that principle. But the question whether that practice should
continue merits consideration by the authorities responsible for the
administration of the Act. Experience certainly has not shown
that cases of that
kind, which so closely resemble or are even identical with cases instituted in
the ordinary courts, have been
dealt with more expeditiously by Industrial
Courts, arbitrators and Labour Tribunals.
I would allow with costs the appeals in Cases Nos. S. C. 18 to 23 of 1962 and
No. 9 of 1962, and set aside the orders of the Labour
Tribunals in those cases.
I hold that in applications Nos. S. C. 319/63, 144/64, 158/64 and 37/65, the
Court or Arbitrator had in each such case jurisdiction
to entertain the
reference. The applications will be set down for further hearing upon other
matters raised by the Petitioners.
T. S. FERNANDO, J.-
I have had the advantage of reading the judgment prepared by my Lord, the
Chief Justice. I agree with the views expressed therein
and agree also to the
making of the orders proposed by him.
TAMBIAH, J.-
These six cases were referred by my Lord, the Chief Justice, under section
51 of the Courts Ordinance to a Bench of five Judges.
Although several points
have been raised in the petitions of appeal, the question which was referred for
the determination of this
court is whether the tribunals which heard these cases
were exercising judicial power, and if so, whether the persons who presided
over
these tribunals were validly appointed. The contention of the appellant in these
cases is that these tribunals exercised judicial
power and therefore should have
been appointed by the Judicial Service Commission. In S.C. 144 of 1962 and S.C.
158 of 1964 the
tribunals concerned are Industrial Courts to which the disputes
were referred to by the Minister under section 4 (2) of the Act;
in S.C. 9 of
1962 and S.C. 18-23 of 1962 the tribunals concerned are Labour Tribunals; in
S.C. 319 of 1963 the tribunal is an arbitrator
to whom the dispute was referred
by the Minister of Labour and Nationalised Services under section 4 (1) of the
Act and in S.C.
37 of 1965 the tribunal is an arbitrator to whom the dispute had
been referred to by the Commissioner of Labour under section 3
(1) (d) of the
Act.
103
These cases were argued on the
footing that if this court holds that the tribunals referred to were not validly
appointed, then
the orders should be quashed. But should it hold otherwise the
cases should be remitted to be heard by a Bench consisting of two
judges in
order to hear and determine the other points raised in the petitions of appeal
filed in these cases.
I have read through the judgment of my Lord, the Chief Justice, and I regret
that I am unable to agree with the orders made by him
in these cases and
therefore it has become necessary to express my dissenting views.
I shall first deal with the appeals in S.C. 9 of 1962 and S.C. 18-23 of 1962
where the tribunals concerned are the Labour Tribunals.
In the Ceylon Transport
Board Ltd. v. Samasfha Lanka Motor Sevaka Samithiya[1 (1963) 65 N. L. R 185.]my
brother Sri Skanda Rajah
J. has already dealt with this matter and held that the
Labour Tribunal need [not be appointed by the Judicial Service Commission.
The point of law raised in these cases is not free from difficulty and requires
careful consideration. This court had the benefit
of hearing a full argument in
these cases and I thank all counsel for the able arguments presented by them and
the help rendered
to this court.
The question raised before us is whether the persons who presided over- the
Labour Tribunals in these cases should have been appointed
by the Judicial
Service Commission. The answer to this question will depend on the precise
meaning which has to be given to the
words " judicial officer" in section 55 of
the Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council (Cap. 379 as amended and adopted
by
the Ceylon Independence Act of 1947, which will hereinafter be referred to as
the " Constitution ").
Section 53 of the Constitution constitutes the Judicial Service Commission and
confers on this body the powers of appointment, transfer,
dismissal and
disciplinary control of the judicial officers.
It has been strenuously contended by counsel for the appellants in these two
cases that the Labour Tribunal exercises judicial power
of the State and
therefore the person who fills in this office has to be a judicial officer
within the meaning of section 55 (1)
of the Constitution. The term " judicial
officer " is nowhere defined but section 3 of the Constitution defines "
judicial office " as any " paid judicial office ". Therefore the short point to
be decided is as to what is meant
by " judicial office " in section 55 of the
Constitution.
In order to place the correct construction on the words " judicial officer " it
is necessary to set out briefly the legal
system and the constitution of the
courts in Ceylon prior to the attainment of Dominion.
104
Status in 1947. During the
earlier period there were in existence a number of courts such as the Supreme
Court, District Courts,
the Courts of Requests, the Magistrates' Courts and the
Rural Courts which administered civil and criminal justice in Ceylon. These
courts administered the law of this country and determined the rights of
parties, whether the dispute was between subject and subject,
or the State and
the subject and granted the remedies provided by law. There also existed at the
time the Constitution came into
force, and still exist, a number of officers and
persons who preside over tribunals, who in addition to their executive and
administrative
functions also perform the strict functions of a court within a
limited scope. Thus, the Divisional Registrar under the Kandyan
Marriage and
Divorce Act (Cap. 113), apart from his other multifarious duties, also sits as a
judge in contested divorce proceedings
between Kandyans whose marriages have
been registered under the Kandyan Marriage and Divorce Act (vide section 32 of
Cap. 113 for
grounds of divorce).
The Workmen's Compensation Ordinance (Cap. 139) provides for tribunals which are
empowered to grant compensation to a workman who
receives injuries in the course
of his employment, or if he is dead, to give relief to his dependants. The
Registrar of Trade Marks,
apart from his administrative functions, also performs
judicial functions when he acts under section 19 of the Trade Marks Ordinance
(Cap. 150). Special officers could also constitute a Court Martial to try
offences committed by persons who are governed by the
military or naval law.
These officers have the power to inflict punishment on those who have been found
guilty by sentencing them
to a term of imprisonment or by giving other forms of
punishment. A tribunal consisting of the District Judge and two visitors also
have jurisdiction to try prisoners who commit offences against prison discipline
and inflict punishment on them (vide section 81
of Cap. 54 and sections 42 and
43 of Cap. 357). The Rent Restriction Tribunal and the Board of Appeal exercise
judicial functions
(vide Cap 274). It is not necessary to set out all the
tribunals, which apart from other functions, administered justice in Ceylon
at
the time Ceylon attained Dominion Status.
Before Ceylon attained independence, a Royal Commission, referred to as the
Soulbury Commission, was sent to Ceylon to advise His
Majesty on the type of
constitution that Ceylon should get. There was the Ministers' Draft which served
as a guide to the Soulbury
Commissioners. The Commission heard evidence and made
its recommendations to His Majesty. The recommendations they made were intended
to preserve the independence of the Supreme Court and to prevent political
interference of the minor judiciary consisting of the
District Judges,
Magistrates, Commiflsioners of Requests and the Presidents of Rural Courts. They
suggested that these minor judges
should be appointed by the Judicial Servict.
Commission consisting of two judges of the Supreme Court and a retired judge or
three
judges of the Supreme Court. In order
105
to preserve the independence of
the Supreme Court they recommended that the Judges of this court could only be
removed from office
for misconduct by the Governor-General after a resolution in
both Houses of Parliament and that their salaries should not be diminished
during their tenure of office.
The Order in Council of 1946 was enacted giving effect to these recommendations
and provisions were made that persons who hold judicial
office should be
appointed by the Judicial Service Commission. Any interference with this body
was made a penal offence.
The learned Solicitor-General who appeared as amicus curiae, Mr. Chitty and Mr.
Satyendra submitted that the term " judicial
office " in this context means the
office held by judges of the courts of law that were in existence at the time
the Constitution
came into force, or the offices which may be held by those who
preside or hear cases in analogous courts or courts performing similar
functions. After a careful consideration of the arguments presented by counsel I
am inclined to accept the contention put forward
by Mr. Satyendra and the
learned Solicitor-General.
Much reliance was placed by Counsel for the appellant on the case of the Bribery
Commissioner v. Ranasinghe[1 (1964) 66 N. L. R.
74.]in which it was held that
the Bribery Tribunal exercised purely judicial functions and therefore the
person who presided over
it should have been appointed by the Judicial Service
Commission. It was held that since he was appointed only by the Public Service
Commission he had no power to make an order sentencing a person accused of
bribery to a term of imprisonment. It was urged that
the ratio decidendi in that
case applies to these cases. It was also contended by Mr. Jayewardene that
judicial power of the State
is vested in the Supreme Court and the Judges
appointed by the Judicial Service Commission and the exercise of this power by
any
other person or body would be illegal. In this case although it is
sufficient to decide the question whether a Labour Tribunal is
a judicial office
within the meaning of the Constitution, in view of the submissions made, I shall
express my opinion on the question
whether the judicial power of the State is
vested in the Judges of the Supreme Court and the Judges appointed by the
Judicial Service
Commission.
In the case of the Bribery Commissioner v. Ranasinghe (supra) Their Lordships of
the Privy Council did not express the view that
the judicial power of the State
is vested in the Supreme Court and the Judges appointed by the Judicial Service
Commission. In
that case they were dealing with a statute which created a
special tribunal and vested it with powers of a court in hearing cases
of
bribery after depriving the courts of the jurisdiction to try this offence.
There was a clear usurpation of the jurisdiction
of the courts by the Bribery
Tribunal which performed the
106
same functions as a court. Since
the person who constituted the tribunal was not appointed by the Judicial
Service Commission, it
was held that if such a course was allowed there will be
an erosion of the jurisdiction of the courts, and the Legislature, without
amending the constitution, can create a number of such tribunals and take away
the jurisdiction of the courts conferred by the
Constitution. The effect of the
legislation creating the Bribery Tribunals is in pith and substance an attempt
to create a rival
court (vide Toronto Corporation v. York Corporation[1 (1938)
A. C. 415. ]). In dealing with the Bribery Tribunal I have expressed
a similar
view in Piyadasa v. The, Bribery Commissioner[(1962) 64 N. L. R 385. ]. The two
cases which we are dealing with presently
are clearly distinguishable.
The constitutional law of Ceylon is found not merely in Ceylon (Constitution)
Order in Council and the Ceylon Independence Act of
1947 but has to be gathered
from the various instruments and statutes. The Courts Ordinance provides for the
constitution of courts.
For the determination of the meaning of the term "
judicial officer " the pertinent question may be posed : what did the
framers of
the Constitution intend by the use of the words " judicial officer "?
In the construction of doubtful provisions of the Constitution, the historical
test has been adopted. Dean Pound said : (cited in
Queen v. Liyanage and
others[(1962) 64 N.L. R at 356.]) " In doubtful cases, however, we employ a
historical criterion. We
ask whether, at the time our Constitutions were
adopted, the power in question was exercised by the Crown, by Parliament, or by
the Judges. " The historical test has been applied in Ceylon in construing the
Constitution (vide dictum of T. S. Fernando
J. in Queen v. Liyanage and others
(supra) at pp. 357, 358, where this test has been applied in Ceylon ; vide also
The Queen v.
Davison [ (1954) 90 Commonwealth Law Reports at 382.].
Where the words are not clear it is permissible to look at the objects and
reasons of the framers of the constitution (vide Maxwell's
Interpretation of
Statutes, 9th Edn. p. 22). In order to ensure that the minor judiciary should be
free from political influence
the Soulbury Commissioners recommended that
District Judges, Commissioners of Requests, Magistrates and Presidents of Rural
Courts
should be appointed by the Judicial Service Commission, an independent
body which is not amenable to political interference (vide
para 358 of the
Soulbury Commissioners Report, CMd. 6677). Mr. Ranganathan contended that
although the Soulbury Commissioners specifically
referred to the Judges who
functioned in the District Courts, Courts of Requests, Magistrate's Courts and
the Rural Courts as persons
who should be appointed by the Judicial Service
Commission, yet in the Constitution it is provided that a person who holds a
paid
judicial office should be appointed by the Judicial Service Commission.
Therefore he urged that any person who performs any judicial
function either
solely or in addition to his executive functions
107
should be appointed by the
Judicial Service Commission. It appears to me that this process of reasoning is
a non sequitur and does
not help the court in determining the meaning of the
words "judicial officer ". Further if this line of reasoning is adopted
the
whole structure of the administrative and judicial system of Ceylon will be in a
state of chaos and many provisions of statutes
will become inoperative. A Court
in considering a statute should construe it in such a way that its provisions
are not repugnant
to other statutes.
In my view the term " paid judicial office " in section 55 of the Constitution
does not apply to the post held by the
Divisional Registrar under the Kandyan
Marriage and Divorce Act who, in addition to his duties as Government Agent,
hears and decides
contested cases of divorce between Kandyans, the office of the
persons who preside over tribunals constituted under the Workmen's
Compensation
Act, the Rent Restriction Act, the Registrar of Patents and Trade Marks and even
jurors who strictly perform purely
judicial functions. If the contention of the
appellants is to be accepted, all these persons should be appointed by the
Judicial
Service Commission. The learned Solicitor-General submitted that if the
term " judicial officer " is given the construction
given by the counsel for the
appellants, then the Court of Criminal Appeal is wrongly constituted, since its
members are not appointed
by the Judicial Service Commission. He further
submitted that should there be a higher court established by the Legislature to
review the orders of the Supreme Court, then the members of such court should be
appointed by the Judicial Service Commission. Such
a result appears to be
untenable.
The term " judicial officer" had a specific connotation which was well
understood at the time the constitution came into
force although no definition
could be found in any of the statutes of Ceylon at the time the constitution
came into force. In the
Courts Ordinance a Commissioner of Assize is referred to
as a " judicial officer " (vide section 22 of the Courts Ordinance,
Cap. 6). The
Oaths Ordinance (No. 7 of 1869) requires judicial officers to take oaths. The
Municipal Councils Ordinance (Cap. 252)
enacts that a Municipal Magistrate
should take a judicial oath. A judicial oath was taken by all the judges who
presided over courts.
All other officers who perform executive functions but
occasionally performed judicial functions, such as the officers mentioned
earlier, were not required to take judicial oaths but only the oath of
allegiance.
Applying the historical test it is clear that the framers of the Constitution
meant by the term " judicial office " the
post held by a District Judge,
Commissioner of Requests, Magistrate, President of a Rural Court and other
officer performing similar
functions.
108
The Labour Tribunal does not have
the same functions as a court. It cannot be said that it is deciding a lis
between parties. The
reasoning laid down in the decision of the Privy Council in
the case of Labour Relations Board of Saskatchewan v. John East Iron
Works
Ltd.[1 (1949) A. I. R. (P. C.) 129.] is equally applicable to the two appeals
under consideration. In that case the question
decided was whether a Provincial
Act in Canada constituting a labour tribunal, whose members were to be appointed
by the Governor-General,
was ultra vires the Canadian Constitution which came
into existence by the British North America Act of 1867. Under section 96 of
that Act the Judges of the " superior, district and county Courts " were to be
appointed by the Governor-General of the
Dominion. Their Lordships of the Privy
Council, after examining the provisions of that Statute creating the Labour
Relations Board,
held that the Board is not a tribunal analogous to the Courts
envisaged by section 96 of the Act. In the view they took it was found
unnecessary to decide the question whether judicial power was vested in the
courts and tribunals envisaged by section 96 of that
Act.
After stating that the border line in which the judicial and administrative
functions overlap is a wide one and the boundary is
more difficult to define in
the case of a body such as the Labour Relations Board, Lord Simonds said : (vide
1949 A. I. R. P. C.
at 133).
"It is a truism that the conception of the judicial function is inseparably
bound up with the idea of a suit between parties,
whether between Crown and
subject or between subject and subject, and that it is the duty of the Court to
decide the issue between
those parties, with whom alone it rests to initiate or
defend or compromise the proceedings. Here at once a striking departure from
the
traditional conception of a Court may be seen in the functions of the appellant
Board, for, as the Act contemplates and the
Rules made under it prescribe, any
trade union, any employer, any employers' association or any other person
directly concerned
may apply to the Board for any order to be made (a) requiring
any person to refrain from the violation of the Act or from engaging
in an
unfair labour practice, (6) requiring an employer to reinstate an employee
discharged contrary to the provisions of the Act
and to pay such employee the
monetary loss suffered by reason of such discharge, (c) requiring an employer to
disestablish a company
dominated organisation or (d) requiring two or more of
the said things to be done. Other rules provide for the discharge by the
Board
of other functions. It is sufficient to refer only to (6) supra, which clearly
illustrates that, while the order relates
solely to the relief to be given to an
individual, yet the controversy may be raised by others without his assent and,
it may be,
against his will, for the solution of some far-reaching industrial
conflict. It may be possible to describe
109
an issue thus raised as a lit,
and to regard its determination as the exercise of judicial power. But it
appears to their Lordships
that such an issue is indeed remote from those which
at the time of confederation occupied the superior or district or county Courts
of Upper Canada. "
Some of these functional differences exist between a Court in Cerlon and the
Labour Tribunal. Counsel for the appellant referred
to some similarities between
the Labour Tribunal and a Court of law. The mere fact that a tribunal has some
of the trappings of
a Court of Law does not make it a court vested with judicial
power. As Lord Sankey said in Shell Company of Australia v. Federal
Commissioner
of Taxation[1 47 The Times Law Reports 115 at 117.], a tribunal may have all the
trappings of a court and still may
not exercise judicial power. A careful
perusal of the relevant provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act shows that the
Labour
Tribunal functions differently from a court.
The qualifications necessary to function as an officer presiding over an
Industrial Court are of a special nature. Such an officer
must be acquainted
with labour practices. Industrial disputes can spark off a general strike and it
is the clear function of a
Labour Tribunal, Industrial Court or arbitrator,
appointed under this Act, to settle the disputes in a just and equitable manner
and bring about industrial peace. But a court is vested with powers of
adjudication of existing rights and granting reliefs provided
by law. Judges
should have different qualifications. They are appointed by the Judicial Service
Commission, the members of which
are competent to select suitable persons from
the Bar who are learned in the Law and acquainted with the practice in Courts.
The provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act (Cap. 131) dealing with the
constitution and powers of the Labour Tribunal may be
examined with a view to
finding out whether the Tribunal is performing the functions of a court. The
Industrial Disputes Act was
enacted to preserve industrial peace. The preamble
to the Act reads as follows : " An Act to provide for the prevention,
investigation
and settlement of industrial disputes and for matters connected
therewith or incidental thereto.'' The provisions governing Labour
Tribunals
came into existence by the amending Act No. 62 of 1957. It was not seriously
disputed that before the amending Act of
1957 came into existence the provisions
of the Industrial Disputes Act, as enacted in 1951, contained provisions for the
objects
set out in the preamble to the Act. But it was contended that the
amendment of 1957 brought into existence a tribunal in the nature
of a court of
law, and that the preamble to the original Act did not apply to the provisions
of the amending Act. If the intention
of the legislature was to make a radical
change in the structure of our courts there is no reason why the preamble to the
original
Act was not altered when the amending Act was passed or the Courts
Ordinance amended But the preamble remained the same and it is
a clear rule of
construction that
110
the preamble to an Act applies
not only to the original Act but also to all amendments. " The preamble of the
Statute ",
says Coke, in 1 Inst. 79a, "is a good means to find out the meaning
of the statute, and as it were a key to open the understanding
thereof ". (vide
Craies on Statute Law, 5th Edn., by Sir Charles E. Odgers, p. 186). I am of the
view that the preamble governs
as much the provisions of the original Act as the
provisions contained in the amending Act of 1957 which brought into existence
the Industrial Tribunals and is a guide to enable this court to find out the
objects and purposes for which the amending Act was
enacted.
The scheme of the Act shows that it was the intention of the legislature to
bring about industrial peace by the settlement of industrial
disputes by means
of collective agreements (vide sections 5 to 10), settlements by conciliation
(sections 11 to 15), settlement
by arbitration (sections 16 to 21), by awards by
Industrial Courts and Labour Tribunals and by decisions of an arbitral nature by
the Labour Tribunals (sections 22 to 30). There is also provision for industrial
courts to make arbitral orders which are "
just and equitable " in order to
prevent strikes, lockouts etc., and to ensure industrial peace between employer
and employee.
Under section 4 of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Minister may, if he is of
opinion that the industrial dispute concerned is a
minor one, refer it by an
order in writing for settlement by arbitration by an arbitrator appointed by the
Minister or to a Labour
Tribunal, notwithstanding that the parties to such
dispute do not consent to such reference. The creation of Labour Tribunals with
the power to make orders of an arbitral nature is for the same purpose.
Section 31 (A) enables the Minister to appoint a number of Labour Tribunals as
he may determine and each Labour Tribunal is to consist
of one person. The
Minister is also empowered to make regulations for prescribing the manner in
which applications under section
31 (B) may be made to the Labour Tribunal.
Section 31(B) sets out the matters in respect of which relief or redress may be
obtained
by a workman or by a trade union on behalf of the workman who is a
member of the trade union. The matters set out are-
" (a) the termination of his services by his employer ;
(b) the question whether any gratuity or other benefits are due to him from his
employer on termination of his services and the
amount of such gratuity and the
nature and extent of any such benefits ;
(c) such other matters relating to the terms of employment or the conditions of
labour of the workman as may be prescribed ".
111
It was conceded at the argument
that the provisions of section 31B (a) applies both to a legal as well as an
illegal termination
of services of an employee by his employer. Such a view has
been taken by this Court (vide Shell Company of Ceylon Ltd. v. Pathirana[1
(1962) 64 N. L. R 71]). In granting relief or redress under section 31B (1) (a)
the Tribunal can make an order reinstating or discontinuing
the services of any
workman whose dismissal or continuance in employment is the matter in dispute.
Thus, although the termination
may be lawful, yet the Tribunal is empowered to
order a reinstatement and such an order will take effect from the date of
dispute.
Thus a new contract is brought about by the order of the Tribunal from
that date. When a Tribunal makes an order of this kind there
is no question that
it gives relief by creating new rights between parties. Could it be said that
the Tribunal, as a court of law
does, only declares and adjudicates on the
existing rights of parties and grants relief or redress for the infringement of
such
rights ?
Another matter in respect of which the Tribunal is given power to inquire into
and give relief or redress is when there is a question
whether any gratuity or
other benefit is due to the workman from the employer on the termination of his
services. In such cases
the Tribunal is given the power to fix the amount of
such gratuity and set out the nature and extent of such benefits. In two
judgments
of this court the view had been taken that the word " due " in section
31B must be interpreted as legally due, and therefore
a tribunal cannot grant
anything more than what a court of law could do when giving relief to a workman
(vide Richard Peiris &
Co. Ltd. v. Wijesiriwardena [2(1960) 62 N. L. R 233. ] ;
Electric Equipment and Construction Co. and Cooray[. 3(1961) 63 N. L. R
164.]).
With respect I am unable to agree with this restrictive construction. As Mr.
Satyendra contended, nowhere in section 31B
(1) is it stated that this tribunal
is empowered to consider what amount is legally due by way of gratuity or
benefits. Section
31B (1) sets out the matters in which the Tribunal has the
power to act. The section empowering the Tribunal to make an order is
set out in
section 31C (1) which enacts as follows :
" Where an application under section 31B is made to a Labour Tribunal, it shall
be the duty of the tribunal to make all such
inquiries into that application and
hear all such evidence as the tribunal may consider necessary, and thereafter
make such order
as may appear to the tribunal to be just and equitable. "
No doubt in making an order which is just and equitable, as is stated in an
earlier case, a Tribunal cannot mis-state the law of
the Courts and completely
ignore the provisions of the contract (vide Hayleys Ltd. v. E. W. Crossette
Thambiah [4 (1961) 63 N.
L. R. 248.]).
112
It seems to me that a Tribunal in
making an order which is just and equitable is not fettered by the terms of the
contract and therefore
is not bound by the strict letter of the law of
contracts. Industrial peace cannot be secured if another court is created merely
to enforce legal rights. The employer, being in a position to dictate terms of
employment to the workman, could always provide
terms in the contract in such a
way that no gratuity or other benefits would be payable to the workman or he may
contract that
such benefits should be paid on a niggardly basis.
Fears have been expressed that in view of the wide powers given to a Labour
Tribunal, the person appointed by the Public Service
Commission who officiates
as President of the Labour Tribunal can order an arbitrary sum to be paid to the
workman according to
his whim and fancy and will not observe the rule of law.
These fears are unjustified in view of the fact that any order that he
has to
make has to be just and equitable. An arbitrary order cannot be just and
equitable. No order which penalises an employer
by ordering him to give a penal
sum is just and equitable. If such an order is made, there is a right of appeal
to the Supreme
Court on a point of law. The employer could contend that an
arbitrary order made according to one's whim and fancy is not a just
and
equitable order within the meaning of section 31C of the Industrial Disputes
Act. This contention would apply equally to a
President of a Labour Tribunal who
is appointed by the Judicial Service Commission. Both the Public Service
Commission and the
Judicial Service Commission are independent bodies and it
cannot be said that an officer appointed by the Judicial Service Commission
will
act with greater restraint than an officer appointed by the Public Service
Commission. Both these bodies were designed to
be free from political control or
influence.
Legislation which is intra vires is good although it may have ill effects (vide
1945 A.C. 14 at 27 and 28). It is an accepted rule
of construction that nothing
should be read into a statute on the ground that there could be an abuse of the
provisions of a statute
(vide 1943 A.I.R. 30 Fed. 36 at 57; Legislative,
Executive and Judicial Powers in Australia by W. A. Wynes 2nd Edn. at page 16).
It may be contended that section 31B (4) was enacted to ensure a Labour Tribunal
to make an order which is just and equitable despite
the terms of the contract
between parties that the dispute should not be taken before the Labour Tribunal.
Counsel who appeared
in these two cases and the other cases referred to, did not
venture to put forward such a construction. If that was the intention
of the
Legislature, then the wording of section 31B (4) would have been different. It
should have been as follows :
" Any relief or redress may be granted by a Labour Tribunal to a workman upon an
application made under subsection 31B (1)
notwithstanding anything in the
agreement to the contrary between the employee and the employer. "
113
The words " relief" and " redress
" in section 31B (4) are also significant. Redress is a word that is used with
reference to grievance. A grievance arises when something legally due is not
given. The word relief clearly indicates cases where
a person is not enforcing a
legal right. Relief may be given to a workman although the employer has adhered
to the terms of the
contract and has fulfilled his legal obligation.
The scope and ambit of the powers of the Labour Tribunal become clear when one
examines section 33 of the Act. Section 33 sets out
the contents of the relief
or remedy which could be granted by a Labour Tribunal. Under section 33 (1) (a)
the order of a tribunal
may contain decisions as to wages and all other
conditions of service, including decisions that any such wages and conditions
shall
be payable or applicable with effect from any specified date, which may,
where necessary, be a date prior to the date of such award
or such order and
decisions that wages shall be payable in respect of any period of absence by
reason of any strike or lockout.
Under this provision the Tribunal can order
wages, although an employee's services have been legally terminated, and it
could also
order his reinstatement. As stated earlier, in making such an order
the Tribunal creates new rights and is not determining or enforcing
existing
rights.
A company may retrench some of its employees after lawfully terminating their
services. But if in all the circumstances of the case
it is just and equitable
to give compensation to such employees, a Tribunal is not precluded from
granting such relief. If the
Tribunal follows such a course it creates new
rights which did not exist under the law because when there is an unlawful
strike
the strict legal position is the employer is not bound to pay any wages
to the employees.
Under section 33 (1) (6) the Tribunal could order reinstatement of a workman who
has been dismissed either legally or illegally.
If the dismissal was legal still
the Tribunal may find that it is just and equitable that a workman should be
reinstated as from
a date anterior to the date of the dismissal. Here again, as
stated earlier, new rights are created as a result of this order. The
tribunal
could also order the discontinuance from service of any workman as a result of
whose employment there has been labour
unrest. Here again the tribunal does not
enforce any rights but terminates the rights that existed under the contract. An
employer
may cause a justifiable lockout if the workmen have acted in an illegal
manner. But there may be a workman who is prepared to go
for work but was
prevented from doing so as a result of the lockout by the employer. If such a
workman asks for relief, a tribunal
can give relief to him by ordering that his
wages should be paid as from a particular date if such a course is just and
equitable.
By such an order new rights are created between parties.
114
Under section 33 (1) (c) the
Tribunal may also make order containing decisions as to the extent to which the
period of absence from
duty of any workman, who it has decided should be
reinstated, should be taken into account or disregarded for the purpose of his
rights to any pension, gratuity or retiring allowance or to any benefit under
any provident scheme. Such orders create new rights.
A court of law declares existing rights of parties whether vested or contingent
and grants relief or redress for a breach. A court
administers justice according
to law. But a tribunal in giving relief or redress to a workman upon an
application made under subsection
1 of section 31B may do so notwithstanding
anything to the contrary in any contract of service between a workman and his
employer.
Therefore how could it be said that a Labour Tribunal is a court whose
function is to administer the law of the land between parties
and give judgment
declaring the rights and obligations of the parties and grant them relief for
breach of contract ? Any Tribunal
which alters the rights of parties and not
declares the rights is not a court (vide 67 Commonwealth Law Reports 28).
In dealing with the distinction between arbitral and judicial power, Isaacs and
Rich JJ stated as follows: (vide Waterside Workers'
Federation of Australia v.
Alexander Ltd.[1 (1918) 25 Commonwealth Law Reports 434 at 463. ])
" But the essential difference is that the judicial power is concerned with the
ascertainment, declaration and enforcement
of the rights and liabilities of the
parties as they exist or are deemed to exist, at the moment proceedings are
instituted; whereas
the function of an arbitral power in relation to industrial
disputes is to ascertain and declare, but not enforce, what in the opinion
of
the arbitrator ought to be the respective rights and liabilities of the parties
in relation to each other."
This distinction has been approved by the Privy Council (vide Attorney-General
of Australia v. Reginam[2 (1957) 2 A. E. R. 45.]).
It has been held that the
functions of an arbitral tribunal are different from those of a court and the
requirement that both of
them should not act without hearing both sides of the
case, does not weigh against the proposition that the exercise of the judicial
function is concerned, as the arbitral function is not, with the determination
of a justiciable issue (vide supra at p. 55).
Other differences between Courts functioning in Ceylon and the Labour Tribunal
are as follows :
1. A Labour Tribunal is not open to an employer. It is only the employee who can
seek relief or redress under the provisions of
section 31B of the Industrial
Disputes Act, but a court of law is open to both an employer and employee.
115
2. The Labour Tribunal has to
suspend proceedings when it is satisfied, after such inquiry as may be
necessary, that the matter
in respect of which the application is made under
section 31B (1) (a) is one under discussion with the employer of the workman to
whom the application relates by a trade union of which that workman is a member.
Further upon conclusion of such inquiry, if a
settlement is reached in the
course of the discussion, the tribunal is bound to make an order according to
the terms of such settlement.
It may be noted that a settlement may be brought
about between the employer and such trade union by considerations of policy with
which the workman may be not in agreement. But a court of law has to hear the
case instituted till a final decision is reached.
A court of law is not
influenced by matters of policy.
3. Where the tribunal is satisfied that such matter constitutes or forms part of
an industrial dispute referred by the Minister
under section 4 for settlement by
arbitration, or for settlement by an Industrial Court, it may make order
dismissing the application
without prejudice to the rights of parties to the
dispute. But a party before a Court is entitled to have a full hearing and have
his case decided according to its merits.
4. Where an application under section 31B (1) relates (a) to any matter which,
in the opinion of the tribunal, is similar to or
identical with the matter
constituting or included in the industrial dispute to which the employer to whom
that application relates
is a party and to which an inquiry under the act is
held or (b) to any matter the facts affecting which are, in the opinion of the
tribunal, facts affecting any proceeding under any other law, the tribunal
should make an order suspending its proceeding. After
such conclusion the
tribunal could resume proceedings. But in making an order upon such application
it shall have regard to the
award or decision of the said inquiry or proceeding
under any other law. It is significant that under the provisions referred to
above an employee is affected by orders made in proceedings to which he is not a
party. The mere membership of a Labour Union which
has taken part in the
proceedings does not make the Union the agent of the employee. The Labour Union,
in effecting a settlement
or collectively bargaining, may be influenced by
policies. Here again there is a clear distinction between a court of law and a
tribunal. In a court of law the parties are not bound by settlement and orders
made in proceedings in which they are not parties
and & court of law cannot be
influenced by matters of policy but is under a duty to adjudicate according to
law. A tribunal
which has to consider a matter of policy is not a court.
5. A court of law is bound to interpret the contract and hear only the parties,
whereas the Labour Tribunal is bound to hear the
Commissioner of Labour who may
set out the policy of the government. Here again a Labour Tribunal may be
influenced by matters
of policy in determining an application before it.
116
6. The orders of a Tribunal
cannot be enforced by it. But the court is given the power to enforce its
orders.
From these differences it is clear that the functions of a Labour Tribunal and a
court of law are entirely different and the objects
for which they are created
and their powers are not the same.
In amending the Industrial Disputes Act and providing for Labour Tribunals in
addition to the existing machinery for the peaceful
settlement of strikes and
lockouts, which can paralyse the country, it could never have been the intention
of the Legislature to
provide an additional court which administers the law of
contract since such courts were in existence and are still functioning.
In this context the dictum of Powers J. in the case of Waterside Workers'
Federation of Australia v. J. W. Alexander Ltd[1 25 C.
L, R. 435 at 483.] is
apposite. In dealing with the courts and arbitration tribunals of Australia he
said :
" I find, on looking at the Act to see if it was intended to make it a Court of
the Judicature, six very strong grounds why
I am satisfied that it was only
intended to make it a Court of compulsory arbitration- and not a Court of
judicature : (1) the
title of the Act (section 1) ; (2) the declared objects of
the Act; (3) the fact that no power has been given to the Court to punish
for
any breach of the Act; (4) the fact that by section 25 it declares that ' in
hearing and determination of every industrial
dispute and in exercising any
duties or powers under or by virtue of this Act the Court of the President shall
act according to
equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms, and shall not be
bound by any
rules of evidence, but may inform'; (5) that the only power given to it as to
penalties is to impose penalties for
breaches of its awards or orders made as an
Arbitration Court (this power, I assume, was conferred because Parliament
considered
it incidental to the power to make awards) ; (6) that no power of
execution to enforce even the power to impose penalties was given
to the
Arbitration Court-(under section 46 orders made by the Arbitration Court
imposing penalties are to be enforced by execution
only in Federal or State
Courts of judicature, not by the Arbitration Court). "
These observations, mutatis mutandis, apply equally when the functions of a
court of law in Ceylon are compared with those of a
Labour Tribunal.
As stated earlier, at the time the Constitution came into force, many tribunals
and officers exercised judicial power although they
were not functioning as
courts. The canon of construction which should be adopted in interpreting a
constitution is set out as
follows : " In doubtful cases, however, we employ a
historical criterion. We ask whether at the time
117
our Constitution was adopted, the
power in question was exercised by the Crown, by Parliament or by the Judges.
Unless analysis
compels us to say in a given case that there is a historical
anomaly, we are guided chiefly by the historical criterion. "
This view has met
with approval in our Courts (vide Queen v. Liyanage [1 (1962)64N.L.R.313at356.
]). Applying this test the term
" judicial office " in section 55 of the
Constitution means the office of a District Judge, Commissioner of Requests,
Magistrate, Presidents of Rural Courts and other similar offices and does not
apply to a Labour Tribunal.
Mr. Jayewardene in the course of his argument strongly urged that judicial power
of the State has vested in the Supreme Court and
the other Courts constituted
under the Courts Ordinance. He contended that there is a separation of judicial,
executive and legislative
powers in Ceylon. As a corollary, he submitted that
where a Tribunal which has functions of an executive and arbitral nature
performs
a limited judicial function, then the person who presides over it must
be appointed by the Judicial Service Commission in order
to perform the judicial
functions, otherwise the judicial orders he makes are null and void. Although in
view of the interpretation
I have placed on the words " judicial officer " it is
unnecessary to decide this point; yet in view of its importance
I would like to
express my views.
After a careful consideration of the arguments put forward by counsel I am of
the view that the judicial power of the State is not
vested in the Supreme Court
and the other courts in Ceylon. In some cases we have ventured to express the
view that judicial power
is vested in the Supreme Court and the minor courts
(vide Queen v. Liyanage [2 (1962) 64 N.L.R.313.]; Senadhira v. Bribery
Commissioner
[3(196l)63N.L.R.313 at318.] ; Piyadasa v. Bribery Commissioner[
4(1962) 64 N.L.R. 385 at 390.]). But for the decision of these cases
it was not
necessary to hold that judicial power of the State vested in the Judges only. In
Piyadasa's Case I did not have the
benefit of a full argument as there was no
counsel for the appellant. In the present appeals this matter has been fully
argued
and I am of the view that judicial power of the State is vested in Her
Majesty who exercises it through the Judges in Ceylon but
has reserved to
Herself the right to exercise this power as the final Court of Appeal.
In this connection a distinction has to be drawn between a jurisdiction of a
Court and the judicial power of the State. In England
there is no separation of
judicial, executive and legislative powers, though in political theory political
institutions are ceremoniously
divided into three groups. As Sir Ivor Jennings
remarks : (vide The Law and the Constitution, 4th Edn. p. 9) " It is not a
political theory but political experience, the logic or accident of events which
caused England to develop this three-fold division.
" As regards administrative
bodies, it is to be noted that in England from the earliest days of its legal
history a mingling
of
118
administrative and judicial
powers is to be found. Before the end of the 12th century the King's Court had
become the dominant governing
authority in England and it had at one and the
same time powers which were judicial, administrative and financial. By the
mediaeval
period the chief administrative organ-the King's Council-came to be
regarded as an administrative body. Referring to the separation
of powers in the
English Constitution Professor Holdsworth said : " But as yet boundaries between
the executive functions
on the one hand, judicial and legislative functions on
the other hand were very indistinct. " (vide History of English Law
by W. S.
Holdsworth, Vol. I, pages 478 to 479). Gradually with the increase of work and
pressure of judicial business a large amount
of judicial work was placed on the
King's Council when it began to split into two parts, a judicial court and an
administrative
court. The powers of the Common Law Courts and the importance of
the King's Council was stressed. The administration of law shifted
to the Courts
of Requests and to the Courts of Chancery, which were at that time for all
intents and purposes administrative tribunals.
The 17th century, however,
witnessed the ascendancy of justices of the peace, a small group of country
gentlemen who were appointed
to keep the peace and to arrest wrongdoers. They
gradually acquired extra-ordinary collection of judicial and administrative
duties
which, as Maitland remarks, "No theorist could attempt to classify since
their rich variety was not the outcome of theory but
experience. "
The mingling of powers arose more as a result of convenience until Montesquieu
apparently mis-read the English legal system and
in his famous chapter " esprit
des lois " Book II Cap. 6 adumbrated the doctrine of separation of powers. But
even in
modern times, in strict legal theory, such separation of powers does not
exist in England or Ceylon. The blending of the executive
and judicial functions
is not confined to the lowest grades but extends to the highest officials.
Responsible ministers now often
perform a variety of functions which sometimes
frequently overlap with judicial functions.
In the Australian and American Constitutions there is a clear separation of
powers. But even there, as has been pointed out, the
constitution cannot be
worked if there is a strict separation of powers (vide Administrative Law by
David, Vol. I page 64). The
Constitution of Ceylon is based on the English
Constitution (vide the observations of the Soulbury Commissioners-Soulbury
Commissioners'
Report, Cmd 6677, paras 408 to 410). At no time in the history of
our legal system has there been in theory any separation between
judicial,
administrative and legislative powers.
119
Before the constitution came into
force judges were appointed by the Governor on the recommendation of a Judicial
Service Commission
which served only as an advisory body at that time. Under the
Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council, subject to certain limitations,
the
legislative function is no doubt now delegated to the Queen in Parliament. The
executive function still remains in Her Majesty
(vide section 45 of the
Constitution). The judicial power is still vested in Her Majesty and not in the
courts. Her Majesty exercises
this power directly with the advice of the Privy
Council and through the Judges of the Supreme Court and the other Courts. If
judicial
power is vested in the Supreme Court and the other courts functioning
under the Courts Ordinance, then the Privy Council will have
no power to advise
Her Majesty to affirm or allow appeals which are taken from the decisions of the
Supreme Court to Her Majesty
in Council. Although such a view was taken by this
court, it has been held by the highest tribunal of this Island that Her Majesty
still retains her prerogative rights to hear appeals from the courts of Ceylon
(vide The Queen v. Hemapala [1 (1963) 65 N. L. R.
313.]). This power can be with
Her Majesty only if judicial power of the State is still vested in Her.
If the contention of Mr. Jayewardene is to prevail, as the learned
Solicitor-General submitted, should Ceylon abolish appeals to
the Privy Council,
then only the Judicial Service Commission can appoint a court higher than the
Supreme Court, unless the constitution
is amended. It could hardly be conceived
that the Judicial Service Commission which consists of at least two Supreme
Court Judges
and a third member who is either a judge of the Supreme Court or a
retired judge, should appoint judges to the highest tribunal
which will have
jurisdiction over the Supreme Court in such an event. If Mr. Jayewardene's
argument is carried to its logical conclusion
the Court of Criminal Appeal is
badly constituted. Therefore it is permissible under the Constitution of Ceylon,
for administrative
tribunals to have a residuum of judicial powers and the
existence of such judicial powers will not be a criterion to draw the line
of
demarcation between a court of law and a tribunal. The correct line of
demarcation between a judicial office and a non-judicial
office, is to apply the
functional test and ask the question whether an officer or tribunal is
performing analogous or same functions
as a judge, before determining whether
such tribunal or office is a judicial office.
It remains to consider some of the arguments put forward by counsel in these
cases. Mr. Ranganathan submitted that the duty to make
an order which is just
and equitable imposes on a judicial tribunal the functions of a judge who
presides in a court of law since
he has to act according to this norm. In the
case of legislation he stated that there was no norm or limitation placed.
Although
these observations may be justified in considering legislation by a
Supreme Parliament, it is not true of delegated legislation.
When a Supreme
legislature delegates legislative
120
functions to a body of persons it
sets out the scope and ambit of such legislation and the norms or standards
which the delegated
body has to conform in enacting subordinate legislation. Any
legislation in excess of the powers given to a delegated body would
be ultra
vires. The duty to act judicially imposed on a tribunal does not make it a Court
of Law exercising judicial power.
It was also contended that it is only a court which is under a duty to act
justly and equitably and the use of such a phrase is
not appropriate in the case
of arbitral tribunals. The duty to act " in equity and good conscience is not a
decisive test
to differentiate between a court of law and an administrative
tribunal. " Thus in Moses v. Parker [1 (1896) A. C. 245.] the
Privy Council held
that the Supreme Court of Tasmania which is vested with jurisdiction to deal
with disputes regarding claims
to grants of land was not pronouncing judicial
decisions from which there was a right of appeal to the Privy Council. Such
disputes
had, prior to the statute, been dealt with by certain Commissioners and
they reported to the Governor who was bound to act "
with equity and good
conscience ". Although it was expressly provided that the Supreme Court is not
bound by strict rules
of law and equity in any case or any technicalities or
legal forms whatsoever, yet it was not absolved from acting in good conscience.
Despite this restriction it was held that the Supreme Court in exercising this
jurisdiction was not performing the functions of
a court.
Mr. Jayewardene also placed reliance on a passage from an article contributed by
Dr. Duncan Derret in " Law in the Changing
World ", who while writing on
justice, equity and good conscience said, " Contrasted with the office of Judge
is the
so called arbitrium rusticorum which seems to have been the Romanic
counterpart of palm tree justice whereby the arbitrator divided
a disputed
property equally between two parties; here no juridical activity can be seen and
he splits it between them like the
monkey in Aesop's Fables, as the simplest way
of appeasing the nullity of parties. It is not even rough justice or substantial
justice. For when there is no juridical discretion, there is no justice." This
passage cannot be taken out of its context and
given a meaning which the writer
does not intend. At no stage does the writer apply this as a test to distinguish
between a court
of law and an arbitral tribunal. If this is a distinguishing
feature, then all tribunals could act arbitrally-a proposition which
is not
tenable.
I did not understand Mr. Satyendra's argument to mean that a tribunal that is
empowered to make a just and equitable order, is not
for that reason exercising
judicial power. His argument, as I understand, is that this provision taken
along with the other provisions
of the Industrial Disputes Act authorises the
Tribunal to make an order which is just and equitable, notwithstanding the terms
of the contract.
121
Further, arbitral functions must
be distinguished from arbitrary functions. When a tribunal is given the power to
act in a just
and equitable manner, it cannot act in an arbitrary manner. A
number of administrative tribunals in England and Ceylon cannot act
in an
arbitrary way but have to act judicially and yet they are not courts, although
their orders could be reviewed by the Supreme
Court on an application by way of
writ of certiorari or prohibition.
It was contended by counsel for the appellants that the power to alter the terms
of the contract is no decisive test to determine
whether a tribunal is an
arbitral tribunal or a court of law. Mr. Jayewardene cited section 2 of the
Money Lending Ordinance which
enables a court to re-open the transaction and
take an account between the lender and the person sued, and relieve a debtor
from
payment of any sum in excess of the sum adjudged by the court to be fairly
due in respect of such principal, interest and charges
as the court, having
regard to the risk and all the circumstances may adjudge to be reasonable. This
jurisdiction can only be exercised
if the court is satisfied on the evidence led
that-" (a) the return to be received by the creditor over and above what was
actually lent, having regard to the sums already paid on account, is excessive,
and that the transaction was harsh and unconscionable,
or as between the parties
thereto, substantially unfair; or, (6) that the transaction was induced by undue
influence, or is otherwise
such that according to any recognised principle of
law or equity the court would give relief; or (c) that the lender took as
security
for the loan a promissory note or other obligation in which the amount
stated as due was to the knowledge of the lender fictitious
or the amount due
was left blank."
It must be noted that it is only after a judicial finding that one or more of
the matters set out in section 2 (1) of the Money
Lending Ordinance are
satisfied that the court is enabled to re-open the account. Here the court of
law is not disregarding the
provisions of law or the terms of the contract in
granting relief but enforcing the rights granted by the law in favour of the
debtor.
It was also contended that the term " rights deemed to exist " must be construed
as rights which are given under section
31B to the workman. Under section 31B of
the Industrial Disputes Act there are no vested or contingent rights in the
workman co-relating
the reliefs that are set out. The relief being entirely
discretionary, may be refused or granted. Therefore in granting relief or
redress under seection 31B the Tribunal does not decide existing rights or
rights deemed to exist and give relief as a court of
law, but creates new rights
which grant relief or redress, provided it acts in a just and equitable manner.
Mr. Satyendra submitted that the function of the Labour Tribunal in making an
arbitral order is not judicial but legislative. It
was however contended by
counsel for the appellants that legislative function
122
cannot be exercised in favour of
a single individual. I am unable to accept this contention since there are a
number of private
Acts in the statute book which affect single individuals or
corporations.
Reference was made to the provisions of the Companies Act (Cap. 145) and the
Partnership Act (Cap. 83) under which Courts may dissolve
Companies or
Partnerships, as the case may be, among other grounds, on the ground that it is
just and equitable to make such an
order (vide Davis v. Brunswick (Australia)
Ltd.[1 (1956) I A.E.R.299. ]). These provisions were cited as instances to show
that
merely because a tribunal is empowered to act justly and equitably it does
not cease to be a court. But it must be noted that when
a court is empowered to
wind up the company on specific grounds, one of them being that it is just and
equitable, the court is
exercising a judicial function and determining existing
rights. But when the Labour Tribunal acts under section 31B (4) a discretion
is
given to the Tribunal to act justly and equitably notwithstanding anything to
the contrary in any contract of service between
the employer and employee. This
subsection sets out the power of the Tribunal and not the ground of its
decision.
Apart from the powers under section 31B of the Industrial Disputes Act, a Labour
Tribunal may also be appointed as an arbitrator
if the dispute is of a minor
nature under section 4 of the Act. This provision again shows that it was never
the intention of the
legislature to regard a Labour Tribunal as a court of law.
It is no part of a function of a court of law to act as an arbitrator.
Further it was contended that a right of appeal was given from a decision of the
Industrial Tribunal on a point of law and therefore
this Tribunal is a court.
But there are many administrative tribunals from the decisions of which a right
of appeal is given to
the Supreme Court, yet they are not courts of law. Thus a
right of appeal is given to a party who is dissatisfied by an order of
the
Registrar of Trade Marks under the Trade Marks Ordinance, by the Registrar of
Patents under the Patents Ordinance, by an order
made under the Workmen's
Compensation Ordinance etc. Yet these officials or Tribunals are not courts.
Mr. Jayewardene also contended that by an order of the Labour Tribunal instant
liability is imposed on the employer to either pay
wages or compensation etc. He
therefore urged that it was a court of law and relied on the ruling in The
Waterside Workers' Federation
of Australia v. Alexander Ltd.[25 C. L. R. 434.]
for his proposition. The case relied on is from Australia where there is clear
severability of judicial, executive and legislative power. In Australia where
the judicial power is vested in the courts, instant
liability cannot be created
by a tribunal which is not a court by creating the right and enforcing it. A
tribunal cannot adjudicate
upon
123
a right that has been brought
into existence by its action and grant relief in countries where is no
separation of powers and there
is nothing repugnant to the provisions of our
constitution for the Legislature, by a simple majority, to create a body which
could
not only create rights but also could give relief or remedy on the footing
that the rights created bind the party so long as there
is no direct or indirect
attempt to erode the jurisdiction of the established courts.
In enacting the Industrial Disputes Act, the Parliament of Ceylon was no doubt
concerned to bring about industrial peace for the
welfare of the nation. Both
the employer and employee were benefited by the Industrial Disputes Act. A
serious responsibility is
cast on the Court to declare invalid a statute passed
by the Parliament for the welfare of the nation. The views expressed by Isaacs
J. in the Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Munro [(1926) 38 C. L. R. at
180.]are equally applicable to Ceylon. In this context
he said : " It is always
a serious and responsible duty to declare invalid, regardless of consequences,
what the National
Parliament representing the people of Australia has considered
necessary or desirable for the public welfare. "
For these reasons I am of the view that the Labour Tribunal does not exercise
judicial power. The orders in S. C. 9/62, S. C. 18-23/62,
S. C. 144/64 and S. C.
158/64 are not null and void for the reason that the persons who presided over
these tribunals were not
appointed by the Judicial Service Commission. In view
of the fact that the other points taken up in the petitions of appeal have
not
been argued, I would remit these cases to a Bench of two Judges to hear these
matters.
I shall now deal with applications Nos. 158 of 1964 and 144 of 1964. In S. C.
Application 144 of 1964 a writ of certiorari has been
asked for to quash the
orders of the Industrial Court. In this case the Hon. Minister of Labour and
Nationalised Services, by his
order dated 16th November 1964, has referred an
alleged industrial dispute between the petitioner and the second respondent
union
to an Industrial Court for settlement. The question the Industrial Court
had to decide was whether the non-employment of a number
of workers set out was
justified and to what relief they are entitled to. The Industrial Court held
that the Company was justified
in retrenching the workers but their not being
paid any compensation was not justified. Therefore it awarded in respect of each
of these workers a sum representing three months salary to be paid as relief.
In S. C. No. 158 of 1964 also a writ of certiorari is asked to quash the
proceedings of the Industrial Court. In this case the alleged
industrial dispute
is whether notice of discontinuance of four persons set out in the petition was
insufficient and whether they
are entitled to any compensation. The Industrial
Court held that the notice was insufficient
124
and they should have been given
at least two months notice before retrenchment and ordered that each of them be
paid Rs. 200 as
compensation. One of the points relied on in both these
applications is that the Industrial Courts in these two cases were not appointed
by the Judicial Service Commission and since they exercised judicial power their
orders are null and void. This was the only point
argued before the Court.
Section 4 (2) of the Act provides that a Minister may by an order in writing
refer any industrial dispute to an Industrial Court
for settlement. Thus, the
very purpose for which the matter is referred to an Industrial Court is for
settlement and not adjudication.
Section 22 (1) of the Act provides for the
constitution of the Court. Every order of the Minister referring a case to an
Industrial
Court should be accompanied by a statement prepared by the
Commissioner setting out each of the matters which to his knowledge is
in
dispute (vide section 23). The duties and powers of the Industrial Court are set
out in section 24 (1) which enacts :
" 24 (1). It shall be the duty of an industrial court to which any dispute,
application or question or other matter is referred
or made under this Act, as
soon as may be, to make all such inquiries and hear all such evidence, as it may
consider necessary,
and thereafter to take such decision or make such award as
may appear to the court just and equitable. "
It is significant to note that the Industrial Court is only empowered to make an
award and not deliver a judgment. Section 25 provides
for the publication of the
award on a date from which it comes into force.
The effect of an award is set out in section 26 which enacts that every award of
an industrial court or tribunal, for the purpose
of this Act, shall be binding
on the parties, trade unions or workmen referred to in the award in accordance
with the provisions
of section 24 (3) and the terms of the award shall be the
implied terms of the contract of employment between the employers and
workmen
bound by the award.
Under section 25 (2) the award of an Industrial Court is made effective from the
date of the dispute. Thus the effect of an award
is not to give a judgment which
would be enforced but to introduce terms which become implied terms of the
contract.
Provision is also made for reconsidering an award by an Industrial Court. After
hearing, an Industrial Court to which an application
is made, may in its
decision (a) confirm the award, (6) set aside the award, (c) set aside the award
and make a new award in place
therof, or (d) vary or modify the award in such a
manner as may be necessary (vide section 27 of Cap. 131). Section 30 (1) sets
out the effect of such a decision. It enacts that " every award which is set
aside by a decision of an
125
industrial court under section 28
(1) (b) shall cease to have effect on the date of that decision or on such later
date as may be
specified in the decision.
Section 30 (2) enacts that every award which is varied or modified on an
application made under section 27 by a decision of an industrial
Court shall on
and after the date of such decision or on or after such other date, if any, as
may be specified in that decision,
not being earlier than the date of such
application, have effect and continue in force as so varied or modified.
It is clear therefore, from these provisions, that the effect of an award is
merely to make the terms of the award, implied terms
of the contract from the
date the award comes into force and the award may be repudiated later. It was
conceded by Mr. H. V. Perera
in the course of the argument that if the effect of
the award is merely to create future rights, then it will be an arbitral
tribunal,
but he urged that if it imposes instant liabilities on rights created,
then it exercises judicial power. I see no reason why such
a limited
interpretation should be given to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act,
in a country where there is no separation
of legislative, executive and judicial
powers. Further, the reasons given by me to differentiate a Labour Tribunal from
a Court
equally apply to an Industrial Court.
For these reasons I hold that the Industrial Court in these cases did not
exercise judicial power. Therefore these cases should
be sent before a Bench of
two Judges for adjudication on the other points raised in the appeal.
In S. C. Application 319/'63 a writ of certiorari is asked for to quash the
order of the arbitrator appointed by the Hon. Minister
of Labour and
Nationalised Services under section 4 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act (Cap.
131). In S. C. 37/'65 an application
for a writ of certiorari is made to quash
the order of an arbitrator appointed by consent of parties under sections 3 (1)
(d) of
the Industrial Disputes Act. The only point argued before us was whether
the arbitrator should have been appointed by the Judicial
Service Commission. I
am of the view that the arbitrators appointed in both these cases are not
judicial officers within the meaning
of the Constitution. Therefore their
appointment is valid.
Where a matter is referred to for settlement by an arbitrator, the duties and
powers of an arbitrator are set out in section 17
of the Industrial Disputes
Act. The effect of an award of an arbitrator is to make the terms of an award
implied terms of the contract
entered into by the employer and employee bound by
the award (vide section 19).
126
Any party, trade union, employer
or workman bound by an award made by an arbitrator under the Industrial Disputes
Act may repudiate
the award by a written notice in the prescribed form sent to
the Commissioner and every other party bound by the award subject to
the
provisions set out in the proviso to section 20 (1). It is enacted that where a
valid notice of repudiation of an award is
received by the Commissioner, subject
to the proviso to section 20, (a) the award to which such notice relates shall
cease to have
effect upon the expiration of three months immediately succeeding
the month in which the notice is so received by the Commissioner
or upon the
expiration of twelve months from the date on which the award came into force as
provided in section 18 (2) whichever
is the later, and (6) the Commissioner
shall cause such notice to be published in the Gazette together with the
declaration as
to the time at which the award shall cease to have effect as
provided in paragraph (a).
I have already given my reasons for holding that an officer presiding over an
Industrial Court or Tribunal is not a judicial officer
and therefore need not be
appointed by the Judicial Service Commission. Where the effect of an award is to
make the terms of the
award implied terms of the contract which may be
repudiated later, I fail to see how it could be said that an arbitrator is
exercising
judicial power and acting as a judge and determining the rights of
parties.
In S.C. Application 37 of 1965 the arbitrator was appointed by consent of
parties. If it is held that such an arbitrator holds a
judicial office, by the
same process of reasoning an arbitrator appointed under the provisions of the
Civil Procedure Code should
also be appointed by the Judicial Service
Commission. When a party consents to refer a matter to an arbitrator, such party
waives
the jurisdiction of the court and agrees to abide by the decisions of the
arbitrator. The reasons given by me for holding that an
Industrial Court or
Tribunal is not a Court of law apply with greater emphasis when an arbitrator's
functions are examined.
The learned Solicitor-General adumbrated that orders made by Judges who act
under colour of office are valid. He developed the doctrine
which gives validity
to acts of officers, whatever defects there may be in the legality of their
appointment. In support of his
contention he cited the dictum in the case of
Norton v. Shelby County (United States Supreme Court Reports, Book 30, page 178
at
186). Although I am attracted by this submission it is unnecessary to decide
this point in view of the orders I have made in these
cases.
For these reasons it cannot be said that the arbitrators in these two cases were
acting as judicial officers within the meaning
of the Constitution. Therefore I
hold that this application should not be allowed on the ground that since the
arbitrator was not
appointed by the Judicial Service Commission, the orders are
null and void.
127
These two applications shall be
remitted for hearing before a Bench of two judges on the other points raised in
the petitions. The
costs will abide the event in all these cases.
SRI SKANDA RAJAH, J.-
Careful consideration of the arguments of Counsel for the appellants and the
petitioners and the judgments of My Lord the Chief Justice
and H. N. G.
Fernando, S.P.J., has not persuaded me to change the view that I expressed in
Ceylon Transport Board v. Samastha Lanka
Motor Sevaka Samithiya[1 (1963) 65 N.
L. R. 185.], viz., that the
Labour Tribunal need not be appointed by the Judicial Service
Commission. On the
other hand, the arguments of Counsel for the respondents and the judgment of my
brother Tambiah confirm me in
that view.
I agree with Tambiah, J., that appeals No. 9/1962 and Nos. 18-23/62 should be
set down for hearing in due course.
Also, I agree with H. N. G. Fernando and Tambiah, JJ., that applications Nos.
319/63, 144/64, 158/64 and 37/65 should be set down
for hearing in due course.
In each of these appeals and applications costs will abide the event.
[ContextAppeals in S. C. Nos. 9 and 18/23 of 1962 allowed.
Applications in S.C. Nos. 319/63, 144/64,158 /64 and 37/65 set down for further argument on the matters indicated.
] [Hide Context]
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