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Federal Court of Malaysia |
] [Hide Context] DALAM MAHKAMAH PERSEKUTUAN DI MALAYSIA (RUJUKAN DARIPADA MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MENGIKUT PERUNTUKAN DI BAWAH
ARTIKEL 128(2) PERLEMBAGAAN PERSEKUTUAN)
NO. RUJUKAN: 06-7 OF 2009 (W)
ANTARA
SHAMALA A/P SATHIYASEELAN
(NO.K/P: 720501-02-5210/A 2138944) … PERAYU DAN
1. DR. JEYAGANESH A/L C. MOGARAJAH (juga dikenali sebagai
Muhammad Ridzwan bin Mogarajah) (No K/P: 681209-10-5871/A 1138397)
2. MAJILIS AGAMA ISLAM WILAYAH … RESPONDEN- PERSEKUTUAN RESPONDEN
[DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN MALAYSIA (BIDANGKUASA RAYUAN)
RAYUAN SIVIL NO. W-01-31-04
ANTARA
SHAMALA A/P SATHIYASEELAN
(NO.K/P: 720501-02-5210/A 2138944) … PERAYU
DAN
1. DR. JEYAGANESH A/L C. MOGARAJAH (juga dikenali sebagai
Muhammad Ridzwan bin Mogarajah) (No K/P: 681209-10-5871/A 1138397)
2. MAJILIS AGAMA ISLAM WILAYAH ... RESPONDEN-
PERSEKUTUAN RESPONDEN]
[DALAM PERKARA MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR (BAHAGIAN SIVIL)
SAMAN PEMULA NO. S8-24-1727-03
Dalam Perkara SAKTISWARAN (NO K/P: 990927-02-5701)
berumur 3 tahun 11 bulan dan THEIVISWARAN
(NO. K/P: 010314-02-0987)
Dan
Dalam Perkara Pengislaman
Saktiswaran (No. K/P: 990927-
0205701) dan Theiviswaran (K/P:
010314-02-0987) seperti mana yang disebutkan dalam Akuan
Sementara Pengislaman pada 25
November 2003 oleh Jabatan
Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan
Dan
Dalam Perkara Artikel 8(2), 11, 12 (4), 75 Perlembagaan Persekutuan
Dan
Dalam Perkara Seksyen 5
Guardianship of Infant Act 1961
Antara
Shamala a/p Sathiyaseelan
(No. K/P: 720501-02-5210/A 2138944) … Plaintif
Dan
1. Dr. Jeyaganesh a/l C. Mogarajah
(juga dikenali sebagai
Muhammad Ridzwan bin Mogarajah) | ||
(No K/P: 681209-10-5871/A 1138397) | … | Defendan- |
2. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan | Defendan] |
Coram: Zaki Tun Azmi CJ
Alauddin bin Dato‟ Mohd Sheriff PCA
Arifin bin Zakaria CJ (M) Richard Malanjum CJ (S&S) Zulkifli Makinuddin FCJ
Reference
1. The matter before this Court is a reference submitted by the Court of Appeal („COA‟) pursuant to Article 128
(1) of the Federal Constitution („FC‟).
2. The five questions posed for consideration read:
i. Whether Section 95(b) of the Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993 (Act 505) is ultra vires Article 12(4) and Article 8 of the Federal Constitution read in their proper context?
ii. Whether Section 95(b) of the Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993 (Act 505), as State law, is by reason of Article 75 of the Federal Constitution, inconsistent with a Federal law, namely, Section 5(1) of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1961 (as amended) and is therefore invalid?
iii. In the context of Article 121(1A) of the Federal Constitution, where a custody order is made by the Syariah Court or the High Court, on the basis that it has jurisdiction to do so, whether there is jurisdiction for the other court to make a conflicting order?
iv. Where there has been a conversion of the children of a civil marriage into Islam by one parent without the consent of the other parent, whether the rights of remedy under Part II of the Federal Constitution of the non- Muslim parent read with the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 is vested in the High Court?
v. Whether in the context of Articles 8, 11, 12 (4) and 121 (1A) of the Federal Constitution, the Syariah Court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of conversion of a minor into Islam once the minor has been registered by the Registrar of Muallafs (Majlis Agama Islam) ?
3. These questions were formulated by the COA with the consent of counsel for the parties during the hearing of the appeal
(W-01-31-04) against the judgment of the High Court in Originating Summons No. S8-24-1727-2003. It was thus agreed
that the hearing of the appeal and all other pending appeals (W-02-1084-03, W-02-1033-03, W-02-504-04 and W-
02-824-03) in connection with the actions between the parties
involving related issues should be stayed pending the disposal of this reference.
4. It cannot be denied that the questions posed are complex and touch on some of the most fundamental constitutional issues
besetting this country today. Yet what triggered them is in essence a family court matter over the custody of two young
children ages 3 years 11 months and 2 years 5 months respectively („the Children‟) at the time of the filing
of the Originating Summons No. S8 -24-1727-03. They are the children of the Wife-Appellant („Wife‟)
and Husband- Respondent („Husband‟) born out of their civil marriage
solemnized in accordance with the Hindu marriage rite on 5th
November 1998.
6. „In selecting proper guardian of a minor, the paramount consideration should be the welfare and well-being of the child. The litigation where the question of a custody is involved and
where the parties are at loggerheads, in our opinion, such litigation cannot be dealt with like any other petition/suit or appeal in civil or commercial litigation. The courts are not expected to examine legality of the impugned order or go into a question as to whether the trial court has committed any error of law. Such litigation needs to be dealt with keeping the welfare and well-being of the child in view‟ per D.B. Bhosale, J. in Mohan Kumar Rayana v Komal Mohan Rayana (Bombay Family Court Appeal No. 29 OF 2007).
„The children are not mere chattels; nor are they mere playthings for their parents. Absolute right of parents over the destinies
and the lives of their children has, in the modern changed social conditions, yielded is the considerations of their
welfare as human beings so that they may grow up in a normal balanced manner to be useful members of the society and the guardian
court in case of a dispute between the mother and the father, is expected to strike a just and proper balance between the requirements
of welfare of the minor children and the rights of their respective parents over them‟.
8. While the question of custody simpliciter itself demands a tactful approach due to its sensitive nature and sentimental
attachment thereto (see: R.V. Srinath Prasad v. Nandamuri
Jayakrishna, (2001) 4 SCC 71), this matter before this Court has taken an added dimension of enormous constitutional importance. It arises from the
fact that the Husband had arranged for the conversion of the Children to Islam on 25th November 2002 without the knowledge and consent of the Wife. The Husband himself had earlier on embraced the Muslim
faith on 19th November 2002. Thus, the change in the circumstances of the family members has brought into focus, inter alia, Article 121(1A) of
the FC. And connected thereto to be considered for their constitutional implications in the dispute between the parties are Articles
8, 11, and 12 (4) of the FC.
The Preliminary Objection
9. As this Court prepared to hear this reference learned counsel for the Husband stood up to raise a preliminary objection. It was quickly followed by a counter objection from learned counsel for the Wife submitting that the preliminary objection should be dismissed in limine due to the absence of notice as required under the Bar Council Ethics Rules. The counter objection was overruled as being merely a technicality and would cause no prejudice to the Wife.
the general principle that „a party in contempt cannot be heard further in the same proceedings for his own benefit unless and until he has purged his contempt‟. It is alleged that the Wife has failed to comply with the interim court order dated 17.04.2003 („Court Order‟) as well as
the subsequent court order dated
06.05.2004 (Leave Order) and has not purged her contempt.
The Court Orders
11. The Court Order was granted pursuant to an application made under Originating Summons No. S8-24-3586-2002. The terms are these:
i. That the Husband has access to the Children every Saturday from 1 p.m. and 2 p.m. until the following day (Sunday)
at the same time;
ii. That the Husband is to pick up the Children from the house of the Wife;
iii. That the Husband is not allowed to bring the Children outside the District of Alor Setar;
iv. That the Husband is to pay maintenance of RM250.00 for the Children respectively by crediting into their saving accounts;
and
v. That the Arrest Warrant issued by the Syariah High Court
Selangor under Kes Mal Bil: 10200-028-04-2003 is not to
be enforced pending the disposal of the Civil Suit No. S8-
24-297-2003.
12. It is not in dispute that the Wife and the Children left Malaysia in 2004. To date they have not returned.
13. As a result the Husband has not been able to have access to the Children as stipulated in the Court Order. He thus applied
ex parte under the same action and obtained the Leave Order. It was also a term in the Leave Order that pending the disposal of the
said action the Wife was to return the Children within the jurisdiction of the court in Malaysia and to surrender to the court
their travel documents until further order. To date neither of these two orders has been complied with.
14. Meanwhile, on 20.07.2004 the High Court heard and disposed of the Originating Summons No. S8-24-3586-2002. It ordered a joint
legal custody of the Children to the Wife and Husband
„which meant that both the parents had to discuss and agree on issues about their two infant children‟, for example „choosing the method of education, choice of religion and administrating the children‟s property‟.
15. The Court however ordered that „the care and control which covered the day to day care of the two infant children and the responsibility for looking after them
daily would be given‟ to the Wife with the Husband allowed to visit them on alternative weekends from 1-2 p.m. on Saturday to Sunday 1-2 p.m.
The
prohibition for the Husband to take the Children out of Alor
Setar as earlier ordered in the Court Order was maintained.
The principle in Wee Choo Keong case and the current position
16. Learned counsel for the Wife submitted that Wee Choo
„there are no exceptions to the general rule‟ and as such it should not be followed. Learned counsel proffered that the new test is whether „in the circumstances of an individual case the interests of justice would be best served by hearing the party‟ who is in contempt.
18. In that case the appellants (Wee and another) had appealed against the decision of the trial court to hear first
the substantive motion of the respondents to commit the appellants to prison for contempt of court alleging that the appellants
had breached the ex parte injunction obtained by the respondents earlier on.
19. In dismissing the appeal the Court said this, inter alia, at page
221:
„It has not been seriously disputed and indeed we find that it is also an established general rule of law that a
party in contempt cannot be heard further in the same proceedings for his own benefit unless and until he has purged his contempt. The question which we have to determine in these appeals is the ambit of that general rule.
……….
We are unable to accept that any exceptions per se exist to the general rule that a party in contempt cannot be heard until he has purged his contempt. We are in favour of the views expressed by Denning LJ in Hadkinson [1952] 2 All ER 567 that it is a matter of discretion depending on the circumstances of the case whether or not a litigant ought to be heard notwithstanding his contempt. This flexible approach to the jurisdiction is based upon a discretion to be exercised in accordance with the circumstances of the case which was accepted by the House of Lords in X Ltd & Anor v Morgan- Grampian (Publishers) Ltd & Ors [1991] 1 AC 1 ……. The rationale for the rule is public policy. Orders of court must be treated with respect and require strict obedience.
………
In this regard, we are mindful of the competing public interest in a litigant having a right to be heard. Although the right to be heard is a fundamental right vested in all litigants, that right however cannot be taken as an absolute right. Where the litigant shows himself to have little or no regard to an order issued against him, then he
has to an extent, forfeited his right to be heard or at least postponed that right until he has suitably purged his contempt.
……..
…….. In this context, we are more inclined to accept the view expressed by Young J in Young v Jackman (1986) 7
NSWLR 97 where he said: „Accordingly, it would seem from 1820 onwards that the rule that a person will not be heard when he is guilty of contempt extended as well to the case where a party was considered to be in contempt, that is, where his contempt had prima facie been demonstrated to the court or alternatively when he had confessed the facts which were the subject of a charge of contempt.‟ (Emphasis added).
20. Having therefore carefully considered what was said by the then Supreme Court I do not think the Court adopted,
as portrayed, a rigid position „that a person in contempt should not be heard‟. It is obvious from the judgment that in coming
to its decision the Court was well appraised of the views expressed by the learned judges in Hadkinson v Hadkinson [1952] 2 All E R 567.
21. No doubt the Court said that it could not „accept that any exceptions per se exist to the general rule that a party in contempt cannot be heard until he has purged
his contempt‟. But that was because it had already taken preference of the
view expressed by Denning LJ to that of Romer LJ and
Somervell LJ.
22. The view of Denning LJ was subsequently considered and approved by the House of Lords in X Limited v Morgan- Grampian (Publishers) Ltd [1991] 1 AC 1. Lord Bridge of Harwich (with whom Lord Templeman, Lord Griffiths, Lord Oliver of Aylmerton and Lord Lowry agreed) said this, at page
595.”
23. In Polanski v Condé Nast Publications Ltd (2005) 1 WLR
„A similar approach is now adopted in cases where a party seeking to be heard by the court is in contempt of court. That fact is not of itself a bar to the contemnor
being heard: see per Denning LJ in Hadkinson v Hadkinson [1952] P 285, 298, approved by Lord Bridge of Harwich in X Ltd v Morgan-Grampian (Publishers) Ltd [1991] 1 AC 1, 46. In Arab Monetary Fund v Hashim (unreported) 21 March 1997, quoted by Potter LJ in the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Motorola Credit Corp v Uzan (No 2) [2004] 1 WLR 113, 128, Lord Bingham of Cornhill CJ said the preferable approach is to ask
“whether, in the circumstances of an individual case, the interests of justice are best served by hearing a party in contempt or by refusing to do so, always bearing in mind the paramount importance which the court must attach to the prompt and unquestioning observance of court orders.”‟
(See also: In the Marriage of MKA and SH Fahmi (1995) 19
Fam LR 517 – a decision of the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia).
24. Accordingly, I find no good reason to say that Wee Choo Keong case (supra) is erroneous in law. The then Supreme Court preferred the approach that „it is a matter of discretion depending on the circumstances of the case whether or not a litigant ought to be heard notwithstanding his contempt‟.
25. And it is trite law that discretion must be exercised judicially.
His Honour Campbell J. in Leaway v Newcastle City Council
„At the outset, I note that it is not suggested that the discretion that a judge might exercise in deciding not to hear a person in contempt is a completely open-ended or unguided one. If it is to be a discretion which is exercised judicially, it needs to be one which aims at achieving an objective or objectives which are able to be stated as a matter of law, or to involve a balancing of factors which can be said, as a matter of law, to be ones which are appropriate to take into account for the purpose of exercising that discretion. Only one standard has been invoked, as the objective which is sought to be advanced by sometimes declining to hear someone who is in contempt, by the judges who have favoured it being a matter of discretion whether a person in contempt should be heard. That standard is what is appropriate for the administration of justice.‟
26. I am therefore of the view that the approach adopted in Wee Choo Keong case (supra) is not entirely out of step with the modern formulation of the test by the Court of Appeal (England and Wales) in Raja v van Hoogstraten (2004) EWCA Civ 968 at para. 82 per Chadwick LJ:
„That an appellate court may refuse to hear a party who has been found to be in contempt and who has made no attempt to purge that contempt is not in doubt – see
Hadkinson v Hadkinson [1952] P 285, Astro Exito Navegacion SA v Southland Enterprise Co Ltd (The Messiniaki Tolmi) [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep 595 and X Ltd v Morgan Grampian (Publishers) Ltd and others [1991] 1
AC 1. But it is now recognised that there is no general rule that a court will not hear an application for his own benefit by a person in contempt unless until he has first purged his contempt; so that, in order to avoid the application of that rule the party in contempt must bring himself within some established exception. The approach which the court should adopt is now found in the judgment of Lord Bingham of Cornhill, Chief Justice, in Arab Monetary Fund v Hashim and others (unreported,
21 March 1997). After referring to the speeches of Lord Bridge of Harwich and Lord Oliver of Aylmerton in X Ltd v Morgan Grampian, Lord Bingham said this:
"From those speeches it is, I think, clear that it is wrong to take as a starting point the proposition that the court will not hear a party in contempt and then ask if the instant case falls within an exception to that general rule. It is preferable to ask whether, in the circumstances of an individual case, the interests of justice are best served by hearing a party in contempt or by refusing to do so, always bearing in mind the paramount importance which the court must attach to the prompt and unquestioning observance of court orders." (Emphasis added).
27. In other words the modern formulation of the test is a refinement of the discretionary test first propounded by Denning LJ in Hadkinson v Hadkinson (supra).
28. Thus, in exercising the discretion in relation to the preliminary objection in this reference it should be taken into account the facts and the circumstances prevailing between the Wife and Husband as well as that of the Children while keeping in mind how best the interest of justice can be served.
Safeguarding Constitutional Rights
29. The core issue between the parties is over the custody of the Children. And as stated above, ordinarily, in coming to any
decision on the issue what need to be considered is the paramount interests and welfare of the Children which may even
prevail over the bar on a contemnor to be heard. (See: Schumann v. Schumann (1964) 6 FLR 422).
30. However, as noted earlier, this reference has an added fundamental constitutional issue.
31. Premised on the undisputed facts it is the Wife who is seeking, inter alia, for the interpretation of the phrase „parent or guardian‟ as found in Article 12(4) of the FC which reads:
„(4) For the purposes of Clause (3) the religion of a person under the age of eighteen years shall be decided by his parent or guardian.‟
32. In the event that this Court rules in her favour she will thus have the equal right as that of the Husband over the religion
of the Children. In short she is seeking an order to establish her constitutional right which for now the Husband says he has the
sole rights in view of the word „parent or guardian‟ in singular used in the constitutional provision.
33. Assuming therefore for a moment that the contention of the Wife is sustained by reading the provision [Article 12(4) of the
FC] as giving both the Wife and Husband equal right over the religion of the Children, I am of the view that in removing the Children
out of Malaysia and thus out of the jurisdiction of this Court the Wife has not only disobeyed the Court Order but has also deprived
the Husband of his constitutional right to the Children which in my view is a very serious matter.
34. The Wife is before this Court with a complaint that she has been deprived of her constitutional right to the Children. But
it is also a fact that the Husband has been deprived of access to the Children since 2004 despite the Court Order and hence his constitutional
right. I would therefore think that he is equally entitled to complain that his constitutional right has been infringed.
35. Both parties are entitled to safeguard his or her constitutional rights to the Children. And bearing in mind that constitutional
rights are sacrosanct it is expected that they must be religiously safeguarded. Thus, it was said and which I agree that if „an established right in law exists a citizen has the right to assert it and it is the duty of the Courts to aid and assist him in
the assertion of his right. The Court will therefore assist and uphold a citizen‟s constitutional rights. Obedience to the law
is required of every citizen, and it follows that if one citizen has a right under the Constitution there exists a correlative
duty on the part of the other citizens to respect that right and not to interfere with it.‟ (See: Educational Company of Ireland Ltd v Fitzpatrick (No 2) (1961) I.R. 345 per Budd J. at page 368).
36. The view of Budd J. was subsequently supported by Walsh J. in Meskell v. Coras Iompair Eireann [1973] I.R. 121 at page
37. Indeed constitutional rights are so cherished that even a conduct which is calculated to „inhibit suitors generally from availing themselves of their constitutional right to have their legal rights and obligations ascertained and enforced in courts of law, by holding up any suitor to public obloquy for doing so or by exposing him to public and prejudicial discussion of the merits or the facts of his case before they have been determined by the court or the action has been otherwise disposed of in due course of law‟ has been considered as in contempt of court. (See: A-G v Times Newspaper [1974] AC
38. Thus, before considering this reference which would involve the determination of the constitutional rights of both the Wife
and the Husband, it is only fair that this Court should ensure that the parties are on equal footings in all respects. Having
the Wife in the present position of „heads I win, tails you lose‟ is not conducive to the just determination of such important constitutional questions. It would result in
the constitutional right of the Husband being made illusory irrespective of who succeeds. And it should be the solemn duty of
this Court to ensure that constitutional rights enshrined in the FC are safeguarded. Further, it is settled law that a litigant
should be allowed to enjoy the fruit of his or her litigation.
39. Incidentally, in determining the respective constitutional rights of the Husband and the Wife over the Children the question
of who is at fault or who initiated the problem should not arise. The paramount interest of the Children must be given priority.
40. Therefore, with the foregoing factors in the forefront on my mind and taking into account the question of how best the interest
of justice is served in the exercise of discretion and in fairness the parties should be heard notwithstanding there is an issue
of contempt raised. Unfortunately the Wife was absent during the hearing. And I am conscious that any decision made by this
Court should not be in vain.
The Ruling
41. But I also noted that learned counsel for the Wife informed this Court during the hearing that he needed to take instruction
whether the Wife would be willing to return to Malaysia with the Children upon the determination of this reference. May be
learned counsel for the Wife should be allowed to seek for the necessary instruction as I do not think any serious prejudice would
be caused. Further, the Husband had only obtained leave for contempt against the Wife and did not proceed with it. Thus,
strictly speaking, an order is yet to be obtained that in law the Wife is in contempt although it is not in dispute that due to
her absence in this country the Wife is yet to comply with the Court Order and the Leave Order.
42. Accordingly in the final analysis and notwithstanding any instruction that may be obtained by learned counsel for
the Wife, I am of the view that since there is no undue serious prejudice I am therefore inclined to rule that the interest of
justice is best served by making an order that the Wife and the Children are to appear before this Court within three (3) months
from today failing which this reference will be deemed dismissed with costs. Upon dismissal the Court of Appeal may then
proceed to deal with the matter before it accordingly.
Other Contentions Considered
44. With respect, although the Court Order and the Leave Order are not directly being appealed against, they are however
interim orders of the High Court made under the Originating Summons No. S8-24-3586-2002. The final judgment of the High
Court disposing of the said action is under appeal together with the other judgments in respect of the other related actions
between the parties. These appeals are interrelated
and collectively upon which the questions posed in this reference were formulated by the COA. It is therefore quite far- fetched
to say that since there are no appeals against the Court Order and the Leave Order the alleged contempt cannot be said to be in the
same suit, proceedings or cause.
45. Thus, with the alleged contempt being in the same suit, proceedings or cause as this reference and if the
general principle as discussed above is strictly applied and without considering the modern formulation of the test, this
reference could be dismissed in limine but for my ruling above.
46. Mr. Malik Imtiaz, learned counsel for the National Human Rights Society submitted that this Court should proceed
to answer the questions referred and let the final determination of the appeals to the COA guided by the answers given to the questions
posed in this reference.
47. At first blush the suggestion seems reasonable. However, the answers, if given, to the questions posed would entail,
in practical effect, their mere formal application to the critical issues raised in those appeals. In other words, the contentious
issues raised in the appeals are therefore addressed while circumventing the general principle invoked in the preliminary
objection. That in my view may not be in the best interest of justice.
The Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine
49. The doctrine however was not endorsed by House of Lords.
„30. I understand the intuitive dislike of relieving a fugitive of a disadvantage which until recently was inherent in his self-created status. Until recently the fugitive had to
make up his mind whether (a) to surrender his fugitive status and give his oral evidence in court or (b) to maintain his flight from justice and suffer whatever disadvantages this might have in civil proceedings to which he was a party as claimant or defendant.
31. I understand that. But overall the matter which weighs most with me is this. Despite his fugitive status, a fugitive from justice is entitled to invoke the assistance of the court and its procedures in protection of his civil rights. He can bring or defend proceedings even though he is, and remains, a fugitive. If the administration of justice is not brought into disrepute by a fugitive's ability to have recourse to the court to protect his civil rights even though he is and remains a fugitive, it is difficult to see why the administration of justice should be regarded as brought into disrepute by permitting the fugitive to have recourse to one of the court's current procedures which will enable him in a particular case to pursue his proceedings while remaining a fugitive.‟
50. Similarly, Lord Carswell at page 658 paragraph 90 said this:
„90. I may state at once that I would not support the application of the principle in such a way that a person in the
position of the claimant would become in effect an outlaw. Mr. Pannick for the defendants, quite rightly in my opinion, disclaimed
reliance on any such use of the
principle. I also respectfully agree with the view expressed by Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead in para 19 of his opinion that it is not appropriate to have resort to the doctrine of ex turpi causa non oritur actio. Nor is it necessary to import into our legal system the full rigour of the fugitive offender doctrine accepted in courts in the United States.‟
Conclusion
51. In conclusion I repeat my ruling in paragraph 42 above.
Signed.
(RICHARD MALANJUM)
Chief Judge Sabah and Sarawak
Date: 12th November, 2010
Counsel for the Appellant: Dato‟ Cyrus Dass
(Datuk Ambiga Sreenevasan, Steven Thiru, Revi Nekoo, Matthew, Ratnam and
Ng See Teng with him)
Solicitors for the Appellant: Messrs Hakem, Arabi & Associates No. 120-3A Jalan Tun Sambanthan (Brickfields)
50470 Kuala Lumpur
Counsel for the 1st Respondent: Encik Muralee Menon
Solicitors for the 1st Respondent: M/s Jaffar & Menon
Unit 2-7-7 & 2-7-8, 7th Floor Menara KLH Business Centre No. 2 Jalan Kasipillay
Off Jalan Ipoh
51200 Kuala Lumpur
Counsel for the 2nd Respondent: Azmi Mohd Rais and Zulkifli Yong
Solicitors for the 2nd Respondent: M/s Zulkifli Yoing Azmi & Co.
25-7, Level 7 The Boulevard Offices
Mid Valley City
Lingkaran Syed Putra
59200 Kuala Lumpur
For the Bar Council: Mr. Lim Chee Wee
For Buddhist, Christians, etc
Consultative Council: Mr. Shamugam
For Association of Women Lawyers: Mina Samitan
For All Women Action Society,
Women Aids Organization,
Women Centre for Change Penang,
Sisters in Islam and
Persatuan Kesedatan Komuniti
Selangor: Encik Haris Ibrahim
For National Human Rights Society: Encik Malik Imtiaz
For Sidang Injil Borneo (SIB)
(Semananjung): Mr. Anno Xavier
For Malayan Chinese Association
(MCA): Mr. Quek Nee Meng
] [Hide Context]
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