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Zulkifli Bin Ahmad - Appellant Vs Public Prosecutor - Respondent [2011] MYSSHC 18 (13 January 2011)

MALAYSIA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SABAH AND SARAWAK AT TAWAU

IN THE STATE OF SABAH, MALAYSIA

CRIMINAL CASE NO: CAT (42) 15 / 2010 – ENCL. 2 – NOTICE OF APPEAL

BETWEEN

ZULKIFLI BIN AHMAD … APPELLANT

AND

PUBLIC PROSECUTOR … RESPONDENT

BEFORE THE HONORABLE JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER

TUAN JOHN KO WAI SENG

IN OPEN COURT

18 13TH JANUARY 2011 @ 11.15 AM

JUDGMENT

The appellant was charged before the sessions court with the following:

“Bahawa kamu bersama seorang lagi yang masih bebas, pada 30hb Julai

2008, jam lebih kurang 2.35 petang, bertempat di dalam kereta Proton

Iswara Iswara Aeroback warna merah, numbor. Pentaftaran SD4299B, di

kawasan jalan Kampung Jawa, di dalam Daerah Lahad Datu, Di dalam

negeri Sabah, denag niat bersama telah melakukan rompakan

berkumpulan ke atas seutas rantai emas kepunyaan Lee Khyun Yin,

maykad numbor: 490705-12-5044, oleh yang demikian kamu telah

melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 395 Kanun Keseksaan”

Loosely translated as follow:

13 “That you with another one who is still at large on 30th July 2008, at about

2.35pm, in a red Proton Iswara Aeroback, Registration number SD4299B,

at Kampung Jawa Road, in Lahad Datu, in the State of Sabah, with

common intention did commit gang robbery on a gold necklace owned by

Lee Khyun Yin, maykad number: 490705-12-5044, in that you had

committed an offence under section 395 of the Penal Code.”

The appellant was found guilty and convicted and sentence to 8 years

imprisonment from the date of arrest and with 3 stroke of whipping.

The appellant being dissatisfied with the decision of the sessions court

has filed an appeal and the petition of appeal has set out the following

grounds:

.

Grounds 2 a, c, and d.

The appellant contends the learned sessions judge had erred in finding

a prima facie case against the appellant despite material discrepancies

of the evidence.

Learned counsel for the appellant had contended that because the

appellant was unrepresented, and the fact that he repeatedly informed

the sessions court that he knew nothing of this case and did not know

what to say casts an extra duty on the court to ensure that the

appellant had a fair trial. It was further submitted that the learned

sessions judge had failed to conduct a maximum evaluation of

evidence at the close of prosecution’s case because of the following

discrepancies in the evidence:-

(a) Date and Time of photographs

Looking at the date and time of the photograph, it will appear to the

court the explanation given by learned DPP that the intitulement of the

photos purportedly taken at the exact time of the incident does not in

any way detract from the evidence of PW2, PW3 and PW4 in regard to

1 the timing of the incident that took place at 2.35 pm of July 30th, 2008.

It appearing that the photographer (PW1) had put in the actual time of

the incident rather than the time the photo was taken. This is a minor

discrepancy that would not materially affect the finding of a case to

answer, since the photographer (PW1) was not an eye witness to the

incident.

(b) Discrepancies in the evidence of PW2, PW3 and PW4.

The next issue relates to the car used by the appellant which learned

counsel for the appellant pointed out was identified as red with black

accessories and numbered “SD 4299”:

(i) in Exhibit P4 the First Information Report of PW2 the victim, and

her examination in chief (at line 15 of page 14 ROA); and

(ii) in PW3’s examination in chief (at line 12 of page 25 ROA);

but the red proton saga car produced by the prosecution was

numbered “SD 4299B” and therefore totally different, see Exhibit P1 (7)

and Exhibit P2 (1-6).

PW4 on the other hand in his examination in chief had identified the

appellant’s car as bearing registration number “SD 4299B” (at line 25

of page 23 ROA) and further confirmed the photographs of the car in

Exhibit P1 (7) and Exhibit P2 (1-6) was that of the appellant. PW4 also

confirmed that the person in Exhibit P2 is himself (at line 7 of page 33

ROA).

The missing “B” from the number of the car is not of such a material

discrepancy on the facts of this case for the following reasons. If we

view Exhibit P1 (7) it shows PW2 pointing to the car as identifying SD

4299B as the vehicle used by the appellant notwithstanding that

Exhibit P1 index identified the car at paragraph 7 as “SD 4299”. PW2

also confirmed in examination in chief and had identified that the car

bearing registration number SD 4299B in Exhibit P1 (7) was the one

used by the appellant (at line 24 of page 22 ROA).

This minor discrepancy of the missing “B” alone with all the weight of

PW2, PW3 and PW4’s evidence of physical identification of the red car

with black accessories used by the appellant in this Court’s view is not

sufficient to upset the learned sessions’ judge finding that a prima facie

case had been made out.

(c) Acceptance of PW4’s evidence not in First Information Report

On this ground learned counsel for the appellant submitted that PW4

was never mentioned by PW2 in her First Information Report (FIR)

(Exhibit P4) nor did PW4 make a FIR and his evidence should not

have been accepted by the sessions court.

21 The cases of PP vs. Fong Chee Cheong (1970) 1 MLJ 97 and

Balachandran v PP (2005) 2 MLJ 301 already accepts that no FIR or

any inconsistency in the FIR is not always fatal to a case as it is not

treated as substantive evidence.

4 In Herchun Singh & Ors v PP (1969) 2 MLJ 209, Ong Hock Thye CJ

(M) (at page 211F) cited with approval the following extract from

Sohoni’s Commentary of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code (16th

Edition Vol. 1, page 750):

“.......... All that is required for purpose of this section is that there

should be clear, definite information about the commission of a

cognizable offence to set the investigation machinery in motion.

Further, the information required need not contain the

circumstances of the commission of the offence, nor the names of

the offenders or the witnesses, for the main purpose of

investigation is to ascertain these matters .... The first information

report is not an Encyclopaedia. It is not the beginning and ending

of every case. It is only a complaint to set the affairs of law and

order in motion. It is only at the investigation stage that all the

details can be gathered and fill up. But it cannot be said that

omission in the first information report would always be of no

significance. The report is not substantive evidence and

omissions in it will not ipso facto lead to the case being thrown

out. But it is a piece of corroborative evidence; omissions in it will,

other things being the same, deprive the prosecution of the most

valuable corroboration and thereby make the story suspicious.

When a first information report contains an omission as to an

important fact relied upon by the prosecution, the omission is

important and in the absence of any other evidence, the court

may in a given case refuse to consider the evidence of the

informant on that fact because of such omission. For a correct

appraisal of the effect of omission as contradicting the informant it

is essential to keep in view the circumstances in which the report

was lodged.

For instance, an omission in a report hurriedly lodged under the

press of events should not have the same significance as one in a

report lodged after cool calculation.”

And Ong CJ (M) went further to add at page 211B (ibid):

“...it is wrong to hold up the first information report as a sure

touchstone by which the complainant’s credit may invariably be

impeached. It can only be used for that purpose with

discrimination, in much the same way as previous statements by

the witness are used, so that irrelevant errors in detail are not

1 given exaggerated importance, nor omissions, objectively

considered in the light of surrounding circumstances.”

(Emphasis added)

The learned sessions judge had not erred in not considering that the

FIR (Exhibit P4) did not mention PW4 as it was meant to kick start the

robbery report against the appellant. Neither is there any necessity in

law for PW4 to make a separate FIR in order for his evidence to be

admissible in the trial of the appellant, the key requirement being

whether it is relevant to the issues to be tried before the sessions

court.

(d) Not represented accused

Lastly, learned counsel for the appellant proposes that where an

unrepresented accused is being tried, this casts an extra duty on the

court to ensure that the appellant had a fair trial. In as much as the

court has to be fair to all accused whether represented or not, the court

also has to consider the public interest represented by the learned

DPP. If this extra duty is considered as bias in favour of the accused

who is unrepresented by the court then it is wrong as it will offend the

interests of Justice not to say all accused who are represented by

counsel who will not be extended such a favour. This “extra duty” if

any should be one of fairness to see that justice is done by the court to

all parties before it and not merely to an unrepresented accused. In

this respect there is nothing from the notes of proceedings or her

grounds of decision to fault the conduct of the trial of the appellant

before the learned sessions judge.

.

Grounds 2 b.

The appellant contends that the failure to call the 6 passengers of

PW4, should result in adverse inference being drawn by the sessions

court against the prosecution under section 114(g) of the Evidence Act.

The prosecution contends that this immaterial.

On the drawing of adverse inference for the prosecution’s failure to call

the 6 passengers, the court notes that it is the prosecution’s discretion

to decide who to call as witness so long as he discharges his duty to

make out a prima facie case.

In Chia Leong Foo v PP (2000) 4 CLJ 649, Augustine Paul J at page

g had observed:

“It is well settled that in a criminal case prosecuting counsel,

provided there is no wrong motive, has discretion as to whether

or not to call any particular witness and in particular has a

discretion not to call in support of his case a witness whom he

does not believe to be a witness of truth (see Khoon Chye Hin v.

PP [1961] MLJ 105). But there is an obligation on the prosecution

to call as witnesses persons whose evidence is essential to

unfold the narrative upon which its case is based (see

Seneviratne v. R [<<1936] 3 All ER 36>>). Thus as Abdul Hamid CJ

3 (Malaya) (as he then was) said in Teoh Hoe Chye v. PP [1987] 1

MLJ 220 at p. 229:

Nevertheless, the decision whether to call or not to call a

witness including a witness from whom a statement has

been taken is always the right of the prosecution (Abdullah

Zawawi v. PP [1985] 2 MLJ 16). Insofar as the trial court is

concerned, its duty is essentially to decide whether on the

evidence before it the prosecution has proved its case, and

if there are unsatisfactory features in the prosecution case

to determine whether, in the light of such feature, the

prosecution case fell short of proof beyond reasonable

14 doubt (Abdullah Zawawi’s case, supra).

Thus the question to be asked in each case is whether the

prosecution has proved its case even without calling some other

witnesses who are available. An adverse inference cannot be

drawn for failure to call a witness when the prosecution has

discharged it burden............. As Yong Pung How CJ said in

Chua Keem Long v PP [1996] 1 SLR 510 at pg 523-524:

.........The court must hesitate to draw any such presumption

unless the witness not produced is essential to the

prosecution’s case.........”

From the evidence adduced by the 3 eye witnesses, the learned

sessions judge has found that the prosecution had made out a prima

facie case against the appellant for gang robbery after the close of the

prosecution’s case without calling the six passengers. The learned

sessions judge has rightly exercised her discretion not to make an

adverse finding against the prosecution for failing to call the six

11 passengers because in Chia Leong Foo’s case (supra) Augustine Paul

J. at page 666 d had accepted that there is no compulsion to draw a

presumption on such failure by observing:

“... the words “may presume” in presumptions of facts like in s.114

of the Evidence Act 1950 which only gives the court a discretion

to raise the presumptions contained therein.”

Section 134 of the evidence act 1950 states that no particular number

witnesses shall in any case be required for the proof of any fact.

The court is therefore in agreement with the prosecution, even if the

benefit of the doubt is given to the appellant and as such whatever

adverse inference that may be drawn may not be sufficient to rebut

and discredit the eye witnesses evidence to PW2, PW3 and PW4 that

it was the appellant that was at the scene of crime.

In other words even if the 6 passengers were to give evidence, it will

only for identifying the appellant at the scene and not as to the fact of

the other ingredients of the offence of gang robbery which will be from

PW2 and PW3.

.

Grounds 2 e and h.

Learned counsel for the appellant challenges the validity of the

identification parade conducted by the police. The prosecution pointed

it out that the appellant was identified at the dock before the court by

PW2.

The prosecution had referred to the case of Ong Poh Cheng v. PP

(1998) 4 CLJ 1 regarding the same issue of dock identification which

held:

“It does not follow, as a matter of course, that just because the

learned judge rejected the identification at the identification

parade, he must of necessity also reject the dock identification of

the appellant. The facts showed that the identification thereof

was rejected not because there was no identification of the

appellant as the robber but because there was defect in the

conduct of the parade. That being so, his rejection of the

evidence at the identification parade was in no way fatal to the

document identification of the appellant as the robber.”

The court agrees that even if the identification parade was defective

nevertheless the victims of the crime PW2 (at line 1 of page 22 ROA

and line 25 page 18 ROA) and PW3 (at line 20 of page 30 ROA) had

identified and proved to the satisfaction of the learned sessions judge

that the appellant was the perpetrator of the crime and accepted it as

such.

.

Ground 2 f and g.

Learned counsel for the appellant because the appellant was

unrepresented was not the appraised of the 3 options available by the

court to the appellant after defence was called and the consequences

thereof.

Ground 2 g on the failure to explain the consequences of the mitigation

plea thereby occasioning a miscarriage of justice was withdrawn by

learned counsel for the appellant.

The court notes that the appellant had advanced the defence of total

denial and as such thereafter he continued his defence to deny and

maintain no knowledge of the incident. When we read NOP at page 44

from lines 6 – 23, the accused had finally said “saya sudah cuba tapi

tidak tahu apa lagi yang saya mahu jawab (I try but I don’t know what

else to answer)” meaning the sessions court had properly explained

and discharged its duty in explaining the three options available to the

appellant but nonetheless he chose not to give evidence voluntarily at

all and closed his defence.

.

Ground 2 i.

Learned counsel contends that exhibits tendered were not read or

explained to the appellant.

The prosecution had pointed out the exhibits were the photographs an

identification report and other documents which are inconsequential.

The court agrees that even without these exhibits the identification of

the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime were through the oral

evidence of PW2 and PW3 which remained unrebutted and which

identification of the appellant was supported by the evidence of PW4.

.

Conclusion

The court having considered the grounds in the petition of appeal and

hearing the submissions by the learned counsel for the appellant and

the prosecution would dismiss this appeal.

SGD.

Y.A. TUAN JOHN KO WAI SENG

JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER

TAWAU HIGH COURT

6 DATE: 13TH JANUARY 2011 @ 9.00 AM

Counsel:

For the Appellant: Mr. Muhammad Bin Abdul Karim

Messrs Johari & Zelika

Advocates and Solicitors

Lahad Datu.

For the Respondent: Mr. Shukor Abu Bakar

Deputy Public Prosecutor

Attorney-General Chambers Malaysia

Tawau, Sabah.

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