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High Court of Sabah and Sarawak |
] [Hide Context] 13 “That you with another one who is still at large on 30th July 2008, at about
2.35pm, in a red Proton Iswara Aeroback, Registration number SD4299B, at Kampung Jawa Road, in Lahad Datu, in the State of Sabah, with common intention did commit gang robbery on a gold necklace owned by Lee Khyun Yin, maykad number: 490705-12-5044, in that you had committed an offence under section 395 of the Penal Code.” The appellant was found guilty and convicted and sentence to 8 years imprisonment from the date of arrest and with 3 stroke of whipping. The appellant being dissatisfied with the decision of the sessions court has filed an appeal and the petition of appeal has set out the following grounds:| . | Grounds 2 a, c, and d. | |
The appellant contends the learned sessions judge had erred in finding | ||
a prima facie case against the appellant despite material discrepancies | ||
of the evidence. | ||
Learned counsel for the appellant had contended that because the | ||
appellant was unrepresented, and the fact that he repeatedly informed | ||
the sessions court that he knew nothing of this case and did not know | ||
what to say casts an extra duty on the court to ensure that the | ||
appellant had a fair trial. It was further submitted that the learned | ||
sessions judge had failed to conduct a maximum evaluation of | ||
evidence at the close of prosecution’s case because of the following | ||
discrepancies in the evidence:- | ||
(a) Date and Time of photographs | ||
Looking at the date and time of the photograph, it will appear to the | ||
court the explanation given by learned DPP that the intitulement of the | ||
photos purportedly taken at the exact time of the incident does not in | ||
any way detract from the evidence of PW2, PW3 and PW4 in regard to |
1 the timing of the incident that took place at 2.35 pm of July 30th, 2008.
It appearing that the photographer (PW1) had put in the actual time of the incident rather than the time the photo was taken. This is a minor discrepancy that would not materially affect the finding of a case to answer, since the photographer (PW1) was not an eye witness to the incident. (b) Discrepancies in the evidence of PW2, PW3 and PW4. The next issue relates to the car used by the appellant which learned counsel for the appellant pointed out was identified as red with black accessories and numbered “SD 4299”: (i) in Exhibit P4 the First Information Report of PW2 the victim, and her examination in chief (at line 15 of page 14 ROA); and (ii) in PW3’s examination in chief (at line 12 of page 25 ROA); but the red proton saga car produced by the prosecution was numbered “SD 4299B” and therefore totally different, see Exhibit P1 (7) and Exhibit P2 (1-6). PW4 on the other hand in his examination in chief had identified the appellant’s car as bearing registration number “SD 4299B” (at line 25 of page 23 ROA) and further confirmed the photographs of the car in Exhibit P1 (7) and Exhibit P2 (1-6) was that of the appellant. PW4 also confirmed that the person in Exhibit P2 is himself (at line 7 of page 33 ROA). The missing “B” from the number of the car is not of such a material discrepancy on the facts of this case for the following reasons. If we view Exhibit P1 (7) it shows PW2 pointing to the car as identifying SD 4299B as the vehicle used by the appellant notwithstanding that Exhibit P1 index identified the car at paragraph 7 as “SD 4299”. PW2 also confirmed in examination in chief and had identified that the car bearing registration number SD 4299B in Exhibit P1 (7) was the one used by the appellant (at line 24 of page 22 ROA). This minor discrepancy of the missing “B” alone with all the weight of PW2, PW3 and PW4’s evidence of physical identification of the red car with black accessories used by the appellant in this Court’s view is not sufficient to upset the learned sessions’ judge finding that a prima facie case had been made out. (c) Acceptance of PW4’s evidence not in First Information Report On this ground learned counsel for the appellant submitted that PW4 was never mentioned by PW2 in her First Information Report (FIR) (Exhibit P4) nor did PW4 make a FIR and his evidence should not have been accepted by the sessions court.21 The cases of PP vs. Fong Chee Cheong (1970) 1 MLJ 97 and
Balachandran v PP (2005) 2 MLJ 301 already accepts that no FIR or any inconsistency in the FIR is not always fatal to a case as it is not treated as substantive evidence.4 In Herchun Singh & Ors v PP (1969) 2 MLJ 209, Ong Hock Thye CJ
(M) (at page 211F) cited with approval the following extract from Sohoni’s Commentary of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code (16th Edition Vol. 1, page 750): “.......... All that is required for purpose of this section is that there should be clear, definite information about the commission of a cognizable offence to set the investigation machinery in motion. Further, the information required need not contain the circumstances of the commission of the offence, nor the names of the offenders or the witnesses, for the main purpose of investigation is to ascertain these matters .... The first information report is not an Encyclopaedia. It is not the beginning and ending of every case. It is only a complaint to set the affairs of law and order in motion. It is only at the investigation stage that all the details can be gathered and fill up. But it cannot be said that omission in the first information report would always be of no significance. The report is not substantive evidence and omissions in it will not ipso facto lead to the case being thrown out. But it is a piece of corroborative evidence; omissions in it will, other things being the same, deprive the prosecution of the most valuable corroboration and thereby make the story suspicious. When a first information report contains an omission as to an important fact relied upon by the prosecution, the omission is important and in the absence of any other evidence, the court may in a given case refuse to consider the evidence of the informant on that fact because of such omission. For a correct appraisal of the effect of omission as contradicting the informant it is essential to keep in view the circumstances in which the report was lodged. For instance, an omission in a report hurriedly lodged under the press of events should not have the same significance as one in a report lodged after cool calculation.” And Ong CJ (M) went further to add at page 211B (ibid): “...it is wrong to hold up the first information report as a sure touchstone by which the complainant’s credit may invariably be impeached. It can only be used for that purpose with discrimination, in much the same way as previous statements by the witness are used, so that irrelevant errors in detail are not1 given exaggerated importance, nor omissions, objectively
considered in the light of surrounding circumstances.” (Emphasis added) The learned sessions judge had not erred in not considering that the FIR (Exhibit P4) did not mention PW4 as it was meant to kick start the robbery report against the appellant. Neither is there any necessity in law for PW4 to make a separate FIR in order for his evidence to be admissible in the trial of the appellant, the key requirement being whether it is relevant to the issues to be tried before the sessions court. (d) Not represented accused Lastly, learned counsel for the appellant proposes that where an unrepresented accused is being tried, this casts an extra duty on the court to ensure that the appellant had a fair trial. In as much as the court has to be fair to all accused whether represented or not, the court also has to consider the public interest represented by the learned DPP. If this extra duty is considered as bias in favour of the accused who is unrepresented by the court then it is wrong as it will offend the interests of Justice not to say all accused who are represented by counsel who will not be extended such a favour. This “extra duty” if any should be one of fairness to see that justice is done by the court to all parties before it and not merely to an unrepresented accused. In this respect there is nothing from the notes of proceedings or hergrounds of decision to fault the conduct of the trial of the appellant | ||
before the learned sessions judge. | ||
| . | Grounds 2 b. | |
The appellant contends that the failure to call the 6 passengers of | ||
PW4, should result in adverse inference being drawn by the sessions | ||
court against the prosecution under section 114(g) of the Evidence Act. | ||
The prosecution contends that this immaterial. | ||
On the drawing of adverse inference for the prosecution’s failure to call | ||
the 6 passengers, the court notes that it is the prosecution’s discretion | ||
to decide who to call as witness so long as he discharges his duty to | ||
make out a prima facie case. | ||
In Chia Leong Foo v PP (2000) 4 CLJ 649, Augustine Paul J at page | ||
| g had observed: | ||
“It is well settled that in a criminal case prosecuting counsel, | ||
provided there is no wrong motive, has discretion as to whether | ||
or not to call any particular witness and in particular has a | ||
discretion not to call in support of his case a witness whom he | ||
does not believe to be a witness of truth (see Khoon Chye Hin v. | ||
PP [1961] MLJ 105). But there is an obligation on the prosecution | ||
to call as witnesses persons whose evidence is essential to |
1936] 3 All ER 36
). Thus as Abdul Hamid CJ3 (Malaya) (as he then was) said in Teoh Hoe Chye v. PP [1987] 1
MLJ 220 at p. 229: Nevertheless, the decision whether to call or not to call a witness including a witness from whom a statement has been taken is always the right of the prosecution (Abdullah Zawawi v. PP [1985] 2 MLJ 16). Insofar as the trial court is concerned, its duty is essentially to decide whether on the evidence before it the prosecution has proved its case, and if there are unsatisfactory features in the prosecution case to determine whether, in the light of such feature, the prosecution case fell short of proof beyond reasonable14 doubt (Abdullah Zawawi’s case, supra).
Thus the question to be asked in each case is whether the prosecution has proved its case even without calling some other witnesses who are available. An adverse inference cannot be drawn for failure to call a witness when the prosecution has discharged it burden............. As Yong Pung How CJ said in Chua Keem Long v PP [1996] 1 SLR 510 at pg 523-524: .........The court must hesitate to draw any such presumption unless the witness not produced is essential to the prosecution’s case.........” From the evidence adduced by the 3 eye witnesses, the learned sessions judge has found that the prosecution had made out a prima facie case against the appellant for gang robbery after the close of the prosecution’s case without calling the six passengers. The learned sessions judge has rightly exercised her discretion not to make an adverse finding against the prosecution for failing to call the six11 passengers because in Chia Leong Foo’s case (supra) Augustine Paul
J. at page 666 d had accepted that there is no compulsion to draw a presumption on such failure by observing: “... the words “may presume” in presumptions of facts like in s.114 of the Evidence Act 1950 which only gives the court a discretion to raise the presumptions contained therein.” Section 134 of the evidence act 1950 states that no particular number witnesses shall in any case be required for the proof of any fact. The court is therefore in agreement with the prosecution, even if the benefit of the doubt is given to the appellant and as such whatever adverse inference that may be drawn may not be sufficient to rebutand discredit the eye witnesses evidence to PW2, PW3 and PW4 that | ||
it was the appellant that was at the scene of crime. | ||
In other words even if the 6 passengers were to give evidence, it will | ||
only for identifying the appellant at the scene and not as to the fact of | ||
the other ingredients of the offence of gang robbery which will be from | ||
PW2 and PW3. | ||
| . | Grounds 2 e and h. | |
Learned counsel for the appellant challenges the validity of the | ||
identification parade conducted by the police. The prosecution pointed | ||
it out that the appellant was identified at the dock before the court by | ||
PW2. | ||
The prosecution had referred to the case of Ong Poh Cheng v. PP | ||
(1998) 4 CLJ 1 regarding the same issue of dock identification which | ||
held: | ||
The court agrees that even if the identification parade was defective | ||
nevertheless the victims of the crime PW2 (at line 1 of page 22 ROA | ||
and line 25 page 18 ROA) and PW3 (at line 20 of page 30 ROA) had | ||
identified and proved to the satisfaction of the learned sessions judge | ||
that the appellant was the perpetrator of the crime and accepted it as | ||
such. | ||
| . | Ground 2 f and g. | |
Learned counsel for the appellant because the appellant was | ||
unrepresented was not the appraised of the 3 options available by the | ||
court to the appellant after defence was called and the consequences | ||
thereof. | ||
Ground 2 g on the failure to explain the consequences of the mitigation | ||
plea thereby occasioning a miscarriage of justice was withdrawn by | ||
learned counsel for the appellant. | ||
The court notes that the appellant had advanced the defence of total | ||
denial and as such thereafter he continued his defence to deny and |
maintain no knowledge of the incident. When we read NOP at page 44 | ||
from lines 6 – 23, the accused had finally said “saya sudah cuba tapi | ||
tidak tahu apa lagi yang saya mahu jawab (I try but I don’t know what | ||
else to answer)” meaning the sessions court had properly explained | ||
and discharged its duty in explaining the three options available to the | ||
appellant but nonetheless he chose not to give evidence voluntarily at | ||
all and closed his defence. | ||
| . | Ground 2 i. | |
Learned counsel contends that exhibits tendered were not read or | ||
explained to the appellant. | ||
The prosecution had pointed out the exhibits were the photographs an | ||
identification report and other documents which are inconsequential. | ||
The court agrees that even without these exhibits the identification of | ||
the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime were through the oral | ||
evidence of PW2 and PW3 which remained unrebutted and which | ||
identification of the appellant was supported by the evidence of PW4. | ||
| . | Conclusion | |
The court having considered the grounds in the petition of appeal and | ||
hearing the submissions by the learned counsel for the appellant and | ||
the prosecution would dismiss this appeal. |
6 DATE: 13TH JANUARY 2011 @ 9.00 AM
Counsel: For the Appellant: Mr. Muhammad Bin Abdul Karim Messrs Johari & Zelika Advocates and Solicitors Lahad Datu. For the Respondent: Mr. Shukor Abu Bakar Deputy Public Prosecutor Attorney-General Chambers Malaysia Tawau, Sabah. [Context
] [Hide Context]
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