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District Court of Singapore |
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Wang Ding v Chong Koi Pin
[2006] SGDC 244 |
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DC Suit 293/2004, DA 35/2006, 39/2006 |
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01 Nov 2006 |
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District Court |
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Kathryn Low Lye Fong |
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Eric Liew Hwee Tong (Gabriel Law Corporation) for the plaintiff, Renuka Chettiar and Cheah Saing Chong (Karuppan Chettiar & Partners) for the defendant |
Judgment
1 November 2006
District Judge Low Lye Fong Kathryn
Background
1 The plaintiff, Wang Ding is a Chinese National who was a pedestrian. The defendant, Chong Koi Pin was the authorized
driver of a taxi bearing registration number SHB 3700M. The plaintiff had pleaded in the statement of claim when the writ was filed
in January 2004, that he was crossing Kim Seng Road on 3 November 2003 at about 8.46am when the taxi that was driven by the defendant
collided into him, causing him to suffer injuries and damages. He claimed that the accident was caused or contributed to by the
defendant’s negligence.
2 About 10 days before the commencement of the trial, the plaintiff applied for and obtained leave to amend the statement
of claim. He pleaded in the amended statement of claim that he had left the Ministry of Manpower’s office at Kim Seng Road
at the material time, and was walking towards a bus stop situated along Kim Seng Road opposite Great World City shopping centre,
where part of the pedestrian walkway leading to the bus stop was partially obstructed. As a result, he was compelled to walk along
Kim Seng Road on the extreme left lane, facing the direction of the traffic, when the taxi collided into him.
3 The defendant claimed that while the taxi was travelling along the extreme left lane of Kim Seng Road near the unnamed
road next to Kim Seng Plaza, the plaintiff had emerged from the defendant’s right suddenly and without warning, with his back
to the traffic. The defendant could not avoid colliding into the plaintiff despite having sounded his horn, applying the brakes
and swerving to avoid the plaintiff. He pleaded that the accident was caused or contributed to by reason of the negligence on the
part of the plaintiff whilst crossing Kim Seng Road.
4 The trial proceeded solely on the issue of liability for the accident. At the end of the trial, I found the defendant’s
liability for the accident was 40%, with the plaintiff’s contribution being 60 %.
5 Both parties have appealed against the whole of the decision relating to the apportionment of liability for the accident.
The plaintiff’s case
The evidence of Wang Ding, PW1
6 The plaintiff Wang Ding, PW1 affirmed an affidavit of evidence-in chief on 26 August 2004 (the “1
st
AEIC”) and a supplemental affidavit of evidence-in-chief on 4 April 2006 (the “2
nd
AEIC”).
7 He stated in his 1
st
AEIC that he was in the vicinity of Kim Seng Road, visiting a branch office of the Ministry of Manpower (the “MOM”) on
3 November 2003 at 8.46am for his employment pass purposes. He was at the time employed by a company called Fine Sheetmetal Technologies
Pte Ltd holding a valid employment pass at PBD21 which was to expire on 28 June 2005. He had been offered a job at another company
which was subject to the approval by the relevant authorities. He stated that as a result of the accident, he could not work with
the new company and was issued with a special pass by the MOM at PBD23. He also stated in his 1
st
AEIC that when he regained consciousness at the Singapore General Hospital, he vaguely remembered having been collided into from
behind.
8 The plaintiff stated in his 2
nd
AEIC which was affirmed some one and a half years later that he had since June 2005, started recalling the events on the day of the
accident. He claimed that he was attending at the MOM at Kim Seng Road on 3 November 2003 and had planned to return to China for
a short holiday before commencing employment with a new employer. He had bought his air tickets and planned to proceed to the airport
after the interview with the MOM officer. He stated in paragraph 5 of the affidavit that he had completed attending at the MOM and
left after taking a short rest at the lobby of the office. He then proceeded to walk out to Kim Seng Road to take a bus from the
bus stop situated opposite the Great World City shopping centre. He claimed that there was no necessity for him to cross Kim Seng
Road as the bus stop was situated on the same side of the road as the MOM office. However, as he approached the junction of the
road leading from the MOM office to Kim Seng Road, he noticed that there were some construction or piping works underway and that
part of the pedestrian walkway leading to the bus stop had been cordoned off by road barriers. As a result, he had to step onto
the edge of the extreme left lane of Kim Seng Road in order to get to the bus stop that was further down the road. He claimed that
the taxi collided into him as he was walking towards the bus stop while pulling his trolley bag with his right arm. He stated that
apart from recalling the events on the day of the accident, he still had great difficulty recalling other things.
9 He took a different stance in court when he stated that he had attended at the MOM office on the day of the accident to
assist in investigations relating to his employer who was having some problems with the MOM. Contrary to his evidence in paragraph
4 of his 2
nd
AEIC where he stated that he had intended to proceed to the airport after attending at the MOM office at Kim Seng Road, he claimed
that he was at the airport in the early hours of 3 November 2003 when he was asked to assist in investigations by the MOM. He was
then brought from the airport to the MOM office at Kim Seng Road by three MOM officers. He was unable to explain the discrepancy
with his evidence in the 2
nd
AEIC, which was allegedly made after he had started to recall the events on the day of the accident. He merely stated that he could
not remember the matters stated in paragraph 4 of the 2
nd
affidavit. However, he claimed that he could remember that he was proceeding to the bus stop situated opposite the Great World shopping
centre as stated in paragraph 5 of the same affidavit. He failed to produce his airline ticket to show that his flight was scheduled
at about 2.00 am on the morning of 3 November 2003, although he claimed that he had previously given it to his counsel.
10 The plaintiff’s oral evidence was that he was brought to the MOM office at about 3.00am on the morning of 3 November
2003. He also claimed that he was given the letter dated 3 November 2003 at exhibit marked ‘P1’ when he was at the MOM
office before the accident and was asked to go back to the MOM office on 4 November 2003. He then claimed contrary to his earlier
evidence, that his airline ticket and employment pass or permit were taken away from him by the MOM officer who told him to return
to the office on 4 November 2003 before the accident. He could not produce his passport when asked to do so by the defendant’s
counsel and stated that he had not been able to locate it since the day of the accident. However, he was certain that he had his
passport with him at the time of the accident. He claimed that the special pass that was issued to him by the MOM on 4 November
2003 while he was still in hospital was given to him by an MOM officer after his discharge.
11 The plaintiff claimed that he could not recall how the accident had happened after the accident and that he only started
to recall the events on the day of the accident sometime in June 2005. When he was confronted by his evidence in his 1
st
AEIC and his affidavit in support of his application for interim payment made in March 2005 where he had stated that he vaguely remembered
having been collided from behind, he merely stated that he could not remember clearly. He also claimed that he could not remember
stating in the 1
st
AEIC that he was visiting the MOM office on the day of the accident for the purpose of his employment pass. He claimed that he
had sought treatment for amnesia after the accident but was unable to produce any medical record in this regard.
12 The plaintiff’s evidence was that the accident had happened before the taxi had reached the junction of the road
leading to Kim Seng Plaza, at the spot marked ‘x’ in blue on the sketch plan marked as exhibit ‘D1’. He
disputed that the accident had occurred in the vicinity of Kim Seng Promenade as indicated in his report to the Traffic Police at
PBD1 to PBD2.
The defendants’ case
The evidence of Chong Koi Pin, DW1
13 The defendant Chong Koi Pin, DW1 was the driver of motor taxi registration number SHB 3700M. He affirmed an affidavit
of evidence-in-chief on 22 June 2005 and a supplementary affidavit of evidence-in-chief on 26 April 2006.
14 He stated that he was travelling along the extreme left lane of Kim Seng Road which has four lanes on 3 November 2003 at
about 8.42am with a passenger, Gerald Mackenzie, DW2 in his taxi. The passenger had boarded his taxi at Regency Park. As the passenger
had forgotten his wallet, he had driven back to Regency Park for him to retrieve his wallet. His evidence was that the vehicles
travelling on the other three lanes of Kim Seng Road were moving slowly but there was no congestion on the extreme left lane where
he was driving at a normal speed of about 50 kmph. He claimed that the plaintiff had emerged suddenly from the right and crossed
the path of the taxi. He stated in his supplementary affidavit that the traffic in the three lanes to the right of his taxi at the
time was stop and go, which may have presented pedestrians with opportunities to cross the road when the occasion arose. He also
stated that the vehicles to the right of his taxi had blocked his view of any emerging pedestrians. Therefore, by the time he saw
the plaintiff who had emerged suddenly and dashed across his path, he did not have any reasonable opportunity of avoiding the accident.
15 His oral evidence was that the plaintiff had his back facing the traffic as he was crossing the road at an angle. He claimed
that he had sounded his horn to alert the plaintiff but to no avail. He tried to swerve the taxi to the right and jammed on the
brakes to try to avoid colliding into the plaintiff but was unable to stop in time. The taxi collided into the legs of the plaintiff,
who was flung onto the windscreen of his taxi. The plaintiff then fell from the windscreen to the ground. He explained that the
damage was to the left of his windscreen as the plaintiff had passed the mid point of the front of his taxi at the time and he had
swerved his taxi to the right to avoid the collision. He claimed that the plaintiff had failed to use the overhead bridge which
was a short distance from the site of the accident.
16 It was his evidence that the accident had occurred at the spot marked ‘x’ in black on the sketch plan at exhibit
‘D1’. He did not notice if there were any barriers or obstructions on the left side of the road just before the spot
that he had marked. The defendant had accepted the offer of composition from the Traffic Police for careless driving on 16 February
2005 as shown at PBD180. It was his evidence that both he and the passenger, DW2 alighted from the taxi to check on the pedestrian
after the collision. He then asked a passer-by to call for an ambulance. The passenger stayed at the scene of the accident until
after the Traffic Police officers had arrived. It was his evidence that his brother-in-law had taken the photographs at DBD8 and
DBD9 which showed the damage to his taxi at Kim Seng Road on 3 November 2003, after the accident.
17 Under cross-examination, he denied the suggestion that the extreme left lane of Kim Seng Road on which his taxi was travelling
was smooth flowing as it was a designated bus lane at the time of the accident. He also denied that he was travelling at a speed
of more than 50 kmph and that the plaintiff was walking along the left side of the road at the material time as the pedestrian pavement
was obstructed.
The evidence of Gerald Mackenzie, DW2
18 Gerald Mackenzie, DW2 is a permanent resident who has been residing in Singapore for approximately four years. He had
boarded the taxi bearing registration number SHB 3700M from his residence at Regency Park on 3 November 2003 at about 8.45am. He
was seated at the rear of the taxi driven by the defendant and was on his way to his office at Raffles Place. He also stated that
the taxi had to return to Regency Park after they were on their way, when he realised that he had forgotten his wallet. However,
he did not recall that he was running late for work that morning and denied that he had instructed the defendant to rush him on his
way. His evidence was that generally he was not required to be at the office by a particular time.
19 He stated in his affidavit of evidence-in-chief that the taxi was travelling in the extreme left lane of Kim Seng Road
which has four lanes at a normal speed. The traffic in the other lanes had slowed down due to heavy traffic. His evidence was that
when the taxi was at or near Great World City shopping centre, he noticed the traffic to the right of the taxi stopped abruptly.
He then saw the plaintiff emerging from behind the vehicle which was immediately on the right of the taxi and crossed the path of
the taxi.
20 Under cross-examination, he stated that the taxi was travelling at a normal speed as there was no traffic in front of it
on the extreme left lane. The traffic in the other lanes on the right was more congested and was travelling at a slow speed. But
they could have slowed down abruptly to avoid the plaintiff who was crossing the road. He was reading while seated in the left rear
seat of the taxi when he noticed that the vehicles on the lanes to the right were slowing down abruptly. He stopped reading, looked
up and saw the plaintiff emerging from behind the vehicle immediately to the right of the taxi. The plaintiff was running and carrying
a small trolley bag as he tried to cross the road. He was positive that the plaintiff was crossing from the right to the left and
not walking along the extreme left lane of Kim Seng Road as alleged. He estimated that the plaintiff was about one car length from
the taxi when he first emerged from behind the vehicle on the right.
21 His evidence was that the defendant had applied the brakes and also probably tried to swerve to the right in trying to
avoid the collision. He stated that the taxi could not have swerved to the left as it would have mounted the kerb. The taxi had
collided into the legs of the plaintiff, who was thrown onto the taxi. According to him, the accident had taken place on Kim Seng
Road, next to Kim Seng Plaza at the spot where he marked with a circle in blue on the top photograph at DBD10. He was unable to
recall if there were any construction works that had obstructed the pavement on the left of the road at the time. He disagreed that
the extreme left lane of the road was designated as a bus lane at the time.
22 After the collision, both he and the defendant alighted from the taxi to check on the plaintiff and call for an ambulance.
He remained at the scene until after the Traffic Police officers had arrived and the ambulance had taken the plaintiff to the hospital.
Issue of liability of the defendant
23 The plaintiff claimed that on 3 November 2003 at about 8.46am, he had left the MOM office and was walking towards a bus
stop situated along Kim Seng Road opposite Great World City shopping centre, where part of the pedestrian walkway leading to the
bus stop was partially obstructed. He was compelled to walk along the extreme left lane of Kim Seng Road with the left side of his
body facing outwards and he was facing the direction of the traffic, when he was collided into by the taxi driven by the defendant.
He alleged that his injuries were caused and/or contributed to by the defendant’s negligence and pleaded in the particulars
of negligence of the defendant that the defendant had:
a) failed to keep a proper lookout;
b) driven at an excessive speed;
c) failed to give any or any adequate warning of his approach;
d) failed to stop, swerve and/or steer aside in any way so as to avoid colliding into the plaintiff;
e) failed to apply his brakes in time or at all upon seeing the plaintiff; and
f) collided into the plaintiff.
24 The defendant denied that the plaintiff was walking along Kim Seng Road on the extreme lane facing the direction of the
traffic at the time of the accident. He alleged that while travelling on the extreme left lane of Kim Seng Road at the material
time, the plaintiff had suddenly and without warning, with his back to the traffic, emerged from the defendant’s right and
crossed the path of his taxi. Despite sounding his horn, applying the brakes and swerving to avoid the plaintiff, the defendant
could not avoid the collision. He alleged that the accident was caused by and/or contributed to by reason of the negligence on the
part of the plaintiff whilst crossing Kim Seng Road.
25 The main issues that had to be determined were:
a) Whether the plaintiff was walking on the extreme left lane of Kim Seng Road towards the bus stop opposite Great World
City shopping centre or crossing the road from the right to the left when he was collided into by the defendant; and
b) Was the accident caused by the negligence of the defendant and if so, did the plaintiff contribute to the accident in
any way and the proportion of liability they should each bear respectively.
My Findings
a) Whether the plaintiff was walking on the extreme left lane of Kim Seng Road towards the bus stop opposite Great World
City shopping centre or crossing from the right to the left side of Kim Seng Road when he was collided into by the defendant
26 The plaintiff’s counsel submitted that the plaintiff’s version of the accident was more credible for the following
reasons:
a) The vehicle damage report of the defendant’s taxi at PBD181 and the photographs of the taxi at DBD8 and DBD9 show
that the left side of the windscreen of the defendant’s taxi was shattered, which would be consistent with the left side of
the defendant’s taxi having collided into the plaintiff while he was walking along the extreme left lane of Kim Seng, facing
the direction of the traffic; and
b) The plaintiff’s oral evidence in court was that he had visited the MOM office and obtained the letter dated 3 November
2003 at exhibit marked ‘P1’ before he met with the accident. He claimed that he was brought to the MOM office at Kim
Seng Plaza by three MOM officers from the airport in the early hours of the morning and was on his way home at the material time.
He therefore, had no reason to cross the road from the right side of the taxi towards the left.
27 The plaintiff’s counsel submitted that the defendant’s version was inconsistent in that if the plaintiff had
emerged from the front of the van on the right of the taxi suddenly, the plaintiff could not have been able to cross to the left
of the taxi before the collision. The defendant was also unable to stop the taxi in time, despite having sounded his horn, applied
his brakes and veered to the right. It was submitted that if the plaintiff had emerged from the right, the defendant would have
instinctively steered to the left instead of the right to try to avoid colliding into the plaintiff.
28 The plaintiff’s counsel also submitted that the defendant must have been driving at an excessive speed in the circumstances,
as the vehicles on the other lanes were travelling at a slow speed, while the defendant was travelling at a speed of 50 kmph. Further,
it could be inferred from the severe injuries suffered by the plaintiff and the fact that the windscreen was shattered, that the
taxi was not travelling at a slow speed. The defendant was unable to explain why traffic in the extreme left lane was smooth flowing,
while the other three lanes were congested and travelling at between 10 to 20 kmph. It was suggested that the extreme left lane
of Kim Seng Road was designated as a bus lane at the time. It was submitted that the defendant had been negligent in the control
of his vehicle by driving at too fast a speed even if the extreme left lane was not designated as a bus lane when his view could
be obstructed, as it was by a van. The plaintiff’s counsel also highlighted that the defendant had compounded the offence
of careless driving and paid the fine on 16 February 2005. He has also admitted that he was previously penalised for failing to
give way to the traffic police and given 6 demerit points.
29 The defendant’s counsel on the other hand, submitted that the plaintiff has not been forthright in his evidence and
has been giving conflicting versions in his affidavits and his evidence in court. He had pleaded in the original statement of claim
that he was crossing Kim Seng Road when the taxi collided into him. He stated in his 1
st
AEIC affirmed on 26 August 2004 that he “vaguely remembers being collided into from behind”. He had informed Dr Yeo
Poh Teck when he attended for consultation on 3 September 2004 as stated in paragraph 4 at PBD161 that he was standing by the roadside
when a taxi suddenly hit him from the back. In his 2
nd
AEIC which was filed in April 2006, after the exchange of affidavits, he alleged that he started regaining his memory in June 2005.
He recalled that he had attended at the MOM office at Kim Seng Road for an interview and planned to proceed straight to the airport
to travel to China after the interview. He stated that he was proceeding to the bus stop and as the pedestrian walkway leading to
the bus stop was obstructed, he was compelled to walk on the left lane of Kim Seng Road facing the direction of the traffic. He
was then collided into by the defendant. The plaintiff changed his evidence again under cross-examination and said that he was fetched
by three MOM officers from the airport to the MOM office at Kim Seng Road on 3 November 2003 at 3.00am. He also claimed that he
had received the letter dated 3 November 20003 at exhibit ‘P1’ from an MOM officer on the same day, before the accident.
30 I agree with the defendant’s counsel that the plaintiff’s inconsistent versions of the accident did little
for his credibility. It was noted that although he claimed that he had been able to recall the events on the day of the accident
since June 2005, his oral evidence was different from his 2
nd
AEIC which was affirmed in April 2006. The letter from the MOM at exhibit ‘P1’ did not indicate that the plaintiff had
attended at the office on 3 November 2003, before the accident. It merely indicated that the plaintiff was to attend at the MOM
office on 4 November 2003 to produce two passport size photographs and collect a special pass. It was noted on the letter that the
plaintiff’s passport was impounded by the MOM. However, the plaintiff’s evidence was that he had his passport with him
at the time of the accident. Further, the plaintiff has failed to call any MOM officer to adduce evidence to confirm that he had
indeed attended at the MOM office on 3 November 2003 before the accident and when his passport was impounded. The plaintiff would
also have known that his airline ticket would support his evidence that he was taken from the airport to the MOM office in the early
hours on the morning, but failed to produce it.
31 Although the plaintiff has alleged that there were construction works obstructing the pavement along Kim Seng Road as he
was walking towards the bus-stop thereby forcing him to walk along the extreme left lane of the road, he has not adduced any evidence
to support his allegation that any works were underway at the material time. In fact, a careful examination of the top photograph
at DBD9 which was allegedly taken by the defendant’s brother-in-law on the day of the accident, would show that there were
pedestrians walking along the pavement next to the extreme left lane of Kim Seng Road just before the unnamed road leading to Kim
Seng Plaza where the plaintiff alleged was the spot where the collision had taken place.
32 The plaintiff has marked a spot just before the road next to Kim Seng as the site of the accident on the sketch plan from
the Traffic Police marked ‘D1’, while the defendant has marked a spot after the road in front of the building. DW2 has
also marked a spot after the road on the photograph at DBD10. It was noted that the bloodstain indicated on ‘D1’ is
further down the road, in front of Kim Seng Plaza. That spot would probably have been where the plaintiff had landed on the road
after the collision and is much closer to the spot marked by the defendant and DW2. It was therefore, more likely that the spot
where the defendant’s taxi had collided into the plaintiff was after the unnamed road next to Kim Seng Plaza.
33 The defendant’s witness, DW2 is a permanent resident who has stated in evidence under cross-examination that he was
not aware of having travelled on the defendant’s taxi before the date of the accident. He appeared to have been totally independent
and there would have been no reason for him to give false evidence under oath to assist the defendant in the matter. He was clear
that he had seen the plaintiff attempt to cross the path of the taxi from the right to the left of Kim Seng Road in front of Kim
Seng Plaza on the morning of 3 November 2003. His evidence was unshaken under cross-examination and even if the plaintiff had been
able to prove that he had attended at the MOM office some time before the accident, there was no reason to disbelieve DW2’s
evidence that at the time of the collision the plaintiff was crossing from the right to the left of Kim Seng Road and had dashed
across the path of the defendant’s taxi.
34 In the circumstances, I was satisfied on a balance of probability that the plaintiff was crossing from the right to the
left side of Kim Seng Road when he was collided into by the taxi driven by the defendant.
b) Was the accident caused by the negligence of the defendant and if so, did the plaintiff contribute to the accident in
any way and the proportion of liability they should each bear respectively
35 Having found that the plaintiff was crossing Kim Seng Road from the right side to the left, I had to determine if the accident
was caused by the defendant’s negligence.
36 The defendant’s counsel referred to the case of
Ng Weng Cheong v Soh Oh Loo & Anor
[1993]2 SLR 336. In the case, the appellant pedestrian had attempted to cross at a pedestrian crossing when the red man had come
on and the right turning signal for vehicles in the right lane was green. The respondent was unable to see the appellant until he
was about 12 feet from the stop line as his view of the pedestrian crossing was blocked by vehicles in the lanes on his left. The
Court of Appeal held that the respondent who was approaching a pedestrian crossing, had a duty to keep a proper lookout to see that
there are no pedestrians on it or about to enter it. Liability was apportioned at 30% on the part of the respondent driver. The
defendant’s counsel also referred to the case of
Sim Hau Yan v Ong Sio Beng
37 Kim Seng Road is a four-lane wide major road with an overhead bridge just before the bus stop opposite Great World City
shopping centre as is evident from the photographs at PBD130 to PBD135. On the morning of the accident, the defendant was travelling
along the extreme left lane of the road. The traffic on the lane was smooth flowing while the traffic along the three lanes to the
right of the defendant was slow moving. The defendant’s counsel submitted that there was no reason for the defendant to expect
any pedestrian to suddenly emerge from his right as he was not approaching any pedestrian crossing. In the circumstances, the collision
was unavoidable as the defendant’s view was blocked by the stationary traffic on his right and that the accident was solely
caused by the negligence of the plaintiff.
38 The plaintiff’s counsel submitted that even if the plaintiff was found to have dashed across the Kim Seng Road, the
defendant’s liability for the accident should at the lowest, be 50%. He referred to the case of
Ng Ng Mui v Ibrahim bin Mohamad
39 The plaintiff’s counsel also referred to the case of
Ang Kuang Hoe v Chia Chow Yew
40 I agree with the defendant’s counsel that the defendant’s acceptance of the offer of composition for careless
driving could not be taken as an admission of guilt. The effect of a composition was that no further action could be taken by the
prosecuting authority against the person who had accepted the offer on the offence compounded under s199A(5) of the Criminal Procedure
Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed).
41 The defendant claimed that he was travelling on the extreme left lane of Kim Seng Road at 50 kmph at the material time,
while traffic on the first three lanes was travelling at between 10 to 20 kmph. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was driving
at too fast a speed in the circumstances. It was suggested that the extreme left may have been designated as a bus lane at the time
but no evidence to that effect was adduced. This was refuted by both the defendant and DW2 who were supported by the photographs
at DBD8 and DBD9, which did not show a continuous line that would have been present if it was in fact a bus lane. Although the defendant
has stated that there was an overhead bridge for pedestrians nearby, no evidence was adduced as to the actual distance between the
spot where the collision was alleged to have occurred and the pedestrian bridge.
42 Although the traffic along that stretch of Kim Seng Road at that time of the morning was heavy, the plaintiff was entitled
to cross the road at that spot. DW2 has stated in evidence that the traffic on the lanes to the right of the taxi was travelling
slowly but had stopped abruptly just before he saw the plaintiff emerging from the front of a vehicle on the right. His attention
was drawn to the traffic condition although he was reading just before that, as the traffic had stopped abruptly. He surmised that
the drivers of the vehicles had done so to avoid colliding into the plaintiff. Yet, the defendant did not appear to have been alerted
by the abrupt braking of the drivers of the vehicles on the right of the taxi and continued at the speed he was travelling. He was
thus unable to take effective evasive action to avoid colliding into the plaintiff. He claimed that he had sounded his horn to alert
the plaintiff, applied his brakes and swerved right. DW2 could not recall if the defendant had sounded his horn. The defendant’s
evidence that the plaintiff was running with his back to the traffic was also not credible. DW2 stated that the plaintiff was running
while carrying a trolley bag from the right to the left of the road although he was not sure if he was running at an right angle.
He also said that the defendant had time to take some evasive action, but not much. I was satisfied that the defendant had failed
to keep a proper lookout and was probably travelling too fast in the circumstances, when traffic was generally congested.
43 I was also of the view that the plaintiff did not properly look out for oncoming traffic. He had attempted to cross a
busy four-lane road during the morning peak hours without first ensuring that it was safe for him to do so. Both the defendant and
DW2 have described how the plaintiff had appeared from the front of a vehicle that had stopped on the lane on the right of the taxi
and dashed across the path of the taxi. Belinda Ang Saw Ean J has in
Ang Kuang Hoe
’s case quoted the judgment of the High Court of Australia in
Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd
[1985] HCA 34; (1985) 59 ALR 529 at 632-533 as follows:
‘A finding on a question of apportionment is a finding upon a “question, not of principle or of positive findings of
fact or law, but of proportion, of balance and relative emphasis, and of weighing different considerations. It involves an individual
choice or discretion, as to which there may well be differences of opinion by different minds”:
British Fame (Owners) v Macgregor (Owners)
…
The making of an apportionment as between a plaintiff and a defendant of their respective shares in the responsibility for the damage
involves a comparison both of culpability, ie of the degree of departure from the standard of care of the reasonable man (
Pennington v Norris
[1956] HCA 26; (1956) 96 CLR 10 at 16) and of the relative importance of the acts of the parties in causing the damage:
Stapley v Gypsum Mines Ltd
44 Applying the same test, I was of the view that although the plaintiff was not attempting to cross at a pedestrian crossing
at a traffic junction against the light signal as in the case of
Ng Weng Cheong v Soh Oh Loo & Anor
, the plaintiff should bear a greater responsibility for the accident by virtue of the manner in which he had attempted to dash across
the road in heavy traffic. I therefore apportioned liability to the plaintiff at 60% and entered interlocutory judgment in his favour
against the defendant at 40% of the amount of damages to be assessed, with interests and costs reserved to the Registrar conducting
the assessment.
Judgment awarded to plaintiff for 40% of damages to be assessed
1953] UKHL 4; [1953] AC 663
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