District Court of Singapore

John Robertson Gillies v Suresh Balan (also known as Sureash Balan)
[2017] SGDC 324

Tort - defamation - publication

Tort - defamation - defamatory statements

Tort - defamation - qualified privilege

Tort - defamation - damages

8 December 2017

District Judge Chiah Kok Khun:

INTRODUCTION

1 This defamation case stems from a neighbours’ quarrel. There are of course better ways to resolve neighbourly disputes other than litigation. These alternative dispute resolution options are well publicised. It is therefore unfortunate that parties, and their advisers, did not avail themselves of such opportunities to settle their differences. Instead, they had allowed the dispute to escalate into a defamation suit. There are certainly better uses for the resources that a court case of this nature would entail. Moreover, it is unlikely that litigation would put an end to any of the underlying neighbourly issues behind the case.

2 Both the Plaintiff, Mr John Robertson Gillies and the Defendant, Mr Suresh Balan are long-time residents of a condominium development known as Camelot By-The-Water, at 110/112/114 Tanjong Rhu Road (“Condominium”). It is in an up-scale residential district located in the eastern part of Singapore. Both the Plaintiff and the Defendant have been living in the condominium for more than ten years.

3 The defamation claims made by the Plaintiff relate to events that took place at the Condominium on 22 and 24 June 2015; and a letter sent together with a report to the police by the Defendant on 24 June 2015. These events were in turn connected to the Plaintiff’s long standing unhappiness with the noise made by young children at the swimming pool of the Condominium. The Plaintiff is also known to have disagreements with residents and the council of the MCST over the dropping-off and picking-up of residents by vehicles along the driveway in the Condominium. The 22 June 2015 event happened near the swimming pool and the 24 June 2015 event happened at the door of the Defendant’s unit at the Condominium.

4 The background to these disagreements between the Plaintiff on the one part and the other residents and the MCST on the other were alluded to by a resident of the Condominium, Mr Torbjorn Gunnar Karsson (“Torbjorn”) who gave evidence as a subpoenaed witness at the trial. Torbjorn is another long-time resident of the Condominium and has been a council member of the MCST for about 10 years. He had given evidence from the perspective of a long-time council member of the MCST.

5 Torbjorn stated that he was not surprised at the event of 22 June 2015 which happened at the swimming pool. He said that speaking as council member of the MCST, in reference to the events in the present case, he “was not surprised that it had happened again because I think this was something that we expected that will happen one more time”. He further said that he expected further incident involving the Plaintiff “either around noise in the pool area or something related to the driveway”. He said that such incidents involving the Plaintiff “came and went in waves”. ^{[note: 1]}

6 Torbjorn has testified in court that the Plaintiff is “one of the most common topics in terms of the incidents that’s been occurring”.^{[note: 2]} He said that these incidents related particularly to parking in the driveway and noise around the swimming pool.^{[note: 3]} Torbjorn said that the Plaintiff had not been satisfied with the way the MCST has been dealing with pollution caused by vehicles in the driveway and noise from the swimming pool.^{[note: 4]} As a result, the Plaintiff “has taken situations into his own hand by either approaching guards or by approaching tenants or visitors, telling them how to follow instructions in the condo particularly around parking but also around noise in the pool.”^{[note: 5]}

7 Torbjorn testified that the complaints by residents against the Plaintiff included “pretty serious allegations about verbal abuse, actions taken like opening doors, shouting in through windows which many of the residents expressed personally to me and as well as in that specific council that this was an issue that they wanted us to address.”^{[note: 6]} He further testified in court that the MCST council members had “concerns around the fact that [the Plaintiff] had in the past threatened to sue us, individual council members, for defamation and for various things if we stay with these cases.”^{[note: 7]} Significantly, Torbjorn was not cross-examined by the Plaintiff’s counsel on his testimony in court.

8 Related to the Plaintiff’s disagreement with residents and the MCST, a police report was filed on 26 November 2013 by the Condominium manager at that time, one Ms Apple Seah (“Apple Seah”), who stated that the Plaintiff had told her that if he saw anyone stopping the person’s vehicle outside the fire engine access road, he would “come out from his unit and strangle the person”.^{[note: 8]} This was said to Apple Seah when she was supervising the putting up of signage along the driveway indicating pick-up and drop-off points. According to her police report, the Plaintiff had come out of his unit and tore down the signage which were put up. In another police report made on 17 May 2013, a chauffeur whose employer was a resident of the Condominium stated that he felt threatened and intimidated by an incident involving the Plaintiff, where the Plaintiff forced the chauffeur’s car door open, attempted to take the ignition key and shouted at the chauffeur aggressively.^{[note: 9]}

9 In a letter to the Honourable Member of Parliament for Mountbatten (“MP”), Mr Lim Biow Chuan, the MCST gave a brief background of the Plaintiff’s history of confronting motorists over dropping-off and picking-up of residents and visitors along the driveway of the Condominium. These confrontations have resulted in heated exchange of words; and complaints against the Plaintiff by more than 10 residents.^{[note: 10]} This letter was written in response to a letter from the MP, who was approached by the Plaintiff on the issue of pick-up and drop-off along the driveway outside his unit.^{[note: 11]}

10 The MCST has compiled a summary of the incidents involving the Plaintiff at the Condominium over 4 years from Jan 2012 to Feb 2015. ^{[note: 12]} It detailed thirteen incidents, including behaviour towards security guards and aggressive conduct when confronting residents and guests alighting from vehicles along the driveway. Torjorn confirmed in court that these incidents were brought to the attention of the MCST.^{[note: 13]}

11 Separately, in a letter dated 18 November 2015 sent to the residents of the Condominium,^{[note: 14]} the MCST alluded to multiple complaints in the preceding 4 years relating to the Plaintiff “behaving aggressively towards other residents, guests, children and worker at the Condominium”. The letter made reference to the subject of pick-up and drop-off along the driveway, noting that it was allowed, whether under the law or the bye-laws. The letter also made reference to the usage of the swimming pool, noting that noisy play is prohibited before 9am and after 7pm. The letter urged residents not to engage in aggressive and threatening behaviour “towards other residents, guests and children”. It stated that the MCST would protect its employees from “any verbal abuse, threat or harassment”. It also urged residents not to damage any estate signage, even if the person disagrees with any rules or signage that reflected these rules.

THE PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

12 With the above backdrop to the case as context, I turn to the Plaintiff’s claims and the events leading to his claims. The Plaintiff claimed that slanderous statements were made by the Defendant on 22 June 2015 (“the 22 June Statements”) and on 24 June 2015 (“the 24 June Statements”). He further claimed that libellous statements were made by the Defendant in the letter and report to the police which was copied to the MCST on 24 June 2015 (“the Further 24 June Statements”).

13 As alluded to above, the 22 June Statements related to a conversation that was taking place near the swimming pool of the Condominium. The Plaintiff pleaded in the statement of claim that the 22 June Statements made by the Defendant were:

13.1. “I know that you have hit guards here”;

13.2. “I have proof that you did this”.^{[note: 15]}

14 The Defendant on the other hand denied that those were the statements made during the conversation. He stated that he had said instead to the Plaintiff the following words:^{[note: 16]}

14.1. “John, you have had issues with the kids before”; and

14.2. “You have had issues with the residents in the past. Also the security guards”.

15 Whilst the parties disagree on the details of the sequence and timing of the various individuals joining the conversation in which the defamatory statements were said to be made, there is objective evidence of only the Plaintiff, his wife Gwen Margaret Gillies (“Gwen”), Ms Catherine Solange (“Catherine”), a French lady who was living at the Condominium at the time and the Defendant being present at the point when the defamatory statements were said to be made. This cannot be seriously disputed by the parties. By the Plaintiff’s own case,^{[note: 17]} the named individuals who heard the 22 June Statements comprised only Catherine and a security guard,^{[note: 18]} one Mr Sadek (“Sadek”). Sadek did not appear in court and there is no evidence of what he had heard of the conversation at the swimming pool on that day. No other residents appeared in court as the Plaintiff’s witnesses to state that they had heard the 22 June Statements. In respect of Gwen, the Plaintiff’s case is that she arrived at the scene and joined the conversation at a later stage. However, the Plaintiff’s case is that the 22 June Statements were uttered “numerous time”,^{[note: 19]} and therefore Gwen would have heard the 22 June Statements. Gwen gave evidence in court. Another witness, Mr Paul Chacko (“Paul”), gave evidence for the Defendant in regard to the 22 June Statements. As will be seen below, Paul arrived at the scene after the fact.

16 As for the 24 June Statements, they related to a conversation outside the door of the Defendant’s unit at the Condominium. The Plaintiff had gone to the Defendant’s unit at about 7am in the morning of 24 June 2015. He had in hand a letter asking the Defendant to retract the 22 June Statement. He wanted to hand over the letter to the Defendant. Besides the parties, the only other persons present at this conversation were the Defendant’s wife, Ms Shashi Bhaskar (“Shashi”) and a security guard, one Jeffrey. Jeffrey did not give any AEIC evidence nor did he appear at the trial. There is no evidence of what he had heard of the conversation at the Defendant’s unit on that day. The Plaintiff’s case is that the 24 June Statements were as follows:^{[note: 20]}

16.1. “I say this to you - if you go to the police I will report you to the police and press charges against you as a paedophile. I know that you have taken obscene photographs of children at the pool”.

16.2. “You should know that this man has hit a security guard at Camelot. You should know that this man has hit a pregnant woman at Camelot. You should know that this man has hit other people at Camelot”.

17 The Defendant, on the other hand denied making the 24 June Statements. His case is that he had refused to take the letter from the Plaintiff, walked away and left Shashi to deal with the Plaintiff. Shashi denied that the Defendant made the 24 June Statements.

18 In regard to the Further 24 June Statements, the words complained of are found in a letter dated 24 June 2015 sent by the Defendant to the Marine Parade Police Station; and copied to the MCST of the Condominium. The letter was in relation to the events of 22 to 24 June 2015. The Defendant had also made a police report in regard to the same matters referred to in the letter. Whilst the Plaintiff has pleaded that several sentences in the Further 24 June Statements were defamatory, he has proceeded on only one sentence at trial. This is clear in his opening statement and in his closing submissions.^{[note: 21]} The sentence in the Further 24 June Statements that the Plaintiff complained of is as follows:

“There have been several other complaints against John previously, which has been lodged at the Camelot Management Office including abusing children and taking photographs when they were playing at the pool.”

19 As mentioned above, the context of the Further 24 June Statements was a letter to the police, written by the Defendant about the events that took place between 22 June 2015 and 24 June 2015. Besides the sentence above, the Further 24 June Statements contained other sentences. Whilst the Plaintiff has not proceeded at trial on these sentences as being defamatory, they are in fact relevant to give the proper context to the sentence complained of. The Defendant had made, amongst others, the following statements in his report and letter to the police:

19.1. “This is when John intervened and started to accuse the children of being noisy and unruly and also threatened me.”

19.2. “When my wife told John that I was not at home, he threatened my wife and harassed her by telling, that he will call the police if I did not call back.”

19.3. “He accused me of assaulting him and again both threatened and harassed my wife and me.”

19.4. “John Gilles came to my house with a Camelot security guard, he shouted at me and accused me of insulting him and demanded for an apology.”

19.5. “I am lodging this report because if John Gillies kept coming to my house, I am worried of the safety of my wife and son.”

20 The Defendant’s case is that taken in context, the Further 24 June Statements are not defamatory. I will discuss the context of the Further 24 June Statements below. The Defendant also pleaded the defences of justification and privilege in respect of the Further 24 June Statements.

THE LAW

21 The ingredients of a cause of action in defamation is uncontroverted.^{[note: 22]} There are three essential elements required to sustain an action in defamation. These are:

21.1. a statement bearing a defamatory meaning;

21.2. publication to a third party; and

21.3. reference made to the plaintiff.

(See: Golden Season Pte Ltd v Kairos Singapore Holdings Pte Ltd [2015] 2 SLR 751 (“Golden Season”) at [34])

22 The claimant in a defamation case therefore have to show that the alleged defamatory words were defamatory of him. He also have to prove publication of the words and that the words referred to him.

Defamatory meaning

23 In regard to the first element, a statement is defamatory in nature if it:

23.1. lowers the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of the society generally or ordinary reasonable people;

23.2. causes the plaintiff to be shunned or avoided;

23.3. exposes the plaintiff to hatred, contempt or ridicule.

(Golden Season at [36]).

24 In Goh Chok Tong v Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin and Anor [1998] 2 SLR(R) 971 (“Goh Chok Tong”), the Court of Appeal held at [44] that the law of defamation is concerned with the meanings of the words conveyed to the ordinary man and ascribes two types of meanings to the words:

24.1. the natural and ordinary meaning; and

24.2. the innuendo meaning.

25 It was stated at [44] that the ordinary meaning is “derived from the words themselves, read or heard in their proper context and in the circumstances in which they were said, while the innuendo meaning is arrived at with the aid of extrinsic facts known to the ordinary man”.

26 In another case, Microsoft Corp v SM Summit Holdings Ltd [1999] 3 SLR(R) 465, the Court of Appeal set out succinctly the principles applicable in determining the natural and ordinary meaning of words in defamation actions, at [53]:-

“... The court decides what meaning the words would have conveyed to an ordinary, reasonable person using his general knowledge and common sense: Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v Goh Chok Tong [1984-1985] SLR 516; and Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v Lee Kuan Yew, supra. The test is an objective one: it is in the natural and ordinary meaning as understood by an ordinary, reasonable person, not unduly suspicious or avid for scandal. The meaning intended by the maker of the defamatory statement is irrelevant. Similarly, the sense in which the words were actually understood by the party alleged to have been defamed is also irrelevant. Nor is extrinsic evidence admissible in construing the words. The meaning must be gathered from the words themselves and in the context of the entire passage in which they are set out. The court is not confined to the literal or strict meaning of the words but takes into account what the ordinary, reasonable person may reasonably infer from the words. The ordinary reasonable person reads between the lines...”

27 In another Court of Appeal decision, Chan Cheng Wah Bernard v Koh Sin Chong Freddie [2012] 1 SLR 506 (“Chan Cheng Wah”) at [18] the rules applicable to the construction of words based on their natural and ordinary meanings are set out as follows:

27.1. the natural and ordinary meaning of a word is that which is conveyed to an ordinary reasonable person;

27.2. as the test is objective, the meaning which the defendant intended to convey is irrelevant;

27.3. the ordinary reasonable reader is not avid for scandal but can read between the lines and draw inferences;

27.4. where there are a number of possible interpretations, some of which may be non-defamatory, such a reader will not seize on only the defamatory one;

27.5. the ordinary reasonable reader is treated as having read the publication as a whole in determining its meaning, thus “the bane and the antidote must be taken together”; and

27.6. the ordinary reasonable reader will take note of the circumstances and manner of the publication.

Publication and reference

28 Turning to the next element, to establish publication, the defamatory words must have been communicated to a third party or parties who would reasonably understand the statement to be defamatory of the claimant.^{[note: 23]} As with meaning, the intention of the defendant is irrelevant. It did not matter that the defendant did not intend for the publication of the defamatory word to a third party. The question is rather, whether the publication of the defamatory words would in the ordinary course of events be published to a third party.^{[note: 24]}

29 The third element of defamation is reference. In order to satisfy the requirement of reference to the claimant, the claimant must show that a third party would reasonably understand the defamatory words to refer to the claimant.^{[note: 25]}

30 The above deals with whether a case in defamation is made out in law. Once defamation is established, the next stage is to determine if any of the defences apply. I will refer to the law in regard to defences in the course of the analysis of the evidence below.

ISSUES

31 In view of the foregoing, the issues in this case are as follows:

31.1. Were the 22 June Statements and the 24 June Statements published in reference to the Plaintiff?

31.2. If publication is proven, do the 22 June Statements and the 24 June Statements bear defamatory meanings?

31.3. If the above two issues are answered in the affirmative for the 22 June Statements and/or the 24 June Statements, as the claims are in the nature of slander, the question arises as to whether the claims are actionable per se, without the proof of special damage?

31.4. If so, are there any applicable defence?

31.5. In relation to the Further 24 June Statements:-

i. were the Further 24 June Statements published?

ii. do the Further 24 June Statements bear a defamatory meaning? and

iii. are there any applicable defences?

31.6. In the event defamation is made out and no defences apply, what is the appropriate quantum of damages which should be awarded to the Plaintiff?

WERE THE 22 JUNE STATEMENTS AND THE 24 JUNE STATEMENTS PUBLISHED?

The 22 June Statements

32 I begin with the 22 June Statements. The Plaintiff's case is that on 22 June 2015, at the swimming pool area of the Condominium, the Defendant shouted the 22 June Statements, and the 22 June Statements were heard by, among other persons, Catherine, Sadek, some children, and other persons near the Condominium's swimming pool area. As the Defendant is said to have repeated the 22 June Statements, Gwen who arrived later, also heard the statements.

33 The Defendant denies making the 22 June Statements. The Defendant’s case is that instead, he had highlighted to the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff's history of acting aggressively and inappropriately^{[note: 26]}and that there had been complaints made about the Plaintiff.^{[note: 27]}

34 At the outset, it should be noted that whilst the Plaintiff’s case is that the 22 June Statements were heard by, among other persons, Catherine, Gwen, Sadek, some children, and other persons near the Condominium's swimming pool area, none of “other persons” have been identified by the Plaintiff. Further, no residents appeared in court as the Plaintiff’s witnesses to state that they had heard the 22 June Statements. Sadek did not appear in court and there is no evidence of what he had heard of the conversation at the swimming pool on that day.

35 The words said to be uttered by the Defendant are as follows:

35.1. “l know that you have hit guards here”;

35.2. “l know that you have manhandled a woman here”; ands

35.3. “I have proof that you did this”.

36 As alluded to above, Gwen, the Plaintiff’s wife, arrived at the scene and joined the conversation subsequently. According to Gwen, she asked the Defendant, “Are you telling me that my husband has hit a guard and manhandled a woman?” She said that the Defendant answered: “Yes and I have proof of this.”^{[note: 28]}

37 Perhaps rather unusually, the Plaintiff was able to produce contemporaneous documentary evidence in respect of the 22 June Statements. The Plaintiff produced in court a document dated 23 June 2015, entitled, “Concerning an Unprovoked Verbal Assault by you on Monday 22 June 2015” (“Demand Letter”).^{[note: 29]} The Demand Letter narrated the Defendant uttering loudly several times statements similar to the 22 June Statements. The Demand Letter featured in the incident relating to the 24 June Statements, which will be discussed below. In the Demand Letter, after setting out the contents of statements similar to the 22 June Statements, the Plaintiff demanded that the Defendant either furnish proof of the 22 June Statements or provide “a formal written retraction” together with “a full apology for each point”. The Demand Letter further stated categorically that if the Plaintiff did not accede to the above demands by the following day, the Plaintiff would “take this matter to the police with the intention of having [the Defendant] charged with assault, slander and malicious defamation of [the Plaintiff’s] character”. It was plainly not a very reconciliatory letter. In fact, I find it high-handed and threatening in its content. Nevertheless, it was a letter detailing what transpired on 22 June 2015 by the poolside of the Condominium. The substance of the 22 June Statements was set out fairly clearly.

38 There is a further contemporaneous document created by the Plaintiff. It was dated 23 June 2015, and entitled “Unprovoked Verbal Assault and Slander directed at me by a resident at Camelot - Sequence of events” (the “23 June Memo”).^{[note: 30]} The 23 June Memo made reference to the 22 June 2015 Statements. Specifically, it referred to the Defendant having said that the Plaintiff had manhandled a woman and physically assaulted a security guard at Camelot.

39 The contemporaneous documentary evidence is consistent with the Plaintiff’s evidence in respect of the publication of the 22 June Statements. As alluded to above, the Plaintiff’s wife, Gwen gave evidence in respect of the publication of the 22 June Statements. She gave an account of her own role in the incident on 22 June 2015. Her evidence was that she had asked the Defendant,^{[note: 31]} “Are you telling me that my husband has hit a guard and manhandled a woman?” She said that the Defendant answered: “Yes and I have proof of this.”^{[note: 32]} The Defendant did not cross-examine Gwen on her recollection of the series of questions and answers between her and the Defendant.

40 The Plaintiff’s other witness that gave evidence in respect of the 22 June Statement was Catherine. She was cross-examined at length in court through a French interpreter. Catherine recollected the 22 June Statements in court. Under cross-examination, she recounted that the Defendant had used the words “hit guards”,^{[note: 33]} and “manhandled women”.^{[note: 34]} Catherine also confirmed that Gwen had asked the Defendant the questions and the Defendant had answered, as set out above.^{[note: 35]}

41 In respect of the Defendant’s evidence, as alluded to above, his case is that he did not made the 22 June Statements. Instead, he had highlighted to the Plaintiff the Plaintiff's history of acting aggressively and inappropriately^{[note: 36]}and that there had been complaints made about the Plaintiff.^{[note: 37]} The Defendant’s case is that he had said to the Plaintiff, “John, you have had issues with the kids before,” and also “You have had issues with the residents in the past. Also, the security guards.”

42 The Defendant’s witness, Paul’s evidence was he had left the gym after the Defendant had left.^{[note: 38]} Paul did not head towards the swimming pool area straightaway; he was walking from the gym to his house.^{[note: 39]}He then noticed that there was a group of people on the far side of the swimming pool.^{[note: 40]}It was when Paul noted that the discussion was quite animated that he decided to head towards the group.^{[note: 41]} It was only when he joined the group that he discovered the topic of conversation.^{[note: 42]}It is not disputed therefore that Paul arrived after the 22 June Statements were said to be uttered.

43 By all account, it is apparent that there was a heated exchange on that day by the swimming pool of the Condominium. Looking at the totality of the evidence discussed above, it appears to me that it was more likely than not that the 22 June Statements were spoken by the Defendant. Catherine’s evidence, in particular is persuasive. Catherine gave rather plain and complete evidence on what transpired at the poolside at the time when the 22 June Statements were made. She recollected the statements made by the Defendant. Catherine also gave evidence on the conversation between Gwen and the Defendant. She confirmed that Gwen had asked the Defendant the questions and the Defendant had answered them, as discussed above.^{[note: 43]}There is no evidence that Catherine had any reason to make unfounded allegations against the Defendant. It is not the Defendant’s case that she had any malicious intent in giving evidence against him. There is also no history of any quarrel between Catherine and the Defendant. The Plaintiff’s case that the first time he met Catherine was when the 22 June Statements were made is not challenged by the Defendant.

44 I do not place undue weight, however, on the contemporaneous evidence produced by the Plaintiff. I note that they were all written by the Plaintiff and I am mindful of the possibility that they were created for self-serving purposes. In respect of the 22 June Statements, I will only note that the contemporaneous documents were not inconsistent with Catherine’s evidence.

45 In view of all of the foregoing, on a balance of probabilities, I find that the Plaintiff has proven that the 22 June Statements were published. It cannot be disputed that they refer to the Plaintiff. It is plain however, that the publication was limited to Gwen and Catherine. There is simply no evidence on which I am able to make a finding that the publication was extended to any other person; and I decline to do so.

The 24 June Statements

46 I turn next to the 24 June Statements. To re-cap, the 24 June Statements comprised the following:

46.1. “I say this to you - if you go to the police I will report you to the police and press charges against you as a paedophile. I know that you have taken obscene photographs of children at the pool”.

46.2. “You should know that this man has hit a security guard at Camelot. You should know that this man has hit a pregnant woman at Camelot. You should know that this man has hit other people at Camelot”.

47 The 24 June Statements related to a conversation outside the door of the Defendant’s unit at the Condominium. As mentioned above, the Plaintiff had gone to the Defendant’s unit at about 7am in the morning of 24 June 2015. He had in hand the Demand Letter referred to above. He wanted to hand over the Demand Letter to the Defendant. Besides the parties, the only other persons present at this conversation were the Defendant’s wife, Shashi and Jeffrey, the security guard.

48 The Plaintiff’s case is that the first statement was said to the Plaintiff, whilst the second statement was made to Jeffrey, the security guard. Jeffrey did not give any AEIC evidence nor did he appear at the trial. The Defendant, on the other hand, denied making the 24 June Statements. His case is that the Plaintiff had come to his apartment at 7am and demanded that he accept the Demand Letter.^{[note: 44]} He had refused to take the letter from the Plaintiff, walked away and left Shashi, his wife to deal with the Plaintiff.^{[note: 45]} The Defendant’s evidence was that when he refused to take the Demand Letter, the Plaintiff threw it at his doorstep. He said that he did not wish to talk to the Defendant and he refused to take the Demand Letter as he wanted the council of the MCST to resolve the dispute.^{[note: 46]}

49 Shashi’s evidence corroborated the Defendant’s. She said that when the Plaintiff threw the Demand Letter at her doorstep, she picked it up and asked the Plaintiff to take it back.^{[note: 47]} When the Plaintiff refused, she put the Demand Letter on her shoe stand outside her door. Shashi’s evidence is that the Defendant did not make the 24 June Statements.^{[note: 48]}

50 The Defendant did not dispute that Jeffrey was with the Plaintiff when he came to his apartment at 7am on 24 June 2015. However, while Jeffrey was on the Plaintiff’s list of witnesses, he did not file an AEIC, nor turn up in court to give evidence. There is therefore no objective evidence to support the Plaintiff’s case that the Defendant had uttered the 24 June Statements.

51 The Plaintiff sought to shore up his case that the Defendant had made the 24 June Statements by referring to two emails sent by Shashi to the MCST on 23 June 2015.^{[note: 49]} In both emails, Shashi referred to the Plaintiff’s various confrontational behaviour and of him taking picture of her son and his friends at the swimming pool. The Plaintiff contends that Shashi’s two emails meant that the thought of the Plaintiff being a paedophile was on the Defendant’s mind when the Plaintiff went to his apartment the next morning. The Plaintiff’s contention is that the Defendant would have therefore uttered the 24 June Statements. I am unable to see how the two emails sent by Shashi could be used by the Plaintiff to support his case the Defendant had uttered the 24 June Statements. Firstly, the Plaintiff is asking me to make a finding on the state of mind of the Defendant on the morning of 24 June 2015, on the basis of two emails sent by his wife the day before. I fail to see the basis to make such a finding. Second, even if I make such a finding, I have to make a further finding that his state of mind led to him making the 24 June Statements. I do not have the basis to do so. It should be noted that aside from reference to the Plaintiff being a paedophile, the 24 June Statements also contained statements regarding the Plaintiff hitting security guards, a pregnant woman and “other people”. In my view, the Plaintiff’s reliance on the two emails sent by Shashi to support his case that the Defendant had uttered the 24 June Statements is not sustainable.

52 Finally, the Plaintiff relied on a note created by him and dated 24 June 2015.^{[note: 50]}This note sets out the Plaintiff's recollection of the events on 24 June 2015, and states that the Defendant did utter the 24 June Statements. The Plaintiff argues that this is a contemporaneous document and should be given weight as self-corroboration under section 159 of the Evidence Act. In my view, it should first be noted that it is plain, following the foregoing discussion, that there is no objective evidence in support of the Plaintiff’s case. The evidentiary burden remains with the Plaintiff. I am unable to ignore the self-serving nature of the Plaintiff’s note, which was created by him. In my view, this document, by itself, does not prove the Plaintiff’s case that the Defendant had uttered the 24 June Statements.

53 In the totality of the evidence in respect of the 24 June Statements, I find that the Plaintiff has failed, on a balance of probabilities, to prove that the Defendant made the 24 June Statements.

ARE THE 22 JUNE STATEMENTS DEFAMATORY?

54 Following my finding that the 22 June Statements were made and that they referred to the Plaintiff, the next question is whether they carried a defamatory meaning. Applying the Court of Appeal decision in Chan Cheng Wah at [18], on the rules applicable to the construction of words based on their natural and ordinary meanings, the words in the 22 June Statements, “I know that you have hit guards here”; and “I know that you have manhandled a woman here", would be defamatory. That the 22 June Statements bear defamatory meaning cannot and is not seriously disputed by the Defendant.^{[note: 51]}

ARE THE 22 JUNE STATEMENTS ACTIONABLE PER SE?

55 The 22 June Statements were spoken and constituted slander. Slander is not actionable without the proof of special damage, unless statutory or common law exceptions apply. Surprisingly, the Plaintiff failed to address this issue at the trial or in his closing submissions. No submissions were made that the statutory or common law exceptions apply; or that the Plaintiff had suffered any special damage as a result of the 22 June Statements.

56 It is trite that no action will lie for slander unless the plaintiff can prove that he has suffered special damage. There are only four known exceptions to the general rule, where slanders are actionable without proof of special damage: Workers’ Party v Tay Boon Too [1974-1976] SLR(R) 204 at [34] & [40].

57 The four exceptions are:^{[note: 52]}

57.1. if the words impute the commission of a crime for which the plaintiff may be subjected to physical punishment;

57.2. if the words impute that at the time the statement was made, the plaintiff was suffering from contagious or infectious disease;

57.3. if the words impugn the chastity of or impute adultery to, any woman or girl; or

57.4. if the words are calculated to disparage the plaintiff in his office, profession, calling, trade or business carried on by him.

58 The last two of the above exceptions are codified in sections 4 & 5 of the Defamation Act, respectively.

59 The Defendant contends that the exceptions do not apply to the 22 June Statements. However, it is clear that the 22 June Statements contained words that, if true, would imply that the Plaintiff had committed criminal offences that would have exposed him to an imprisonment term. Physically assaulting another person and manhandling a woman are both acts that would expose a person to prosecution for criminal offences attracting imprisonment sentences. Slander in such terms would be exempted from the requirement of proof of special damage by the plaintiff. In the circumstances, I find that the 22 June Statements are actionable per se.

ARE THERE ANY APPLICABLE DEFENCE IN RESPECT OF THE 22 JUNE STATEMENTS?

60 The Defendant pleaded only the defence of justification.^{[note: 53]} However, the Defendant did not pursue the defence at trial or in his closing submissions. In any event, there is no evidence before me to make out such a defence. The Defendant admitted at trial that he had no basis to allege, and did not believe, that the Plaintiff had hit persons and had manhandled women.

61 In the circumstances, I find that there is no applicable defence in respect of the 22 June Statements.

THE FURTHER 24 JUNE STATEMENTS

62 I turn to the Further 24 June Statements. The Further 24 June Statements are found in a letter dated 24 June 2015 sent by the Defendant to the Marine Parade Police Station; and copied to the management office of the Condominium.^{[note: 54]} The Defendant also made a police report in regard to the same matters referred to in the Further 24 June Statements. As alluded to above, at trial the Plaintiff had proceeded on only one sentence in the Further 24 June Statements as defamatory of him.^{[note: 55]} The sentence that the Plaintiff complained of is as follows:

“There have been several other complaints against John previously, which has been lodged at the Camelot Management Office including abusing children and taking photographs when they were playing at the pool.”

Were the Further 24 June Statements published?

63 There is no dispute as regards publication of the Further 24 June Statements. The Defendant admitted publication of the Further 24 June Statements to the police. It is also not denied that the letter containing the Further 24 June Statements was copied to the management office of the Condominium.^{[note: 56]}

Do the Further 24 June Statements bear a defamatory meaning?

64 The Plaintiff’s pleaded case is that the sentence complained of meant and was understood to mean that the Plaintiff had committed serious sexual offences, acts of battery, and/or acts of moral and ethical impropriety against children.^{[note: 57]} In his closing submissions, however, the Plaintiff submitted that the meaning of “abuse” was “treat with cruelty or violence, especially regularly.”^{[note: 58]} The Plaintiff maintains that the sentence complained of is defamatory of him. The Defendant’s case is that the Further 24 June Statements are not defamatory.^{[note: 59]}

65 It is trite that defamatory meaning is to be determined in the context of the words in question. The law in this regard is set out above. In particular, the Court of Appeal in Goh Chok Tong at [44] held that the ordinary meaning of words is,

“…derived from the words themselves, read or heard in their proper context and in the circumstances in which they were said …”

66 In another case, Chan Cheng Wah, the Court of Appeal at [18], set out the rules in constructing words to determine whether they are defamatory. Among the guidelines given are the following:

66.1. where there are a number of possible interpretations, some of which may be non-defamatory, an ordinary reasonable reader will not seize on only the defamatory one;

66.2. the ordinary reasonable reader is treated as having read the publication as a whole in determining its meaning, thus “the bane and the antidote must be taken together”; and

66.3. the ordinary reasonable reader will take note of the circumstances and manner of the publication.

67 It is clear therefore that the context of the publication of the words said to be defamatory is relevant. The circumstances and manner of publication is equally important. In the present case, the Further 24 June Statements were in relation to the events that had taken place from 22 to 24 June 2015. The Defendant was writing to the police in regard to those events. The Defendant also made a police report in regard to the same matters referred to in the letter.

68 The context of the Further 24 June Statements was therefore a letter to the police, written by the Defendant, about the events that took place from 22 to 24 June 2015. The letter set out the background of the events, including the incident on 22 June 2015 at the swimming pool. Besides the words complained of by the Plaintiff, as set out above, the Further 24 June Statements contained other statements of relevance. These statements are pertinent to give the proper context to the sentence complained of. The Defendant had made, among others, the following statements in respect of the events that took place from 22 to 24 June 2015 in his letter to the police:

68.1. “This is when John intervened and started to accuse the children of being noisy and unruly and also threatened me.”

68.2. “When my wife told John that I was not at home, he threatened my wife and harassed her by telling, that he will call the police if I did not call back.”

68.3. “He accused me of assaulting him and again both threatened and harassed my wife and me.”

68.4. “John Gillies came to my house with a Camelot security guard, he shouted at me and accused me of insulting him and demanded for an apology.”

68.5. “I am lodging this report because if John Gillies kept coming to my house, I am worried of the safety of my wife and son.”

69 The above statements have to be read together with the words complained of, which is set out here again for convenience:

“There have been several other complaints against John previously, which has been lodged at the Camelot Management Office including abusing children and taking photographs when they were playing at the pool.”

70 Juxtaposed with the other statements in the same letter to the police, it would firstly be plain that the Defendant was putting on record in the letter to the police the events that had occurred from 22 to 24 June 2015. The context was the incident at the swimming pool on 22 June 2015; and the subsequent actions by the Plaintiff in attempting to hand the Demand Letter to the Defendant. Taken as a whole, the letter to the police centred on the Plaintiff’s issues with children playing and being noisy at the swimming pool of the Condominium. The Plaintiff’s ongoing issues with noisy children playing at the swimming pool led to the events set out in the letter to the police. An ordinary reasonable reader would be treated as having read the letter as a whole and understood the context of the letter. The same ordinary reasonable reader would also have taken note of the circumstances and manner of the publication of the letter.

71 Second, taken in the context, the words “abusing children” in the sentence complained of would have been understood to be connected to the children being noisy and unruly at the swimming pool. Read in the totality of the entire Further 24 June Statements, the plain meaning of the words would be that the Plaintiff had taken issues with the noisy children playing at the swimming pool. The words would not have been understood to mean that the Plaintiff had committed serious sexual offences, acts of battery, and/or acts of moral and ethical impropriety against children; or “treat with cruelty or violence, especially regularly.” The Plaintiff’s take on the meaning of the words in question is made in isolation of the context in which the words appeared. Not only would the ordinary reasonable reader read the publication as a whole in determining the meaning of words, where there are a number of possible interpretations, some of which may be non-defamatory, such a reader would not seize on only the defamatory one.^{[note: 60]}

72 In my view, taken in context, I find that the Further Statements of 24 June are not defamatory.

Are there any applicable defence?

73 I have made the finding that the Further 24 June Statements are not defamatory. My finding would be sufficient to dispose of the Plaintiff’s case in respect of the Further 24 June Statements. In any event, it is my view that the Further 24 June Statements were made on an occasion of qualified privilege.^{[note: 61]}

74 The categories of qualified privilege at common law include:

74.1 where the defendant has an interest or duty to communicate information and the recipient has the corresponding interest or duty to receive the information;

74.2 where the defendant makes a statement with a view to protecting his or her self-interest; or

74.3 fair and accurate reports of parliamentary and judicial proceedings.

(Gary Chan Kok Yew and Lee Pey Woan, The Law of Torts in Singapore (Academy Publishing, 2011), (“The Law of Torts in Singapore”) at [13.061])

75 The Defendant has pleaded the first category of qualified privilege.^{[note: 62]} In respect of this category, it has been held that the defendant has to show that the publication of the statement in question was for the fair and reasonable protection or furtherance of his own interests and that the receiving party had a legitimate interest in the subject matter of the publication: Maidstone Pte Ltd v Takenaka Corp [1992] 1 SLR(R) 752. The duty or interest on the part of the informant of a statement to publish it must be reciprocated by the duty or interest on the part of the recipient to receive it: Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309 at 334. There must be a corresponding duty-interest relationship.

76 The Defendant had sent the letter and made the report to the police to put on record the events that had occurred from 22 to 24 June 2015. In the letter and report, the Defendant had stated clearly that he was worried for the safety of Shashi and his son; and had written to the police in the hope that it would stop the Plaintiff from going to his home to threaten them.^{[note: 63]} He had made the Further 24 June Statements for the fair and reasonable protection or furtherance of his own interest. The police clearly would have had the corresponding interest or duty to receive the Further 24 June Statements. In the circumstances, I find that the Further 24 June Statements were made on an occasion of qualified privilege.

77 The next stage is for me to examine if the Defendant was actuated by express malice when he published the words. Express malice would defeat the defence of qualified privilege.

78 In Golden Season at [92] it was held that there are two ways to establish malicious intent on the part of the defendant:

78.1. where it can be shown that the defendant had knowledge of falsity or where there was recklessness or lack of belief in the defamatory statement; or

78.2. where although the defendant may have a genuine or honest belief in the truth of the defamatory statement, his dominant intention is to injure the plaintiff or he has some other improper motive.

79 On the plain meaning of the words I had found above, that the Plaintiff had taken issues with the noisy children playing at the swimming pool, it is not shown that the Defendant had knowledge of falsity or was reckless or had lack of belief in the words. There is also no evidence that the dominant intention of the Defendant in making the Further 24 June Statements was to injure the Plaintiff or that he had some other improper motive. I therefore find that the Defendant was not actuated by express malice when he published the Further 24 June Statements. The defence of qualified privilege in this case is not defeated by malice; and the defence applies in respect of the Further 24 June Statements.

QUANTUM OF DAMAGES

80 I have found that the 22 June Statements are defamatory. I now address the question of damages in respect of the 22 June Statements. The purposes of general damages in defamation are:

80.1. to console the plaintiff for the personal distress and hurt he suffered caused by the publication;

80.2. to repair the harm to the plaintiff’s personal and business reputation; and

80.3. to vindicate the plaintiff’s reputation to the public.

See Lim Eng Hock Peter v Lin Jian Wei and anor and anor appeal [2010] 4 SLR 357 (“Peter Lim”) at [4]-[5]

81 The relevant factors in assessing the quantum of general damages for defamation are as follows:

81.1. the nature and gravity of the defamation;

81.2. the conduct, position and standing of the parties; and

81.3. the mode and extent of publication.

The Law of Torts in Singapore at [13.123]

82 Clear and succinct guidance^{[note: 64]} was given by the Honourable Justice Lee Seiu Kin in respect of quantum of damages in Isabel Redrup Agency Pte Ltd v A L Dakshnamoorthy and others and anor suit [2016] SGHC 30 (“Isabel”), at [148]-[154]. Justice Lee held that at the top end of the scale in terms of quantum of damages would be the politician plaintiffs.^{[note: 65]} Further down the ladder would be non-politician plaintiffs who are prominent businessmen or professionals of significant standing. For example, in ATU and others v ATY [2015] 4 SLR 1159 (“ATU”), also decided by Justice Lee, he awarded damages falling at the higher end of the scale to non-politician plaintiffs on the basis that the plaintiffs were prominent businessmen. In a similar vein, the plaintiff in Peter Lim was awarded $140,000 for general damages and $70,000 for aggravated damages. The plaintiff in Peter Lim was a well-known investor and majority shareholder in several listed companies; and one of the richest men in Asia. Similarly in El-Nets Ltd and another v Yeo Nai Meng [2004] 1 SLR(R) 153 (“El-Nets Ltd”), the plaintiff, a businessman holding positions of responsibility in public and private organisations, was awarded $80,000 for false allegations of fraud and dishonesty that were distributed only to a limited number of other directors and staff. The plaintiff in Arul Chandran v Chew Chin Aik Victor [2001] 1 SLR(R) 86 was a long-standing advocate and solicitor of 30 years and the vice-president of Tanglin Club. He was awarded $100,000 as general damages and $50,000 as aggravated damages. There is therefore clearly a scale of award calibrated against the standing of the plaintiff. The other two factors listed above remain relevant in deciding the quantum of damages; and the interplay amongst the three factors would determine the quantum to be awarded.

83 I further note the principle in awarding damages in defamation suits as laid down by the Court of Appeal in Goh Chok Tong at [51]: “…courts should award one single lump sum as damages” compensating the plaintiff for the “collective actions of the defendant, from the date of publication to the end of trial”. The Court of Appeal held that an award for aggravated damages should not be separated from an award for general compensatory damages. The courts should award one single lump sum as damages.

84 In assessing the quantum of damage, I consider first the nature and gravity of the defamation in the present case. The offending words in the 22 June Statements are “you have hit guards here” and “you have manhandled a woman here”. I note that these words imply acts of violence on the part of the Plaintiff and I accord them the necessary gravity. Next, I consider the standing of both the Plaintiff and the Defendant. No focus was given by the parties on their standing and profession at the trial. I note that both are directors of companies and appear to be involved in some form of gainful economic activities. No evidence is adduced as to the exact nature of the companies.^{[note: 66]} Finally, I consider the extent of publication. As discussed above, the evidence is clear that the publication of the 22 June Statements was limited to two persons. They were Catherine; and Gwen, the Plaintiff’s wife.

85 Next, I consider the question of aggravated damages. The Plaintiff has submitted that aggravated damages should be awarded.

86 The main factors of aggravation are well established: see Peter Lim at [7]. They generally include the following:

86.1. express malice;

86.2. defendant’s conduct after the publication;

86.3. refusal or failure to apologise;

86.4. a reckless unsuccessful plea of justification.

87 In the present case, there is no evidence of express malice. As for the Defendant’s conduct, it follows from my findings above that I do not find any aggravation in his conduct after the publication of the 22 June Statements. In respect of the question of apology, I have noted above that the Demand Letter written by the Plaintiff to the Defendant was far from reconciliatory. As stated above, I find it high-handed and threatening in its content. In the light of the Demand Letter, I place little weight on the lack of apology on the part of the Defendant. As regards the plea of justification, whilst justification was pleaded in the Defence, it was not pursued by the Defendant with any vigour at trial or in the closing submissions. It certainly could not be said that there was any reckless plea of justification. In the circumstances, there is plainly no basis for me to award any aggravated damages in this case.

88 Following from the foregoing, all in all I take into consideration the following in assessing the quantum of damages:

88.1. the nature of the defamation;

88.2. the very limited extent of publication;

88.3. the position and standing of the Plaintiff and the Defendant; and

88.4. the lack of aggravation.

89 Taking all of the above factors in totality, in my assessment, an appropriate quantum of damage would be in the sum of $5,000.

90 The Plaintiff has pleaded a claim for an injunction to prohibit the Defendant from repeating the 22 June Statements, the 24 June Statements and the Further 24 June Statements. As discussed above, I have found that the Plaintiff failed in his case in respect of the 24 June Statements and the Further 24 June Statements. As regards the 22 June Statements, the Plaintiff did not adduce any evidence to show the likelihood of the Defendant repeating the statements. In fact, the claim for injunction was not pursued at trial or in closing submissions. As there is no evidence of the likelihood of the Defendant repeating the 22 June Statements, I decline to order any injunction against the Defendant.

91 I turn to the question of costs. The general rule in awarding costs at the end of a case is that costs should follow the event. However, the principles governing the award of costs allow for departure from the general rule. The High Court provided guidance in this regard in the case of Jet Holding Ltd and Others v Cooper Cameron (Singapore) Pte Ltd and Another [2006] SGHC 20 (“Jet Holding”). At [3] of Jet Holding the principles governing the award of costs are set out as follows:

91.1. Costs are in the discretion of the court.

91.2. Costs should follow the event, except when it appears to the court that some other order should be made.

91.3. The general rule does not cease to apply simply because the successful party raises issues or makes allegations on which he fails, but where that has caused a significant increase in the length or cost of the proceedings he may be deprived of the whole or part of his costs.

9.1.4. Where the successful party raises issues or makes allegations improperly or unreasonably, the court may not only deprive him of his costs but may also order him to pay the whole or a part of the unsuccessful party's costs.

92 In the present case, the Plaintiff claimed against the Defendant in respect of three sets of statements. The Plaintiff succeeded on only one set of statements. In regard to quantum of damages, the Plaintiff has claimed the sum of $50,000 in general damages and another $50,000 in aggravated damages, making a total claim of $100,000 against the Defendant. I am awarding the Plaintiff $5,000. The Plaintiff also claimed for an injunction against the Defendant. I did not order an injunction.

93 I take into account the above in the exercise of my discretion on costs, in particular that the Plaintiff succeeded on only one set of statements. In my view, the Plaintiff should be deprived of half of his costs. Accordingly, the Defendant is to pay half of the Plaintiff’s party and party costs, to be taxed, if not agreed.

CONCLUSION

94 In summary, I find that the Plaintiff has proven, on a balance of probabilities, that the 22 June Statements were published. It is plain however, that the publication was limited to Gwen and Catherine. There is simply no evidence on which I am able to make a finding that the publication was extended to any other person. The 22 June Statements are defamatory and actionable per se. There is no applicable defence.

95 Taking into consideration the following factors, I assessed the quantum of damages in respect of the 22 June Statements to be in the sum of $5,000:

95.1. the nature of the defamation;

95.2. the very limited extent of publication;

95.3. the position and standing of the Plaintiff and the Defendant; and

95.4. the lack of aggravation.

96 I find that the Plaintiff has failed, on a balance of probabilities, to prove that the Defendant made the 24 June Statements. As for the Further 24 June Statements, I find that taken in context, they are not defamatory. In any event, I hold that the Further 24 June Statements were made on an occasion of qualified privilege, which was not actuated by malice.

97 There is no evidence that the Defendant is likely to repeat the 22 June Statements and I declined to order an injunction against the Defendant. As for the costs of the proceedings, for the reasons I have set out earlier, the Defendant is to pay half of the Plaintiff’s costs, to be taxed if not agreed.

98 This completes the instalment of the ongoing neighbourly disputes at Camelot By-The-Water that was played out before me. As I have alluded to at the beginning of this judgment, litigation is not the best answer to such disputes. The underlying neighbourly issues have to be first resolved. In the Arthurian world, Camelot represents a time, place or atmosphere of idyllic happiness. It is only when neighbourliness prevails, that there will be hope for Camelot By-The-Water to live up to its name.[Context] [Hide Context]

^{[note: 1]}NE 13/4/2017, 11:3-14.

^{[note: 2]}NE 13/4/2017, 4:13-14.

^{[note: 3]}NE 13/4/2017, 4:11-22.

^{[note: 4]}NE 13/4/2017, 4:25-31.

^{[note: 5]}NE 13/4/2017, 5:1-5.

^{[note: 6]}NE 13/4/2017, 7:19-32; 8:1-4.

^{[note: 7]}NE 13/4/2017, 10:3-18.

^{[note: 8]}AB4-6.

^{[note: 9]}AB69-70.

^{[note: 10]}AB14-15.

^{[note: 11]}AB13.

^{[note: 12]}AB45-83.

^{[note: 13]}NE 13/4/2017, 9:25-10:2.

^{[note: 14]}AB41-42.

^{[note: 15]}Statement of Claim (Amendment 2) at [3].

^{[note: 16]}Bundle of AEICs p81 at [14].

^{[note: 17]}[28] of Plaintiff’s closing submissions.

^{[note: 18]}[2.1] of Plaintiff’s opening statement.

^{[note: 19]}[30.2] of Plaintiff’s opening statement.

^{[note: 20]}[2.2] of Plaintiff’s opening statement.

^{[note: 21]}[2.3] of Plaintiff’s opening statement; [56] of Plaintiff’s closing submissions.

^{[note: 22]}I have in another defamation case tried before me similarly written on the law of defamation: Tan Kok Quan & 2 Ors v Gao Shuchao [2017] SGDC 152.

^{[note: 23]}Gary Chan Kok Yew and Lee Pey Woan, The Law of Torts in Singapore (Academy Publishing, 2011), at [12.063].

^{[note: 24]}Supra, [12.064].

^{[note: 25]}Supra, [12.048].

^{[note: 26]}Defence (Amendment No. 1), [5(e)].

^{[note: 27]}Defence (Amendment No. 1), [5(c), (d)].

^{[note: 28]}[4] SOC (Amendment No. 2).

^{[note: 29]}AB18.

^{[note: 30]}Ab22.

^{[note: 31]}[4] SOC (Amendment No. 2).

^{[note: 32]}[10] of Gwen’s AEIC.

^{[note: 33]}NE 25/11/2016, 26:23 – 27:18

^{[note: 34]}NE 25/11/2016, 20:11 – 19.

^{[note: 35]}[8] of Catherine’s AEIC.

^{[note: 36]}Defence (Amendment No. 1), [5(e)].

^{[note: 37]}Defence (Amendment No. 1), [5(c), (d)].

^{[note: 38]}[4] of Paul AEIC.

^{[note: 39]}[5] of Paul AEIC.

^{[note: 40]}[5] of Paul AEIC.

^{[note: 41]}[6] of Paul AEIC.

^{[note: 42]}[8] of Paul AEIC.

^{[note: 43]}[8] of Catherine’s AEIC.

^{[note: 44]}[23] of Defendant’s AEIC.

^{[note: 45]}[25] of Defendant’s AEIC.

^{[note: 46]}NE 12/4/2017, 32:1-7.

^{[note: 47]}[34] of Shashi’s AEIC.

^{[note: 48]}[39] of Shashi’s AEIC.

^{[note: 49]}AB19 & 21.

^{[note: 50]}AB23.

^{[note: 51]}[100]-[102] of the Defendant’s closing submissions.

^{[note: 52]}As would be apparent, the third and fourth exceptions are archaic in nature; and they have been abolished as exceptions to the requirement of proof of special damage in England.

^{[note: 53]}[6] &[17] of the Defence (Amendment No.1).

^{[note: 54]}AB26-27.

^{[note: 55]}[2.3] of Plaintiff’s opening statement; [56] of Plaintiff’s closing submissions.

^{[note: 56]}[138] of the Defendant’ closing submissions.

^{[note: 57]}[14C.1-3] of Statement of Claim (Amendment No. 2).

^{[note: 58]}[57] of Plaintiff’s closing submissions.

^{[note: 59]}[21] of Defence (Amendment No. 1).

^{[note: 60]}Ibid. Chan Cheng Wah at [18].

^{[note: 61]}The Defendant pleaded qualified privilege at [23] of Defence (Amendment No.1).

^{[note: 62]}[23] of Defence (Amendment No. 1).

^{[note: 63]}AB26-27.

^{[note: 64]}I have in other defamation cases that were tried before me referred to the learned Justice Lee’s judgment in regard to quantum of damages: Ng Bee Choo @ Ng Catherine v Mary Hoe-Tan & Chung Jee Mean [2016] SGDC 260 at [106]; and Tan Kok Quan & 2 ors v Gao Shuchao SGDC 152, at [84].

^{[note: 65]}As per the Court of Appeal in Lim Eng Hock Peter v Lin Jian Wei and anor and anor appeal [2010] 4 SLR 357 (“Peter Lim”)

^{[note: 66]}[1] & [2] of Statement of Claim (Amendment No. 2).