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Public Prosecutor v Tee Bee Han - [2018] SGDC 90 (28 March 2018)

Public Prosecutor v Tee Bee Han
[2018] SGDC 90

Case Number:DAC 937313/2015 & 4 Others, Magistrate's Appeal No: 9062/2018/01
Decision Date:28 March 2018
Tribunal/Court:District Court
Coram: Imran bin Abdul Hamid
Counsel Name(s): The prosecution was conducted and led by DPP Ms Eunice Lau; The defence was conducted by Mr Bajwa, assisted by Mr Kertar Singh
Parties: Public Prosecutor — Tee Bee Han

[LawNet Editorial Note: An appeal to this decision has been filed in MA 9062/2018/01.]

28 March 2018

District Judge Imran bin Abdul Hamid:

I. INTRODUCTION

(a) Disclosure

1 These facts are not disputed.

2 The accused is Mr Tee Bee Han, born on 14th Sept 75. His registered address is Blk 7, Lorong 7, Toa Payoh, unit #07-195. He worked as a deliveryman. Sometime in 2011/2012, he was in a relationship with redacted (‘K’), born on 31st July 67.

3 K has 2 daughters[note: 1]: redacted (‘V’, PW1), born on 5th Aug 94, and redacted (F, PW 9), born on 26th Feb 91. At the time, V was 17 years old and F was 21 years old.

4 At or about early 2012[note: 2], the accused stayed over with K and her family in a 2-bedroom flat at Blk 310, Woodlands Avenue 1, unit #09-18 (‘the unit’). F, the older of the 2 girls, has her own bedroom. V and her mother, K, slept in the master room which has an attached bathroom. They have done so since V’s younger days. When the accused joined their family, he slept with K (and V) in the master room.

5 On 14th Mar 12, sometime after midnight, V’s cousin, redacted (TB, PW2), who resides in Choa Chua Kang, called the police “to report a case of attempted rape” adding that V was “molested” by her “mother’s friend”. He related that that was “not the first time” the “older man” had tried to do so[note: 3]. He was with his sister, redacted (TS, PW3), and they were en route to Blk 310, Woodlands Avenue 1. They hurried to the unit after receiving news of an incident between V and the accused.

6 Subsequently, the first officers, Sgt Gabriel Chan (PW7) and SC/Sgt Hafiz, arrived at the void deck of Blk 310, Woodlands Avenue 1. V was then crying. At about 1.39 am, after conducting preliminary investigations with the others who were present and after receiving instructions from duty investigation officer, Mr Joe Kok (PW10), Sgt Gabriel arrested the accused for attempted rape[note: 4]. At the station, an arrest report for Sexual Assault by Penetration was formally lodged.[note: 5]

7 At about 2.47 am, Scene of Crime Officer, SI Sukumar took 8 photographs of the unit including the master room where the offences allegedly took place[note: 6]. At about 2.55 am, the white bra worn by V, which was earlier photographed, was seized[note: 7]. After analysis, the accused’s DNA was found on the left cup of the bra[note: 8]. On 16th Aug 12, sketches of the incident place were prepared[note: 9].

8 As at 14th Mar 12, the brief facts seemed to suggest allegations pertaining to attempted rape, molest and sexual assault by penetration (SAP), said to have occurred in the master room of the unit. It was also alleged that 13th Mar 12 was not the only occasion something like that had taken place.

(b) Charges

9 On 21st Oct 15, the accused was charged. On 22nd Aug 16, he claimed trial[note: 10]. The 4 charges were as follows[note: 11].

DAC 937313/2015, 1st charge: “…are charged that you on 11th Mar 12, sometime between 12 am and 4 am, in Block 310, Woodlands Street 31, #09-18 (‘the unit’)…did sexually penetrate the vagina of the victim…by inserting your finger into her vagina without her consent…thereby committed an offence under section 376(2)(a) punishable under section 376(3) of the Penal Code (‘PC’).”

DAC 937314/2015, 2nd charge: “…are charged that you on 11th Mar 12, sometime between 12 am and 4 am, in the unit…did attempt to rape the victim…by attempting to penetrate the vagina of the victim with your penis, without her consent…thereby committed an offence under section 375(1)(a) punishable under section 375(2) read with section 511 of PC.”

MAC 908739/2015, 3rd charge: “…are charged that you on 11th Mar 12, at about 4 am, in the unit…did use criminal force on the victim…intending to outrage her modesty…by slipping your hand underneath her shirt and bra and touching her breast…thereby committed an offence under section 354(1) of PC.”

DAC 937315/2015, 4th charge: “…are charged that you on 13th Mar 12, at or about 11 pm, in the unit…did attempt to rape the victim…by lying on top of the said victim and rubbing your exposed penis against her vagina, and subsequently against the back of the victim’s hand when she covered her vagina…thereby committed an offence under section 375(1)(a) punishable under section 375(2) read with section 511 of PC.”

10 The offences were committed on 2 occasions. In essence, the accused denied committing the acts alleged. As for the 11th Mar 12, nothing happened and they slept peacefully in the master room. As for the 13th Mar 12, although F did walk into the master room at the time alleged, the accused had merely pinned down V to the mattress only to tell her to stop disturbing him.

(c.) Outcome

11 After assessing the evidence, observed the witnesses testify and after perusing parties’ submissions, I was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed the 4 offences and he was convicted.

12 On 6th Feb 18, for sentencing, the DPP, Ms Eunice Lau, submitted a medical report (‘MR’)[note: 12] dated 29th Jan 18 prepared by psychiatrist, Dr Francis Ngui (PW12-NH). In short, he opined that V suffers from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (‘PTSD’) with Major Depression (‘MDD’). On 14th Feb 18, the Defence applied for Dr Francis to be called to testify. Adopting the approach in PP v UI[note: 13] , a Newton Hearing was held on 28th Feb 18. After reviewing the evidence, I was satisfied that V suffers from PTSD with MDD due to the sexual assaults. I accept Dr Francis’ opinion that V is at a “high risk” of “recurrent self-harm”[note: 14].

13 Having earlier perused the parties’ submissions on sentence, including the mitigation plea, on 5th Mar 18, he was sentenced as follows.

DAC/MAC

Offence

Punishment Passed

DAC 937313/15

Digital-Vaginal Penetration committed on 11th Mar 12: Offence under s376(2) p/u s376(3).

Punishment Prescribed: “…shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 20 years, and shall also be liable to a fine or to caning.

7 years, 4 strokes

DAC937314/15

Attempted rape, committed on 11th Mar 12: Offence under s375(1)(a) p/u s375(2) r/w s511.

Punishment Prescribed: “…shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 20 years, and shall also be liable to a fine or to caning.”

S511: “…the longest term of imprisonment that may be imposed…shall not exceed one half of the longest term provided for the offence…”

6 years, 4 strokes

MAC908739/15

Outrage of modesty by essentially touching victim’s breast, committed on 11th Mar 12: Offence under s354(1).

Punishment Prescribed: “…shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 2 years, or with fine, or with caning…”

1 year, 3 strokes

DAC937315/15

Attempted rape, committed on 13th Mar 12, offence under s375(1)(a) p/u s375(2) r/w s511.

Punishment Prescribed: see DAC 937314/15.

6 years, 4 strokes

Pursuant to s307, CPC, imprisonment terms in DAC 937313/15 and DAC937315/15 are consecutive, the rest is concurrent. Aggregate: 13 years imprisonment, 15 strokes[note: 15].



(d) Appeal

12 The accused has filed an appeal[note: 16]. These are the detailed reasons.

II. FACTS & EVIDENCE

(a) Summary of the Prosecution’s Case

13 For the trial, the prosecution called 11 witnesses to testify[note: 17]. K was offered to the Defence as a witness but she was not called to testify.

SN

ID LABEL

Name of Witness

Role

PW1

“V”

Redacted

Victim

PW2

“TB”

Redacted

Supporting witness

First Information Report, P1

PW3

“TS”

Redacted

Supporting witness

PW4

N.A

Dr Wayne Yap

Accused’s Examining Doctor

Medical Report 8th July 12, P11

PW5

N.A

Dr Ng Yew Yee

Accused’s Examining Doctor

Medical Report 6th Aug 12, P6

PW6

N.A

Dr Lee Li Yen Candy

H.S.A Witness

Lab Report, DN-1234-00661, P5

PW7

N.A

Sgt Gabriel Chan

First attending officer

Arrest Report, P2

PW8

“S”

Redacted

Supporting witness

PW9

“F”

Redacted

Supporting witness

PW10

N.A

Joe Kok Jian Wei

Investigation Officer

PW11

N.A

Thomas Ong

Recorder, Cautioned Statements

P13 – P16



14 The prosecution indicated its intention to admit into evidence the accused’s s23, CPC statements (‘the cautioned statements’, CS), recorded on 14th Oct 15.

Offence referred to in the Cautioned Statement

Time Recorded

1st charge: S376(2)(a) p/u s376(3), PC

10.20 am to 11.05 am

2nd charge: S375(1)(a) p/u s375(2) r/w s511, PC

1.20 am to 12.10 pm

3rd charge: S354(1), PC

12.45 pm to 1.15 pm

4th charge: S376(2)(a) p/u s376(3), PC

1.30 m to 1.50 pm



15 The Defence objected, contending that the accused was forced to admit and sign the statements; that he was induced by the recorder’s assurance of a lighter punishment. It was also alleged that the statements were not read to the accused capitalizing on an existing error in the handwritten charge pertaining to the 4th charge (attempted rape on 13th Mar 12) where it was written down as an attempt “with her consent” whilst the typed charge for the same statement stated that it was an attempt “without her consent”.

16 Following an ancillary hearing, I found that the statements were voluntarily recorded and allowed their admission.

17 In the main, the DPP submitted that V’s evidence was cogent and comprehensive, covering pre-incidents interactions with the accused, the incidents of 11th and 13th Mar 12, and the trauma she suffered as a result. Although distressed when recounting the incidents, she nevertheless gave a coherent and textured account of the offences.

18 In her testimony, V related that her father passed away in Dec 2010[note: 18]. She looked up to the accused as an elder and called him, “Uncle”.[note: 19] She said that the accused started sleeping over at the unit sometime in 2012. He slept in the master room with K and herself. V would sleep on the single mattress whilst the accused and K shared the mattress next to her. K slept in middle.[note: 20] The accused stayed over 4 - 5 times a week. Around the house, the accused wore his boxers.[note: 21]

19 Occasionally, the accused would playfully punch and pinch V, and she responded similarly[note: 22]. In early 2012, she recalled the accused touched her thigh under the blanket. When she had gastric, he pressed her chest area saying that it was to check for pain.[note: 23] He also pressed acupressure points on her hand. These, according to her, pre-dated the two incidents.

· First incident, 11th Mar 12

20 On the night of 10th Mar 12 (Saturday), K left home to celebrate a friend’s birthday, leaving the accused and V alone in the master room[note: 24]. V went to sleep sometime after midnight[note: 25]. She woke up when she felt discomfort and pain and realized the accused had penetrated her vagina with his finger. She saw the accused slipped his hand in her underwear through the opening of her shorts[note: 26].

21 V did not know what to do[note: 27]. She turned to face the wall and laid on her stomach. The accused kneeled between her legs and pulled them apart. She heard the sound of the elastic band of his boxer shorts[note: 28] and felt the pushing aside of her shorts and underwear. V felt “something rubbery” against her vagina[note: 29].V tried to move away but he pulled her leg. He put his hand over her stomach and tried intercourse again. V tried to offer resistance by moving and kicking her leg. She also tried to get him off by pushing his arms and shoulders but he was too strong. The accused went on top of her and rubbed his penis against her vagina[note: 30].

22 V bit his left arm, intending to hurt him, so that he’d stop. However, he laughed and returned to his side of the mattress[note: 31]. V turned to face the wall and pretended to sleep[note: 32]. The accused touched her right breast. He also reached under her shirt and bra to touch her left breast. V tried to push away his hand. When the sound of the keys rattling was heard, the accused pulled out his hand.[note: 33] K had returned at about 4 am[note: 34]. He asked K whether she had finished partying. V did not tell K about what the accused did fearing she’d be the cause of their break-up.[note: 35]

23 On the afternoon of 13th Mar 12, K asked V to help the accused with his delivery rounds. Since K knew that V would be with the accused and they would be in very public places throughout[note: 36], she agreed. When they arrived in Changi, the accused spoke of new hotel at the location[note: 37] and used a Hokkien phrase, “kui bao”, when asking her to accompany him to the hotel[note: 38]. V recalled that that was not the first time the accused had used the phrase “kui bao”. On an earlier occasion, he used it when he spoke to K about V. K reacted by scolding him[note: 39]. V learned from her cousin, TS (PW3) that “kui bao” means ‘stop being a virgin’.[note: 40]

24 V declined to go to the hotel. They went for dinner and after that[note: 41], the accused drove to a MSCP nearby. He told V to go to the back of the van and lay down. V refused. He then drove them home.[note: 42] Later that same night, K left the unit again. The accused and V were, again, alone in the master room.

· Second incident, 13th Mar 12

25 At some point during that night, while V was on her mattress, the accused touched her thigh. He wanted to insert his hand into V’s shorts[note: 43] but she pushed his hand away. He then went on top of V and started rubbing his penis against her vagina.[note: 44] V pushed his arms (biceps) but he pulled down his boxers, exposing his penis, and continued rubbing his penis against her vagina.[note: 45] Despite V’s kicking at his groin area, intending to hurt him, the accused laughed.[note: 46] V covered her private area (her vagina) with her right hand but the accused held his penis and rubbed it against her hand.[note: 47]

26 There was a sound outside the room which temporarily stopped the accused. He pulled up his shorts and looked out. Thereafter, he resumed. When the victim pushed at his biceps, he directed her hand to his penis.[note: 48] He moaned when she pushed him away.[note: 49] He went on top of V and lifted her shirt despite the struggle. He pushed her bra aside[note: 50] and bit her left breast. V tried to push the accused’s head and body away but was unable to. He sucked her breasts and licked her ear.[note: 51] V told him to “go away!”[note: 52]

27 The victim turned her face away but dared not raise her voice as she feared alerting her sister, knowing that she would tell K.[note: 53] V saw F standing at the entrance of the room.[note: 54] On seeing F, the accused rolled back onto his mattress. He smiled at V as he did so. F entered the toilet. V buried her face into a pillow[note: 55].

28 Consequently, V ran from the unit and went down to the 8th floor where she started crying.[note: 56] TS (PW3) called her and asked what had happened. V did not tell her and continued crying. She was scared and ashamed because at that point of time, in her mind, “everybody knows what happened”.[note: 57]

29 F was called to testify on what she saw on 13th Mar 12. It seemed to her that the accused was trying to rape V as she found him lying on top of V, with a portion of her t-shirt pushed to her chest level, exposing the bottom part of V’s bra. She saw V trying to push off the accused. The accused does not deny that F walked into the master room at or about the time stated by V but he had a different spin on what happened and why it happened.

30 At the void deck, after K’s return, she shouted at V and asked why she was so stupid.[note: 58] When the accused came down, K asked him the same question but he claimed nothing had taken place. He wanted to leave but K stopped him.[note: 59] Thereafter, TS (PW3) and TB (PW2) arrived at the void deck to join K, V, F and F’s then boyfriend, Andrew (‘A’). F and TS, consoled V seeing that she was crying[note: 60]. When asked if this had happened before, V told TS that something similar had happened last Saturday and she bit the accused’s left arm then.[note: 61]

31 The police arrived thereafter and this information (about a possible bite mark) was communicated to them. Dr Ng Yew Yee (PW5) examined the accused on 14th Mar 12 at about 9.20 pm after being told to look out for a bruise on the left arm. A 0.2 cm bruise with mild discoloration on the left arm of “at least a few days old”[note: 62] was found.

32 TB (PW2) and TS (PW3) were called to testify on what led them to proceed to Blk 310, Woodlands Avenue 1, from their house in Choa Chu Kang. They also testified on what they heard and saw at the void deck.

33 V testified that K did not cease interactions with the accused. K told her that the accused regretted what he did and begged for forgiveness. He was prepared to financially support her studies in return.[note: 63] K wrote a note[note: 64] to V to persuade her to meet with lawyers to “drop this case”. [note: 65] F’s former boyfriend, ‘A’, did likewise. F testified about a meeting they had about possible settlement[note: 66].

34 V is traumatized from the sexual assaults. F, TS, TB, and redacted (S, PW8) were asked what they observed of V after the incidents[note: 67].

(b) Summary of the Defence’s Case

35 The accused was the only witness for his case. The Defence argued that the victim is not “an unusually convincing witness” and her evidence must be treated with caution.[note: 68] Her behavior soon after the alleged incident of 11th Mar 12 was not consistent with that of a victim who was almost raped.

36 It was also submitted that there were material contradictions in her evidence, for example, vis-à-vis, the Prosecution Summary of Facts (PSOF)[note: 69]. His purported confessions in his cautioned statements should be accorded “little weight”[note: 70].

37 In his testimony, the accused stated that his highest formal education was Primary 3. He has been a working man since then. At the material time, he was working as a driver/deliveryman. He started staying over the unit at K’s invitation, after his divorce. The accused did not deny that he was at home, alone in the master room, with V on 11th and 13th Mar 12.

38 With respect to 11th Mar 12 incident, the accused was asleep throughout and nothing happened. As for 13th Mar 12 alleged incident, the accused explained that he was merely “teaching the victim a lesson” for disturbing him from his sleep, “prompting him to pin her down and warned her not to do so”[note: 71].

39 The accused said that V had accompanied him on his delivery runs after the alleged 1st incident. He did not deny that F stood at the entrance of the master room on 13th Mar 12 when he pinned and tickled. His denials were “completely consistent”[note: 72] with his statement recorded by IO Joe Kok (PW10)[note: 73].

· First incident, 11th Mar 12

40 According to the accused, on the night of 10th Mar 12, he was at home with V, F and F’s then boyfriend, A. K had left the house to go to a club at about 9 to 10 pm. After 11 pm, Andrew ordered food for them. The accused moved to the master room to watch TV. After the meal, he switched off the TV and turned in.

41 At about midnight of 11th Mar 12, V pressed him on his “knees”. He told her to stop playing. Other than that, there was no “horseplay”. At some point in the early hours, he woke up and realized that K had returned. He checked his mobile and saw that it was about 3 am. He spent the day with K. He returned to his own place as he had to work on Monday. He told K that he needed her help with his delivery and she agreed.

42 On 12th Mar 12, he arranged to meet K at Northpoint Shopping Centre., after 1 pm. K brought V and told V to accompany the accused on his delivery rounds instead. After ending his delivery runs, he sent V home at about 5 to 6 pm, where he had dinner with K and V. Before going back to his own place for the night, the accused told K that he would need V’s help the next day as well.

43 On the morning of 13th Mar 12, the accused fetched V from Clementi MRT station for his delivery rounds. They finished the runs at about 5 plus pm. The last delivery destination was Changi City Point. When he saw a signboard stating that a hotel was being constructed there, he wondered aloud why anyone would build a hotel in that area. He drove them to Woodlands Central where they had dinner. Thereafter, they returned to the unit.

· Second incident, 13th Mar 12

44 On 13th Mar 12, at about 8 pm, K left the house, leaving the accused, V and F at home. He watched TV in the master room until he fell asleep. He was later awakened by the victim who disturbed him.

45 The accused got angry and “pressed on” her shoulders, and told her not to disturb him anymore. He remembered the victim biting him on his shoulder in the past causing bruises. As such, he bit V back on her shoulders because he “wanted her to know” how painful it was. He had always advised V “not to play around” as she could be “rough”. V merely smiled and tickled the accused. He responded by tickling her back on the waist. When he told V to stop, F walked into the room.

46 According to the accused, he and V were then at “various stages of horseplay”[note: 74]. Prior to 11th Mar 12, the accused and V had engaged in similar ‘horseplay’[note: 75].V became “frightened” when she saw F. She stood up and walked out to talk to F. Following the biting and tickling, the accused remained “very angry”. He called K to ask if she was coming home.

47 Later on, in the early hours of 14th Mar 12, he left the unit because “he had to work” later that day. On reaching the ground floor, he saw K and V. K demanded to know if he had “done something” to V. He denied. Later when TS arrived at the void deck, she scolded the accused. He kept quiet.

III. ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE

(a) The approach to sexual cases

48 In Tang Kin Seng[note: 76], the offender was convicted after trial for molesting a domestic maid. He denied the act and maintained the denial during investigations. Like the present case, the victim was alone with the offender in the lift when the act happened. After being molested, she returned to her employer’s unit and shut the door hurriedly. She continued working and vacuumed the house. Later, she tried to tell her employer but she did not understand. However, the employer could see that the victim was distressed. The employer called a friend for help to talk to the victim. That friend also didn’t fully understand the victim fully but could hear that the victim was distressed. Against this, the offender testified that they merely talked in the lift. He said that the victim did not realize that she had reached her floor and tried to run out when the door was about to close. He grabbed her to prevent her from being hit. The victim said: “Thank you uncle bye, bye...” and waved at him. Dismissing the appeal and affirming the conviction, the High Court stated inter alia[note: 77]:

“… in a trial for sexual offences, what is important is that the evidence is weighed carefully, always bearing in mind the relevant aspects of human nature and behaviour. It would be wrong to be bogged down by technicalities, especially when it has no logical bearing to the problem at hand…analyse the evidence for the Prosecution and for the Defence, and decide whether the complainant's evidence is so reliable that a conviction based solely on it is not unsafe. If it is not, it is necessary to identify which aspect of it is not so convincing and for which supporting evidence is required or desired. In assessing the supporting evidence, the question then is whether this supporting evidence makes up for the weakness in the complainant's evidence. All these would, of course, have to be done in the light of all the circumstances of each case and all the evidence, including the defence evidence, as well as accumulated knowledge of human behaviour and common sense.”

49 In Mohammed Liton[note: 78], the Court of Appeal added:

“...therefore, the “extra something” implied by the word “unusually” must refer to the need for the trial judge to be aware of the dangers of convicting solely on the complainant’s testimony as well as of the importance of convicting only on testimony that, when weighed against the overall backdrop of the available facts and circumstances, contains that ring of truth which leaves the court satisfied that no reasonable doubt exists in favour of the accused. …”

50 I kept in mind the above guidance as I assessed the evidence.

· Was V unusually convincing?

Finding: There were no material contradictions in V’s evidence

51. Defence sought to undermine the credibility of V evidence by highlighting “material contradictions” between her account and, for example, the Prosecution’s Summary of Facts (PSOF)[note: 79], in relation to the 13th Mar 12 incident. As the name suggest, the PSOF is a summary, a brief statement/account of the facts Prosecution relies on to make out the charges. Drafting the PSOF requires a balance between capturing the key essentials of a case versus brevity[note: 80]. A comparison of V’s testimony against how the facts were presented in the PSOF might be helpful.

PSOF

ORAL TESTIMONY

On 13th Mar 12, at about 11 pm, V was in the master bedroom, lying on her mattress and watching TV. The accused was sleeping at the other side of the bedroom, on the other mattress.

It was around 10 plus, 11 pm on 13th Mar 12.[note: 81] V laid on her single mattress; the accused was on the right of his queen size mattress.[note: 82]

The accused placed his hand on V’s waist and tried to slip his hand under her T-shirt. V pulled his hand away, but the accused grabbed her hand.

The accused restrained V by lying on top of her and using one hand to hold her. He touched her all over her body and rubbing his groin against her groin.

The accused swung his hand and touched her thigh[note: 83]. His hand wanted to go inside her shorts. She pushed away his hand. When he grabbed her hand, she pulled it away. The accused then came on top of V and started rubbing his penis against her private area. She resisted by pushing at his biceps area.

There appears to be an omission whether he had also tried to put his hand under her t-shirt first before going “inside her shorts”[note: 84]. In re-examination, V clarified that she remembered that the accused turned to her. He swung his hand, trying to slip it under her shirt. There was a struggle[note: 85]. He then tried to put his hand into her shorts.

Argument: The Defence said that “these are two completely disparate accounts” - either the accused moved into her shorts first or her t-shirt first[note: 86]..

Remarks: The net effect of V’s testimony was that the accused progressed from trying to put his hand into her shirt; her shorts, rubbing his penis against her private part, to rubbing against her hand. The composite actions happened quickly.

Whether he tried to put his hand into the t-shirt or shorts first, whether during the initial phase or later on in the incident, her account showed that the accused tried to do all composite actions. The Defence’s criticism is actually on the sequencing of the composite acts.

The accused pulled down his shorts and started to rub his penis against the victim’s groin[note: 87].

He pulled down his boxers, exposing his penis, and rubbed his penis against her private part. In that position, she kicked him in his groin, but did not manage to hurt him.

V covered her groin area with her right hand and used her left hand to push the accused. He then rubbed his penis against the back of her right hand.

V covered her ‘private area’ (she clarified that she was referring to her vagina) with her hand. Then he held his penis and rubbed it against her covering hand.

The accused stopped and put back his shorts. He turned to face the victim, pulled her hand to touch his penis. He also tried to insert his hand into her T-shirt.

V pulled her hand away and held onto her T-shirt. He touched her all over the body. The accused managed to lift her T-shirt from the bottom. The accused lifted her bra and bit her left breast at the nipple before sucking on both breasts.

The accused stopped because there was a sound coming from outside the room.[note: 88] He looked out and pulled up his shorts (boxers). V tried to push him away at his biceps. He grabbed her hand to his penis. V pulled her hand back. When V kicked him in the groin area, he was not hurt. He made moaning noises.

Then the accused went on top of V. He tried to lift up her shirt, initially pulling from the bottom and then, the collar. There was a struggle as V tried to stop him from lifting her shirt. He succeeded[note: 89] and pushed her bra aside. V remembered that it was the left breast that he bit because of the position of his head. V tried to push his head/body away by his shoulders but she could not. He sucked on the breasts and licked her ear. She told him to “go away!”

Argument: The Defence contended that in the PSOF, it was stated (a) that the accused touched her all over her body (which she never said in court) and (b) that the accused was able to lift her t-shirt from the bottom. It was said that “here again the PSOF differs significantly”.

Remarks: In the context of struggle described in her testimony, although V never specifically parroted the phrase the accused had touched her all over her body, her narration of what he tried to do: pulling her shirt from the bottom/collar; pushing her bra aside, represented the act of V being touched all over her body. The accused succeeding in partially pushing her t-shirt away, exposing her bra and touching the breast. The accused’s DNA was deposited onto the left cup of V’s white bra, proving that direct contact was made with the V’s bra.



52 After perusing her evidence in totality as tabulated above, the purported contradictions indicated by the Defence, are more apparent than real. I was mindful that V was asked to narrate in sequence the events of Mar 2012, in late 2016. Whilst a minor kink in the sequence of each composite action is not unexpected[note: 90], the substance of her allegations is clearly intact (see ‘Remarks’)[note: 91].

53 Next, V was questioned on the Police Message Form (D1, PMF)[note: 92]. The Defence argued there was a material contradiction between V’s testimony and D1 where it was reported that it was V who called K after the incident of 13th Mar 12. However, it is notable that later in D1, it was reported that after the incident of 10th Mar 12, V “did not inform anyone about it”.

54 The unchallenged evidence of Sgt Gabriel was that he prepared D1 as a “summary”[note: 93] from various sources, namely, from the witnesses then present as he felt that V was not comfortable to speak to a male officer. It must be remembered that the undisputed evidence was that K, F, their cousins, TB and TS, and V, were already at the void deck soon after the accused was caught lying on top of V. Sgt Gabriel informed that he “did not question her (V) directly”[note: 94].

55 In D1 there is a column labelled “initials”. However, none of the witnesses, including V, appended their signatures to confirm accuracy of the contents of D1. The Defence has not shown that this inconsistency originated from V. I am not persuaded that the inconsistency could be attributed to V.

56 In cross-examination, V maintained that she did not call K either on 11th or 13th Mar 12. V did not want her mother to find out what happened[note: 95]. V feared that she might cause them (K and accused) to fall out. V misgivings about exposing the accused’s misconduct towards her for fear of ruining her mother’s relationship with him, existed on 11th Mar and remained on 13th Mar 12.

57 The corroborated prosecution’s evidence showed that it was F who called K telling her what happened and it was F who urged K to hurry back. TS (PW3) testified that she spoke to K after F called her. She tried to speak to V directly via the mobile but she was crying. TS also spoke to F.

58 Viewed from that perspective, in my view, doubt arises about the accuracy of the record alleging that V called K on 13th Mar 12: why would she do so on 13th Mar 12 when she didn’t do so on 11th Mar 12?

59 With respect to the above, I am of view that there was nothing materially contradictory to impair V’s credibility.

60 In cross-examination, V testified that the accused’s act of sucking her breasts happened before she saw her sister at the door of the master room[note: 96]. It was contended that the fact that PW9 only saw her t-shirt and the bottom of her bra rendered her account “unbelievable”. With respect, I disagree.

61 It was never V’s evidence that she was unclothed during the sexual assault on 13th Mar 12. Her evidence was that although she was fully clothed, the accused managed to partially pull her t-shirt up to her chest area and managed to push aside her bra. This being her account, I failed to see how F’s observation of only being able to see V’s t-shirt up to chest level, exposing the bottom part of her bra, rendered V’s account, suspect.

62 The Defence also argued during the struggle when the accused laughed and moaned, F would have heard it. The fact that F did not hear anything, meant that there was no such struggle. V’s account was that her struggle, her resistance to the accused’s acts seemed to have spurred the accused’s on.[note: 97] Whilst it is possible that some may laugh and moan loudly, there are also others who do not. Thus, the fact that F did not hear the accused’s laugh or moan is neither here nor there. With respect, I could not agree that the fact F did not hear these sounds from her room meant that V did not struggle or resist within her own room.

63 In any event, it would have made it so much easier for both V and F to simply testify, if they wanted to falsify, that the accused’s laughs and moans were loud enough that F actually heard them. Neither F nor V did this. This is an example of an inconvenient truth that V maintained when it would have made it relatively easier for her to say otherwise.

64 The main thrust of the Defence’s attack on V’s credibility was the perceived incredulity of her inaction for not exposing the sexual assault on 11th Mar. V continued to accompany him for his delivery rounds[note: 98] even after that[note: 99].

65 In fact, when cross-examined whether V and F had lied about Andrew being present in the unit on 11th Mar 12, the accused’s deflection of the question came in the form of his answer that V ought to have reported him immediately and refused to accompany him on his delivery runs. It is apparent that this is a significant factor even to the accused.

Finding: V gave a cogent explanation for not telling on accused

66 The Defence laid siege to V’s non-disclosure of the first incident on 11th Mar 12[note: 100]. It was submitted that her answers during cross-examination was “completely incoherent”. The concluding submission was that “it is more likely that the victim and the accused were ‘in various stages of horseplay’ and when the victim saw her sister at the door (13th Mar 12), she decided to cry molest and rape.” [note: 101] The various stages of sexual assault on 13th Mar 12, seen by F and experienced first-hand by V, were in fact, stages of horseplay. The embarrassment V felt being seen by F caused her to make false claims about the sexual assault on 13th Mar 12 as well as 11th Mar 12[note: 102].

67 It must be noted that V never denied that she accompanied him for his delivery rounds at K’s behest between the first and second incidents. She did so when she narrated the accused’s use of “kui bao” to the others when he asked her to accompany him to a hotel earlier on 13th Mar 12. It is apparent that this concession has a tendency to complicate V’s evidence about the assaults and that was precisely what the Defence had capitalized on. Despite being an inconvenient truth, however, V resolutely maintained it as a fact.

68 V explained that she accompanied the accused on his delivery rounds because her mother, K, asked her to. She did not decline because she did not want her to suspect something was amiss between her and the accused. In addition, she was assured by the fact K knew where she was and who she would be. She also did not think the accused would dare to make sexual assault her in public places during the daytime. As it turned out, V was right.

69 The common denominator in the 2 incidents was that they happened late at night or in the wee hours of the morning when the people in the household had already retired for the day; when both V and accused were in the master room, alone, at the time the accused tried to impose himself on V. In my view, it would not be conducive, with the accused getting in and out of the van to do deliveries, for him to engage in such acts with V on the road. V confirmed that during the rounds, the accused did not sexually assault her.

70 However, at the time of his last delivery in Changi[note: 103], V said that he propositioned her to go to hotel with him (when he made the “kui bao” remark). Later, after dinner, V testified that the accused drove the van to the MSCP and asked her to lay at down at the back of the van. She refused both times. Later that night, in the master room, the accused tried to rape her.

71 Additionally, the evidence showed that F did not believe V was enthused to accompany the accused. F testified that before 13th Mar 12, she knew that V “was quite reluctant to go”[note: 104].

DPP:So before what happened on the 13th to 14th of March 2012, did your sister ever tell you about these incidents between herself and the accused?

A:No, my sister never told me anything. I only know there was this once whereby she was quite reluctant to go on the delivery rounds with him…And there were some sort of arguments at home, between my mother and her.

72 V’s desired to give K the appearance of normalcy. Her main concern was her mother’s happiness at the expense of her own[note: 105]. That was essentially the reason why V did not request to sleep elsewhere or in F’s room after the first incident[note: 106]. That was a misguided naivety on her part. V’s priority for her mother’s happiness explains the sharp sense of betrayal she felt when K continued to be with the accused despite the disclosures that he had sexually abused her.

“And I…whenever I know that my, my mother is still together with him after the incident and when she doesn’t come home at night, I felt very very betrayed…”[note: 107]

73 The fact that an early disclosure of sexual abuses may not be at the apex of a victim’s pyramid of concerns, sadly, is not unknown or rare[note: 108].Victims of sexual offences may not always react in a predictable manner and it is the credibility of their explanation that is important.

74 On the evidence, V’s conduct is remarkably consistent with the fact that she endeavoured to keep from her mother what had happened to her. She maintained that she did not call K on 13th Mar 12. Her denial is supported by the evidence of Sgt Gabriel (who prepared D1) and the evidence of F and TS (PW3) about how the disclosures happened.

75 V explained that she wanted to see her mother happy because of her mother’s previous tumultuous relationship with her biological father. There was hardly any rebuttal of this aspect of her evidence.

DPP:Now, why were you so scared that…why were you so scared that their …the relationship between your mother and uncle would be broken?

A:Because, because my, my mother didn’t…when my…when my father is still around, my mum didn’t have a happy marriage together with my dad. And a…and after they divorced…after my mum divorced my dad, and when he…when my…when my mother met uncle, and after they got together, my…I can, I can see that my mother is very happy together with him.

DPP:Can you just tell the Court also about your relationship with your dad when he was around?

A:When my dad is around, I am…I’m scared of him because he usually get drunk every day. And then he will threaten to…He’ll usually get drunk every day…And then he will beat my mother up and threaten to kill us[note: 109].

76 The net effect of the evidence F, TB (PW2), TS (PW3) and S (PW8) showed that V has a quiet, introverted personality unlikely to raise a hue and cry. As it turned out, after the 11th Mar incident, V did keep mum on what he did. Like the offender in PP v AOM, who exploited the young victim’s naivety, the accused again exploited V quiet personality on 13th Mar after putting his thoughts into action[note: 110] on 11th Mar.

77 Having assessed the quality of her evidence and observed her testify, I am persuaded that V has given a cogent explanation for her continued interaction with the accused. She kept up the pretence so that K “can be together with [Uncle]”. If not for F’s accidental intervention on 13th Mar, K would have continued in the relationship with the accused blissfully unaware of what had happened to V.

DC:Now, was your sister upset about the fact that the police had been called regarding the incident?

A: No, she’s just very upset that my mother will be very heartbroken.[note: 111]

Finding: V did not have a motive to lie

78 In Goh Han Heng v PP[note: 112], the Court stated that:

“….where the accused can show that the complainant has a motive to falsely implicate him, then the burden must fall on the Prosecution to disprove that motive. This does not mean that the accused merely needs to allege that the complainant has a motive to falsely implicate him. Instead, the accused must adduce sufficient evidence of this motive so as to raise a reasonable doubt in the Prosecution’s case…To hold otherwise would mean that the Prosecution would have the burden of proving a lack of motive to falsely implicate the accused in literally every case, thereby practically instilling a lack of such a motive as a constituent element of every offence.”

79 The Defence’s case is that V made these false allegations against the accused because F caught them in “various stages of horseplay”’ on the night of 13th Mar 12. To cover up her embarrassment, V manufactured an entire story, complete with DNA evidence, for example. If the accused, did not intrude into the V’s intimate area, how then was his DNA deposited there?[note: 113]

80 From the above, the argument must follow that V also falsified allegations about the 11th Mar 12 incident to cover up her embarrassment, complete with the evidence (correctly predicted) that an examination of the accused’s arm, would find a bruise consistent with her biting him on that occasion.

81 However, it is common ground is that even prior to these incidents, there were already such “horseplay”. V had shared with her friend, PW8, certain conduct of the accused towards her that she was not comfortable with (she insisted that PW8 tell no one as she did not want K to know). F was already aware that the accused and V engaged such “horseplay” such that both became annoyed at each other. V had also admitted to it.

“…Then at about 11 pm (13th Mar 12), when I was sleeping, Ah Ling (V) was tickling me on my hand and waist. I then told her not to do so. This is not the first time she did that and Ah Cat (K) also knew about it before.”[note: 114]

82 If the “horseplay” of 13th Mar 12, was as whimsical as the accused’s depiction (mutual tickling; biting etc), why would V be so spectacularly embarrassed about an already known occurrence such that she would lie to the police to frame the accused? Additionally, the largely undisputed evidence further showed that V she engaged in acts of self-harm post-incidents. No evidence (none in the Defence’s Submissions) was led on the accused’s behalf, to show that V already had a pre-existing issue with self-harming behavior even before 11 and 13th Mar 12. There being no embarrassment (only distress) the central thesis for the supposed false allegations, breaks apart.

83 In my respectful view, V was forthcoming and did not embellish her evidence. She even took on inconvenient truths and maintained them as facts. These complicated her testimony but she never jettisoned them in favour of an easier pass, a lighter scrutiny, of her evidence. I found V to be an unusually convincing witness.

Finding: The accused tried to rape V on 13th Mar 12

84 In my mind, in a case such as this, it is commonsensical and pragmatic to look for supporting/corroborating evidence.

“…When in the ordinary affairs of life one is doubtful whether or not to believe a particular statement one naturally looks to see whether it fits in with other statements or circumstances relating to the particular matter; the better it fits in, the more one is inclined to believe it. The doubted statement is corroborated to a greater or lesser extent by the other statements or circumstances with which it fits in.”[note: 115]

85 Even if the Defence’s submission is correct, the motives ascribed to V about why she would falsify allegations against the accused, does not apply to F. All that could be alleged of V’s evidence was a weak assertion that V lied merely because her account of 13th Mar 12 differed from the accused.

86 According to F, on 13th Mar 12, at or about 9 pm, her mother, K, left the unit. At around 10 to 11 plus pm, F needed to use the bathroom and proceeded to the one in the master room. She preferred this rather than the one in the kitchen because the towels and toiletries were there including her toothbrush. Then, she saw the accused watching TV. V was at her side of the room close to the wall where the air-con unit was. After using the toilet, she returned to her room. After trying to sleep but could not, F went to the bathroom again. As she was about to step into the master room, she saw the accused on top of V. F was shocked and she did not know how long she “froze”. Everything “happened so quickly”.

87 F saw V using her left hand “to push” the accused’s right arm or shoulder. V didn’t succeed in pushing him off. The accused was “pinning” V and saying something to her, attracting a frustrated response from V who said “go away!” In cross-examination, F said that although she did not hear what he said, she was sure that he was not telling V to “stop it” because of the response she heard from V and what she saw him do. F saw V’s t-shirt at her chest level exposing the bottom of her bra (white). In cross-examination, she said she did not see what happened to V’s shorts. When V’s gaze caught F standing at the door, the accused turned to look. He stopped and rolled back onto the mattress[note: 116]. What F saw demanded some serious explaining. The accused did not say anything to her.

88 F was shocked at what she saw. She went into the bathroom. When she eventually walked out, she saw the accused watching TV. F heard V “crying when she had the pillow in her face”. F went into her room from and called her boyfriend, A, and her mother, K. F told A what she saw and said that “something was wrong”. She told A to come over immediately. She then went to the lift area to call K and told her to “hurry back” because she saw the accused on top of V.

89 According to TS (PW3), it was near to midnight when K called her. In that call, K was very hysterical and told her that F called and said she saw the accused pressing his whole body was on top of V in the bedroom. After K chided her for leaving V alone, she returned and switched on the lights in the unit. The accused was “smoking in the kitchen”. She waited in the living room until A arrived. As they escorted V out of the unit, she suddenly ran down to the 8th floor and cried. To comfort V, F said that she had already called their mother. V’s response was to say that would make their mother “very sad”[note: 117]. There was no dispute that this was what F did.

90 In cross-examination, the Defence tried to capitalize on F’s initial inaction upon seeing the accused trying to rape V. For example, she did not shout, did not ask what he was doing that to V, and/or pull the accused off V. The argument goes that it must mean then that nothing untoward happened. This appears to the Defence’s primary strategy to undermine F’s evidence.

91 In my view, this represents an oversimplification, premised of an assumption that there is a ‘standard’ response to witnessing a crime[note: 118]. Different people react differently to stressors and responses to witnessing a crime do vary: some may unhesitatingly intervene and put themselves in harm’s way; others offer limited intervention, hesitating and reacting belatedly. There will even be those who wouldn’t intervene[note: 119].

DC:So why didn’t you straightaway go and help her…to prevent her from being raped?

A:I only weighed 38 kg at that point of time…Ah Han’s size is so much bigger than me. I did not think…I did not think that I will be able to push him away, and in that state I was still trying to register everything. I went out of…I didn’t think so much in that moment. It was only after I went inside the toilet…that I tried to think of what I should do next. And that’s why I called Andrew.”[note: 120]

92 The logic of her answer is quite compelling. It is not every day one stumbles upon the boyfriend of one’s mother lying on top one’s teenage sister.

DC:Why didn’t you ask him what was going on?

A:Because in that moment all I wanted to do was to get help, because it looks really wrong[note: 121].

93 Going into the bathroom, gave her the isolation, a temporary reprieve, to gather her thoughts. Her inaction in those circumstances was transient. Furthermore, if V found it difficult to push the accused off her, it is not a stretch of the imagination for F to have the same concern. She wouldn’t need to call A and K to return to the unit urgently if she believed that she could handle the accused alone. I accept F’s explanation.

94 In any event, it is not true to say that F did not react at all. She was seen by V and the accused. He ceased what he was doing and F’s presence was enough to stop further harm to V: as good as any screams could; as good as the act of pulling him off V could. Switching on the lights in the unit when the entire household should have been asleep deterred further acts against V. Bathing the unit in lights erased shadows from where dirty deeds tended to hide.

95 F’s evidence concerning V’s frustrated response telling the accused to “go away!” when he laid on top of her does not support the narrative that the accused merely told her “to stop it” and was instead tickling her at her waist[note: 122]. There is nothing arising from the cross-examination to suggest that what F saw, heard and did, were a deceptive albeit a clever, elaborately staged drama. F’s behaviour was nonplussed and frantic not the action of one who saw something innocuous.

96 Against this, the accused’s claim that F merely witnessed a whimsical moment is not credible. It did not help his case that he was not exactly unambiguous in his description of what he did to V. In his evidence-in-chief, he testified that he merely pressed her on her shoulders, his body was not on top of her. In cross-examination, he gave confusing and barely coherent responses[note: 123].

“DPP:So let me get this image right, okay? You turned around, and…you basically got into a push-up position, with your weight resting on V(redacted)’s shoulders while she was lying on her back. Is that an accurate description?

A:Yes, but I was not using great force…I just pressed on her shoulders lightly.

DPP:Mr Tee, your entire body weight is practically on V(redacted)?

A:Yes.

DPP:You are in a push-up position and your hands are pressing on her shoulders, yes?

A:No, not as in the force used in a push-up position. I turned around, my---both my knees were on the floor, I pressed…

DPP:Okay, so let me get this right, okay. When I first asked you what was your position. You said you believed you were sitting on her legs, yes? Version one, yes?

A:Yes. Yes, when I turned around, I was on top of her. That’s what I meant.

DPP: Version two, you are squatting, yes?

A:I used my knees to support my weight…You can say that I was squatting, you can also say that I was on top of her.

DPP:So to you is the same thing, to be squatting and to be on your knees? Or is that a different position?

A:Different position. I’m sorry. When I just woke up, I thought I was just squatting or on my---my knees were on the floor.

DPP:So we have version one sitting, version two squatting, and now version three, you are on your knees with V(redacted) between your legs. Am I correct?

A:Your Honour, I need to explain, when the prosecutor asked me whether I was on top of V(redacted), I said yes. Yes, I was on top of her because I used my both hands to press on her shoulders. The second time, the prosecutor asked me if I was squatting, I thought with both my knees on the ground means squatting. That’s why I said yes.

DPP:Sorry, he was the one who said he was squatting.

A:Yes. I thought by kneeling down is also the same as squatting

DPP:Both your knees were on the floor, in between your knees was V(redacted), yes?

A:Yes…She was lying on her own mattress.

DPP:So for your hands to be on her shoulders, and…her to be in between your knees, am I right to say that your groin area is above her groin area?

A: At that time I did not pay attention to such details.”

97 As an added brace to this strategy, the Defence tried to ascribe to F a motive for falsehoods.

DC:Alright. Now, can you confirm that right at this particular moment itself, you are very angry with the accused, right?

A:No, I am not.

DC:That despite the fact that he tried to rape your sister, you’re not angry with him?

A:No.

DC:Why are you not angry with him?

A: I just think that he’s very pathetic and he should be very ashamed about his own children.

98 The incident happened in 2012 and the trial started in 2016/2017. Her answer that she is not angry now was, although blunt, logical and credible.

99 F’s account corroborates V’s evidence albeit not every single detail of it. What she saw the accused did was not as extensive as what V had experienced close-up. This is perfectly logical with what a witness, who had a macro view of an incident unfolding about 4.8 m[note: 124] ahead of her, would say. One can imagine that an older sister like F, if motivated by deliberate falsehoods, could easily render her account much better than what it is.

100 In Kwan Peng Hong v PP[note: 125], it was said that weight to be attached to the witness’s evidence, among other factors, depended on his honesty, ability, number and consistency of the evidence, and conformity of the evidence with experience, and the coincidence of the evidence with other collateral circumstances. Having observed F, I find that she gave her evidence in a measured way. She answered questions from the Defence candidly. She was unshaken in cross-examination and her account withstood scrutiny. Key aspects of her testimony are supported by the accounts of TB and TS, even V. Her evidence ticked all the right boxes: Kwan Peng Hong. F impressed as a credible witness.

101 I am satisfied that the net effect of the evidence of F, TS and TB, corroborated V’s account of the incident of 13th Mar 12 including the following:

a) V’s shirt was pushed up to the chest level revealing the bottom part of her bra. It seemed “very wrong” and she believed that the accused wanted to rape V. The accused said something into V’s ear, resulting in a frustrated response from her telling him to “go away!”

b) F set into motion a flurry of hurried activity: she called A to come over to her place from where he was; told K to return to the unit immediately because she saw the accused on top of V; she returned to the unit to switch on all the lights; she waited for A and together they tried to escort V out of the unit but she ran away suddenly from them;

c) V was sobbing and hugging herself. She was in distress. The people around her responded by trying to comfort her.

102 I do not accept that the incident of 13th Mar 12 and by extension, the incident of 11th Mar 12, were merely “horseplay”.

103 In Tang Kin Seng v. PP[note: 126], the Court in not following the decision of PP v. Nasar Bin Ahmad[note: 127] stated:

“…Roberts CJ held that there was corroboration of the victim’s evidence in relation to the first incident in the form of testimonies from witnesses and that the victim’s evidence was credible. D1 and D3 were convicted of rape and D2 of attempted rape. However, in relation to the second incident, he held that there was no corroboration and so D1 and D2 were acquitted.

With respect, the acquittals on the second charge are hard to justify. D2’s evidence was that he spent the night in the room with her and that he did not have any physical contact with her as he rejected her advances. That being so, how can there be any doubt that D2 was obviously lying about what happened in the room? That would have entailed the court believing that after the victim was gang-raped by three men and after D2 had attempted to rape her as well, she turned around and made sexual overtures to D2. This was patently ludicrous.

If the victim could be believed in relation to the first incident, and D2 could not, why should she not be believed in relation to the second incident? She did not fabricate her evidence in relation to the first incident and she clearly did not fantasize it. There was no evidential basis at all in the circumstances for suggesting that she could have done so in relation to the second incident. There was thus no basis for doubting her evidence.”

104 With respect, it is most unfortunate that the accused (and Defence) chose to describe the accused’s pre-incidents interactions with V as “horseplay”.

Q12:The police was informed that on last Saturday night, you had touched Ah Ling’s breast (V). What do you have to say about that?

A12:I did no. But last time, we were playing, she was violence and pinching my nipple so I did pinched her on her breast back and told her to stop her nonsense. I knew I was in the wrong but at that time, I did it out of impulse.

Q14:The Police was informed that on last night (13th Mar 12), you had touched Ah Ling’s breast, lifted up her t-shirt and bra and bite her nipped and sucked on both breast. What do you have to say?

A14:No. But I was tickling on the side of Ah Ling’s body (V) and Ah Girl (F) came in. Last night, Ah Ling tried to bite me several times. I got angry and thought that I must let her feel the pain to stop her. So I bite her on the chest above her left breast. But I did not suck on her breast.[note: 128]

105 In cross-examination by the DPP, the accused had this to say.

DPP:Have you ever pinched V(redacted) on her breast?

A:At that time, we were playing. I pinched her…but not on the breast. Because she also pinched me around my body. Sometimes, I sustained bruises on my body. Her mother was aware.

DPP:So you deny ever pinching V(redacted) on her breast, is that right?

A:Never. Sometimes, she pinched on my arm, I pinch her back on her arm. Sometimes, her mother had to shout at her before she stopped.

DPP:Turn to D3 (long statement) at A12 on page 6. Now, did you not tell the police on the 14th of March 2012, that there was a time when you were playing with V(redacted) and in your words: “She was violent and pinching my nipple. So I did pinch her on her breast back.”

A:I just pinch somewhere, I do not know where was the location. I just pinched her back. I only know that I pinched her on her chest area, that’s why I said this to the IO.

DPP:So you did pinch the victim on her chest area, that’s what you are saying now?

A:Yes. Because she also pinched me, she was disrespectful.

106 Going by the accused’s own evidence, his explanation about where he had intruded and pinched V changed from her “breast” to her “chest area” that was “not” the breast. I find the little ‘twist’ to be incredible since he was the one who volunteered the information in Answer 12 (D3) without qualification. Furthermore, if reciprocity was the reason, since V pinched his “nipple”, he would have retaliated by pinching V on her “breast”.

107 In my view, the prevarication was his attempt to erase the inappropriateness of a prior violation of an intimate part of the body of a 17-year old girl. The change in his evidence, gravely impacted his credibility.

DPP:And you agree with me that it is highly inappropriate of you to have pinched her chest.

A: Yes, I agree. But when she played with me, she was very violent. I did not have the intention to pinch her on her breast...in particular. I just wanted to pinch her back.[note: 129]

108 There was nothing playful, whimsical or funny about an intrusion of the chest/breast area of a teenager by a 40-year old man.

Finding: V’s was distressed and remained distressed thereafter.

109 Genuine distress can corroborate although it did not originate[note: 130] from an independent source: R v. Alan Redpath.[note: 131]

“…the victim’s mother had found her in a distressed state barely a few hours after the rape. The circumstances under which the mother found her did not suggest that she was putting on an act and was simulating distress. Her mother had found her crying in the bedroom and, when questioned, had refused to tell the mother what had happened because she was too ashamed to do so. Her distressed condition lent support to her story of being raped…”

110 However, I bore in mind that the value of distress as supporting evidence may be weak in certain instances. For example, where the issue pertains to the mental state of the accused at the time of the act (accidental contact etc), distress adds little since that can be equally consistent with a mistaken perception: Cadawanaltharayil v. PP[note: 132]. In the present case, the key issue is whether the accused attempted to rape V (amongst other acts) or not; not whether he did the acts with or without consent[note: 133].

111 After the second incident on 13th Mar 12, F heard V crying into the pillow as she walked out of the bathroom. As V was being escorted out of the unit, she suddenly ran down to the 8th floor and sat there, crying. When TS (PW3) called her to find out what happened, she heard V crying into the phone. At the ground floor, V remained crying and was seen by TB (PW2) “cuddling herself on the floor”. V was not in “a good state” [note: 134]. She was expressionless and had a blank stare. F had her arm around her, comforting her. Sgt Gabriel Chan (PW7) did not question V directly because he felt that she was not “comfortable speaking to a male officer”. The above is the unchallenged observations of the witnesses.

112 Redacted (S, PW8) is a friend of V. She was told about the police coming to investigate around 5 plus am on 14th Mar 12. She missed V’s text but once she woke up and saw the text, she went to the unit. V told her that the police came earlier because of “uncle” who tried to touch her when she was sleeping initially. When she pushed his hand away and tried to resist, “Uncle” became forceful. “Uncle” merely smiled at her[note: 135]. V did not share much with her. On that occasion, S observed that V, although calm and not hysterical, seemed afraid and looked very lost. V had told her on at least 2 other occasions, prior to the incidents, “uncle” had touched her in appropriately. She also mentioned how he would subtly and in a playful manner touch her and that she was not comfortable with it. V told S to keep these to herself. V did not want to ruin her relationship with her mother. According to S, V really is a quiet girl since they first met. After sharing this with S, V “was not as opened” as before. There was no cross-examination of S.

113 F similarly testified that V is not a chatty person and she does not have a lot of friends. After the disclosure of the incidents, V told her that she felt “very different”[note: 136] and she does not “trust people”. She wished to be “normal” like her peers and “just hang out” after school. V was not willing to do group projects with her schoolmates preferring instead to do them with her. In cross-examination, F testified that V became more suicidal after her polytechnic studies ended. She had cut her wrist and thigh and F had seen the scars. TB (PW2) confirmed that V is very reserved and does not talk much. He knows that V had not worked since graduation and does not seem to be “doing too well” in life.

114 In explaining her feelings about the incidents, V said the following.

“…I can’t stop thinking about what happened. And I just felt very different from everyone after. So, I stopped contacting most of my friends because I just felt that…I felt very different from other people.

I don’t understand why she still choose to be together with him and I took pills to make myself sleep but it doesn’t work all the time. Because I took too much and I’m so used to the pill. And then, I will just go and look for other pills to make---that will cause drowsiness to make myself sleep.

I just feel so angry that then I will start to cut myself. I just didn’t know who to talk to because not everyone will be there for you all the time. Everyone have their own worries and I shouldn’t be such a burden. I just want to take this all by myself because it’s okay. …sometimes I just want to give up because when you…once you end your life, you don’t have to face anything anymore. But the reason that I’m still here is for the sake of my mother.”[note: 137]

115 What V has said and done have been observed by the Court of Appeal in previous cases[note: 138].

“…great many survivors develop chronic anxiety and depression which persist into adult life…This emotional state cannot be terminated by ordinary means of self-soothing. Abused children discover at some point that the feeling can be most effectively terminated by a major jolt to the body…through the deliberate infliction of injury. The connection between childhood abuse and self-mutilating behavior is by now well documented. …Survivors who self-mutilate consistently describe a profound dis-associative state preceding the act…The mutilation continues until it produces a powerful feeling of calm and relief; physical pain is much preferable to the emotional pain that it replaces…Self-injury is also frequently mistaken for a suicidal gesture….there is a body of expert opinion that self-injury is intended not to kill, but, rather, to relieve unbearable emotional pain, and many victims of child abuse (which includes rape of a young girl) regard it, paradoxically, as a form of self-preservation.”

116 In my view, these astute observations represents “accumulated knowledge of human behaviour”: Tang Kin Seng. I do not accept the Defence’s argument that the “victim’s self-harming method” could only be explained by “expert psychiatric evidence” during the trial[note: 139]. To ignore such evidence is to be bogged down in “technicalities”: Tang Kin Seng.

117 In any event, I do not think that expert evidence is even necessary. The accused’s evidence is that he and V had engaged in “horseplay”[note: 140] before 11th and 13th Mar 12, a fact already known to F[note: 141] even before then and something which V had already shared with S prior to that[note: 142]. V also confirmed this aspect of the accused’s evidence. No evidence was led to show that these self-destructive behaviour pre-existed 11th and 13th Mar 12.

118 In this case, several prosecution witnesses attested to V’s distress very shortly after the incident. Having examined the evidence, especially the cross-examination evidence of F, TB, TS, I am convinced that V’s distress including her self-destructive acts were not feigned.

119 No submission on this issue appeared in the Defence’s initial submissions. However in its Reply Submissions, Defence argued that V’s distress is consistent “with the feelings of shame” that she was experiencing having been “discovered physically interacting” with the accused[note: 143]. The “physical interaction” alluded to was the act of the accused pressing V down on her shoulders lightly, his biting V and tickling her waist. However, it must be noted that there was already similar ‘horseplay’ before that never caused V trauma. If what the accused did on 13th Mar 12 was ‘whimsical’, it could not cause her such distress.

120 The Defence next argued that the fact V decided not to submit to medical examination is “inexplicable” and showed that she “was not so distressed as to be [un]able to make a considered decision”[note: 144]. I am not able to accept the idea that if V was truly distressed, her thought processes would have disintegrated and she would, if I understand the logic of the argument, blindly submit to examination.

121 In Tang King Seng[note: 145], the domestic helper who was molested went back to her employer’s unit and continued vacuuming and doing her chores, before she made a complaint. In my view, having had her sexual autonomy recently violated by the accused, I am not at all surprised that V declined to subject her body to examination.

122 Regarding her distress soon after the incident and her behaviour at the void deck, which has been verified by several witnesses, I find them bona fide. There was causality between her condition and what happened between her and accused.

123 I agree with the prosecution’s submission. I am satisfied that an event of great emotional disturbance happened to V, incompatible with the accused’s assertion that nothing untoward occurred. The evidence also showed that since then, V continued to be in distress to the point that she has been engaging in harmful acts to relieve “unbearable emotional pain”: see PP v UI.

Finding: The repeated use of the phrase “kui bao” proves intent

124 The Hokkien phrase “kui bao” has been described in various ways to mean: “stop being the virgin”; “your daughter is going to lose her virginity”; “breaking her virginity”. There is no controversy that “kui bao” is euphemism for sex with a virgin (to deflower)[note: 146]. The Defence does not deny that the accused had used the phrase when talking to K about V once before[note: 147].

DC:Now, I’m instructed that the accused did say…He did utter the words “kui bao” but this was said jokingly in front of your mother since you were going to turn 18 soon. Do you agree, he said in jest or jokingly?

A:Mm, I…I don’t know why he said that suddenly. Because I’m not sure about the conversation between them earlier, and what makes him say and what makes him mention about the word.

DC:And I further put it to you that instead of scolding him, your mother was laughing about it. Agree or disagree?

A:Disagree.

125 It has not been explained why V turning 18 meant that the topic of her losing her virginity suddenly becomes important. When cross-examined by the DPP, the accused was coy about its meaning despite knowing how to use it in a conversation[note: 148].

DPP:Now, Mr Tee, you have heard of this Hokkien phrase “kui bao”? Tell me what it means.

A: Because V(redacted) was very mischievous and naughty

Q: Tell me what it means.

A:I do not know how to explain…It’s a Hokkien term.

Q:Let me explain for you then. Now, it literally means to open treasure, yes…I will take the other meaning…What that phrase means is to essentially take a person’s virginity. Yes?

A: Yes.

126 The crux of the accused’ explanation appears to be that it was appropriate for him to talk to K about K’s 17 years old daughter losing her virginity when done in jest. In cross-examination, the accused said the following[note: 149].

DPP:And you had used this phrase (essentially take a person’s virginity) before?

A:Yes, in front of the mother. She (V) was disrespectful, that’s why…disrespectful to me…that was the reason why I use the term. I was very angry at that time. Her mother was…present…

DPP:So you used this phrase in your girlfriend’s presence?

A:Yes.

DPP:In relation to your girlfriend’s daughter, yes?

A:Yes. We were talking about this at home. Ah Kat was present. Ah Kat was laughing and ask me not to say this to V(redacted). Ah V(redacted) ask her mother what does that mean. Her mother was laughing and ask me not to use such term. I told her mother that you---she should discipline her daughter. She…her daughter has been disturbing me. I was very angry with her.

DPP:You told her mother that she should…that she should discipline her daughter when you are the one saying that you want to take her daughter’s virginity?

A:No, I did not say that. That’s not what I mean. That’s not what---that was not what I meant. I merely use the term.

DPP:Now, I ask you, if someone twice your daughter’s age…Now, someone twice your daughter’s age uses that phrase on your daughter, would you find it funny?

A:If my daughter is disrespectful, if my daughter has gone overboard, if someone were to use this word to scold her, I would discipline my own daughter.

DPP:So you think it’s appropriate for someone to use the phrase “Taking your …taking her virginity of your daughter”…you would think it’s appropriate, wouldn’t you, based on what you just said?...You would think it’s appropriate for someone to say that he would take your daughter virginity?

A:No, I’m not saying that. I would discipline my daughter. I would also told the person who use this term off…I will tell the person that if my daughter has done something inappropriate, I could discipline my daughter.

127 The accused was angry and used that phrase, according to him, to urge K to discipline V. Apart from the evasive way he responded to the DPP, his answers is inherently unbelievable. If he was angry because V disrespected him and wanted K to discipline her, he could have just asked K to reprimand V and insist that the V show the accused the due respect.

128 Talking to K about something as serious and intimate as V losing her virginity at a young age is not a topic that can be dressed up and excused, casually, as a joke. In any event, based on what the accused himself had said, the motivation could not have been to joke.

129 Having examined the evidence of V, F and TS, including the accused’s own evidence, on this point, I do not see the accused having a substantive, defensible explanation to the prosecution’s evidence that he had on at least 3 occasions used that phrase when talking about V and when talking to V. I prefer the clear and corroborated evidence of the prosecution’s witnesses.

130 According to V, when she was alone with the accused in the afternoon of 13th Mar 12 during his delivery runs, he used the Hokkien phrase “kui bao” when he spoke to her about accompanying him to a hotel. Later that same night, the accused attempted to rape her.

131 The phrase stood out in her mind because he had used it once before when speaking to K about V. Then V saw K scolding him. This is corroborated by TS (PW3). TS testified that K shared that there was once the accused used the phrase when speaking about V.

DPP:Earlier you mentioned this Hokkien phrase “kui bao”, have you heard it used before by the family… V(redacted)’s family?

A:Yes. He mentioned it…my auntie told me there was once, in the evening, they were all in the living area…watching TV…In the evening, we were all seated in the living room watching television and Tee Bee Han started his dirty jokes…Yes…Mentioning “kui pao”, this word…And my auntie was very disturbed. She told Tee Bee Han, ‘You have daughters yourself, so stop saying all these in front of my daughters.’”

132 On 13th Mar 12, whilst at the void deck, the accused when replying to K’s question as to how he could bring himself to do this to V, used that phrase in a sentence[note: 150]. F heard “kui bao” being used and K reacted angrily with TS almost wanting to “whack” him.

133 According to TS, the accused said in Hokkien: “Wui di li eh zhar bor kia tio ai hor lang kui bao eh, wa seng lai lor…” which she understood it to mean as “your daughter is going to lose her virginity one day might as well I do that now”. The phrase was seared into her memory[note: 151].

134 The clear and corroborated evidence of the prosecution witnesses showed that the accused resorted to using the Hokkien phrase when talking about V and when talking to V on at least 3 occasions namely, once before 11th and 13th Mar 12; once before, during the afternoon of 13th Mar 12, the attempted rape and once after that when they gathered at the void-deck.

135 The inappropriateness of using the phrase is self-evident. On none of the occasions when he used it did he get a favourable response. How could he? There is nothing casual about the topic of deflowering a virgin like the then teenage V. The accused himself admitted it was inappropriate and he would “tell off” the person who raised the same topic about his own daughter[note: 152].

136 Although, this issue was not addressed in its initial submissions, in its Reply Submissions, the Defence argued that such a phrase would be material if it was uttered “at time of the alleged offence” since that is “the critical point”. It was further argued that it would be “perverse and disingenuous” to say that “every time a man is seen climbing on top of a woman” is an indication of an attempt to rape and it is “even more absurd” that just because a man has uttered these words, that he is “ascribed the intent on a subsequent act 2 days later”. [note: 153]

137 The evidence shows that the accused spoke about V’s virginity with V’s mother, K, for no real reason; at or about the time of the incident (13th Mar 12 afternoon), he also used the phrase on V when he propositioned to go to a hotel (she refused) and again with K soon after the attempted rape later that night. The repeated use of the phrase ‘book-ended’ the 2 incidents.

138 The evidence points to the accused’s fixation with V’s virginity and on her losing it. I agree with the prosecution’s submission that the warning signs indicating an intent to deflower V were present before the incidents. The opportunities presented themselves on 2 distinct occasions, when V was in master room alone with the accused in early hours and late at night.

139 To convict the accused of attempted rape, the Prosecution must prove that the accused intended to commit the primary offence of rape. The actus reus for the offence of attempt was that the accused must have “embarked on the crime proper”. The point in time at which a criminal is regarded to have attempted to offend is a fact centric exercise: Chua Kian Kok v PP[note: 154].

140 V gave detailed and textured accounts of the 2 incidents that showed that the accused had begun his sexual assaults as summarized below:

a) 1st incident: Sexually penetrating V’s vagina with his finger through the opening of her shorts; kneeled in between her legs and pulled them apart before pushing her shorts/underwear aside; tried to insert his penis into V’s vagina to the point that V felt “something rubbery” (he did so twice); grabbed her hand to his penis and then rubbed his penis against her vagina; he then molested her by touching her breast over her t-shirt and then underneath her t-shirt and bra.

b) 2nd incident: The accused tried to insert his hand into V’s t-shirt and shorts; grabbed her hand when she pulled his hands away; he went on top of V and rubbed his penis against her vagina; he pulled down his boxers, exposed his penis and continued to rub it against her vagina; when V covered her private part with her hand, he rubbed his penis against his hand[note: 155]; he sucked her breasts and licked her ear[note: 156].

141 In both instances, his embarking on the crime proper was interrupted namely, the early return of K back home (1st incident) and when F walked in on the two of them (2nd incident). His acts were not merely that of lying passively on top of V. If an attempt can theoretically be made out even when the offender did not take his trousers off and was unable to sustain an erection to successfully penetrate, with respect, the actions of the accused have clearly crossed the Rubicon. In my view, because of the interruptions, the accused’s intent was unfulfilled on the first, leading him to try again on the second. His propositioning to V to go to a hotel and later, to lay down at the back of the van exemplified that persistence: PP v Zainal Abidin bin Ismail[note: 157].

Finding: Most of Cautioned Statements is reliable

142 Having perused the evidence and the submissions of parties at the end of the ancillary hearing, I found myself largely in agreement with the prosecution’s submission and I allowed the admission of the 4 cautioned statements.

143 For the sake of brevity, I will summarise and highlight the main pieces of evidence that led me to decide to admit the statements.

(a) The Recorder, Mr Thomas Ong (PW11), testified that he followed proper procedures in the recording of the cautioned statements. He read back the statements in Mandarin to the accused at the conclusion of the recording of the statements.

i. His role then was to record the cautioned statements of the accused for the purpose of charging him. He did not offer any threat inducement, promise or oppression (‘TIPO’) during the recording of the statements. He admitted he made an uncorrected error in the handwritten charge to the 4th offence and missed out the phrase “with her consent”.

ii. However, the typed charge at the cover of the statement clearly stated that the accused did so “without her consent.” When it was suggested that the error was uncorrected because he never read back that statement, and the other statements, PW11, insisted that he did.

iii. His explanation essentially is that in the course of reading back the statements, although he was able to spot the errors in the cautioned statement related to the 2nd offence, he missed the second syllable to the word “without” in the handwritten charge to the 4th cautioned statement: a human error.

iv. To my mind, it is not insignificant, that this kind of error occurred only on the final statement. PW11 testified that the accused gave his statements and signed them voluntarily.

(b) The accused insisted that PW9 never read out and translated any of the 4 statements. As he was illiterate, he did not know what was written in the cautioned statements.

i. Essentially, according to the accused, he had signed ‘blank cheques’, not knowing what were the contents of the 4 statements, all the pages of the statements, because “he (IO) asked me to sign”. If what the accused said is true, that he did not know what was stated in the statements, there can be no confusion then about his understanding of the statements since the author of the statements would have been PW11.

ii. Other than being physically present, the accused played no effective part in the recording process. Thus, in my view, it is diametrically opposed to state that the accused “was confused by the handwritten charge where he was told that the act of attempted rape was with the victim’s consent”[note: 158], that he could “well have been misled by the words ‘with consent’” and in the same breath, claim that all the statements were not read back/translated to the accused.

iii. Later, in his cross-examination, the accused said that he “was forced to sign” the statements, a serious modification to his earlier claim.

DPP:

You had the pen in your hand. You had the paper before you. You could have chosen not to put your pen to the paper and you could have chosen not to sign. On all 24…on all 20-plus sheets of paper before you, you had a choice. Am I right, Mr Tee?

A:

I did not know that there is such a law at the police station that I could choose not to sign. It was my first time. I really didn’t know. The IO kept forcing me to “sign here, sign here”. He kept forcing me to sign. I did not know what to do and I was in a daze.

DPP:

That’s very interesting, Mr Tee. Describe to me in detail how the IO had forced you to sign on the paper, please.

A:

Once he was done writing, then he threw this to me…the papers…He was writing. After he was done, he threw this to me. He did not explain to me at all and just said, “Okay, you sign here, sign here.” I really did not know what this was all about. He did not explain to me. I did not know that I could choose not to sign at the police station. I didn’t know of such a law…

DPP:

So it’s your evidence that you were forced by the IO because he threw the papers at you and insisted that you signed?

A:

Yes.



iv. Even if true, and that was what PW11 did (threw papers), I do not consider the Recorder’s rudeness to be tantamount to the accused’s “being forced” to sign the statements. PW11’s act of rudeness, does not amount to a threat, inducement, promise or oppression exercised on the accused.

v. This fell far short of the instance in Seow Choon Meng v PP where the Court held that excessive cross-examination in the course of hours, could amount to oppressive circumstances. In this case, the accused were given breaks, including a smoke breaks, during the day of the recording of the statements.

vi. In my view, the description by the accused that he was “asked” to sign (“so he signed”) and later, “forced” to sign, represent two extreme ends of the spectrum. It is apparent that there was once when the accused viewed the PW11’s act of rudeness, of throwing papers, as minor.

vii. In my view, the accused had exaggerated his evidence to make his allegation that the IO had TIPO him, more credible.

viii. If PW11 could have written anything he wished in the cautioned statements, because he was not going to read back the statements to the accused and knowing the exculpatory nature of the earlier long statement of 14th Mar 12, it would seem that PW11 foolishly missed the golden opportunity to make the cautioned statements as detailed as possible.

viv. As the Defence itself pointed out, “there was no elaboration whatsoever on how he (the accused) committed the offences alleged in each charge.”[note: 159] That being the case, it beggars belief that when PW11 could have easily duped the accused into signing the cautioned statements by saying that they contained ‘denials’(as per his earlier long statement), he chose to resort to TIPO.

(b) It was the accused’s case that the Recorder told him, “I asked you to come back because I’m charging you for five charges” and that he wanted to charge the accused “today”. In response, the accused asked the IO, “what was the matter?”. PW11 apparently did not want to hear any more explanation (that was already covered on 14th Mar 12, long statement) since his role then was to prefer charges against the accused. Preferring charges to the accused represents the concluding point of the investigations.

i. I see nothing untoward about the PW11’s refusal to record a further statement to allow him to explain himself. There is nothing in the CPC that obliges a recorder to record another ‘long statement’ from the accused because the accused wishes to make further clarifications. He could have done so in the cautioned statements. He did not.

(c.) The Recorder, PW11, told the accused that since this was his “first time”, the judge will give him “a lighter sentence” of “less than 20 years”. The accused became scared. That was the accused’s first time at the police station and when he was told of the charges, and asked to admit them, he “didn’t know what to do.” In cross-examination, when the accused was told to appear at the station to face charges, the accused said that he took the matter very seriously and admitted that he would not put his signature and name on such things carelessly. The concession came about although he was evasive about it initially.

DPP:

Now, on the contrary, you would approach this statement recording process with a special caution, yes?

A:

Like I’ve said, I was only asked to, “sign here, sign here”. I was not given the chance to explain so I didn’t know what to do.

DPP:

But you knew for a fact that you were being charged, am I right?

A:

Yes.

DPP:

So when you were told to “sign here, sign here”, it was precisely in relation to the charges, yes?

A:

Yes.

DPP:

So in other words, Mr Tee, your signature on the charges would not have been put down blindly, am I right?

A:

What do you mean by that?

DPP:

You knew you were being charged?

A:

Yes.

DPP:

This is something serious.

A:

He did not told me this.

DPP:

said I’m not asking him what he told you.

A:

He was writing and asked me to “sign here, sign here”. I was not given the chance to explain. He did not speak to me.



i. I find it difficult to accept the logic of the accused’s allegation. If according to him, he did not do the acts alleged and he was innocent (he had already given an earlier exculpatory account) why would he fold and capitulate on the strength of PW11’s promise that he would get a sentence less than 20 years’ imprisonment?

ii. In my view, it would have been a better bargain for the accused to falsely incriminate himself only if PW11 had guaranteed that no court prosecution will ever take place. There would have been no loss to him to admit to something with no actual legal consequence.

iii. The accused did not strike me as a babe in the woods lacking in ‘street smarts’. He has been a working man since primary 3 and even had a business once selling Buddhist paraphernalia. It is unlikely that he would be so impressed by the promise of a bad bargain that he would give up his innocence.

iv. I was more persuaded by the evidence of PW11 that he uttered no such thing to the accused and there isn’t anything in PW11’s cross-examination to persuade me otherwise.

(d) Additionally, I find there is force in the DPP’s submission that an inference may be drawn against the accused when no details were provided concerning the facts relied on by the Defence in its Case for the Defence (CFD) challenging the voluntariness of the cautioned statements.

i. Illustration 2 in s165(d), CPC, specifically covered this situation. This was the specific mischief that the amendment was intended to cover. This was not a case where the accused was unrepresented by counsel. The Defence attempted to argue that it was not obliged to state every detail of its case challenging the voluntariness of the statements and that could retain some form of tactical advantage in holding some cards close to its chest. I am not persuaded by the arguments made. There were no other facts mentioned in the CFD other than the “generic” (without limiting the generality) statement that the accused challenges the voluntariness of the statements.

ii. I found that the lack of particulars provided the accused with a wriggle room, with the safe haven, from where he could exaggerate and invent excuses, especially under cross-examination, with being pinned down by the facts stated in the CFD. This, together with my findings above, led me to conclude that the PW11 is credible in his account that no such TIPO was given to the accused.

143 In PP v Mustari Bin Sari[note: 160], 3 accused persons were jointly tried for housebreaking. Mustari was acquitted after trial, even though his cautioned statements were ruled admissible after a trial within a trial. The prosecution appealed against his acquittal. The 3 cautioned statements merely stated: “I admit to the offence and ask for leniency as I have cooperated with the police.”

144 The trial judge in acquitting Mustari stated thus:

“As for the remaining three charges in DAC 5733, 5734 and 5735 of 1984, Mustari’s cautioned statements, whereby he merely admitted to the offences and pleaded for leniency, were evidence.

However, I considered that these bare confessions were given on 27 November 1984, consecutively at 8.50pm, 9.15pm and 9.35pm, after he was first arrested on 21 November 1984 at 9pm. They were given while the accused was in remand for the past six days.

I also took into consideration the detailed statement given by the accused less than 24 hours after his arrest (P57 recorded on 22 November 1984 at 4.35pm) whereby he completely denied being involved in the offences. As there were clear contradictions in the statements given by the accused, less credence could be given to these statements. What was more, the accused in his testimony further denied committing the offences and generally maintained the stand he took in his statement P57…”

145 On appeal, the High Court, reversed the acquittal holding that with the clear confession of Mustari and the statement of Hasan, co-accused, implicating the him, there was ample evidence before the trial judge to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent had committed the offences.

146 I had found that PW11 read back all the statements back to the accused and translated them to him. Thus, I have no reservations about the weight to be placed on the first three cautioned statements. However, I have concerns about the weight to the placed on the 4th statement pertaining to the second incident of the 13th Mar.

147 To be clear, I do not think the uncorrected error had prejudiced the accused since his defence was never about whether there was consent or not; it was that there was no actus reus to begin with.

148 However, although the accused’s admitted to “this charge”, in his 4th cautioned statement, it is unclear if he had admitted to the offence where the victim consented (as per the handwritten charge) or when she did not consent (as per the typed charge).

Finding: The offer of out-of-court settlements, non-conclusive

149 For the avoidance of doubt, I do not think the offers of out of court settlements have been satisfactorily shown to be directed by the accused and that it was indicative of his guilt.

150 In my view, the net effect of the evidence does show there was a meeting where offers of settlement were made by A and K. At its highest, I am prepared to hold that the settlement was meant for the accused’s benefit but it remains unclear if the accused’s himself had given directions for settlement talks. The accused was not present during the settlement where such offers were communicated personally by him and heard by the witnesses. Additionally, the net effect of the evidence also showed that, by and large, the settlement was offered without any admission of liability on the accused’s part.

Finding: The accused is not a credible witness

151 In my finding, V’s evidence concerning what the accused did was corroborated by the accused’s own cautioned statements relating to the three offences committed on 11th Mar 12. As for the offence committed by the accused, sans the 4th cautioned statement, there is plenty of corroboration in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses.

152 In the final analysis, as I have earlier stated, I do not find the accused to be a credible witness in his own defence. I have already highlighted instances where his evidence was ‘anaemic’ compared to the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. Other instances related to:

(a) Position of his body during the 13th Mar 12 incident:

i. Within the span of a few questions, the accused vacillated between three different versions of how his body was positioned on top of the victim’s while he was allegedly trying to stop the victim from tickling him further.

ii. The accused claimed that he was “sitting up” while pressing on the victim’s shoulders; when asked exactly which part of the victim’s body he was seated on, the accused backtracked and claimed that he was not in fact seated but “squatting”.

iii. Besides this, he was not able to explain why in his long statement, D3, he had unequivocally stated that he was “sitting on top” of V’s lower body, while moving his own body as he was tickling the victim. The accused later came up with a third version, where he “kneeling” on the floor with V between his legs.

iv. In my view, he attempted to distance himself from the account in D3, by claiming rather surprisingly and belatedly that he was “illiterate” and “do not know how the police put it in writing”, an allegation never put to PW10. I could not accept his explanation.

(b) Whether victim had bitten accused at all:

i. According to his testimony, he was the one who bit V’s shoulder in retaliation to her disturbing him by tickling him that night. No mention was made of the victim biting him at all on the same incident; rather, the accused referenced a previous occasion instead where V bit him instead. He claimed that his reason for doing so was to inflict the same pain on her.

ii. In D3, the accused claimed that V tried to bite him several times that very night. When asked to explain the difference, the accused repeated that he did not “how the police put this in writing”.

iii. In cross-examination, particularly when questioned on his statement, D3, admitted by the Defence supposedly as being corroborative of his denials, the accused developed the habit of directing the blame at the recorder, PW9, whenever it became difficult for him to explain the inconsistencies.

iv. It seems to me that was what was driving his allegations against PW11 when the Prosecution sought to admit his positive cautioned statements.

153 Whilst Prosecution is duty bound to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt, it is not to prove them beyond all doubt. In Sucha Singh & Anor v State of Punjab (2003) 7 SCC 643 (referring to Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [1973] INSC 151; [1974 (1) SCR 489 (492-493)]), the Supreme Court stated:

“…The dangers of exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt at the expense of social defence and to the soothing sentiment that all acquittals are always good regardless of justice to the victim and the community, demand special emphasis in the contemporary context of escalating crime and escape. The judicial instrument has a public accountability. The cherished principles or golden thread of proof beyond reasonable doubt which runs through the web of our law should not be stretched morbidly to embrace every hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubt…"

154 Having carefully scrutinized the evidence, I was satisfied that the evidence against the accused is convincing. I found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he committed 4 offences stated in the charges.

IV. SENTENCE

155 Post-conviction, the DPP informed that she would be making submissions on sentence. I invited the Defence to put a mitigation plea on behalf of the accused, however they might feel about my decision. I am grateful that they did so. In the written mitigation plea of 31st Jan 18, essentially, 2 mitigating factors were raised: the accused is untraced and he is a hardworking man and a caring father.

156 The accused is a divorcee with 2 children: a 18-year old son and a 15-year old daughter. His children are in the care and control of his ex-wife. He earns $1,800 monthly and contributes $600 in maintenance. He is the youngest of 5 children. Presently, he lives with his elderly father and takes care of him and pays for his medical bills. He has little formal education and has been working since he left school. His initial foray into business collapsed and the divorce in 2009 devastated him. He once lost the will to live and even contemplated suicide.

157 The DPP suggested a sentence of at least 9 years and 4 strokes for the SAP charge; 7 years and 4 strokes of the cane for the attempted rape charges and 1 year and 3 strokes of the cane for the outrage of modesty charge. It was suggested that the aggregate term should be at least 14 years imprisonment and 15 strokes of the cane It was submitted that the benchmarks in Ng Kean Meng v PP[note: 161]; Pram Nair and KKS v PP (for attempted rape; SAP and outrage of modesty) are applicable.

Ng Kean Meng Terence v PP

[2017] SGCA 36; [2017] 2 SLR 449

Facts: The 44 year-old offender pleaded guilty to 2 charges:

2nd charge: That sometime in November 2013 in the evening, at Block 30 Tanglin Halt Road #06-170, Singapore, committed Rape on [V], then a female of age 13 years old…to wit by penetrating the vagina of the said [V] with your penis, with her consent, and you have thereby committed an offence under Section 375(1)(b) punishable under Section 375(2) of the Penal Code;

4th charge: That on or about 29th October 2013, at Block 30 Tanglin Halt Road #06-170, Singapore, did sexually penetrate with your finger, the vagina of one [V], who was then under 14 years of age, to wit, 13 years, with her consent, and you thereby committed an offence under Section 376A(1)(b), and punishable under section 376A(3) of the Penal Code.

He admitted to 2 other charges and gave consent for TIC.

1st Charge: Sometime on or about 29th October 2013, at Block 30 Tanglin Halt Road #06-170, Singapore, committed Rape on [V], then a female of age 13 years old…by penetrating the vagina of the said [V] with your penis, with her consent, and you have thereby committed an offence under Section 375(1)(b), and punishable under section 375(2) of the Penal Code;

3rd charge: That on or about the 1st December 2013 in the morning, at Ancestral Temple of Ying Fo Fui Kun located at No. 9 Commonwealth Lane, Singapore, committed Rape on [V], then a female of age 13 years old…by penetrating the vagina of the said [V] with your penis, with her consent, and you have thereby committed an offence under Section 375(1)(b) punishable under Section 375(2) of the Penal Code.

The offender, then 42 years met the 13-year-old minor at the stall where he was carrying out his trade and invited her to his flat. After discovering that she was a runaway, he phoned her parents and offered to act as godfather. They began spending time daily and 2 weeks later, they engaged in sexual activity, with the minor’s consent.

Prosecution submitted that the court should impose a global sentence of at least 13 to 14 years’ imprisonment in addition to caning. Inter alia, it argued on PP v NF, approved in PP v. Mohammed Liton and PP. v UI[note: 162] that the case fell between Category 1 and 2 cases. The offender exploited a vulnerable girl for his sexual pleasure. He was in a position of trust. He had initiated sex. The offences were not committed on the spur of the moment.

Sentence by the trial court: The offender was sentenced to 13 years’ imprisonment and 12 strokes for the statutory rape charge; 1 year’s imprisonment and 2 strokes of the cane for the digital penetration charge. Terms to run consecutively - aggregate of 14 years’; 14 strokes of the cane.

The court found the accused was “remorseful by pleading guilty”. While his previous convictions (property-related) meant that he did not have a clean record, the court did not “give much regard to them” as they were not sexual offences and were committed when the accused was very young. The court stated that the presence of consent was irrelevant and its presence meant only that there was no aggravating factor of coercion/deception. The case was between a Category 1 and 2: see PP v NF.

Sentence by the appeal court: The offender’s appeal was dismissed. The CA reformulated the benchmarks.

Band 1 comprised of cases at the lower end of the spectrum of seriousness.

No offence-specific aggravating factors or were cases where those factors were only present to a very limited extent and therefore had a limited impact on sentence.

10 - 13 years;

6 strokes of cane.

Band 2 comprised of cases of rape of a higher level of seriousness.

Usually containing two or more offence-specific aggravating factors.

13 – 17 years

12 strokes of cane.

Band 3 comprised of cases at the extreme end of seriousness.

Number, intensity of aggravating factors high - extremely serious cases.

17 – 20 years;

18 strokes of cane

The CA found that the case fell at the lower end of Band 2 and attracted an indicative starting sentence of 13 years’ and 12 strokes.

Step One: The court would have regard to the factors which related to the manner and mode by which the offence was committed as well as the harm caused to the victim (“offence-specific” factors) in deciding which band the offence in question belonged to.

There were two offence-specific aggravating factors: the vulnerability of the minor and the clear abuse of trust. The minor was vulnerable because she was only 13, had run away from home and was not subject to any meaningful form of parental control. In those circumstances, the offender offered to take care of her as Godfather which arrangement her parents agreed to. The commission of the offences was an abuse of the trust and complete abnegation of his duty. While he did not deliberately seek out the position of godfather in order to commit the offences, their relationship was not platonic but familial.

Step Two: Once the sentencing band had been identified, the court would further identify where precisely within that range the offence fell in order to derive an “indicative starting point” – this was a sentence that reflected the intrinsic seriousness of the offending act. At the second step, the court would have regard to the aggravating and mitigating factors which were personal to the offender to calibrate the appropriate sentence for that offender.

These “offender-specific factors” related to the offender’s particular personal circumstances and not factors already been taken into account in the categorization of the offence. A plea of guilt was one of the offender-specific factors assessed at the second step. The mitigating value would be assessed in terms of (a) the extent to which it was a signal of genuine remorse and contrition; (b) the savings in judicial resources it brought about; and (c) the extent to which it spared the victim the ordeal of testifying. Since the Appellant had pleaded guilty, this was the most significant personal mitigating factor. The most significant offender-specific aggravating factor was the fact that there were two TIC charges.



158 It was argued that the approbation society feels for an offence of rape should not be any less because the offender did not succeed to rape his victim. Additionally, the severity of the action should not be downplayed just because it was an attempted rape offence.

159 It was pointed out that the offences were committed in a high egregious manner. The victim was violated within the sanctity of her own bedroom; repeatedly intruded at the most intimate areas of her body; the offences were not fleeting; and there was a persistence to his actions. The accused was in a quasi-relationship of authority with the victim and had abused that authority. There was also significant psychological harm and the victim suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder with major depression (‘PTSD with MDD’) as a result, placing her at high risk of recurrent self-harm.

160 To support its submission that the victim suffers from PTSD and MDD, the prosecution relied on the medical report (MR) from psychiatrist, Dr Francis Ngui which it tendered on the day of sentencing itself. The Defence requested for an adjournment to take the accused’s instructions on the MR. I allowed the adjournment.

162 At the same time, I invited parties to address me whether the Terence Ng’s benchmarks applied (rather than PP v NH), where the offences were committed in early 2012 and charges were preferred against the accused in 2015. I noted that in Terence Ng, the revised benchmarks were applied in that case despite the offences being committed in 2012/2013. Notwithstanding this, I felt it prudent to seek parties’ assistance on this. Subsequently, Prosecution put up an amended Sentencing Submissions essentially taking the position that the BM in Terence Ng applied. Having done my own research on the matter in the meantime and reviewed the submissions, I accept the Prosecution’s arguments on this preliminary point.

163 During sentencing, the Defence’s key dispute was the psychiatric report which indicated special psychological harm suffered by the victim. The MR dated 29th Jan 18, was prepared by Dr Francis Ngui pursuant to a letter from the Police requesting production on 22nd Jan 18. This MR was made available to the Defence post-conviction. Subsequently, the Defence[note: 163] said that it wished to cross-examine the maker of the MR particularly the diagnosis that the victim is now suffering from PTSD with MDD following the sexual assault: paragraph 10, MR. A similar issue arose in PP v UI[note: 164]. Inter alia, the trial judge discounted the possibility of harm having been caused to the Victim as a result of the serial rapes over a period of four years relying on the comment of the child psychiatrist that,

“She [ie, the Victim] said the father [ie, the Respondent] was a nice man and she had no fear of seeing him. She had no signs and symptoms of a post-traumatic stress disorder.”

164 However, the trial judge ignored the following remarks in the same MR which read:

“…the Victim had a change of [behaviour] in the second half of 2005 when she cut her hair short and [bound] her breasts down. In June 2006, she cut her wrist and would not disclose to the mother the reason. In September 2006, she stole money from her classmate.”

165 Unfortunately, the prosecution conceded that the change in the Victim’s behavior had not been attributed to the offender’s conduct. The prosecution appealed against the sentences passed. Its’ appeal was allowed by the CA. The term for each charge was increased to 12 years (from 8 years), with aggregate of 24 years imprisonment (from 16 years). Inter alia, the CA was not entirely satisfied that the Prosecution was in a position to make this concession that there was no causality between the Victim’s change in behavior and the Offences. The CA said this:

“… but we would say that the issue of whether there was a causal link between the change in the Victim’s behaviour and the Respondent’s offences should not have been determined by just reading Dr Cai’s report alone. Dr Cai should have been called to explain and be examined on his report if this issue were material to the sentence to be imposed.”

166 Guided by this approach as well as the principle underpinning the use of Victim Impact Statement in s228(1) and s228(5), CPC, I convened a hearing to allow the opinion held in the MR to be tested. The Defence did not seek a second opinion to adduce evidence of a contrary view. The sentencing hearing was held on 28th Feb 18.

167 During the hearing, the defence/the accused took the position that the history of behavioral abnormalities[note: 165] exhibited by the victim, as informed to the psychiatrist by the victim and her mother was either feigned by V and/or because she had malingered. However, the fact is that as at the 29th Jan 18, V is on a combination of powerful medications which include tranquilizers, anti-depressants and mood stabilizers, in addition to psychotherapy. At a relatively young age, she is taking several psychotropic drugs – an act which no person, including a young adult, could possibly enjoy as part of her daily regimen. The report further added that the road to recovery remains long and unpredictable[note: 166].

168 Even if, for the sake of argument she was not vulnerable then, according to the MR, V is vulnerable now because of her psychiatric conditions. The evidence adduced during the sentencing hearing showed that the victim was temporarily able to complete her Diploma following the assault but “felt emotionally numb and flat during her 3 years” at the Polytechnic.

169 This evidence is broadly compatible with the evidence of the victim and her friend, S (PW8) and F during the trial. Since graduating, V had lost interest in studying or finding work during the period the offences were reported and eventually court proceeding initiated. V became phobic and socially anxious, and became mostly housebound. She had been observed quietly pacing aimlessly around the house; lost appetite and a significant amount of weight. There were recurrences of nightmares and insomnia.

170 Dr Francis Ngui assessed V to be on high risk of recurrent self-harm with passive suicidal ideations – stating that ‘life has no meaning’ etc.

171 I noted that there were no specific examples highlighted to Dr Francis about her malingering behavior other than being premised on the fact that the accused had denied sexually assaulting her. Having observed V during the course of the trial, and reviewed the evidence of Dr Francis, I accept his definitive diagnosis that the victim suffers from PTSD and MDD circa 2016/2017. I further accept his opinion that these conditions are causally linked directly to the sexual assault by the accused.

172 Even if I am wrong to accept Dr Francis specific diagnosis, during the course of the trial itself, there was evidence of a drastic change in the victim’s behavior. V testified to acts of self-harm: such as burning herself with lit cigarettes; she had abused pills/medications; she had difficulties sleeping and had nightmares when she did; cut herself; and had expressed passive suicidal ideas. No evidence to the contrary, was elicited either through K, V’s mother, or from F (PW9), V’s sister, to show that she was already was doing all these before the sexual assaults.

173 I noted the observations of the CA in PP v UI that it was not beyond the bounds of probability that there might have been a causal link between the victim’s change in behavior and the sexual abuse which she had been subjected to citing studies in Nathaniel McConaghy, Sexual Behavior: Problems and Management (Plenum Press, 1993) at p 253). Case-law is also replete with examples of the sexual assault victims exhibiting troubling behavior later on in life.

a) For example, in PP v Lim Beng Cheok, the offender turned to homosexuality after being sexually assaulted by his neighbor as a boy. Expert evidence was given by a psychiatrist that “the development of the offender’s sexual orientation had been affected by his upbringing and the early sexual victimization by his neighbor”[note: 167]. In addition, one of the offender’s victims, became conflicted about his sexual orientation, afraid that he might be “gay” as he felt good during the acts and had hesitated to go to the police.

b) In PP v. Peh Thian Hui & Other[note: 168], a psychiatric report on the offender was adduced by the Defence to show Peh had been deeply affected by his childhood sexual experience when, as a boy of eight to ten years of age, he was straddled by a slightly older girl and instructed to perform cunnilingus on her while she performed fellatio on him.

174 The cutting of wrists as a form of self-mutilation has been recognized to be a common consequence of traumatic experiences such as rape. In PP v NF[note: 169], the victim had cut her wrists after she was raped. It was noted that psychological trauma often manifested in destructive behavior: see Judith Lewis Herman, Trauma and Recovery (Basic Books, 1997) at pp 108–109:

“…a great many survivors develop chronic anxiety and depression which persist into adult life. This emotional state … cannot be terminated by ordinary means of self-soothing. Abused children discover at some point that the feeling can be most effectively terminated by a major jolt to the body. The most dramatic method of achieving this result is through the deliberate infliction of injury. The connection between childhood abuse and self-mutilating behavior is by now well documented. …

… The mutilation continues until it produces a powerful feeling of calm and relief; physical pain is much preferable to the emotional pain that it replaces. …Self-injury is also frequently mistaken for a suicidal gesture…There is a body of expert opinion that self-injury is intended not to kill, but, rather, to relieve unbearable emotional pain, and many victims of child abuse (which includes rape of a young girl) regard it, paradoxically, as a form of self-preservation.”

175 The Defence argued that the evidence of IMH should have been sought by the prosecution. The Defence invited me to draw an adverse conclusion that the IMH Report, had it been called for, would contradict Dr Francis’ opinion.

176 Given that this case has go on for some time, and the possible adverse consequences on the victim, the prosecution argued that it viewed Dr Francis’ evidence, a competent psychiatrist, to be valid and objective. The prosecution felt that there was no need to compel the IMH psychiatrist to attend court and to compel them to deviate from their internal protocols (to get a written MR before asking the IMH psychiatrist to attend court). It was further argued that it is not the prosecution’s obligation to actively seek evidence favorable to the Defence to “gift” it to them. I was of the view the Defence’s suggestion of an adverse inference goes too far and I declined for reasons given by the prosecution. In any event, either party was at liberty to subpoena the IMH doctor[note: 170] - neither did so.

177 Even if the diagnosis by Dr Ngui was completely wrong, at the very least, V had suffered significant trauma from the sexual assault. Her repeated acts of self-harm and her expressions of passive suicidal ideations justify that conclusion. This is evidence of significant psychological harm suffered by the victim whatever the scientific label is given to it. In the final analysis, I see nothing in the cross-examination of Dr Francis that substantially destroyed the basis for his conclusion that the victim suffers PTSD with MDD following the assault. Having observed the victim when she testified, I found the evidence of Dr Francis on this point credible and I accept his opinion. I accept that evidence of psychological harm experienced V is a significant aggravating factor[note: 171].

178 The accused’s act causally contributed to the victim’s subsequent acts of self-harm. She has a high risk of suicide. At present, she is dependent on psychotropic drugs. She is neither studying nor working. The most significant offence-specific factor in this case is the fact that the accused stood in a position of authority vis-à-vis the victim. She was then a school going 17-year old. The accused was her mother’s boyfriend and was the most mature adult in that quasi-family unit (other than the mother). Not only did he become embedded into their family, he became embedded in the victim’s bedroom.

179 This is not so dissimilar to the case of PP v AOM[note: 172]. In that case, the victim resided with her mother and the accused (her mother’s boyfriend) in a flat. However, the accused raped the victim sometime in 2007 when she was 12. The accused would rape her on several occasions when her mother was not at home. After the accused ended his relationship with the victim’s mother, she continued to go to the Flat on weekdays as it was near her school. The accused repeated his sexual acts on her when she was alone in the Flat. He told her that he had sex with her so that she would not be curious about sex and be cheated[note: 173]. The victim did report the accused as she did not want him to go to jail because she cared for him.

180 In my view, as the adult male in that household, he had the moral obligation to maintain appropriate boundaries in his interactions with the V. This was a legitimate expectation not only on the part of the V’s mother, K, but also the victim’s. The accused did not do so. In this sense, not only was there an abuse of authority, there was also a betrayal, by the accused, of the trust reposed in him by the victim’s mother, and by extension, the victim’s.

181 The flip side of an abuse of authority is that it can argued that the victim was somewhat vulnerable. The acts were perpetrated by the accused standing in a position of authority in a quasi-family dynamics due to his relationship with the victim’s mother. How he became embedded into their family life, made her so. During the trial, the victim testified not wanting to reveal the sexual assault for fear of destroying the happy relationship her mother had with him. In the circumstances, she was less likely to (and did not) report him after the first incident. The accused’s intent to rape her during the second incident was blunted only because she covered her private parts. The disclosure of the offences was fortuitous. Her unselfish, naïve, act of putting a premium on her mother’s happiness above herself, by not reporting the accused after the first assault, predictably left her vulnerable and open to another sexual assault 2 nights later. However, I accept that this is not one of examples of vulnerable victims specifically mentioned in Terence Ng[note: 174].

182 The most significant offender-specific mitigating factor of the two highlighted by the Defence in its mitigation plea is the fact that the accused is a first offender. However, the fact that the victim was put through the rigors of trial and having to relive the trauma of the assault under the glare of court proceeding is a significant offender-specific factor unlike the case of the offender in Terence Ng.

183 Having considered the facts of the case and the cases cited particularly Pram Nair and Terence Ng, I agreed with the DPP that this could be classified as within the Band 1 type of cases. I assessed that the indicative sentences should be as follows: for DAC 937313/15, the indicative sentence should be, in my view, 8 years and 4 strokes; for DAC 937314/15 and DAC 937315/15, the indicative sentence should be 7 years and 4 strokes per charge; for MAC 908739/15, the indicative sentence should be 1 year and 3 strokes.

184 I am of the view the overall moral/legal culpability of the accused (to be reflected in the overall sentence) is broadly comparable to Pram Nair[note: 175]. There, other than the fact that the victim was inebriated (thus vulnerable), the court did not accept that the offences were premeditated. Additionally, I felt that the accused’s overall culpability is less than Terence Ng (the offender showed his remorse by pleading guilty)[note: 176].

185 In my assessment, the appropriate aggregate sentence fell between Pram Nair and Terence Ng, once adjustments are made for the factual differences. Since the already fragile victim was exposed to the rigors of a trial, with no indication of remorse on the part of the accused for what he did, an aggregate term close or equivalent to Terence Ng would be appropriate.

186 Having accounted for the factual differences, these are the final sentences.

a) For DAC 937313/15: SAP committed on 11th Mar 12 – digital-vaginal penetration: 7 years’ imprisonment, 4 strokes of the cane;

b) For DAC 937314/15: Attempted penile-vaginal rape, without consent, committed on 11th Mar 12: 6 years’ imprisonment, 4 strokes of the cane;

c) For MAC 908739/15: Molested her by pushing away her bra, and touching her breast, committed on 11th Mar 12: 1 year imprisonment, 3 strokes of the cane;

d) For DAC 937315/15: Attempted penile-vaginal rape, without consent, committed on 13th Mar 12: 6 years’ imprisonment, 4 strokes of the cane.

187 As there were more than 4 terms of imprisonment, I am obliged by law to make 2 terms consecutive. I ordered the terms in DAC 937313/15 and DAC 937315/15, which were for different offences committed over different days, to be consecutive: 13 years’ imprisonment; 15 strokes of the cane.

188 The remaining two terms were made concurrent. For the avoidance of doubt, I placed very little regard to the TIC charge which was a relatively minor charge. A stay of execution on the imprisonment and caning pending the hearing of the appeal. The accused is on bail pending the appeal.[Context] [Hide Context]


[note: 1]V and F are half-sisters. V’s father died in Dec 2010.

[note: 2]ROP, Day 1, page 9, lines 1-2.

[note: 3]P1, First Information Report (FIR), lodged at 12.19 am, 14th Mar 12.

[note: 4]ROP, Day 6, page 137, lines 1 to 24: IO Joe Kok, present at the location, instructed him to arrest and bring the accused back to Jurong Division charge office for attempted rape.

[note: 5]P2, Arrest Report J/20120314/2024, lodged at 2.13 am, 14th Mar 12.

[note: 6]P7.1 to 7.8, 8 photographs.

[note: 7]P3, Seizure Report J/20120314/2032, lodged at 3.39 am, 14th Mar 12.

[note: 8]P5, HSA DNA Profiling Lab Report, DN-1243-00661, 7th Aug 12, read with P4, H.S.A Lab Report, DB-2012-03590 (the accused’s blood specimen was obtained on 30th Mar 12).

[note: 9]P8.1 and P8.2, Two sketch plans of the master bedroom and the living room of the unit.

[note: 10]The accused was represented by DCs Mr Bajwa and Mr Kertar Singh.

[note: 11]MAC 908740/2015, 5th charge: Following his conviction, the accused admitted to the charge of buying a public lottery ticket, namely, “10,000 characters” lottery from the illegal 4D collector, an offence punishable under section 9(1) of CGHA (Cap 49) and consented for the charge to be TIC.

[note: 12]P18N: Medical Report, 29th Jan 18, Dr Francis Ngui, Medical Director & Senior Consultant Psychiatrist.

[note: 13]PP v UI [2008] 4 SLR(R) 500 (CA); also under s228(1) and s228(5), CPC, the Defence is allowed to question the maker of a victim impact statement – I applied the same principle.

[note: 14]P18N: Medical Report @ paragraph 11.

[note: 15]S306(4), CPC: The aggregate imprisonment term that a District Court is competent to give shall not exceed twice which it is competent to impose under s303, CPC.

[note: 16]A stay of execution on imprisonment and caning was granted. The accused is on bail pending the appeal.

[note: 17]During the Newton Hearing, the Prosecution and Defence questioned only one witness, Dr Francis Ngui, PW12-NH. His CV and MR are marked and admitted as P17N and P18N respectively.

[note: 18]ROP, Day 1, page 13, lines 13.

[note: 19]ROP, Day 1, page 9, line 31, p 10, line 1.

[note: 20]ROP, Day 1, page 10, lines 19-26.

[note: 21]ROP, Day 1, page 12, line 19.

[note: 22]ROP, Day 1, page 10, lines 6-8 and 16.

[note: 23]ROP, Day 1, page 34, line 24 to page 35, line 26.

[note: 24]ROP, Day 1, page 23, line 26; page 24 line 22.

[note: 25]ROP, Day 1, page 24, lines 26-31.

[note: 26]ROP, Day 1, page 25, line 5: Evidence pertaining to Sexual Assault by Penetration (SAP) offence.

[note: 27]ROP, Day 1, page 24, lines 5-16, 23.

[note: 28]ROP, Day 1, page 25, lines 21-30.

[note: 29]ROP, Day 1, page 26, lines 4-5.

[note: 30]ROP, Day 1, page 26, lines 5-8: Evidence pertaining to Attempted Rape offence.

[note: 31]ROP, Day 1, page 26, lines 15-27.

[note: 32]ROP, Day 1, page 26, lines 28-29.

[note: 33]ROP, Day 1, page 26, lines 11-18: Evidence pertaining to the Outrage of Modesty offence.

[note: 34]ROP, Day 1, page 28, lines 10-11.

[note: 35]ROP, Day 1, page p 28, lines 1-20.

[note: 36]ROP, Day 1, page 32, lines 13-20.

[note: 37]ROP, Day 1, page 30, lines 5-22.

[note: 38]ROP, Day 1, page 31, lines 17-19.

[note: 39]ROP, Day 1, page 32, lines 1-6.

[note: 40]ROP, Day 1, page 31, lines 21-25.

[note: 41]ROP, Day 1, page 30, lines 24-30.

[note: 42]ROP, Day 1, page p 31, lines 1-10.

[note: 43]ROP, Day 1, page 16, lines 1-2.

[note: 44]ROP, Day 1, page 15, lines 10-12; page 16, lines 27-29.

[note: 45]ROP, Day 1, page 16, lines 17-19.

[note: 46]ROP, Day 1, page 17, lines 15-21.

[note: 47]ROP, Day 1, page 16, lines 25-26.

[note: 48]ROP, Day 1, page 17, lines 1-3.

[note: 49]ROP, Day 1, page p 17, lines 15-21.

[note: 50]Her white bra was seized after the police was called in and sent for DNA analysis. It traced positive for accused’s DNA - which is not disputed.

[note: 51]ROP, Day 1, page 18, lines 16-17.

[note: 52]ROP, Day 1, page 18, lines 21.

[note: 53]ROP, Day 1, page 18, lines 15-27.

[note: 54]ROP, Day 1, page 18, lines 25-26.

[note: 55]From V’s account, if believed, after the accused smiled at her, despite trying to force himself on her earlier, she took the pillow and buried her face in it.

[note: 56]ROP, Day 1, page 19, lines 30-31.

[note: 57]ROP, Day 1, page 20, lines 1-7.

[note: 58]ROP, Day 1, page 20, lines 20-28

[note: 59]ROP, Day 1, page 21, lines 4-10.

[note: 60]ROP, Day 1, page 22, lines 6-14.

[note: 61]ROP, Day 1, page 39, lines 2-16.

[note: 62]ROP, Day 6, page 97, lines 13-26.

[note: 63]ROP, Day 1, page 40, lines 11-15

[note: 64]P10, P10T; ROP, Day 4, page 43: A photograph and translation of the note was admitted as exhibits. Victim had a photograph of the note – the actual note had somehow been torn out from her notebook.

[note: 65]ROP, Day 1, page 43.

[note: 66]ROP, Day 1, page 41, lines 18-21.

[note: 67]Dr Francis Ngui (PW12-NH) recorded his observations and he presented them at the Newton Hearing.

[note: 68]DS3, paragraphs 44 and 45.

[note: 69]DS1, Prosecution’s Summary of Facts. For details, later on in this GD.

[note: 70]DS3, Defence’s Submissions on Conviction, page 22, paragraph 43.

[note: 71]DS3, Defence’s Submissions on Conviction, page 22, paragraph 44.

[note: 72]Kwan Peng Hong v. PP [2000] 2 SLR(R) 824 @ paragraph 21: It was highlighted on the accused’s behalf that after the incident, the accused did not attempt to run away from the bus driver. Instead, he offered his mobile to the complainant. He asked her to get off the bus to settle the matter between themselves. Whilst at the bus stop, he even asked the complainant whether she had informed the police of the right location. His s 122(6) CPC statement was not inconsistent with his testimony. Counsel submitted that such behavior was not consistent with a person who had something to hide. His defence had been consistent. The trial judged reasoned that what the appellant had done was not inconsistent either with one who knew that he was in trouble. To run away in haste after being caught red-handed, would have aroused suspicion, making any subsequent defence much more unacceptable. The accused not uneducated or without his wits about him. He was calm throughout. An innocent person would have reacted rather differently on being accused of such an offence. He most probably would have reacted with great indignation and intense exasperation. These were postulations and explications but based on common sense and understanding of human behavior. More significantly, they showed that the explanation by counsel regarding his behavior after the incident was not the only plausible one. A consistent defence does not always raise a reasonable doubt.

[note: 73]D3, Long Statement, 14th Mar 12. There was no controversy about accuracy and voluntariness raised by the Defence. Statement was recorded in Hokkien and written down in English by IO Joe Kok.

[note: 74]DS3, Defence’s Submissions on Conviction, page 13, paragraph 21.

[note: 75]It is not disputed that such was already known to K and F before then. V had also shared this with her friend, PW8.

[note: 76]Tang Kin Seng v PP [1996] 3 SLR(R) 444: The victim’s actions/distress victim post-incident was supporting evidence inconsistent with the offender’s account that nothing untoward/sinister had happened.

[note: 77]Tang Kin Seng v PP @ paragraphs 39 to 44.

[note: 78]PP v Mohammed Liton [2008] 1 SLR(R) 601 at paragraph 39.

[note: 79]DS1, a 4-paged Prosecution Summary of Facts, dated 11th Mar 2016.

[note: 80]There is a typographical error in the PSOF: paragraph 3(c.) [Mr TB(PW2) was described as a “female, 27 years old”]. The duration the accused stayed over at the unit and slept in the master room with K and V, was omitted for brevity. In the earlier paragraphs, the mattress on which the acts took place was described as “the bed”. In paragraph 13, a reference to V “lying on her mattress” was made. The pair of boxers, the accused wore was described as “shorts”.

[note: 81]ROP, Day 1, page 14, lines 22, 26 - 28

[note: 82]ROP, Day 1, page 14, lines 14 – 15.

[note: 83]ROP, Day 1, page 16.

[note: 84]DS3, Defence’s Submission on Conviction, page 11, paragraph 14.

[note: 85]ROP, Day 2, page 24.

[note: 86]DS3, Defence’s Submission on Conviction, page 11, paragraph 15.

[note: 87]The groin area includes the private part.

[note: 88]ROP, Day 1, page 17.

[note: 89]ROP, Day 1, page 18.

[note: 90]Jagatheesan s/o Krishnasamy v PP [2006] 4 SLR (R.) 45: Witnesses are not expected to recall every single detail of an incident given human fallibility in observation and recollection.

[note: 91]Chng Yew Chin v PP [2006] 4 SLR(R) 124 @ paragraph 34: If the precise recollection of dates of the offence(s) could not be a sufficient reason to disbelieve the victim, a fortiori, the exact sequencing of each composite act on a single date (correct date), cannot be sufficient reason to disbelieve V. Also Haliffie bin Mamat v. PP [2016] SGCA 58 @ paragraph 35: The CA observed that many of the inaccuracies in the Victim’s recollection relate to small details such as how she reached for her shoe, and how and when Haliffie took off his clothes. The fact that the Victim was at tipsy, and that the encounter, being traumatic, it is unexceptional not to have precise memories as to when and how each event happened.

[note: 92]D1, Police Message Form.

[note: 93]ROP, Day 6, page 138, line 31.

[note: 94]ROP, Day 6, page 139, line 13: Although the opening statement to D1 was that “A1 (V) informed”, PW7 clarified that he did not actually “question her directly”. Sgt Gabriel was not cross-examined.

[note: 95]D1, Police Message Form.

[note: 96]DS3, Defence’s Submissions on Conviction, page 15, paragraph 25.

[note: 97]DS3, Defence’s Submissions on Conviction, page 16, paragraph 27.

[note: 98]DS3, Defence’s Submissions on Conviction, page 17, paragraph 29.

[note: 99]DS3, Defence’s Submissions on Conviction, page 17, paragraph 29.

[note: 100]DS3, Defence’s Submissions on Conviction, page 14, paragraph 22.

[note: 101]DS3, Defence’s Submissions on Conviction, pages 12 - 13, paragraphs 20 – 21.

[note: 102]R v Wilson (1986) 42 SASR 203: The “capacity of the human mind to conjure up fanciful, nervous or unreasonable misgivings about matters which are not in reality in doubt” are endless.

[note: 103]ROP, Day 10, page 69, lines 6-14.

[note: 104]ROP, Day 7, pages 35 - 36, lines 25 – 6.

[note: 105]F testified that V was very attached to their mother, K, and would follow her (and the accused) whenever they went out.

[note: 106]V has been sleeping in the master room with K since her younger days - that was their lifestyle.

[note: 107]ROP, Day 1, pages 471– 473, lines 25 – 2

[note: 108]PP v Peh Thian Hui & Anor [2002] 2 SLR(R) 41 @ paragraph 24: Peh started to rape the Victim, with her mother’s consent and abetment in 1996 when she was 9. The sabuses took place in her home and at the back of Peh’s van. In Oct 01, the victim learnt that her mother had filed for divorce from her father. V’s mother sought custody of the children. She related the abuses to an acquaintance who advised her to report. The victim was concerned about the repercussions on her mother if she made a report. When she eventually did, she accused Peh (only) of rape. See PP v. AOM [2011] SGHC 29: The victim resided with her mother and accused in a flat. The accused acted as a guardian to her. The sexual abuses started in 2007 when the victim was in Pri 6 and stopped in Oct 09. The accused exploited the victim’s naivety and told her he had sex with her so that she would not be curious in future. She did not tell anyone about the abuses because she did not want the accused to go to jail as she cared for and regarded him like her own father.

[note: 109]ROP, Day 1, pages 28 – 29, lines 21 – 6.

[note: 110]The accused’s admitted use of the phrase “kui bao” will be further examined later on.

[note: 111]ROP, Day 7, page 68, lines 8 – 10.

[note: 112]Goh Han Heng v PP [2003] 4 SLR(R) 374 @ paragraph 33.

[note: 113]Chua Siew Lin v PP [2004] 4 SLR(R) 497 @ paragraph 37: Even if the IO, Mr Joe Kok, did less than the ideal by not sending both swabs from the V’s bra and breast for analysis, the fact remains that the swab of an item of personal inner wear uncovered the accused’s DNA. The intent was to find out if he had intruded into V’s intimate area such as the breast under her t-shirt. The analysis of the bra provided that result. Ms Tan Jia Yu (PW6) explained that HSA had taken swabs of the left cup of the bra based on the IO’s instructions that the accused sucked, kissed and bit V’s left breast. While it was preferable for swabs of the left breast to be submitted to achieve a more conclusive result, she explained that swabs of the bra “were equally important” as V’s breast would have come into contact with the bra that she was wearing. Likewise, a medical examination of V would be of limited value since the allegation was one of attempted rape.

[note: 114]D3, Long Statement, 14th Mar 12 @ paragraph 8.

[note: 115]PP v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729, at page 750 (per Lord Reid).

[note: 116]This is consistent with what the accused himself said. As he was pinning her down allegedly telling her to stop, he also caught a glimpse of F standing near the master room door. He stopped and rolled onto his back.

[note: 117]F informed that V was very attached to K. V often followed K when she went out with the accused.

[note: 118]There are no standard reactions to being victims of offences (they are themselves, witnesses): Khoo Kwoon Hain v PP [1995] 2 SLR (R) 591, paragraph 74.

[note: 119]Online videos of crimes in progress are ubiquitous.

[note: 120]ROP, Day 7, pages 48 - 49, lines 30 – 26.

[note: 121]ROP, Day 7, page 56, lines 27 – 30.

[note: 122]This also V’s account. Much has been made by the Defence concerning V’s ‘frustrated’ response (“go away!”) when the accused tried to rape her. This is linguistic nitpicking. Frustrated is the feeling of being upset, expressing distress or annoyance. Her crying at the 8th floor/void deck is an expression of distress.

[note: 123]ROP, Day 10, pages 92 to 93, lines 17 – 31; lines 1 – 14.

[note: 124]P8.1, P8.2: Sketch plan of Living Room and Master Bedroom.

[note: 125]Kwan Peng Hong v PP @ paragraph 50.

[note: 126]Tang Kin Seng v. PP @ paragraphs 63 – 65.

[note: 127]PP v Nasar bin Ahmad [1986] 2 MLJ 71.

[note: 128]D3, Long statement, 14th Mar 12, pages 5-6.

[note: 129]ROP, Day 11, page 75, lines 18 – 22: His claims of “horseplay” became more elaborate to include instances where V “became wild when playing with me” by “spread chilli sauce on my neck, shoulder and chest area”.

[note: 130]R v Ramesh Chauhan (1981) 73 Cr App R 232: The accused was alone in an office with the victim. The victim was seen by a colleague running into the toilet, crying. The colleague followed her and victim said that she had been molested. The accused said that nothing happened in the room and the victim was normal when she left. The Prosecution thought that her distress could not corroborate. However, the Judge told the the jury that the victim’s distress could corroborate if it was not feigned and she was not imagining things. The Court of Appeal agreed with the judge.

[note: 131]R v Alan Redpath (1962) <<46 Cr App R 319>>, Lord Parker CJ; also Goh Han Heng v. PP [2003] 4 SLR(R) 374: Genuine distress can be corroborate if the judge is satisfied that it was not fabricated or caused by an incident other than offence in question.

[note: 132]Cadawanaltharayil v PP [1995] 3 SLR(R) 478: Alleged molest of a patient by the examining doctor.

[note: 133]Although the cross-examination about previous incidents of ‘horseplay’ between the accused and V, could also possibly be used for an alternative defence that there was consent.

[note: 134]ROP, Day 6, lines 16 – 25.

[note: 135]V also said this.

[note: 136] It is not uncommon for victims to feel “changed”. For example, in PP v Lee Seow Peng [2016] SGHC 107, the accused was convicted after trial on 2 counts of statutory rape of a woman below the age of 14. He was 36; the victim was 13. They got acquainted via a dating app. Following the incidents, the victim made ablutions because she felt “disgusted and dirty”. In PP v Balakrishnan s/o Kuppusamy [2016] SGDC 7, the accused claimed trial for molesting the victim by kissing her on the back of her neck. She testified that she felt soiled or “dirty” as a result. The offender in Lee Seow Peng withdrew his appeal. The offender in Balakarishnan appealed against conviction and sentence. His appeals were dismissed and Prosecution cross-appealed against acquittal on one of the charges and sentence, allowed. The aggregate term was increased from 2 months’ and fine of $5000, to 12 months and 3 strokes of the cane.

[note: 137]ROP, Day 1, pages 471– 473, lines 25 – 2.

[note: 138]PP v UI [2008] 4 SLR(R) 500: The CA noted that psychological trauma manifested itself in self-destructive behavior, citing Judith Lewis Herman, Trauma and Recovery (Basic Books, 1997) at pp 108–109 (originally quoted in PP v NF).

[note: 139]Defence’s Reply Submissions, 15th Jan 18, pages 3-4, paragraphs 7-8.

[note: 140]Defence’s Reply Submissions, 15th Jan 18, page 4, paragraph 9.

[note: 141]ROP, Day 7, pages 19 – 20; lines 31 – 17: They pinched and punched each other.

[note: 142]ROP, Day 7, page 9, lines 12 – 25: “Before the incident, she (V) mentioned that the uncle attempt to touch her subtly…subtly, in a playful manner. She told me that she was not comfortable with it. I don’t remember [the date]…But it was before the incident that happened.”

[note: 143]Defence’s Reply Submissions, 15th Jan 18, page 4, paragraph 7.

[note: 144]Defence’s Reply Submission, page 4, paragraph 7: There appears to be a typographical error.

[note: 145]Also PP v. Ryan Adhy Pradhana [2016] SGMC 9 where the victim, employed as a chamber maid, after being molested by a hotel guest (the accused) continued with her tasks to clean and tidy the other guest rooms on that floor. Shortly after, the accused called the victim to his room and attempted to pull her into his room again. She successful pried herself away and then reported both incidents. The accused was convicted after trial and filed an appeal. However, he absconded.

[note: 146]PP v Peh Thian Hui & Anor [2002] 2 SLR(R) 41: B1 and B2 were in a romantic relationship, though married to others. B2 had a daughter, the victim, whom B1 (Peh) started raping/molesting when she was 9. These acts occurred with B2’s aid and consent. The incidents ended after 5 years when a police report was made. Prior to the first molest, B1 told B2 that “he wanted to touch V’s groin”. B2, agreed. B1 molested V. After that incident, B1 told B2 that “he wished to have sex” with the victim. B2 agreed. B2 called the victim into the bedroom and ordered her to submit to B1. The unwilling victim was scolded by B2 with Hokkien vulgarities until she relented. B1 then raped her. Their appeals on sentence were dismissed by CA.

[note: 147]ROP, Day 2, page 50, lines 4 – 29.

[note: 148]ROP, Day 11, page 54, lines 21 – 31.

[note: 149]ROP, Day 11, pages 54 – 56, lines 21 – 23.

[note: 150]ROP, Day 6, page 47, lines 2 – 6.

[note: 151]TS said the phrase has been replaying in her mind for many years since she heard it being uttered.

[note: 152]ROP, Day 11, pages 54 – 56, lines 21 – 23. See paragraph 97 above.

[note: 153]Defence’s Reply Submissions at page 2, paragraph 4.

[note: 154]Chua Kian Kok v PP [1999] 1 SLR(R) 826 @ paragraph 26.

[note: 155]The accused temporarily stopped his advance when he heard a sound outside the master room. After looking out the room to ensure that there were no undue disturbances, he continued.

[note: 156]At that time F stumbled onto the 2 of them. He stopped completely.

[note: 157]PP v Zainal Abidin bin Ismail [1987] 2 MLJ 741 @ at page 748.

[note: 158]DS3, page 21, paragraph 43.

[note: 159]DS3, Defence’s Submission on Conviction, page 21, paragraph 41.

[note: 160]PP v Mustari bin Suri [1989] 1 SLR(R) 20

[note: 161]Ng Kean Meng Terence v. PP [2017] SGCA 36; [2017] 2 SLR 449.

[note: 162]See PP v NF [2006] 4 SLR(R) 849 (“PP v NF”), approved in PP v. Mohammed Liton [2008] 1 SLR(R) 601 and PP. v UI [2008] 4 SLR(R) 500.

[note: 163]What I understand from the Defence is that it is not seriously objecting to the argument that the victim suffered adversely from alleged sexual assaults, as is generally the case with sexual assault victims but Defence doubted the credibility of the psychiatrist’s specific opinion of PTSD with MDD

[note: 164]See PP v UI [2008] 4 SLR(R) 500 (CA). There, the 51 years old offender pleaded guilty to 3 charges of rape of a woman below the age of 14 (offence punishable under s 376(2) with a mandatory min of 8 years and not more than 20 years, as well as with caning of not less than 12 strokes). He raped his natural daughter when she was between 10 and (below) 14. He would enter her bedroom at night when everyone was asleep and raped her. He would also make the Victim masturbate him. The offender agreed to TIC 7 charges (2 charges of rape and 5 charges of outrage of modesty under s 354.) The Prosecution submitted for a sentence between 12–15 years’ imprisonment per charge. Choo J held, inter alia, that: (a) the victim’s age was not an aggravating factor; (b) the relationship with the Victim was not an aggravating factor but was “a [factor] that raise[d] the level of opprobrium and sanction against the accused”; (c) he did not have to impose a harsher sentence for the TIC charges; (d) the serial nature of the offences over 4 years was not an aggravating factor because he had been charged separately for each offence and would be punished accordingly; and (e) the court accepted that the ‘forgiveness’ expressed by the Victim and her mother mitigated the offences. The offender was sentenced to 8 years’ per statutory rape charge (mandatory min of 8 years, aggregate of 16 years).

[note: 165]See P18N, at paragraphs 4 – 9, MR,

[note: 166]See P18N, at paragraph 13, MR.

[note: 167]PP v Lim Beng Cheok [2003] SGHC 54, at paragraph 37: One of the Victims blamed his parents for sending him for tuition with Lim. He blamed Lim for giving him horrible times and felt shameful that the events had surfaced. The Child Psychologist advised that the Victim continue with counselling since he had a lot of unjustified anger and hate towards his parents.

[note: 168]PP v. Peh Thian Hui and another [2002] 2 SLR(R) 41: Peh got to know the victim’s mother (B) through B’s husband. Peh was then a housing agent. He asked B to join him in that line. As a result, they operated their business from the flat. Peh sometimes worked late and slept there for the night. When B’s husband began to stay away, B developed a sexual relationship with Peh. Peh visited the flat regularly and supported the family. The sexual abuse of the victim started after Peh told B that he wanted to touch her daughter’s groin. B, who deeply loved Peh, did not want to lose him. She agreed to let him and also participated in the sexual abuse of the victim.

[note: 169]See PP v NF, at paragraph 51.

[note: 170]From the 6th Feb until 28th Feb 18, neither subpoenaed the IMH doctor. The newton hearing was originally set down for an entire day.

[note: 171]See paragraph 44(h) of Terence Ng’s case.

[note: 172]PP v AOM [2011] SGHC 29: The offender pleaded guilty to two charges of rape under s 376(1) of the Penal Code; one charge of rape under s 375(2) and one charge of sexual penetration under s 376A(2). He consented to 7 charges of rape and sexual penetration to be TIC: 26 years jail, 24 strokes of the cane.

[note: 173]ROP, Day 7, page 33, lines 1 – 6. F (PW9) overhead the accused using the Hokkien phrase “kui pao” when referring to the victim. TS (PW3) explained that she understood the accused to mean that he wanted to be the first to “teach her” if she were to lose her virginity one day.

[note: 174]See Terence Ng (CA), at page 28, paragraph 44(e.).

[note: 175]See Pram Nair: The offender was convicted after trial on 2 charges. The original sentence was 12 years imprisonment with caning adjusted to take into account the accused’s previous period of remand. It was adjusted to 11 years, 19 days, imprisonment per charge. On appeal, the original sentence for the SAP offence was reduced to 7 ½ years, 19 days imprisonment and 4 strokes of the cane whilst the sentence of the rape offence was affirmed as 11 years, 19 days and 6 strokes of the cane. Terms were concurrent: aggregate sentence was 11 years, 19 days and 6 strokes.

[note: 176]See Terence Ng: He was sentenced to an aggregate term 14 years imprisonment with 14 strokes of the cane.

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