District Court of Singapore

Public Prosecutor v Tan Chi (Chen Qi) and another
[2021] SGDC 240

Criminal Law – Offences – Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act – Section 34(1)

Evidence – Interpretation presumptions

Criminal Procedure and Sentencing – Sentencing – Principles

[LawNet Editorial Note: An appeal to this decision has been filed in MA 9188/2021/01 and MA 9187/2021/01.]

27 October 2021

District Judge Edgar Foo:

Introduction

1 This was a joint trial involving 2 co-accused persons, namely Tan Chi (Chen Qi) (hereinafter called “B1”) and Mariappa s/o Miniyadi (hereinafter called “B2”). Both the accused persons had claimed trial to their respective charges:

You, B1,… are charged that you, on the 12^th day of July 2018 at about 9.50 a.m., at the coffee shop located at Blk 449 Clementi Avenue 3, Singapore, being a person subject to Police Supervision pursuant to an Order made by the Minister for Home Affairs under Section 32 of the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act (Chapter 67, 2000 Rev. Ed), vide Police Supervision Order MHA (CL) 0031/2012 dated 5 December 2017, did consort with one Muhammad Yusri Bin Mohd Bisri, (NRIC No: XXX) and one Mariappa S/O Miniyadi (NRIC No: XXX), both of whom are persons subject to supervision under the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act (Chapter 67, 2000 Rev. Ed), without the permission of the commander of the police division in which you reside, namely the Commander of Clementi Division, and you have thereby committed an offence under Section 34 (1) and punishable under Section 34(2) of the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act (Chapter 67, 2000 Rev. Ed).

You, B2,… are charged that you, on the 12th day of July 2018 at about 9.50 a.m., at the coffee shop located at Blk 449 Clementi Avenue 3, Singapore, being a person subject to Police Supervision pursuant to an Order made by the Minister for Home Affairs under Sections 32 of the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act (Chapter 67, 2000 Rev. Ed), vide Police Supervision Order MHA (CL) 004/2011 dated 1 March 2017, did consort with one Muhammad Yusri Bin Mohd Bisri, (NRIC No: XXX) and one Tan Chi (Chen Qi) (NRIC No: XXX), both of whom are persons subject to supervision under the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act (Chapter 67, 2000 Rev. Ed), without the permission of the commander of the police division in which you reside, namely the Commander of Clementi Division, and you have thereby committed an offence under Section 34 (1) and punishable under Section 34(2) of the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act (Chapter 67, 2000 Rev. Ed).

2 The punishment prescribed under section 34(2) of the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act (Chapter 67, 2000 Rev. Ed.) was imprisonment for a term of not less than one year and not more than 3 years.

3 At the conclusion of the trial on 30 July 2021. I found both the accused persons guilty and convicted them of their respective charges. On 24 August 2021, after considering the Prosecution’s submission on sentence and the Defences’ mitigation pleas, I imposed a sentence of 13 months’ imprisonment on each of the accused persons.

4 Both the accused persons, being dissatisfied with my decisions, had filed their Notice of Appeal against their convictions and sentences. I hereby set out my reasons for the convictions and sentences.

Parties’ evidence and exhibits

Prosecution’s evidence and exhibits

5 The Prosecution had called a total of 7 witnesses in their case against both the accused persons:

No.	Witness	Role	Marking given to witness
1	SSSGT Shawn Yeo Soon Kiang	Supervising officer for both the accused persons	PW1
2	SI Mark Lee Seow Chye	Officer who recorded B1’s statement	PW2
3	SSGT Nor Aizat Bin Hamid	Officer who recorded B2’s statement	PW3
4	Muhammad Yusri Bin Mohd Bisri	Co-accused	PW4
5	SI Chan Tuck Seng	Police officer who served the Police Supervision Order on B2	PW5
6	Jeya Letchumi d/o Bala Subramaniam	Interpreter who interpreted the Police Supervision Order to B2	PW6
7	SI Poo Tze Chiang	Investigation Officer	PW7

6 In addition to the 7 witnesses, the Prosecution had also tendered a total of 21 exhibits in support of their case against both the accused persons:

No.	Exhibit	Marking given to exhibit
1	Agreed Statement of Facts	AS1
2	Police Supervision Order MHA (CL) 0031/2012 in respect of B1	P1
3	Police Supervision Order MHA (CL) 0020/2011 in respect of Muhammad Yusri Bin Mohd Bisri	P2
4	Police Supervision Order MHA (CL) 0004/2011 in respect of B2	P3
5	Acknowledgment of Police Supervision Order MHA (CL) 0031/2012 in respect of B1 dated 5 December 2017	P4
6	Acknowledgment of Police Supervision Order MHA (CL) 0004/2011 in respect of B2 dated 1 March 2017	P5
7	Police Report No. A/20180712/2087 lodged on 12 July 2018 at 1.40 pm by PW1	P6
8	B1’s statement recorded under Section 23 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) on 25 April 2019 at 10.50 am by PW7	P7
9	B2’s statement recorded under Section 23 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) on 25 April 2019 at 11.40 am by PW7	P8
10	DAC 913190-2019 for FM(PG) in respect of Mohammad Yusri Bin Mohd Bisri	P9
11	Statement of Facts for FM(PG) in respect of Mohammad Yusri Bin Mohd Bisri	P10
12	Certificate under Section 45A Evidence Act in relation to DAC 913190-2019 in respect of Mohammad Yusri Bin Mohd Bisri	P11
13	Photograph of accused persons at Blk 449 Clementi Ave 2	P12
14	Sketch plan by PW1 showing the route taken by the 3 co-accused when they left Clementi Police Division	P13
15	2 maps showing the area between Clementi Police Division and Clementi MRT	P14
16	Sketch plan by PW1 showing the layout of Blk 447 Clementi Ave 3	P15
17	Sketch plan by PW1 showing the positions of the 3 co-accused as per B1’s instruction	P16
18	Statement of B1 recorded under Section 22 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) on 12 July 2018 at 12.25 pm by PW2	P17
19	Statement of B2 recorded under Section 22 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) on 12 July 2018 at 12.25 pm by PW3	P18
20	Consequences of Contravening the Restrictions in a Police Supervision Order and the Restrictions imposed under the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act	P19
21	PW4’s markings on Exhibit P15	P20

7 The Prosecution’s evidence could be summarised as follows:-

Agreed Statement of Facts (Exhibit AS1)

8 At the start of the trial, the Prosecution had sought to tender an Agreed Statement of Facts (Exhibit AS1) in order to narrow the issues between the parties. Both defence counsels also confirmed that they had no objection to Exhibit AS1 being tendered.

9 The parties had agreed to the following facts:

(a) At the material time, B1 was subject to police supervision pursuant to Orders made by the Minister of Home Affairs under Section 32 of the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act (Chapter 67) (“CLTPA”) vide Police Supervision Order MHA (CL) 0031/2012 dated 5 December 2017^{[note: 1]}; and B2 was also subject to police supervision pursuant to an Order made by the Minister of Home Affairs under Section 32 of the CLTPA vide Police Supervision Order MHA (CL) 004/2011 dated 1 March 2017^{[note: 2]}.

(b) The involved party was PW4. At the material time, PW4 was also subject to police supervision pursuant to an Order made by the Minister of Home Affairs under Section 32 of the CLTPA vide Police Supervision Order MHA (CL) 0020/2010 dated 1 September 2016^{[note: 3]}.

(c) The complainant was PW1. On 12 July 2018, PW1 was the reporting officer at Clementi Police Division and his duty was to oversee the reporting of police supervisees at Clementi Police Division.

(d) The accuracy and admissibility of Exhibits P1, P2 and P3 were not disputed by B1 or B2. All the restrictions imposed on B1 and B2 as part of the Police Supervision were explained to them on issuance of their respective Police Supervision Orders. After the restrictions under the Police Supervision Order were explained to them, B1 and B2 had acknowledged that they understood the restrictions as explained and they also signed the Acknowledgement of Supervision Order forms bearing reference numbers CIDF/5/41559 and CIDF/5/41077 respectively. The Acknowledgement of Supervision Order forms bearing reference number CIDF/5/41559 and CIDF/5/41077 were marked as Exhibit P4 and Exhibit P5 respectively. The accuracy and admissibility of Exhibits P4 and P5 were not disputed by B1 or B2.

Facts relating to the proceeded charges

(e) On 12 July 2018 at about 9 a.m., B1, B2 and PW4 were at Clementi Police Division for their mandatory reporting. After the reporting, at around 9.30 am, PW1 escorted the three of them out of Clementi Police Division. PW1 had also noted that the three of them had left in different directions.

(f) Thereafter, en route to Clementi MRT station, B1 approached PW4 and B2 and asked them how to apply for an extension of the time curfew. B1explained that his father had been hospitalized after suffering a stroke and that he needed to work longer hours to pay for the hospital bills. The three of them then agreed to go to the coffee shop located at Block 449 Clementi Avenue 3, Singapore to have breakfast together and talk about B1’s problems.

(g) The three of them did not seek the permission of the Commander of the Clementi Police Division to consort or habitually associate with one another.

(h) The three of them told PW1 that they were aware that they were not supposed to be seen together and claimed that they were only having breakfast. PW1 then told the three of them to report to the Secret Societies Branch (“SSB”) at Police Cantonment Complex at 391 New Bridge Road, Singapore.

(i) Following the incident, PW1 headed back to SSB, where he lodged the first information report bearing report no. A/20180712/2087 lodged on 12 July 2018 at 1.40 pm (Exhibit P6). The accuracy and admissibility of Exhibit P6 was not disputed by B1 or B2.

(j) The three of them also went back to SSB, where their statements were recorded.

(k) B1 was charged on 25 April 2019. On 25 April 2019 at 10.50 am, PW7 had recorded a statement under section 23 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) (Exhibit P7) from B1. B1 had provided the statement voluntarily, and no threat, inducement, or promise was made to him before or during the recording of Exhibit P7. The contents of the statement as provided by B1 were accurately recorded by PW7 and read back to him. The accuracy and admissibility of Exhibit P7 was also not disputed by B1 Tan.

(l) B2 was also charged on 25 April 2019. On 25 April 2019 at 11.40 am, PW7 had recorded a statement under section 23 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) (Exhibit P8) from B2. B2 had provided the statement voluntarily, and no threat, inducement, or promise was made to him before or during the recording of Exhibit P8. The contents of the statement as provided by B2 were accurately recorded by PW7 and read back to him. The accuracy and admissibility of Exhibit P8 was also not disputed by B2

(m) PW4 was similarly charged for the offence. PW4 had pleaded guilty to 1 charge, DAC-913190-2019^{[note: 4]}, for an offence under section 34(1) of the CLTPA punishable under section 34(2) of the same Act, on 23 October 2019 in Court 8 and was sentenced to 1 year’s imprisonment with effect from 23 October 2019. Exhibit P11 was the Registrar’s Certificate issued under section 45A of the Evidence Act and Schedule. The accuracy and admissibility of Exhibit P11 was not disputed by B1 or B2.

PW1 – SSSGT Shawn Yeo Soon Kiang

10 PW1 was a Senior Staff Sergeant (SSSGT) with the Central Investigation Department, Secret Society Branch and he was the supervising officer for B1, B2 and PW4^{[note: 5]}.

11 PW1 testified that he was in charge of 4 police supervisees who were supposed to report to Clementi Police Division on 12 July 2018. The 4 police supervisees were Jepun, B1, B2 and PW4^{[note: 6]}.

12 As supervising officer, PW1’s role was to bring all the police supervisees to the Head Investigation of Clementi Police Division to endorse their reporting slips before releasing them. PW1 had to ensure that the police supervisees were not late for reporting, that their reporting slips have been signed and they did not congregate with each other^{[note: 7]}. PW1 also testified that all police supervisees were required to wear white long sleeve shirts and black pants whenever they were required to report at Clementi Police Division^{[note: 8]}.

13 In the present case, after Jepun, B1, B2 and PW4 had completed their reporting, PW1 had escorted them out of Clementi Police Division and he saw the 4 of them leaving Clementi Police Division and crossing the road and walking to different directions^{[note: 9]}. PW1 also drew a sketch plan of how the 3 of them had crossed the road Exhibit P13^{[note: 10]}. PW4 testified that he had released the 4 police supervisees from Clementi Police Division at about 9.30 am^{[note: 11]}. After they left, PW1 had wanted to take the MRT to go back to his office^{[note: 12]}.

14 However, 5 minutes later, PW1 saw B1, B2 and PW4 forming together along the overhead bridge leading to Clementi MRT. They were walking together and talking to each other^{[note: 13]}. PW1 testified that the overhead bridge was about 200 to 300 metres away from Clementi Police Division^{[note: 14]}. When PW1 saw the 3 of them along the overhead bridge, they were 30 metres ahead of him. At that time, PW1 was going back to his office at Police Cantonment Complex^{[note: 15]}.

15 PW1 testified that there was heavy human traffic at that time as Clementi Shopping mall which was next to Clementi MRT was opening at 10 am^{[note: 16]}. PW1 said that he was able to identify the 3 of them because they were wearing the standard reporting attire for police supervisees^{[note: 17]}. PW1 tried to trail the 3 of them but he lost sight of them due to the heavy human traffic. However, PW1 did notice that the 3 of them did not make their way towards the Clementi MRT^{[note: 18]}. Instead of turning to the MRT, the 3 of them moved in the direction of Clementi Mall^{[note: 19]}.

16 PW1 felt that something was amiss and he decided to walk around the nearby coffeeshops and hawker centre to see if he could find them^{[note: 20]}. PW1 found the 3 of them at the coffeeshop at Blk 449 Clementi Avenue 3 at about 9.50 am^{[note: 21]}. PW1 also said Blk 449 Clementi Avenue 3 was about a 5 to 10 minute walk from the Clementi MRT^{[note: 22]}.

17 PW1 found B1, B2 and PW4 sitting together in the coffeeshop having breakfast^{[note: 23]}. PW1 was about 10 to 15 metres away from the 3 of them when he saw them. PW1 saw B1 and B2 seated together and PW4 was moving in their direction with a plate of food. PW1 then confronted them. The 3 of them knew they were not supposed to be together. They told PW1 that they were hungry and PW1 told them that that was not a good excuse. The 3 of them then pleaded with him to give them a chance and he told them “no” and he told them to report back to his office^{[note: 24]}.

18 PW1 testified that when he spotted the 3 of them, he had stood by his handphone camera. PW4 was caught by surprise. PW1 then told PW4 to sit down and PW1 proceeded to take a photograph of the 3 of them together (Exhibit P12). PW1 said that he told PW4 to sit down because he did not want PW4 to create a scene and alarm the public^{[note: 25]}. PW4 was beside B2 when he asked PW4 to sit down^{[note: 26]}.

19 PW1 also testified that B1 and B2 had stood up from their seats to try and explain themselves and all 3 of them came up to him and they pleaded with him to give them a chance^{[note: 27]}. The 3 of them told PW1 that they were sorry and that they were just having breakfast. But PW1 told them that they knew that they were not supposed to consort with each other, and he told them to report to his office^{[note: 28]}. However, PW1 could not remember if all these happened before or after he took Exhibit P12^{[note: 29]}.

20 When PW1 tried to leave, the 3 of them kept following him and pleading with him. However, PW1 told them not to follow him anymore and to report to his office. PW1 then left the coffeeshop and he went back to his office^{[note: 30]}.

21 PW1 also testified that he did not log down any of the events because it was a spontaneous event. Moreover, PW1 had related all the facts and what he had seen to his supervisors^{[note: 31]}.

22 PW1 also clarified that if he had discovered any breaches, PW1 would inform his supervisors of the breaches and wait for further instructions from his supervisors^{[note: 32]}. PW1 said that he also had no control over the investigation process even though he was the one who had kick-started the process^{[note: 33]}.

23 When cross-examined by B2’s counsel, PW1 testified that:

(a) He was not the direct supervisor of the 3 of them but he was part of the team of supervising officers^{[note: 34]}.

(b) PW4’s direct supervisor was ASP Zahid and PW1 did not know if PW4 was a problem supervisee^{[note: 35]}.

(c) As regard to the Police Supervision Orders, PW1 was not aware if the Police Supervision Order did mention anything about consorting but the police officers have been briefed that the police supervisees were not supposed to consort. According to PW1, consorting meant congregating together.

(d) PW1 also confirmed that when the police supervisees were reporting at Clementi Police Division, they were not supposed to talk to one another and were also supposed to sit apart from each other^{[note: 36]}. PW1 also said that he did not notice PW4 talking to B1 and B3 when they were at Clementi Police Division^{[note: 37]}.

(e) When PW1 saw the 3 of them walking together near the Clementi MRT, they were walking side by side when they were not supposed to do so^{[note: 38]}. PW1 also said that he did not take a photograph because there was heavy human traffic and the back of the 3 of them were towards PW1 and he could not take a clear shot of their faces^{[note: 39]}. PW1 also said he did not take any videos because he did not keep his handphone camera was not on standby mode all the time^{[note: 40]}. PW1 had wanted to confront them but he could not do so because he had lost sight of them due to the heavy human traffic^{[note: 41]}.

(f) PW1 did not know whether B1 or B2 had sat down first because when he spotted them, they were already seated^{[note: 42]}.

(g) PW1 also confirmed that he did not obtain any CCTV from the Blk 449 coffeeshop in relation to this case and he did not observe any CCTV and he was also not aware if there were any CCTV installed at the coffeeshop^{[note: 43]}.

24 I also noted that counsel for B2 had suggested to PW1 that what had happened at the Blk 449 coffeeshop was that when PW1 arrived at the coffeeshop, PW4 was already seated with his food and B1 had just purchased his drink when he saw PW1. B2 had also purchased his drink and food from the Malay stall when he saw PW1. PW1 then called to B1 and B2 and had asked B1 and B2 to sit down with PW4 before he proceeded to take the photograph Exhibit P12 which he subsequently sent to office^{[note: 44]}. I also noted that PW1 had denied all these allegations. PW1 had also clarified that when he saw PW4, PW4 was getting ready to sit down beside B2. PW4 had pulled back a chair and he was standing before B2 ready to take a seat. When PW4 saw PW1, he did not know how to react and just stood there. That was when PW1 told PW4 to take a seat as he did not want PW4 to create any scene^{[note: 45]}.

25 When cross-examined by B1’s counsel, PW1 testified that:

(a) The amount of time from where he had lost sight of the 3 of them at the overhead bridge till the time he located them at Blk 449 Clementi Ave 3 coffeeshop was about 10 to 15 minutes.

(b) PW1 also said that when he was at the coffeeshop, he had observed the 3 of them for about 1 to 2 minutes before he approached them^{[note: 46]}. PW1 saw B1 and B2 sitting at the outdoor refreshment area of the coffeeshop and he saw PW4 walking towards the 2 of them. PW4 then pulled a chair with the intention to sit down with them and that was when PW1 decided to approach them^{[note: 47]}. PW1 also said that PW4 was standing next to B2 and less than 1 arm’s length away from B2 when PW1 saw PW4^{[note: 48]}.

(c) PW1 said that he was not present when PW2 was recording B1’s long statement nor was he called in by PW2 to clarify anything when PW2 was recording B1’s statement. PW1 also said that he did not have any argument with B1 in the presence of PW2^{[note: 49]}.

26 B1’s counsel had put to PW1 that B1, B2 and PW4 were only at the same table because PW1 had directed them to sit at the same table. B1’s counsel also suggested to PW1 that B1 and B2 were moving around the coffeeshop when PW1 directed them to PW4’s table and asked them to sit down at the table with PW4. PW1 had denied and disagreed with what B1’s counsel had suggested^{[note: 50]}.

PW2 – SI Mark Lee Seow Chye

27 PW2 was a Station Inspector who was attached to the Secret Society Branch of the Central Investigation Department^{[note: 51]}. PW2 was the recorder of B1’s statement (Exhibit P17)^{[note: 52]}.

28 PW2 testified that when he recorded Exhibit P17 from B1, B1 had not been arrested. PW2 was informed by PW7 that PW1 had spotted 3 police supervisees having meals together and PW7 had requested PW2 to assist him to interview B1. PW2 also said that PW7 did not give him any other information or information before he interviewed B1^{[note: 53]}.

29 PW2 also said that B1 was normal and responsive when he recorded B1’s statement and B1 was able to understand and answer all his questions.

30 I also noted that B1 had said the following in Exhibit P17:

“3. On the same day at 9.15 am, I left Clementi Division together with “Mari” (recorder note refer to: Mariappa S/O Miniyadi, NRIC : XXX) and “Crow” (recorder note refer to : Mohammad Yusri Bin Mohd Bisri, NRIC: XXX). The other Criminal law Police Supervisee was still engaging a conversation with the Supervising Officer. While we were walking towards Clementi MRT station, I suggested to “Mari” and “Crow” to go for a cup of coffee because I have questions to ask them on how to contact the Duty Officer of Rehab Team/Secret Societies Branch as I need to apply for permit for time extension. I explained to them that my father is currently warded in NUH after suffering from stroke and head injuries. I further told them that I needed money to settle the hospital bills.

4. On the same day at about 9.35 am, three of us walked to a coffeeshop located at Blk 449 Clementi Ave 2. Thereat, we ordered our food and seated together. At about 9.50 am, Supervising Officer Shawn Yeo cam and approached us. He told us that Criminal law Police Supervisees are not allowed to be seen together and instructed us to report to Secret Societies Branch immediately.

5. The following questions were posed to me by SI Mark Lee.

Q1) Do you know that you being a Criminal law Police Supervisee is not allowed to consort with another person under Supervision?

A1) Yes, I know when the Police Supervision Order was served on me when I was released from Prison.

Q2) Do you have anything else to add to your statement?

A2) I am sorry, I hope the Police will give me another chance and I promised I will never do it again. I need to take care of my father who is suffering from stroke, “

31 When cross-examined by B1’s counsel, PW2 testified that:

(a) He was not given Exhibit P12 before he recorded Exhibit P17^{[note: 54]}.

(b) PW2 had been with the Secret Society Branch, Central Investigation Department since 2006 and he was posted to the Rehab team in 2017. PW2 had been briefed that supervisees were not allowed to be together^{[note: 55]}.

(c) When PW2 was recording Exhibit P17, B1 did not protest that he was made to sit together with B1 and PW4^{[note: 56]}. PW2 also did not call in PW1 to clarify B1’s protest when he was interviewing B1. PW2 also said that PW1 and B1 did not have any exchange or argument about Exhibit P12 in PW2’s presence^{[note: 57]}.

(d) PW2 also did not tell B1 after B1 had protested that he would record whatever B1 told him and that he would record B1’s statement in the way B1 had protested^{[note: 58]}.

(e) PW2 also denied that what was recorded in paragraph 4 line 2 of Exhibit P17 was not what B1 had told him and that PW1 did not quarrel with B1 over the wording of paragraph 4 line 2 of Exhibit P17^{[note: 59]}.

(f) PW2 also confirmed that PW1 was not present when he recorded B1’s statement in his office^{[note: 60]}.

32 When crossed examined by B2’s counsel, PW2 testified that:

(a) He was not aware that PW3 had recorded B2’s statement. But PW3 was not one of the 3 officers who were in charge of investigating breach of police supervision orders^{[note: 61]}.

(b) PW7 had only briefed him that the 3 of them were spotted having a meal together^{[note: 62]}.

PW3 – SSGT Nor Aizat Bin Hamid

33 PW3 was the recorder of B2’s statement (Exhibit P18)^{[note: 63]}. PW3 had recorded B2’s statement in his office instead of the interview room because the LAN in the interview room was having technical issues. When PW3 recorded B2’s statement in his office, he was alone and there were no one else present in the office^{[note: 64]}.

34 PW3 also clarified that there is a typographical error as to the date of the incident in Exhibit P18. PW3 said that the correct date of the incident was 12 July 2018. However, the date was erroneously recorded as 12 March 2018 in paragraphs 4 to 6 of Exhibit P18^{[note: 65]}.

35 I also noted that PW3 had recorded the following statement from B2 in Exhibit P18:

“6 On 12 March 2018, after the reporting at about 09.35 am, one Chinese PS known to me as “Ah Orh” approached me and another PS known as “Yusri” and asked for CID/SSB Rehabilitation officer contact number. He approached us just outside of Clementi Division HQ . He informed us that he needed to contact the officer to ask for extension for his curfew hours because he needed to work longer as he needed money for his father hospital expenses. He then shares with us that his father had just undergone operation to remove his blood clot in the head. We all suggested to have a breakfast together at somewhere nearby and talk about his family issues .

7 On the same day at about 09.45 am, we arrived at Blk 449 Clementi Avenue 3, Singapore 120449, coffee shop. We ordered food and drink separately but we were seated together . I started eating first upon buying my food. Moments later, SIO Shawn from CID/SSB came and approached us. He then asked us why we were seated together. He then instructed us to report to him in Cantonment immediately after eating.

8 We proceeded to Cantonment together via Taxi from Clementi interchange taxi stand and headed to Cantonment. I wish to state that I never meant to eat together. The reason for us eating together is because he had shared his family problems and what his father is going through right now. I am aware and was briefed by CID that I am not supposed to be in any company of any other Police Supervisee (PS). I apologise for my action and I plead for leniency. “

36 When cross-examined by B2’s counsel, PW3 testified that:

(a) He was briefed by PW7 that PW1 had found 3 supervisees together having a meal. However, PW7 did not give him any documents to assist in the ascertaining of facts from B2^{[note: 66]}. As such, when PW3 was recording Exhibit P18 from B2, the only information that was available to him was that 3 supervisees were having a meal together^{[note: 67]}.

(b) PW1 was not present and he did not clarify any matter with PW3 when PW3 was recording B2’s statement^{[note: 68]}. PW3 also could not recall speaking to PW1 before or during the recording of B2’s statement^{[note: 69]}.

(c) PW3 also did not know the particulars of the other 2 co-accused persons when he was recording B2’s statement^{[note: 70]}.

(d) PW3 also said that before he started recording B1’s statement, he did not know that the incident had taken place inside a coffeeshop. PW3 was only briefed by PW7 that the 3 supervisees were having a meal in the vicinity of Clementi and he did not know the exact location of where they were having their meals^{[note: 71]}.

(e) PW3 also testified that he did ask B2 if all the 3 supervisees were together when they were caught by PW1and B2 did not inform him that they were together because PW1 had made them sit together and had taken their photograph^{[note: 72]}.

(f) PW3 further testified that he did not recall telling B2 that he was sympathetic to B2 but he was just doing his job and it was up to his superiors to decide whether to give B2 a chance or to charge him^{[note: 73]}.

PW4 – Muhammad Yusri Bin Mohd Bisri

37 PW4 got to know B1 through reporting to Clementi Police Division after his release from prison and he got to know B2 when he was in prison^{[note: 74]}.

38 PW4 testified that he had pleaded guilty to DAC 913190-2019 (Exhibit P10) which was an offence of consorting with B1 and B2 at about 9.50 am on 12 July 2018 at Blk 449 Clementi Avenue 3 Singapore, while he was subject to a Police Supervision Order, without the permission of the Commander of the Clementi Police Division under section 34(1) of the Criminal law (Temporary Provisions) Act^{[note: 75]}. PW4 also confirmed that Exhibit P10 was the Statement of Facts relating to DAC 913190-2019^{[note: 76]}.

39 PW4 confirmed that he had reported to Clementi Police Division at 9 am on 12 July 2018 and he was dressed in a white formal shirt, black pants and dress shoes^{[note: 77]}. PW4 also saw B1 and B2 as they were also required to report to Clement Police Division on the same day^{[note: 78]}. PW4 said that the supervising officer on 12 July 2018 was PW1. PW4 also testified that when the 3 of them were waiting at the police station, they were not supposed to sit together, so they were seated scattered^{[note: 79]}. PW4 said that there were 2 rows of chairs at the waiting area. As police supervisees were not supposed to sit side by side, the 3 of them left gaps between themselves^{[note: 80]}.

40 PW4 testified that after the 3 of them had reported to the Head Investigation, they were released from Clementi Police Division at about 9.15 am^{[note: 81]}.

41 After PW4 had exited from the front gates of Clementi Police Division, he was approached by B1. B1 asked PW4 how he could get his probation time extended. PW4 told B1 to call the rehab officer. B1 then asked PW4 for the rehab officer’s number. PW4 also asked B1 why he needed the extend his probation time and B1 told him that he needed to do more work to earn extra money to pay for his father’s hospital bills. B1 also told PW4 that his father was in ICU^{[note: 82]}.

42 When PW4 was talking to B1, B2 joined them^{[note: 83]}.

43 PW4 testified that he wanted to tell B1 what to do but because they were still in front of the Clementi Police Division, PW4 decided to treat B1 to breakfast to see how he could help B1^{[note: 84]}.

44 PW4 knew that he could not explain to B1 in front of Clementi Police Division because police supervisees were not supposed to communicate or consort with one another as that would constitute a breach of their Police Supervision Order^{[note: 85]}. PW4 said that he was aware of this condition because when he was released from prison, an officer had explained to him the do and don’ts of a Police Supervision Order. PW4 also said that he was also given a copy of Exhibit P19 which list down what a police supervisee could and could not do^{[note: 86]}. PW4 said that it was also explained to him that he could not communicate or contact any other police supervisees^{[note: 87]}.

45 PW4 testified that he had wanted to move further away from Clementi Police Division before talking to B1 so that they would not get into trouble. They left Clementi Police Division, walked across the road away from the police station and walked towards Clementi MRT^{[note: 88]}. PW4 said that they did not have any place in mind to meet up and they just wanted to go to a coffeeshop to have their talk and leave^{[note: 89]}.

46 PW4 said that the 3 of them crossed the road and went past a car park before going to the overhead bridge leading to Clementi MRT. PW4 also said that when they were walking towards the overhead bridge, the 3 of them did not walk together because they did not want to be seen together^{[note: 90]}. PW4 said that it took them about 5 minutes to walk from Clementi Police Division to Clementi MRT^{[note: 91]}.

47 PW4 testified that after the 3 of them had reached Clementi MRT, they started walking together to look for a place to eat. PW4 said that the 3 of them were walking together side by side for about 5 minutes before reaching the coffeeshop at Blk 449 Clementi Avenue 3. When the 3 of them arrived at the coffeeshop, PW4 offered to buy breakfast for B1 but B1 declined. B1 only wanted drink and he went off to buy his drink. B2 went to buy food from one stall and PW4 proceeded to buy his food from another stall^{[note: 92]}.

48 PW4 testified that when he brought his food back to the table, B1 and B2 were already seated at the table^{[note: 93]}. PW4 had wanted to sit next to B2 and just as he was sitting down, he saw PW1^{[note: 94]}. With reference to Exhibit P12, PW4 said that he was seated next to B2 while B1 was seated across the 2 of them. PW4 also confirmed that Exhibit P12 was taken by PW1 on his handphone^{[note: 95]}.

49 PW4 testified that PW1 wanted to take a picture and he asked the 3 of them to sit down so that he could take their photographs^{[note: 96]}. I also noted that PW4 had also marked out the positions of the 3 of them (Exhibit P20) when PW1 took Exhibit P12^{[note: 97]}. PW4 said that after PW1 took the photograph, he told them to report to Cantonment Police Complex immediately. The 3 of them pleaded with PW1 to give them a chance and told him that they would go their separate ways immediately but PW1 walked away. The 3 of them then went after PW1 and continued pleading with him to let them off. PW1 said “no” and he repeated his instruction for them to report to Cantonment Police Complex immediately^{[note: 98]}.

50 PW4 testified that the 3 of them did not get to talk to each other at the coffeeshop because as soon as PW4 reached the table with his food, he saw PW1 and he did even get a chance to touch his food^{[note: 99]}.

51 PW4 also confirmed that Exhibit P12 was not a candid shot but it was a posed shot. PW4 also said that Exhibit P12 showed that all of them were not eating because they felt awkward as they were caught doing something they were not supposed to do and that was associating with each other^{[note: 100]}.

52 PW4 also clarified that if PW1 had not turned up at the coffeeshop at Blk 449, PW4 would have spoken to B1 to suggest ways on how he could deal with his father’s problem^{[note: 101]}. PW4 said that the plan was to go down to the coffeeshop to sit down and talk^{[note: 102]}.

53 When cross-examined by B1’s counsel, PW4 testified that:

(a) He could not recall seeing PW1 sending Exhibit P12 to anyone after he had taken the photograph at the coffeeshop.

(b) PW4 also confirmed that B1, B2 and himself were already at their table before they saw PW1^{[note: 103]}. PW4 also said that B1 was across the table where PW4 was^{[note: 104]}. PW4 also said that B2 was seated next to him when PW1 appeared^{[note: 105]}.

(c) PW4 also confirmed that the 3 of them did not have a chance to talk because PW1 had appeared immediately after they had purchased their food^{[note: 106]}.

(d) PW4 also disagreed with B1’s counsel that the 3 of them had gone to the coffeeshop because they were hungry^{[note: 107]}. PW4 said that the reason why they had gone to the coffeeshop was for B1 to find out how he could extend his working hours in order to pay his father’s medical bills^{[note: 108]}.

54 Under cross-examination by B2’s counsel, PW4 testified that:

(a) When he met up with B1 and B2 at the coffeeshop, they were not discussing anything illegal nor were they having settlement talks or airing grievances among gang members^{[note: 109]}.

(b) PW4 also said that he could not remember if he had sat down first and B1 and B2 were carrying their food when PW1 told them to go to the table where PW4 was seated^{[note: 110]}.

(c) PW4 also confirmed that when the 3 of them were walking from Clementi Police Station to the Clementi MRT, they were not walking side by side and they were keeping a distance from each other when they were at the overhead bridge^{[note: 111]}. However, they could see other and their shared intention at that point of time was to find a coffeeshop somewhere in Central Clementi. So, they decided to continue walking until they reached the coffeeshop at Blk 449^{[note: 112]}.

PW5 – SI Chan Tuck Seng

55 PW5 was a Station Inspector attached to the Criminal law Branch in March 2017^{[note: 113]}. His job responsibilities then included dealing with criminal law issues and liaising with MHA on matters relating to criminal law. PW5 was also tasked to serve Police Supervision Orders on police supervisees^{[note: 114]}.

56 With regard to B2, PW5 was the officer who had served B2’s Police Supervision Order (Exhibit P5) on B2^{[note: 115]}. PW5 testified that he had served Exhibit P5 on B2 on 1 March 2017 at the rehab office at the Secret Society Branch^{[note: 116]}. PW5 said that he was with B2 and PW6 and he had instructed PW6 to explain the contents of Exhibit P5 to B2 in Tamil. PW5 also confirmed Exhibit P19 was also interpreted and explained to B2 on the same day^{[note: 117]}. A copy of Exhibit P19 was also given to B2 after it had been interpreted and explained to B2 by PW6^{[note: 118]}.

57 PW5 also said that after PW6 had interpreted the documents to B2, he did ask B2 if he understood Exhibits P5 and P19 and B2 did confirm that he understood the documents. PW5 also said that if B2 had indicated that he did not understand the documents, he would make PW6 to explain the documents to B2 until he understood^{[note: 119]}. After that, PW5 made B2 acknowledge the documents by signing the acknowledgement slip, following by PW6 and himself^{[note: 120]}. PW5 also said that the entire process took about 20 to 30 minutes^{[note: 121]}.

PW6 – Jeya Letchumi d/o Bala Subramaniam

58 PW6 was the Tamil interpreter who had interpreted Exhibit P3 to B2 when it was served on him by PW5 on 1 March 2017 (see Exhibits P3 and P5)^{[note: 122]}. Other than Exhibit P3, PW6 had also interpreted Exhibit P19 which was the Consequence of Breaching Police Supervision Order or Committing an Offence to B1 on the same day.

59 PW6 testified that she had explained to B1 that he should not mix around others who were police supervisees otherwise he could be sentenced to 1 to 3 years imprisonment. PW6 testified that when she was interpreting Exhibit P19 to B2, she would ask B1 at regular intervals if he understood her and if he did not answer affirmatively, she would repeat her interpretation until he understood. After PW6 had interpreted Exhibit P19 to B1, she would ask him to sign at the end of the documents and she would also sign on the last page^{[note: 123]}.

PW7 – SI Poo Tze Chiang

60 PW7 was the investigation officer in charge of this case. PW7 confirmed that neither B1 nor B2 had at any time applied for permission from the Commander of Clementi Police Division to consult with other police supervisees^{[note: 124]}.

61 PW7 testified that he was notified of the present case by PW1. PW1 had informed PW7 that he had spotted 3 police supervisees from Clementi Police Division having breakfast and talking at a coffeeshop located in Clementi^{[note: 125]}. After that, PW7 approached PW2, who was the rehab officer who was in charge of the 3 police supervisees and PW3 and requested both of them to help him interview the supervisees^{[note: 126]}. PW7 had asked both of them for their help because there were 3 supervisees involved and PW7 needed to interview the supervisees separately^{[note: 127]}. PW7 had requested PW2 to interview B1 because PW2 was fluent in Hokkien and he had requested PW3 to interview B2 because PW3 could speak Malay and English^{[note: 128]}.

62 When PW7 asked PW2 and PW3 to help record B1 and B2’s statements, he informed them that PW1 had spotted 3 police supervisees having breakfast and talking in a coffeeshop in Clementi. PW7 said that he did not furnish PW2 and PW3 with any other information.^{[note: 129]} PW7 also testified that while PW2 and PW3 were interviewing B1 and B2, PW7 was interviewing PW4^{[note: 130]}.

63 With regard to Exhibit P12, PW7 testified that PW1 had sent him the Exhibit P12 about 2 to 3 hours after he had completed recording PW4’s statement. PW1 had sent Exhibit to PW7 by phone^{[note: 131]}.

64 PW7 also testified that he did not visit Blk 449 Clementi Avenue 3 because the accused persons had all admitted to having breakfast together and there was no need for PW7 to visit the scene^{[note: 132]}. PW7 also said that he did not check the coffeeshop for any CCTV because he was informed by PW1 that there was no CCTV facing the crime scene^{[note: 133]}. PW7 also did not take any photographs of the crime scene. This was because none of the accused persons had raised any doubts about having breakfast at the said coffeeshop^{[note: 134]}.

65 During cross-examination by B1’s counsel, PW7 testified that:

(a) He was not aware that B1 had protested to PW2 about Exhibit P12 such that PW1 had to be called in to clarify things^{[note: 135]}.

66 I also noted that B1’s counsel had also put to PW7 the following:

(a) That Exhibit P12 was sent to PW7 before he and PW2 and PW3 recorded the statements of the 3 accused persons; and

(b) That Exhibit P12 was in fact a trophy to show that PW4 had been caught in a situation.

I also noted that PW7 had denied the same.

67 When cross-examined by B2’s counsel, PW7 testified that:

(a) PW7 had started recording PW4’s statement on 12 July 2018 at 12.10 pm and he had completed the statement recording at 1.20 pm. B1’s statement was completed on the same day at 1.40 pm and B2’s statement was also completed at 1 pm on the same day^{[note: 136]}. PW7 said that he had not seen Exhibit P12 by the time he completed PW4’s statement and Exhibit P12 was sent by PW1 to him after the 3 accused persons had been released on bail^{[note: 137]}.

(b) PW7 also confirmed that he did not have sight of Exhibit P6 when he was recording PW4’s statement^{[note: 138]}.

68 I also noted that PW7 had also agreed with B2’s counsel that B1, B2 and PW4 had gathered at Blk 449 Clementi Avenue 3 coffeeshop because of B1’s father’s health problem and that investigations did not reveal that the 3 of them had met up because of illegal activities^{[note: 139]}.

69 At the end of the Prosecution’s case, both counsels for B1 and B2 submitted that there was no case for both B1 and B2 to answer because the Prosecution had failed to furnish sufficient evidence to make out the elements of the charges against both B1 and B2^{[note: 140]}.

No case to answer

70 Counsels for both B1 and B2 had submitted that the Prosecution had failed to furnish any evidence that B1, B2 and PW4 were “consorting” with each other when they were caught by PW1 at the Blk 449 Clementi Avenue 2 coffeeshop.

71 Counsels for B1 and B2 had submitted that the word “consort” in its ordinary meaning as defined in the Cambridge Dictionary was:

“to spend a lot of time in the company of a particular group of people, especially whose character is not approved of”

72 Counsels for B1 and B2 had submitted that the word “consort” under section 34(1) should be interpreted in purpose, object, and alignment in meaning with the word “habitually associate” as what Parliament had intended. It should not be looked at in isolation disjunctively. In short, it alluded to meeting on more than 1 occasion. That was why Parliament required that if they wished to associate or consort together legally regularly, they must get permission from the police officer-in-charge.

73 Counsels for B1 and B2 had also submitted that the gathering by B1, B2 and PW4 was for a legitimate purpose and there was no inkling of any criminal activities at all.

74 In the present case, both the counsels for B1 and B2 had submitted that all the documentary and oral evidence which were tendered by the Prosecution did not support the charge under section 34(1) p/u section 34(2). If at all, it might support a charge under section 36(2) which provided for a situation where the accused persons were not unable to give a satisfactory account of being found in each other’s company.

75 For all the above reasons, both counsels for B1 and B2 had submitted that both B1 and B2 had no case to answer for the charges, and the cases against the Accused should be dismissed without the Accused’s defence being called.

76 The Prosecution had submitted that it would be premature for me to dismiss the case against both B1 and B2 at the close of the Prosecution’s case. The Prosecution had submitted that they had established a prima facie case against both B1 and B2. The Prosecution submitted that they had established that both B1 and B2 were police supervisees, and they did not have permission from the Commander of Clementi Police Division to consort. B1 and B2 were having breakfast together at Blk 449 Clement Avenue 3.

77 As regards to the legal definition of consorting, the Prosecution was of the view that the legal definition of consorting was a matter of legal submissions and the court should only decide on the legal definition after both the accused persons have given their defence.

My decision on no case to answer

78 The standard of proof required at the close of the Prosecution’s case was set out in section 230(1)(j) of the CPC:

“if after considering the evidence.., the court is of the view that there is some evidence which is not inherently incredible and which satisfies each and every element of the charge as framed by the prosecutor or as altered or framed by the court, the court must call on the accused to give his defence”

79 Section 230(1)(j) had codified the approach set out by the Privy Council in Haw Tua Tau v Public Prosecutor [1981-1982] SLR(R) 133 where Lord Diplock had stated:

“… At the conclusion of the prosecution’s case, what has to be decided remains a question of law only. As decider of law, the judge must consider whether there is some evidence (not inherently incredible) which, if he were to accept as accurate, would establish each and every essential element of the alleged offence. If such evidence as respects any of those essential element is lacking, then. And then only, is he justified in finding “that no case against the accused has been made which if unrebutted would warrant his conviction”… Where he has not found so, he must call upon the accused to enter his defence, and as decider of fact must keep an open mind as to the accuracy of any of the prosecution’s witness until the defence has tendered such evidence, if any, by the accused or other witnesses as it may want to call and counsel on both sides have addressed to the judge such arguments and comments on the evidence on the evidence as they may wish to advance.”

80 As such, all that the Prosecution needed to establish was that there was a prima facie case. So long as there was some evidence, not inherently incredible, to satisfy every ingredient of the offence, the standard of proof would be satisfied and the accused would be called upon to give his defence. At this stage, the Court must keep an open mind on the accuracy and veracity of the evidence adduced by the Prosecution.

81 At this stage, the court must act on the following presumptions:

(a) That all such evidence of primary facts is true, unless it is inherently so incredible that no reasonable person would accept it as being true; and

(b) That there will be nothing to displace those inferences as to further facts or state of mind of the accused which would reasonably be drawn from the primary facts in the absence of further explanation.

82 The meaning of “consort” was not defined in the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act. I also noted the word “consort” was defined in a number of dictionaries as follows:

(a) In the Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary of Current English, “consort” was defined as “pass time in the company off”.

(b) In the Oxford Concise Dictionary, “consort” was defined as “class or bring together, keep company (with)”.

(c) In the Merriam Webster Dictionary, “consort” was defined as “to keep company or spend time with (someone)”.

83 As could be seen from above, “consort” simply meant to spend time with someone. In the present case, there was sufficient evidence tendered by the Prosecution to show that B1, B2 and PW4 had intended to go to the Blk 449 coffeeshop to spend time together to discuss B1’s personal problem.

84 Given the above, I was of the view that the Prosecution had established a prima facie case against both B1 and B2 at the close of the Prosecution’s case and I called on both B1 and B2 to enter their defence.

Defence’s evidence and exhibits

85 I noted that after I had called B1 and B2 to enter their defence, both B1 and B2 had elected to remain silent and not to give evidence on oath from the witness stand. Both B1 and B2 had also decided not to call any other witnesses to testify on their behalf.

Prosecution’s Case^{[note: 141]}

I. Introduction

86 B1 and B2 were jointly tried for an offence of consorting with other persons subject to supervision under section 34(1) of the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act (Cap 67, 2000 Rev Ed) (“CLTPA”), an offence punishable under section 34(2) of the same Act.

87 Despite being cautioned to not meet or communicate with other police supervisees, B1, B2 and PW4, all of whom were police supervisees at the material time, had agreed to meet for a seemingly innocuous purpose of having breakfast. The Prosecution submitted that this “innocuous” meeting was itself a crime that Parliament had sought to prevent and deter. This involved the issue of statutory interpretation of “consorting” in section 34(1) of the CLTPA. The Prosecution also noted that the term “consort” had neither been defined statutorily^{[note: 142]} or in Singapore jurisprudence^{[note: 143]}

88 The Prosecution was of the view that the word” must be interpreted to include intentional, one-off meetings involving no improper, illegal or criminal purpose between police supervisees (“the Plain Interpretation”).

89 Before delving into this issue, it was necessary to lay out the facts of the case, which were undisputed.

II. The facts

a. The proceedings at trial showed that the Prosecution’s case was the truth

90 Over the course of a five-day trial, 20 prosecution exhibits were admitted into evidence and 7 prosecution witnesses were called to testify. Despite the admission of Exhibit AS1, counsels for B1 and B2 had expressly stated that there were “factual disputes” pertaining to how Exhibit P12, a photograph of the accused persons, was obtained. In the defence counsels’ words, there was a question of whether Exhibit P12 was “fabricated”^{[note: 144]}.

91 Yet, when called to give their defence, the accused persons had elected to remain silent. Counsel for B2, Mr Paul, had indicated that they would accept the facts as set out in the ASOF.

92 The Prosecution submitted that an adverse inference under section 291(3)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) should be drawn from their election to not give evidence. The evidence given by the Prosecution witnesses clearly called for an explanation, which the accused persons could give. Thus, their silence ought to lead this court to conclude that the Prosecution witnesses’ evidence was probably true (see Took Leng How v PP [2006] 2 SLR(R).

93 That being the case, the Prosecution submitted that the actual facts should be the facts that was stated in Exhibit AS1.

b. The facts

94 At the material time, the accused persons and PW4 (collectively “the supervisees”) were police supervisees under a Police Supervision Order (“PSO”) made by the Minister of Home Affairs pursuant to section 32 of the CLTPA. This PSO was served on the supervisees when they were released from detention and the contents of the PSO were explained by a police officer of the Criminal Law Branch and an interpreter. One of the conditions in the PSO was that the supervisees were not permitted to consort with one another. The accused persons understood those conditions and signed on the acknowledgement form.

95 On 12 July 2018 at around 9.00 am, the supervisees reported to the Head of Investigation of Clementi Police Division. After PW1 had facilitated the reporting process, the supervisees were released. At the gate of Clementi Police Division, B1 approached PW4 to ask about extending his curfew timing. B2 also joined in the conversation. The supervisees then agreed to go to a coffeeshop to have breakfast together.

96 The supervisees then made their way across an overhead bridge leading towards Clementi MRT station. They stopped at a coffee shop located at Blk 449 Clementi Avenue 3, Singapore (“the coffee shop”). Shortly after the supervisees purchased their food and drinks and sat at a table together, they were spotted by PW1. PW1 then took a photograph of the supervisees.

97 PW1 informed the supervisees that they were not allowed to meet and instructed them to report to the Secret Societies Branch of the Criminal Investigation Department at Police Cantonment Complex located at 391 New Bridge Road, Singapore.

98 The supervisees did not have the permission of the Commander of Clementi Police Division to consort or habitually associate with one another. Following the incident, the trio were charged for an offence under section 34(1) of the CLTPA.

III. The approach towards statutory interpretation

99 For the avoidance of doubt, references to the CLTPA hereinafter should be taken as referring to the statute in operation as at 12 July 2018. The CLTPA was amended after that date. Among other things, section 34 was repealed and re-enacted pursuant to section 4 of the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) (Amendment) Act 2018.20 This was a significant development which would be addressed later on in these submissions.

100 The question before this court pertained to the definition to be accorded to the word “consorting” in section 34(1) of the CLTPA. Section 34(1) of the CLTPA provided:

Person subject to supervision not to consort with other persons subject to supervision

34. –(1) No person subject to supervision under this act shall consort or habitually associate with any other person subject to supervision under this Act without the permission of the commander of the police division in which he resides, unless he proves that he did not know and had no reason to suspect that the other person was a person subject to supervision under this Act.

(2) Any persons who contravenes this section shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term of not less than one year and not more than 3 years.

[emphasis in bold]

101 The approach to purposive interpretation under section 9A of the Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed) was canvassed by the Court of Appeal in Attorney-General v Ting Choon Meng and another appeal [2017] SGCA 06 (“Ting Choon Meng”). In Ting Choon Meng, Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon laid out a three-step framework:

“59 It follows from this that the court’s task when undertaking a purposive interpretation of a legislative text should begin with three steps:

(a) first, ascertaining the possible interpretations of the text, as it has been enacted. This however should never be done by examining the provision in question in isolation. Rather, it should be undertaken having due regard to the context of that text within the written law as a whole;

(b) second, ascertaining the legislative purpose or object of the statute. This may be discerned from the language used in the enactment; but as I demonstrate below, it can also be discerned by resorting to extraneous material in certain circumstances. In this regard, the court should principally consider the general legislative purpose of the enactment by reference to any mischief that Parliament was seeking to address by it. In addition, the court should be mindful of the possibility that the specific provision that is being interpreted may have been enacted by reason of some specific mischief or object that may be distinct from, but not inconsistent with, the general legislative purpose underlying the written law as a whole. I elaborate on this in the following two paragraphs; and

(c) third, comparing the possible interpretations of the text against the purposes or objects of the statute. Where the purpose of the provision in question as discerned from the language used in the enactment clearly supports one interpretation, reference to extraneous materials may be had for a limited function – to confirm but not to alter the ordinary meaning of the provision as purposively ascertained; but I elaborate on this in the following section.”

[emphasis in bold]

102 This three-step framework was subsequently affirmed in Tan Cheng Bock v Attorney-General [2017] SGCA 50 (“Tan Cheng Bock”).

103 As was evident from the three-step framework, primacy was accorded to the text of the provision and its statutory context over any extraneous material. While it was trite that purposive interpretation of a statute was a fundamental principle giving effect to Parliament’s intent, the meaning and purpose of a provision should be derived from the statute first, based on the provisions in question read in the context of the statute as a whole. In determining the possible interpretations of the statute, the court must ascertain the ordinary meaning of the words, aided by logical rules and canons of statutory interpretation.

104 Considerations of extraneous material such as Parliamentary debates should only be made in the three situations set out in section 9A(2) of the IA, as discussed in Tan Cheng Bock:

(a) If the ordinary meaning of the provision (taking into account its context in the written law and purpose or object underlying the written law) was clear, extraneous material can only be used to confirm the ordinary meaning but not to alter it;

(b) If the provision is ambiguous or obscure on its face, extraneous material can be used to ascertain the meaning of the provision;

(c) If the ordinary meaning of the provision (taking into account its context in the written law and the purpose or object underlying the written law) led to a result that was manifestly absurd or unreasonable, extraneous material could be used to ascertain the meaning of the provision.

[emphasis in bold]

105 The Prosecution submitted that the first point of reference must be therefore be the words used in the section itself, read against the backdrop of the rest of the section. Extrinsic materials such as parliamentary debates should only be considered after the first step of the three-step test set out by the Court of Appeal in Tan Cheng Bock, in the three situations described above.

106 The Prosecution submitted that the only possible interpretation of “consort” was the Plain Interpretation:

(a) In applying the first step in the Tan Cheng Bock framework, the only possible interpretation of “consort” was that it included intentional, one-off meetings between police supervisees, and that no improper, illegal or criminal motive was required.

(b) In applying the second step in the Tan Cheng Bock framework, the legislative purpose of section 34 of the CLTPA was to prevent and deter police supervisees from committing crimes by preventing police supervisees from interacting with one another.

(c) In applying the third step in the Tan Cheng Bock framework, the legislative purpose of section 34 of the CLTPA was most effectively achieved by interpreting “consort” to mean the Plain Interpretation.

IV. Step 1: The only possible interpretation of “Consort” was that it included intentional, one-off meetings between police supervisees where no improper, illegal or criminal motive was involved

A. The meaning of “consorting” was “to accompany or attend”

107 The Prosecution submitted that the starting point of the analysis was the plain meaning of the word. “Consorting” was defined by the Oxford English dictionary to mean “to accompany or attend”^{[note: 145]}.

108 In this regard, the court in Nadarajan s/o S Raman v PP [2001] SGDC 53^{[note: 146]} had accepted the plain meaning of “consort” as defined in the dictionary to be “pass time in the company of” and “class or bring together, keep company”. This was in the context of an offence under section 8(1) of the Corrosive and Explosive Substances and Offensive Weapons Act (Cap 65), for consorting with a person in possession of an offensive weapon.

109 The Prosecution was of the view that the plain meaning of the word was clearly relevant, at least as the starting point of the analysis.

B. Section 34(1) of the CLTPA could only be interpreted to refer to intentional, one-off meetings between police supervisees

1. Such interpretation was consistent with other relevant provisions in Part V of the CLTPA

110 At the first step of the Ting Choon Meng framework, the court was tasked with ascertaining the possible interpretations of the provision, having regard not just to the text of the provision but also to the context of that provision within the written law as a whole.

111 Having due regard to the CLTPA as a whole, the Prosecution submitted that the Plain Interpretation was the only tenable interpretation bearing in mind the trite principles that “Parliament shuns tautology and does not legislate in vain; the court should therefore endeavour to give significance to every word in the enactment”^{[note: 147]}.

112 Section 34 of the CLTPA not only criminalised “consorting” between police supervisees but also criminalised “habitual association”:

34.–(1) No person subject to supervision under this act shall consort or habitually associate with any other person subject to supervision under this Act without the permission of the commander of the police division in which he resides, unless he proves that he did not know and had no reason to suspect that the other person was a person subject to supervision under this Act.

[Emphasis in bold]

113 It was also a criminal offence under section 36(b) of the CLTPA “to be found in the company of” another police supervisee:

36. Any person subject to supervision under this Act who —

(b) at any time is found in the company of 2 or more persons subject to supervision under this Act; and who is unable satisfactorily to account for his presence at that place or time or in that company shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term of not less than one year and not more than 3 years.

[Emphasis in bold]

114 It was notable that the CLTPA prohibited “consorting”, “habitually associating” and being “in the company of”, none of which were statutorily defined. The starting point should be that the word “consort” should have a different meaning from “habitually associate” and “in the company of”.

115 In promulgating the offence of “habitually associating”, Parliament had clearly applied its mind to scenarios involving some regularity or frequency of meetings. Accordingly, the omission of the word “habitually” from the context of consorting was an intentional one. Indeed, to require regularity or frequency in consorting would essentially render the offence of “habitually associating” otiose. In this regard, it should be noted that other jurisdictions, for example, Australia – deemed it necessary to use the phrase “habitually consort” in their statutes to refer to repeated association.

116 On the flipside, “to consort” must also be something more than “to be found in the company of”. Therefore, a holistic reading of the CLTPA showed that there were three distinct types of association, all of which were left undefined:

(a) Habitually associating;

(b) Consorting; and

(c) Being in the company of.

117 What was clear, however, was that the offences fell on different points on the spectrum of intentionality of association – “habitual association” at the highest end of intentionality and “being found in the company of” at the lowest end. “Consorting” would thus fall between the two ends. The Prosecution submitted that the following fact patterns would satisfy comprehensively the definition of “consorting” under the CLTPA:

(a) While a mere serendipitous encounter would not cross the threshold of “consorting”, it would amount to “being found in the company of”;

(b) Should a serendipitous encounter turn into a more substantial, prolonged interaction, this would bring the case over the threshold of “consorting”. The distinguishing factor was the parties’ intentional, continued association with one another after the chance encounter; and

(c) Similarly, a once-off, planned meeting should reach the threshold of “consorting”, though insufficient to establish “habitual association”.

118 Therefore, the only possible interpretation was that “consorting” referred to intentional, one-off meetings.

C. “Consorting” did not require the meeting to be for an improper, illegal or criminal purpose

1. Requiring an illegal purpose under section 34(1) of the CLTPA would be tantamount to re-writing legislation

119 At the first step of the analysis in Ting Choon Meng, the court must be constrained by literal wording of the provision^{[note: 148]}, and “assiduously guard against inadvertently re-writing legislation”^{[note: 149]}. The starting point was that if Parliament had not expressed such a requirement in the statute, it should be presumed that this was a deliberate omission unless shown otherwise^{[note: 150]}. Therefore, to interpret “consort” as involving illegality would amount to usurpation of Parliament’s powers to legislate.

120 In section 34 of the CLTPA, Parliament had considered it appropriate to impose liability solely based on the offender’s knowledge that the other party was also a police supervisee. In other words, this was the mens rea element of the offence. Section 34 of the CLTPA provided that a police supervisee cannot consort, “unless he proves that he did not know and had no reason to suspect that the other person was a person subject to supervision”. In doing so, Parliament had implicitly declined to require an improper, illegal or criminal purpose for an offence to be made out.

2. To require an improper, illegal or criminal purpose would lead to an absurd result

121 Further, to interpret “consort” to involve an improper, illegal or criminal purpose behind a meeting of two or more supervisees would result in an unworkable statute. Since Parliament had neither legislated for nor defined what impropriety, illegality or criminality might mean, there were obvious difficulties in practical application to any factual scenario. If Parliament had intended for such a requirement to be imposed, the illegality would have been statutorily defined. For example, “criminal conduct” was extensively defined under section 2 of the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act (Cap 65A, 2000 Rev Ed) (“CDSA”). Without such definition, requiring nefarious purposes for consorting would not be regarded as a possible interpretation^{[note: 151]}, as Parliament could not have intended a meaning which would give rise to an absurd, unworkable or inconvenient result^{[note: 152]}.

122 For the above reasons, the only possible interpretation of “consort” was the Plain Interpretation. The identification of a sole possible interpretation was sufficient to dispose of the issue of statutory interpretation (see Yap Chen Hsiang Osborn v PP [2019] 2 SLR 391 at [39].

123 Nevertheless, for completeness, the Prosecution submitted that they would proceed to address the second and third steps of the Ting Choon Meng framework.

V. Step 2: The purpose of the CLTPA was to control police supervisees and deter them from committing crimes

124 In determining the legislative purpose of a provision, there was a distinction between the specific purpose of the provision and the general purpose underlying the statute as a whole. As observed by the Court of Appeal in Ting Choon Meng, “the purpose behind a particular provision may be distinct from the general purpose underlying the statute as a whole”^{[note: 153]}. Therefore, the court should consider the purpose of the particular provision separately from that of the general statute^{[note: 154]}. Subsequently in Tan Cheng Bock, the court expounded on this distinction at [40] – [41]^{[note: 155]}:

40 It is important here to distinguish between the specific purpose underlying a particular provision and the general purpose or purposes underlying the statute as a whole or the relevant part of the statute. As noted in Ting Choon Meng at [60], the words of section 9A of the IA are ambiguous as to which purpose is best considered in this context. This is because it refers both to the purpose underlying the “written law” (in section 9A(1)) and to that underlying the “provision of the written law” (in ss 9A(2)–9A(3)). As was observed in Ting Choon Meng at [61], “the purpose behind a particular provision may yet be distinct from the general purpose underlying the statute as a whole”, and it may therefore be necessary to separately consider the specific purpose of a particular provision when the court endeavours to ascertain the legislative intent. This is only logical given that different provisions may target different specific mischiefs.

41 The distinction between the specific purpose of a provision and the general purpose of a statute is a significant one. The same point was made by the Federal Court of Australia in Evans v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 276 when it observed at [16] that “[u]nder the umbrella of the general object is a multitude of objects of specific provisions”, and by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Edwards v AG [2004] NSWCA 272; (2004) 60 NSWLR 667 when it observed at [72] that “it may be said that there is an underlying object of the Act as a whole and there may be a separate object of discrete parts of it, subject of course to the purpose of the whole”. We note from the use of the phrases “[u]nder the umbrella of the general object” and “subject of course to the purpose of the whole”, that these cases appear to contemplate that the specific purpose can never be contrary to the general purpose. We need not go quite as far given that this issue does not arise in this case; for present purposes we prefer to leave it on the footing that in a truly exceptional case, it may be that the specific intention of Parliament is so clear that the court should give effect to it even if it appears to contradict, undermine, or go against the grain of the more general purpose. Such cases would, however, be rare (as noted in Ting Choon Meng at [60]), if they ever occurred at all. The court must begin by presuming that a statute is a coherent whole, and that any specific purpose does not go against the grain of the relevant general purpose, but rather is subsumed under, related or complementary to it. The statute’s individual provisions must then be read consistently with both the specific and general purposes, so far as it is possible.

[emphasis in bold]

125 Crucially, Tan Cheng Bock had laid down the presumption that a statute was a coherent whole and thus the individual provision should be read in a manner which was consistent with both its specific purpose and the general purpose of the statute.

126 The Prosecution submitted that the purpose of section 34 was not only consistent with the overall schema of the CLTPA, it was instrumental to the CLTPA by assisting in the rehabilitation of police supervisees, whilst preventing and deterring crime. To those ends, the legislative purpose required that “consorting” in section 34 be interpreted to capture one-off meetings between police supervisees, even if there was no illegal purpose behind doing so.

A. The general purpose of the CLTPA is to combat organised crime

127 By way of legislative background, the CLTPA could be traced (with modifications) to the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Ordinance (Ordinance 26 of 1955) (“the Ordinance”). The Ordinance was enacted with the purpose of combatting communism^{[note: 156]}.

128 Preventive detention was introduced during the Second Reading of the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) (Amendment) Bill (Bill No. 165/1958) in 1958 to address organised crime. There, Mr Lee Kuan Yew had stated^{[note: 157]}:

“Let us face the facts: either we bring these gangsters to trial, or we do nothing, or we lock them up without trial. Well, we prefer to bring them to trial if we could. As I know, and I think every practising lawyer in town knows, the point is now reached when police officers frankly admit that gangsters are not scared of the police any more…On the day proceedings commence, they fix a few witnesses who decide that it is healthier not to say anything, and they are acquitted.

Now quite frankly either you surrender and say, well, the judicial process is inadequate and therefore we have been beaten by gangsters, or we say, well what do we do about it? I say, well, if there is no other way, then we had better deal with them firmly.”

129 As the Ordinance had conferred an “exceptional power”^{[note: 158]} to detain individuals without trial, the Ordinance was subject to renewal by Parliament every five years.

130 More recently, the CLTPA’s operation was extended for another five years by way of the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) (Amendment) Act 2018 (No. 12 of 2018). During the Second Reading of the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) (Amendment) Bill (No. 5 of 2018) [TAB S] (“Bill No. 5 of 2018”), Minister of Home Affairs, Mr K Shanmugam, stated examples where the CLTPA was used to address organised crime, where victims and witnesses were unwilling or unable to testify against their attackers^{[note: 159]}:

“In 2017, the CLTPA was used to cripple two gangs operating in Singapore…the first comprised mainly young Indian gang members…they carried out armed attacks against rival gang members…the second gang comprised Chinese males in their mid-20s to 30s...they attached others, used weapons to settle their disputes…Again, in both cases, the victims were unwilling or unable to identify the attackers. The gang members were prepared to give evidence but not in court for fear of reprisal. And really, without CLTPA, it would have been difficult to deal with the gangsters. So, that is, if you look at gangsters.

We also used the CLTPA again in the context of drugs. CNB uses it and many drug trafficking syndicates have been crippled using the CLTPA. Often, because they fear attacks on them and their families, the couriers will not want or refuse to testify in court…

The CLTPA has also been used against persons involved in loansharking activities…And, again, we have used the court processes to prosecute UML offenders. But again, there will be cases where the runners will refuse to testify against the kingpins…

Fourth, we also use the CLTPA, sometimes to detain members of syndicates. There was a case: global match-fixing syndicate. The head made it known to his members that he would kill or harm any person who betrayed him and the syndicate. One person was, in fact, attacked on his orders. The syndicate members were quite unwilling to testify in court against him. But his criminal activities were dangerous, detrimental to our public safety, peace and good order. So, we used the CLTPA.

Unlike other countries, our physical size, smallness, also makes it difficult for us to relocate witnesses in such a way as to assure them and their families of their physical safety… And so, given our local circumstances, our law enforcement agencies will not be able to totally satisfy witnesses that their concerns will not bear out.”

[emphasis in bold]

131 Bearing in mind the general purpose of the CLTPA, and considering the specific purpose of section 34 of the CLTPA, the Prosecution submitted that the specific purpose of section 34 was entirely consistent with the overarching purpose of the CLTPA.

B. Section 34 of the CLTPA was promulgated to enhance control over police supervisees and deter them from committing crimes

132 The Prosecution submitted that the genesis of section 34 of the CLTPA was Clause 10 of the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) (Amendment No. 2) Bill (No. 17 of 1959) (“Bill No. 17 of 1963”). During the Second Reading of Bill No. 17 of 1959, the Minister of Home Affairs, Mr Ong Pang Boon had stated^{[note: 160]}:

“The Government, like any democratic Government, does not wish to lightly deprive the individual of his liberty by executive action, nor for that matter for a longer time than is absolutely necessary. But when we are dealing with unruly and unprincipled thugs and gangsters and because of the terrorism they have spread, the ordinary process of law is inadequate to deal with the crimes and misdeeds committed by them. Special powers such as those contained in this Bill are therefore necessary…

Coming now to the details of the Bill, the main provisions are (1) to extend the life of the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Ordinance which expires in October this year for another five years; (2) to give the Minister alternative powers either to impose detention orders on persons associated with activities of a criminal nature or to order that they be placed under police supervision; (3) to extend the period of detention made by the Minister from six months as at present to one year; (4) to impose special restrictions on those persons placed under police supervision and special penalties on them for breaking the restrictions or for being convicted of specified offences; and (5) to issue special identity cards to those subject to police supervision under this Ordinance.”

[emphasis in bold]

133 The Prosecution submitted that the “special powers” referred to by Mr Ong Pang Boon were, specifically, the restrictions under Clause 7 and 10 of Bill No. 17 of 1963. While the Minister was empowered to order an individual to be detained without trial, this power had been previously introduced in an earlier Bill, the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) (Amendment) Ordinance 1958 (Bill No. 165/1958), by way of Clause 47^{[note: 161]}.

134 The legislative purpose behind supervision orders and the accompanying restrictions was articulated by Mr Ong Pang Boon during the Second Reading of Bill No. 17 of 1959:56

“Clause 7 [note: section 30 CLTPA] is a clause which empowers the Minister either to order the detention of persons associated with activities of a criminal nature in the interests of public safety, peace, and good order for a period of up to one year or to make an order directing that they be placed under police supervision for a period not exceeding three years…there are many gangsters including some who are already detained, who are really misled and misguided persons, often teenagers, who are not all lost to the society of decent people and who should be given a second chance to redeem themselves and go straight. This class of gangsters could be placed under police supervision instead of being detained. They would be released and returned to the intimate circle of their relatives and friends. They would be subject to restrictions but they could lead comparatively normal lives and participate in remunerative employment.

…

Clause 10 [note: section 33 and section 34 CLTPA] makes persons directed to be under police supervision subject to other disabilities and provisions intended to make it easier to control their activities and to prevent or to deter them from committing crimes. If they break the restrictions imposed on them under these police supervision orders or if they consort with other persons subject to similar supervision orders without permission, or if they are found loitering in public places or are found at places where breaches of the peace have been committed, or are found in the company of two or more persons subject to supervision without being able to account for themselves satisfactorily, they are liable on conviction to be punished with imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years and not less than one year”

[emphasis in bold]

135 Minister Mr Lim Kim San then had also highlighted the rehabilitative aspect behind the restrictions under section 34 during the Second Reading of the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) (Amendment) Bill (Bill No. 20/1969^{[note: 162]}:

“Mr Speaker, Sir, Members will appreciate that it is necessary to rehabilitate and re-educate secret society gangsters while they are under detention in order that when they return to society on their release, we hope they would become law-abiding and useful citizens. Rehabilitation takes times and varies with the individual. Some may respond quickly to the rehabilitation programme, while others need a longer period.

Hon. Members are most probably aware that only the hard-core secret society members are put under detention orders. The others are placed under police supervision orders for a period of two years. This enables the less dangerous members of secret societies to earn their livelihood and, at the same time, enables the police to keep track of their movements outside their working hours in order to curb their anti-social activities.”

[emphasis in bold]

136 The legislative purpose of section 34 CLTPA was articulated more recently by Minister Mr K Shanmugam during the Second Reading of the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) (Amendment) Bill (No. 5 of 2018) [TAB S] (“Bill No. 5 of 2018”)^{[note: 163]}:

“So, likewise, for the supervisees. If you do not give them close attention – now, today, you make them report on a regular basis, that alone is not going to prevent them from getting back into bad company, going back into gangsterism. You need to do something more. And so, my directions to the Ministry has been: can we do something more? Can we tailor the changes such that the Police can impose certain conditions? I can imagine you have to spend some time doing this; you have to come for counselling; you have to do these things; basically it is to try and get you to break the habit.

So, that was the significant of the change even though it has not been discussed today. But by moving it into the Schedule, it allows us to look at every individual. Today, when detainees come in, we actually do a risk analysis. Are you likely to be high-risk, medium-risk or low-risk? And if you are low-risk, can we do all these things to make sure that you do not become a permanent feature of the system? So, likewise, we want to do that with the Police Supervision Order (PSO) supervisees. We want to structure it such that we have the power to impose those source of tailored conditions. And in my mind, the sooner the better, we move in line with everything else. So, we are making some other amendments and we put it all together. And because we are coming to the Parliament for the amendments, we said, "Okay, let us ask for another five years at the same time."”

[emphasis in bold]

137 The Prosecution was of the view that what could be distilled from the parliamentary debates was that the restrictions under section 33 and 34 were prophylactic. Viewed in context, those restrictions were part of the larger regime to ensure that supervisees stay on the straight and narrow and put their previous way of life behind them. By preventing these high-risk individuals from returning to their criminal organisations, Parliament was able to chip away at the threats posed by organised crime.

VI. Step 3: Comparing the possible interpretations against the purpose or object of the statute

A. The Plain Interpretation was confirmed by the specific purpose of the CLTPA

138 The Prosecution submitted that the legislative purpose of section 34 CLTPA could be achieved only with the Plain Interpretation, bearing in mind the existence of the other offences of “habitually associating”^{[note: 164]} and “being in the company of”^{[note: 165]}.

139 Comparing section 34 of the CLTPA with the general legislative purpose behind the CLTPA, the Prosecution submitted that it was apparent that section 34 played an instrumental role within the broader legislative purpose of the CLTPA. Section 34 ensured that police supervisees stayed on the straight and narrow, thereby weakening criminal organisations. The logic was intuitive: by preventing police supervisees from meeting each other, supervisees were not only less likely to fall into bad company and commit crimes, but they were also more likely to spend their time in a constructive manner. In turn, criminal organisations were deprived of the people needed to carry out its misdeeds.

140 The Plain Interpretation furthered the legislative purpose by providing an effectual means of preventing organised crime, by punishing those who might attempt to reconnect with their criminal past and thereby deterring others from doing the same.

141 Conversely, adopting a different interpretation would lead to undesirable consequences that detract from the legislative purpose of the CLTPA. As illustrated on the facts of this case, the biggest difficulty in the prosecution of such offences was that of detection. It bore emphasising that the discovery of the supervisees’ meeting at the coffeeshop was an entirely fortuitous one. If police supervisees could not be prosecuted unless they had met on multiple occasions or had met in furtherance of an illegal purpose, section 34 would become a toothless tiger. Not only would it undermine the rehabilitative purpose of section 34, it would stymie Parliament’s efforts at addressing criminal organisations.

B. The subsequent repeal of section 34 of the CLTPA supported the Plain Interpretation

142 The Prosecution had noted that the CLTPA was amended on 1 January 2019 by way of the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) (Amendment) Act 2018 (No. 12 of 2018) (“Amendment Act 2018”)^{[note: 166]}. As part of the amendments, section 34 of the CLTPA was repealed. However, not only did the subsequent amendments not detract from the Plain Interpretation, the amendments also supported the Plain Interpretation by confirming Parliament’s intent behind the statute.

143 The effect of the Amendment Act 2018 was to repeal the restrictions previously set out in sections 33, 34 and 36 of the CLTPA and to re-enact those restrictions in subsidiary legislation^{[note: 167]}. The reason for these amendments was stated during the Second Reading of Bill No. 5 of 2018 by Minister of Home Affairs, Mr K Shanmugam^{[note: 168]}:

“By clause 4, we are seeking to make amendments relating to these persons who could be subject to PSOs. We want to remove them from the main Act and set them out in rules under section 49. Why? Because these conditions need to be tailored to meet the needs of the specific individual. For example, how do you rehabilitate them? To what extent is counselling necessary? It is very difficult to have these in the main legislation. So, we put them in the conditions, to tailor it according to the needs of the individual persons.

Section 33(1) and (2), which are repealed and re-enacted by clause 4, enables the Minister to impose different prescribed condition on each supervisee based on the different risks and needs of each supervisee.

Clause 4 also states that a person subject to supervision – conditions are imposed on him but he cannot comply with them because he is in prison or he is under a court order – then, obviously, he must be excused from having to comply with the conditions.

Clause 5 repeals section 36 of the Act. Section 36 will no longer be required. These restrictions will be set out under the rules to be made under section 49.”

[emphasis in bold]

144 The Prosecution submitted that implicit from the Minister’s speech was that clause 4 was not intended to abolish sections 33 and/or 34 CLTPA per se, but to “remove them from the main Act and set them out in the rules under section 49”. Following the amendments, the restrictions under sections 33 and 34 had been placed under the Criminal Law (Obligations on Person Subject to Supervision) Rules 2018 (s 803/2018) [TAB T] (“the Rules”); in particular, Rules 3(f) and 3(g)(ii), which stated:

“Obligations on person subject to supervision

3. For the purposes of section 33(1) and (2) of the Act, the obligations that the Minister may, by order in writing, direct a person subject to supervision to comply with are the following:

(f) the person must not communicate using any method with any other person whom the person knows, or has reason to suspect, is a person subject to supervision, unless the person has obtained permission from the Director or an authorised person;

…

(g) the person must not, without reasonable excuse –

...

(ii) be in the company of any other person subject to supervision, unless the person has obtained permission from the Director or an authorised person.”

[emphasis in bold]

145 The Prosecution submitted that what was apparent from the Rules was that “consorting” and “habitually associating” was omitted. It was particularly noteworthy that Parliament retained the wording of the offence with the lowest degree of intentionality, that of “being in the company of”, in Rule 3(g)(ii). In addition, Parliament had broadened the scope of the restrictions by criminalising all forms of communication using any methods between police supervisees through Rule 3(f).

146 The Prosecution submitted that the present wording of the Rules served as a clarified expression of Parliament’s intent behind section 30, 34 and 36 CLTPA. In promulgating the amendments, Parliament only intended to confer flexibility in the conditions that could be imposed on a police supervisee, and not to relax the restrictions against consorting. Accordingly, Parliament had intended for “consorting” to be interpreted in a manner that would achieve the same legislative purpose as the Rules. This could only be achieved through the Plain Interpretation.

C. The Australian position supported the Plain Interpretation

147 The Prosecution had pointed out that a similar “consorting” offence exists under Australian criminal law with a similar legislative background. While it was not necessary for the court to rely on Australian law to find in favour of the Plain Interpretation, the Australian legislation and case law would provide additional confluence.

1. The statutory definition of consorting in Australia referred to one-off incidents

148 The relevant statute was set out in sections 93W and 93X of the New South Wales Crimes Act 1900 (No. 40) (“NSW Crimes Act”):

93W Definitions

(1) In this Division – Consort means to consort in person or by any other means, including by electronic or other form of communication.

Convicted offender means a person who has been convicted of an indictable offence (disregarding any offence under section 93X).

(2) For the purpose of this Division, an indictable offence includes an offence committed in another jurisdiction that would be an indictable offence if committed in this jurisdiction.

93X Consorting

(1) A person (other than a person under the age of 14 years) who –

(a) habitually consorts with convicted offenders, and

(b) consorts with those convicted offenders after having been given an official warning in relation to each of those convicted offenders,

Is guilty of an offence.

Maximum penalty—Imprisonment for 3 years, or a fine of 150 penalty units, or both.

(2) A person does not habitually consort with convicted offenders unless—

(a) the person consorts with at least 2 convicted offenders (whether on the same or separate occasions), and

(b) the person consorts with each convicted offender on at least 2 occasions.

(3) An official warning is a warning given by a police officer (orally or in writing) to the effect that –

(a) a certain person is a convicted offender, and

(b) habitually consorting with convicted offenders is an offence.

(4) An official warning ceases to have effect for the purposes of subsection (1)—

(a) if the warning is given to a person under the age of 18 years—6 months after the warning is given, or

(b) in any other case—2 years after the warning is given.

149 Section 93X(2) stated plainly that a person would only be considered to habitually consort where he consorted with at least two convicted offenders and did so on at least two occasions. The obvious flipside was that consort must mean less than that, i.e. one occasion^{[note: 169]}.

2. The legislative purpose behind the consorting offence in Australia

150 The general legislative purpose behind section 93X of the NSW Crimes Act was to combat organised crime. This explained the broad similarities between the Australian statute in the above section and the CLTPA. Under section 93X of the NSW Crimes Act, it was an offence for a person to habitually consort with a “convicted offender”, which was someone convicted of an indictable offence. While in Singapore, under section 34 CLTPA, it was an offence for a police supervisee to consort with another police supervisee.

151 Section 93X of the NSW Crimes Act was introduced by way of the Crimes Amendment (Consorting and Organised Crime) Bill 2012 (“Consorting Bill 2012”). During the second reading of the Consorting Bill 2012, Parliamentary Secretary David Clarke explained the purpose as such^{[note: 170]}:

“The Government is pleased to introduce the Crimes Amendment (Consorting and Organised Crime) Bill 2012. The Bill proposes to make a number of amendments to the Crimes Act 1900 to ensure that the provisions of the Act remain effective at combating criminal groups in NSW.

The Government is determined to ensure that the NSW Police Force has adequate tools to deal with organised crime, and this bill represents part of a suite of reforms aimed at achieving that. The bill introduces a new aggravated form of drive-by shooting, introduces new offences relating to criminal groups, and modernises the offences of consorting, as well as extending and clarifying its application.”

[emphasis in bold]

152 The problems presented by organised criminal groups in Australia were similar to those in Singapore. As stated by a Minister during the Second Reading of the Consorting Bill 2012^{[note: 171]}:

“I will briefly outline the problem presented by organised criminals. They do not think that the law applies to them. For instance, bikies call themselves one-percenters—the minority who will not confirm. They insist on resolving their own disputes and often do so violently. This means that when they are victims of crime they will not talk to police—even if they have been seriously injured or their friends and family members have been murdered They intimidate witnesses to escape conviction for their crimes. They have well-established hierarchies that allow those who plan and coordinate crimes to escape detection and conviction, while still profiting from criminal activity…”

[emphasis in bold]

153 Having set out the general purpose of the provisions, the Prosecution noted that the specific purpose of section 93X of the NSW Crimes Act was to prevent crime, similar to section 34 of the CLTPA. As stated during the second reading of the Consorting Bill 2012^{[note: 172]}:

“…because organised criminals draw their strength from their associations, the bill modernises consorting laws. This will make it easier for police to prevent criminals from getting together to plan and carry out crimes.”

[emphasis in bold]

154 The Prosecution submitted that given these similarities in both the statutes and legislative intent behind the statutes, the Australian interpretation of “consorting” should be considered persuasive.

3. The interpretation of “consort” by Australian Courts was similar to the Plain Interpretation

(a) Consorting did not require an improper, illegal or criminal motive

155 In Johanson v Dixon [1979] HCA 23; (1979) 143 CLR 376 (“Johanson”), the Australian High Court addressed the issue of whether the offence of “consorting” would be made out even if the “consorting” was innocent.

156 In that case, the applicant was convicted after trial for two counts of habitually consorting with reputed thieves under section 6(1)(c) of the Vagrancy Act 1966 (Vic)^{[note: 173]}. The applicant subsequently appealed against his conviction in the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria but failed. He thus sought special leave to appeal to the High Court on the basis that the interpretation of section 6(1)(c) of the Vagrancy Act was of special importance^{[note: 174]}.

157 The court of three judges unanimously rejected his application for leave. Addressing the interpretation of section 6(1)(c) of the Vagrancy Act, Mason J stated^{[note: 175]}:

“9. The history of the legislative provisions does not, I think, furnish any particular reason for construing s. 6 (1) (c) of the Vagrancy Act otherwise than according to its terms. In its context “consorts” means “associates” or “keeps company” and it denotes some seeking or acceptance of the association on the part of the defendant (Brown v. Bryan [1963] TASStRp 2; (1963) Tas SR 1, at p 2). Consequently, the offence is made out if it appears that the defendant habitually associates with persons falling within the three designated classes, “reputed thieves”, “known prostitutes” or “persons who have been convicted of having no visible lawful means of support”. It is not for the Crown to prove that the defendant has consorted for an unlawful or criminal purpose. The words creating the offence make no mention of purpose: cf. section 6 (1) (b) where the proviso refers to “upon some lawful occasion”. Nor does the word “consorts” necessarily imply that the association is one which has or needs to have a particular purpose. What is proscribed is habitual association with persons of the three classes, they being undesirable or discreditable persons. Mere association with those persons, which is not habitual, for a criminal or unlawful purpose is not proscribed. The presence of the word “habitually” tells strongly against the applicant’s argument...”

[emphasis in bold]

158 The justification for criminalising “innocent” consorting was explained subsequently by the Australian High Court in Tajjour v NSW [2014] HCA 35 (“Tajjour”)^{[note: 176]}:

“209 …That is because the proscription of consorting is intended to suppress social interactions which, though themselves innocent, may have a tendency to expand criminal networks.”

159 That being said, the Prosecution noted that the Australian position appeared to differ from the Plain interpretation where the nature of the meeting was concerned. While the Prosecution had submitted that the offence of consorting was made out as long as it involved an intentional one, Tajjour went further, holding that the offence required a relationship of “personal intimacy”^{[note: 177]}. In doing so, the court in Tajjour affirmed a line of authorities that have interpreted “consorting” to involve familiarity, attraction, enjoyment, companionship^{[note: 178]}.

160 The Prosecution submitted that this line of reasoning should not be adopted in the present case:

(a) First, the finding of “personal intimacy” turned on its own statutory context;

(b) Second, there were policy reasons undergirding the court’s finding of “personal intimacy” that were absent in Singapore’s context;

(c) Third, “personal intimacy” was ambiguous and Parliament did not intend for an unworkable statute.

161 On the first point, the Prosecution submitted that Tajjour’s interpretation of “habitually consorting” to involve “personal intimacy” turned on its own statutory context, which dealt with habitually consorting.

162 On the second point, there were policy reasons undergirding the court’s interpretation of “habitually consorting”. Under section 93X of the Crimes Act, any person above the age of 14 could be found guilty for consorting with a convicted offender. Given the potential for section 93X to entangle innocent persons, a more onerous requirement of personal intimacy could be rationalised as a way to prevent boundless liability.

163 In Singapore’s context, the only persons who could be found guilty for consorting are police supervisees – a small group of individuals assessed to be a potential threat to public safety, peace and good order^{[note: 179]}. Taken together with the preventive and deterrent policy behind section 34 of the CLTPA, a less onerous standard – that of an intentional meeting sans intimacy of any sort, was wholly justifiable.

164 Indeed, where the consorting offence pertained to an individual assessed to be of high risk, the approach was to impose liability purely based on association. Under Australian Law, there also existed the Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2012 No 9 (“CCOC”)^{[note: 180]}. That statute was even more analogous to the CLTPA than sections 93W – 93Y of the Crimes Act 1900. Under the CCOC, judges could make control orders in respect of individuals who were members of criminal organisations (“controlled members”) on the basis of affidavit evidence from the police and other relevant persons. Controlled members who associate with another controlled member were liable under section 26(1) of the CCOC^{[note: 181]}:

26 Association between members of declared organisations subject to interim control order or control order

(1) A controlled member of a declared organisation who associates with another controlled member of the declared organisation is guilty of an offence.

Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for two years.

165 Section 3(1) of the CCOC defined “associate with” to mean “to be in the company with” or “to communicate with by any means (including by post, facsimile, telephone, email or any other form of electronic communication)”^{[note: 182]}. This was a lower standard than proposed in the Plain Interpretation. “Consort” under the CCOC meant more than simply being “in the company of”.

166 Thirdly, “personal intimacy” was itself ambiguous. Therefore, this could not be a possible interpretation given that Parliament would not have intended for an unworkable statute. Furthermore, the adoption of “personal intimacy” as an element of a consorting offence would blunt the deterrent effect of section 34 of the CLTPA.

167 Therefore, the Prosecution submitted that this court should adopt the Plain Interpretation and decline to interpret “consort” as requiring anything more than an intentional meeting.

168 Even if this court interpreted “consort” to involve personal intimacy between police supervisees, the Prosecution submitted that such personal intimacy existed on the present facts. The accused persons knew one another while reporting at Clementi Police Divisional Headquarters and thus had actual knowledge that they were all supervisees. Despite knowing the severe consequences that might fall on them if seen together, the accused persons had agreed to go to a coffeeshop to have breakfast and discuss B1’s personal problems.

(b) A “chance” meeting would not suffice

169 In Tajjour, the Australian High Court had endorsed the Attorney-General’s speech in the legislative assembly, where he stated that consorting did not extend to chance meetings. The Australian High Court had stated:

“219 In the Agreement in Principle Speech in the Legislative Assembly in respect of the proposed section 93X, the Attorney-General for the State of New South Wales, referring to Johanson v Dixon, confirmed the purpose of the provision in terms which reflect the concern to suppress social interactions which may have a criminogenic tendency:

‘The High Court has found that consorting need not have a particular purpose, but denotes some seeking or acceptance of the association on the part of the defendant. It does not extend to chance or accidental meetings, and it is not the intention of the section to criminalise meetings where the defendant is not mixing in a criminal milieu or establishing, using or building up criminal networks.’”

[emphasis in bold]

170 Tajjour also had emphasised that consorting was to be regarded as an intentional social interaction involving more than mere physical presence, an aspect of which was the intentional seeking out of the company of the other person^{[note: 183]}.

171 In the present case, the meeting was clearly an intentional social interaction, that of having breakfast and discussing B1 Tan’s personal problems.

VII. Application of the law to the facts

A. B1 and B2 should be convicted of the charge

172 Based on an application of the Plain Interpretation, the prosecution submitted that B1 and B2 should be found guilty and convicted of the charge. The meeting was intentional, B1 and B2 were both police supervisees and they had actual knowledge that they were police supervisees.

173 The Prosecution also highlighted the following aggravating factors in the present case:

(a) The manner of offending was brazen. B1, B2 and PW4 had planned to have breakfast together while they were at the gate of Bedok Police Divisional Headquarters. Knowing full well that they were not allowed to meet each other, they audaciously agreed to break the law while still in the vicinity of the police station.

(b) There was an attempt to avoid detection, B1, B2 and PW4 had decided to leave the area because they wanted to avoid being caught while in the vicinity of the police station, and had in fact taken different routes to get to the overhead bridge leading to their eventual destination.

B. The mandatory minimum of one year’s imprisonment should be imposed in this case

174 Notwithstanding the aggravating factors and the fact that the accused persons claimed trial, the Prosecution had submitted for the mandatory minimum of one year’s imprisonment.

VIII. Conclusion

175 Section 34 of the CLTPA was intended as a prophylactic, targeting activities that laid outside the reach of the traditional criminal law, but nevertheless conduce criminal conduct. It served a key function in the larger scheme of the CLTPA by targeting specifically inchoate criminality, by imposing criminal liability before any acts of preparation or perpetration resulting in harmful consequences have occurred.

176 Against this legislative backdrop and the words of the statute, the Prosecution submitted that the Plain Interpretation was the only possible interpretation. This court should therefore find in favour of the Plain Interpretation and convict the accused persons accordingly.

Defence’s Case^{[note: 184]}

Introduction

177 The Defence submitted that the evidence submitted by the Prosecution did not support the Prosecution’s case as the evidence had given a satisfactory account as to how the 3 accused persons had come about to be sitting together at the coffee-shop.

178 Both defendants had strenuously denied they had 'consorted' in 'ambiguous' sense as the charge had averred against them and also against PW4. They did not dispute they were subject to a police supervision order at the material time under section 32 of the CLTPA which included the restrictions and penalties under section 34 of the said Act.

Case for the Prosecution

179 The Defence submitted that the Prosecution's case against both defendants was that they were having breakfast together at a coffee-shop whilst under supervision orders, they were criminally liable under section 34(1) of the CLTPA for 'consorting' simpliciter.

180 The Defence took issue with this bare concept of 'consorting' as it ignored the important fact that all 3 of them were able to satisfactorily account for their presence there as provided under section 34(2)(3) of the said Act.

The evidence for the Prosecution

181 The Defence noted that in support of their case, the Prosecution had called a total of seven (7) witnesses including PW4 who had elected to plead to the charge of 'consorting' with both defendants.

PW1 Shawn Yeo Soon Kiang

182 The Defence submitted that PW1's evidence was the gateway to understanding the case against the defendants both factually and as well as what a police officer had understood to be 'congregating' or what 'consorting' was. PW1’s evidence was that both defendants as well as PW4 were police supervisees and they were subject to supervision orders and they were mandated to report once every week to the Head Investigation at Clementi Police Station where they resided.

183 During his examination-in-chief, PW1 had testified stated after their reporting, he had "discovered the three of them sitting in the coffee-shop having their breakfast and subsequently I referred them back to the office for investigations". That was all that PW1 had discovered – the 3 of them having breakfast and nothing more. Thereafter, PW1 took a photograph (Exhibit P12) using his hand phone which showed '3 police supervises sitting together having their meal".

184 At first, PW1 had stated that by the time he had discovered or came across them, 'the three of them congregating together". At first, it was PW1’s testimony that they had congregated. However, he changed tack in the same breath and instead said that they were "consorting at Block 449".PW1’s testimony showed signs of wavering. It only raised questions as how PW1 interpreted and understood or whether if he knew the meaning between ‘congregating’ as opposed to what was 'consorting'. This distinction was important here as it begged the question if the 3 of them were congregating for a meal at the coffee-shop or they were consorting just by being 'sitting together' for a meal at a food stall.Therefore, the distinction between congregating and consorting was important in this inquiry before the Court.

185 On the one hand, PW1 appeared to take the position that 3 of them at the coffee-shop constituted congregating while on the other hand, being seated together constituted consorting. Given this, one would wonder what would be PW1's stand if he had 'discovered' the 3 of them, instead of being seated, was standing in each other's company in an MRT travelling off after their reporting at the police station or for that matter he had seen them relieving themselves standing side by side in the respective urinals in the same public toilet. Given factual matrix before us, PW1 was criminalizing an innocuous one-off occasion of the 3 of them having a meal at coffee-shop and reporting it as an offence despite hearing their explanation for congregating at the coffeeshop.

186 The irony surfaced during cross-examination where PW1 had agreed that on 12 July 2018, he knew that all 3 of them were there at the coffee-shop to have breakfast. He further agreed that there was nothing unlawful about them having breakfast there. When asked hypothetically, if instead all 3 of them were at a funeral procession shouting slogans even though they were not together, whether that would constitute an offence, PW1 had replied that that would be an offence.

187 The Defence also submitted that all 3 of them had gone to the coffeeshop to buy food and drinks. They did not go there to fight or steal, but they were just having their meals in order to satiate their hunger. Their priority was first to report at 8 am to the police station and have breakfast and go about their way to work and abide by the curfew hours. The Defence submitted that that was in a nutshell what was before the Court.

188 The Defence also submitted PW1 was not telling the truth in his EIC. PW1 had testified in Exhibit P6 that the 3 of them were seated together. This was totally untrue because in his testimony in court, PW4 was actually not seated but ordered by PW1 to sit with the defendants. Therefore, it was clear that PW1 never 'saw them seated together'.

189 During cross examination, PW1 had testified that PW4 was standing and not seated.So, it was obvious that PW1 had created an offence by converting 'congregating' and defining it as 'consorting' by ordering PW1 to sit with the defendants at the same table. PW1 had 'entrapped' PW4 by making PW4 sit together with the defendants and that was totally unacceptable. This important fact of him having ordered PW4 to sit was not reflected anywhere nor was it stated in PW4's SOF in Exhibit P10).

190 The Defence submitted that we had heard for the first time in Court that PW1 was not seated with the defendants when PW1 came across them at the coffeeshop. The Defence submitted that PW1 had lied in his police report Exhibit P6 where he had stated that the 3 police supervisees were found sitting together.

191 The Defence also submitted that PW1, by ordering PW4 to sit with the defendants, had acted as judge and jury by finding them guilty of "consorting" by applying his rule of law here. PW1 was creative as he realized that the cat was out of the bag. He had tried to wriggle his way out by claiming he was justified in ordering PW4 to sit with the defendants as he did "not want them to create a scene and alarm the public'.The Defence submitted that his claim was lame and inexcusable here. There could not be 2 sets of laws, one for PW1 and another for the defendants.

192 The Defence also submitted that Exhibit P12 was staged. This was clear from the fact that the other people in Exhibit P12 were eating normally when the 3 of them were not eating. PW1 had tried to explain that the 3 of them were not eating because they had lost their mood. The Defence submitted that it was not possible for all 3 to lose their mood to eat as PW1 had testified that they had told him that they were hungry. The Defence was of the view that it was not possible for all 3 of them to have their hunger collectively dissipated into thin air and they then posed rigidly as if they were frozen after they saw PW1. The Defence therefore submitted that PW1 had made the 3 of them pose for exhibit P12.

193 The Defence submitted that PW1 was 'fitting' PW4 into the equation as he had pre-determined all their guilt. PW1 had forced PW4 to sit with the defendants to make up the 'consorting' offence.

194 Turning to PW1's testimony as to why he had ordered PW4 to sit with the defendants, PW1 had said that he did “not want them to create a scene and alarm the member of the public". With respect, the Defence submitted that his evidence was a whitewash and nonsensical to start with. There were no indications whatsoever that any one of them were behaving in a rowdy manner, or that they were drunk or high on drugs or shouting and exhibiting a propensity for violence and being a cause for alarm to the public at large. Neither was a scenario where they were attending a funeral procession where gang members were paying their respects to their deceased head man or fellow gangster and shouting "Huat Ah" and other gangster slogans where it could be said that there was some propensity for violence and they could “create a scene and alarm the member of public".

195 During cross-examination, PW1 had claimed that PW4 was going to sit at the table where PW1 was at. However, what had actually happened was that PW1 had dictated where PW4 was made to sit and it was not a situation where PW4 was already seated when he confronted the 3 of them. The facts cannot be masked here by us accepting PW1's suppositions and assumptions. PW1 realized that his bluff was called into question.

196 The Defence submitted that PW1's explanation was to cover up of his act of forcing PW1 to sit which he ought not to have done in the first place. PW1 was further trying to cast all three of them in bad light when there was no evidence led that they were taken to task for unruly behaviour or breaching the peace.

197 Further, the Defence also noted that PW1 was unable to recall which came first, whether all 3 of them had stood to explain that they wanted to eat as they were hungry before or after he took the photograph using his handphone.

198 The Defence noted that when it was put to PW1 that he had made them pose for the photograph, PW1 had denied doing it, The Defence submitted that PW1’s denial flew in the face of his evidence where he ordered PW4 to sit down where the defendants were seated and he took a picture of them. The Defence submitted PW1 did that because he 'needed' a picture where he can show his boss that 3 of were sitting together and consorting when the truth was far from it.

199 In the present case, why did PW1 not take a videos or other photographs, when he first spotted the 3 of them at the vicinity of the coffee-shop? PW1 was not carrying some old polaroid conventional camera whose film roll had just had only one more film capacity to take a last picture. Was PW 1 being truthful? The Defence was of the view that PW1 had 'entrapped' PW4 by making him sit with the defendants and he had created 'consorting' offence.

200 The Defence also noted another critical piece of evidence that preceded the taking of Exhibit P12. PW1 had testified in EIC that he first spotted 3 of them 'forming together' along the overhead bridge leading towards the Clementi MRT. The 3 of them were walking together and talking with each other.

201 The Defence submitted that the 3 of them were no strangers to PW1 as he was their reporting officer. If PW1 had seen them, there was nothing to stop him from whipping out his hand phone and recording a video or taking a photo of what he had seen. The 3 of them were very visible given their attire. They were dressed in formal black pants and white long-sleeved shirts. PW1’s hand phone was in good working condition with good picture resolution as evident from Exhibit P12.

202 The Defence also submitted that PW1's evidence during cross-examination defied logic. When the obvious was put to him, PW1 conceded he had no problems taking pictures or capturing a video on his hand phone. But when PW1 was asked why he did not do that to corroborate his claim that they were 'consorting' at the overhead bridge, PW1 came up with answers that was not only baffling but nonsensical.

203 PW1 had side-stepped the query by coming up with excuses. PW1 had said that the human at the overhead bridge was very heavy. The Defence submitted that given that the human traffic was heavy, and pedestrians were walking in both directions, it was not possible for the 3 of them to have walked together as if they were strolling in an open empty field.

204 When probed further during cross-examination, PW1 had testified that the 3 of them had walked together on the overhead bridge for some 2 to 3 minutes but he was unable to take pictures or video record them. The Defence submitted that given the current handphone technology, PW1 could easily have taken at least 20 to 30 photographs of them during the 2 to 3 minute period.

205 The Defence submitted that the fact that PW1 did not take any photographs must mean only one thing, the 3 of them had never walked together as what PW1 had alleged. If PW1 had noticed the 3 of them committing an offence at the overhead bridge, he would have no qualms to move in and stop them and to detain them accordingly.

206 In view of the above, the Defence submitted that PW1 had made up the story that the 3 of them were 'consorting' at the overhead bridge to boost his credibility. However, the Defence was of the view that his story of what had happened at the overhead bridge had too many gaps and had dented his story.

207 The Defence submitted that PW1 was not some super sleuth hiding behind a wall or darting behind some bushes and secretly following the 3 of them. He was simply walking behind them. There are obvious facts which did not support PW1’s story:

(a) PW1 did not mention in his police report that he had first spotted the 3 of them 'consorting' al the overhead bridge. This salient fact was not superfluous as that was an essential element of a crime. That fact was an important ingredient of the consorting offence under section 34 (l).

(b) PW1 had claimed that he had tried to trail them but he had lost them. How could this be when PW1 did not any video or photographs of them at the overhead bridge when they were in his line of sight.

(c) There was also no mention of any consorting between the 3 of them at overhead bridge.

(d) There was also no mention of the 3 of them consorting at the overhead bridge,

(e) In Exhibits P17 and P18, the recorders of both the statements had also not queried both B1 and B2 about the 3 of them consorting at the overhead bridge.

208 The Defence submitted that there were other gaps in PW1's evidence during cross-examination. PW1 had also failed to procure the CCTV footage/s from the said coffee-shop on that day in question.PW1's answer that he did not observe there were CCTV cameras there at the coffee-shop was totally uncharacteristic of an experienced officerholding the rank of a Senior Staff Sergeant and who had been with the CID/Secret Society Branch since 2001.

209 The CCTV footage was an important piece of evidence against the 3 persons for 'consorting'. The fact that there was no CCTV footage could only point to 2 things: one was that his reticence to look and procure CCTV footage had casted a serious doubt on the Prosecution's case. The second was that PW1 had deflected that issue to another team. However, PW1 had forgotten that he had hailed from the same team and SI Poo was his boss. Why did PW1 not brief any of his fellow colleague investigators who had recorded the statements from the defendants about the CCTV or did he just assume that they should know what to do? The Defence was of the view that PW1’s story just did not gel.

210 The Defence submitted that PW1's credibility was suspect as no evidence had surfaced as to whether his team had carried or verified if there was any CCTVs installed at the said coffeeshop. The Defence submitted that the real reason why PW1 had not obtained the CCTV footage was because any footage from the CCTV cameras would have contradicted his story.

211 The Defence also submitted that it was disturbing to note that whilst PW1 had conceded that he was duty bound to keep a record of what transpired concerning important events, PW1 had failed to keep any notes of what had happened in this case. The Defence submitted that this was not acceptable conduct as PW1 could then rely on his flawed and/or distorted police report to substitute this requirement in law.

212 The Defence also submitted that PW1 was being elusive when he claimed that the police report was a form of a brief report. The Defence also noted that PW1 had left out the incident of ‘consorting' at the bridge from his police report. There was nothing to prevent PW1 from reporting that incident in his police report.

213 By PW1’s definition of consorting, the 3 of them had committed the first offence at the bridge. PW1 had also seen them committing the offence with his own eyes. So why was this offence not mentioned in the police report and there was no charge preferred against the 3 of them for the same?

214 At the end of the day, the Defence was of the view that PW1's evidence, upon which Prosecution's case was relying on, was far from satisfactory and was insufficient to prove the charge against B1 and B2.

PW2 - Mark Lee Seow Chye & PW3 - Nor Aizat

215 The Defence noted that PW2 and PW3 were the recorders of the long statements from B1 and B2. PW2 had recorded the long statement from B1 and PW3 had recorded B2’s long statement.

216 Although PW2 had denied that PW1 had entered the interview room and had argued with B1 when he was recording B1’s statement, the Defence noted that Exhibit P17 had only 5 paragraphs and yet the recording took I hour and 40 minutes. The Defence submitted that it did not make any sense that a 5-paragraph statement would require 1 hours and 40 minutes of recording time. The Defence also noted that Exhibit P17 had only stated that B1 had some problems and he needed to extend his curfew time and the others were concerned who wanted to help him out. They then adjourned to the said coffee shop to have their breakfast thereafter. PW2 had also that it was PW9 who had briefed him before he recorded B1’s statement.

217 The Defence also noted that PW2 had used the word “consort” in paragraph 5 of Exhibit P17. The Defence also questioned if B1 had understood what “consort” meant.

218 The Defence also noted that PW2 was never told anything about them “consorting” at the overhead bridge as what PW1 had claimed in Court. The Defence submitted that that was unusual and very suspicious as it was at total variance with PW1's evidence. It undermined PW1's evidence materially and contradicted him. As such, there was internal inconsistency in the Prosecution's evidence.

219 The Defence submitted that the word “consorting” was not appropriate in the present case as all of them had given their explanation as to what they were for at the coffee-shop. PW2 should have known about section 34(2)(3) which would have rendered the word “consort” otiose. As such, the Defence was of the view that PW2 was not acting objectively in the circumstances.

220 As for PW3, PW3 had also testified that he was told by PW9 that PW1 had found 3 supervisees having a meal together. The Defence was of the view that this casted doubt on PW1's testimony as there was no disclosure of the 3 of them being together at the overhead bridge prior to the coffeeshop incident.

221 The Defence submitted that it was strange that PW1's position was that the incident at the overhead bridge did not fall within the definition of 'consorting' but having breakfast together at the coffee shop was an offence when PW1 was not even aware if the 3 of them had spoken at the coffeeshop.

222 The Defence also noted that B2’s long statement had contained 8 paragraphs and it had taken PW3 half an hour to record B2’s statement as compared to B1’s statement which took 1 hour 40 minutes. The Defence submitted that this would suggest that there was actually an argument between PW1 and B1 during the recording of B1’s statement and that was why B1’s statement took 1 hour and 40 minutes. The Defence also noted that PW3 had also testified to seeing PW1 in the building on the day he recorded B2’s statement.

223 The Defence also noted that there were quite a lot of details that PW3 was not privy to, such as the names of the other co-accused persons as their particulars were not furnished to him and neither did he know about the overhead bridge. As an investigating officer, PW3 was also candid in that if it were him, he would have gone to the scene or looked for CCTV cameras to secure evidence. But PW3 had chosen not to do so in the present case as he had assumed that other members of his team, i.e. PW9 would have done so. But in this case, no one had bothered to do it.

224 The Defence also noted that PW3’s evidence had also touched on the fact that there should be records of the incident. The Defence submitted that this meant that it was incumbent upon PW1 to have recorded in either the electronic field book if it had been implemented by then or his field book. The Defence noted that PW1 did not produce any such records to support his assertions. The Defence also noted that PW3 had agreed that as a police officer, he was required to write down details of what happened in his pocket book or in the electronic file book if it had been implemented.

225 The Defence also submitted that PW3 had not read B2’s statement back to B2 after he had recorded B2’s statement because if PW3 had done so, he would have spotted the error in the date which was repeated 3 times at paragraphs 3, 5 and 6 of Exhibit P18. The correct date should be July 2018 and not March 2018.

226 Nonetheless, the Defence submitted that Exhibit P18 had corroborated PW4’s testimony in court that they were sympathetic to B1 as his father was sick and their having breakfast was nothing sinister or illegal nor was it an unlawful activity.

Issues before the Court

227 The Defence submitted that the word 'consorting' was something which must be looked at in its proper perspective under the CLTPA, and no further unless there was ambiguity whereby other interpretations could assist the Court in its findings.

228 The Defence also repeated their earlier submissions which was tendered at the Close of Prosecution Case^{[note: 185]}. Both B1 and B2 were charged under section 34(1) p/u Section 34(2) of the CLTPA. Section 34 was repealed on 1 January 2019, and the words “consort” or “habitually associate” have been removed from the said Act.

229 The Defence submitted ordinary meaning of consort was something which must be understood in a common-sense manner. The Defence conceded that the previous provisions in the CLTPA which were repealed were aimed at preventing supervisees from engaging in activities which they were detained in the first place without trial in the interests of public safety and order.

230 Looking at the defunct section 34, section 34(2) stipulated that police supervisees who had breached the restrictions in section 34(1) would be punished under section 34(2). Section 34(1) had provided that:

“he consorts or habitually associates, without the permission of the police officer-in -charge of the police district in which he resides. with any other person similarly subject to Police Supervision (section 34 Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions Act)”

231 The Defence submitted that the above phraseology had referred to a habitual act, therefore the word "consorts" and "habitually associates" were not mutually exclusive but they must be read together to understand the legislative intent. The Defence submitted that the word “consort” in its ordinary meaning did not imply a one-off situation such as here having a meal together in a food shop in public but it was geared towards more of such persons meeting often or habitually associating with each other.

232 The Defence however did concede that there could be instances where even though it was a one-off incident, but the evidence showed that the offenders were found to be involved in nothing innocuous such as having a meal but rather engaged in plans to take part in illegal activities such as preparing for 'table talk' settlement meetings, or to arm themselves and/or have discussions planning for a gang fight and the likes, then justifiably they could be punished under this section.

233 In the present case, even if we were to take the evidence adduced by the Prosecution at the close of its case at its highest, the Defence submitted that the evidence did not show that the accused persons were engaged in any illegal or unlawful activity or embarking on such a course for that matter on 12 July 2018.

234 The Defence submitted that the crux of this case lied with section 34(2)(3). Section 34(2)(3) had been ignored and cast aside in its entirety. Why was it ignored when the statute in clear and unambiguous language accorded an accused person the right to give an account in their defence when confronted by an accusation of consorting to a charge under section 34(2) (l) of the said Act. In the present case, it was clearly stated in section 34(2)(3) that:

“he is found at any time in the company of two or more persons also subject to Police Supervision and is unable to satisfactorily account for being in such company (section 36(b) Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act)”

235 Is there a need to look further to other cannons of interpretation here? The Defence’s position was “no” as going by the statute in Sec 34(2) (3), both B1 and B2 had given a satisfactory account of themselves which was supported by the Prosecution's own witness, PW4, as well as Exhibits P7, P8, P17 and P18.

236 The Defence submitted that the Prosecution's own evidence also did not support the charge against both B1 and B2 given the provisions in Sec 34(2)(3) of the CLTPA. The Defence was of the view that the law had mandated the opportunity to B1 and B2 to give an account of themselves to the consorting accusation.

237 The Defence had also tendered a number of decisions which had dealt with the definition of “consorting” which could offer some insight as to how the law was applied to the facts in the case of consorting.

(a) In Soo Sing & Ors v PP [1951] MLJ 143.The Defence submitted that the issue of consorting was dealt with in an aver clear manner akin to the present case. The Court of Appeal had held what was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove in an offence of consorting. The Prosecution would need to prove that the association must be “something more than a casual meeting or conversation. On the other hand, in the absence of a satisfactory explanation by the accused, such evidence would entitle the Court to convict…”. The Defence submitted that there could not be a clearer elucidation of how the law should be applied to the facts. This was very similar to the present case where B1 and B2 had faced the section 34(1) charge and section 34(2)(3) had come into play and both B1 and B2 were able to give a satisfactory account of themselves.

(b) In Tan Choon Huat v PP [1991] 1 SLR(R) 863; [1991] 65, this was a case where the accused was charged for consorting when he was found in the company of persons who had offensive weapons on them. The Accused was charged with an offence under s. 8(1) of the Corrosive and Explosive Substances and Offensive Weapon Act (Cap 65, 1985 Rev Ed). The High Court had held at [6]:

"Section 8(1) does not, in any way, limit the right of the accused person to cast a reasonable doubt on any of the ingredients of the offence. The accused is entitled, apart from the statutory defence available to him, to negative the Prosecution's case if he could, by placing some evidence acceptable to the Court for it to conclude that he did not know or could have suspected that his companions were in possession of offensive weapon ".

The Defence pointed out that what was interesting about the facts of Tan Choon Huat was that 3 persons including the appellant were spotted by the police in the middle of the night at an isolated place, at a corner of the National Stadium acting suspiciously. On being checked, 2 of them were found with weapons. The association was not some 'innocuous' one-off meeting and it bordered evidently on criminality. The 3 of them were arrested and charged accordingly for consorting. The appellant had given a positive statement but he had challenged the admissibility of his confession at the High Court on grounds it was made involuntary. It meant that he was charged for confessing the crime of confessing that satisfied the ingredients of the offence under section 34(2)(1) where obviously section 34(2)(3) could not afford him any defence to the charge.

But, in the present case, the Defence submitted that there was no evidence submitted by the Prosecution which contained any confession from any of the accused persons. The only evidence that was presented was that the accused persons were at the coffeeshop. And, given that all of them gave a satisfactory account of their association, they could not be guilty of an offence of consorting under Sec 34(2) (l) of the CLTPA.

(c) In the case of PP v Suhaizad Bin Fadilalaili [2020] SGDC 255, the appellant who was subject to police supervision had pleaded guilty 5 criminal charges and consented to another 7 charges being taken into consideration for sentencing purposes. With regard to the first consorting charge on 20 September 2018, the appellant was in the company of another police supervisee in a car. He had a considerable amount of drugs on him, namely 5 packets of methamphetamine weighing 8.96 grams. In addition, the appellant was also in possession of drug utensils and his urine was found to contain controlled drugs. The appellant had also breached his provisional driving license as he had driven the car without a qualified instructor with him. Further, the appellant had driven the car without the owner's consent and he did not have any 3^rd party insurance coverage.

The Defence submitted that the facts in Suhaizad Bin Fadilalaili spoke for themselves. The appellant was unable to any satisfactory account of himself as far as the consorting offence was concerned. He was carrying drugs and drug utensils, breaking traffic rules blatantly. The Defence submitted that Suhaizad Bin Fadilalaili bore all the hallmarks of an unlawful illegal association which were unlike the present case. In that sense, Suhaizad Bin Fadilalaili could be distinguished from the present case. In any event, Suhaizad Bin Fadilalaili was not binding on this Court and it offered no help at all in the inquiry of 'consorting' in the present case.

Summation

238 The Defence submitted that the Prosecution had failed to establish a case against both the accused persons for “consorting” from the moment they were arrested. The Defence was also of the view that PW4 had been let down by the criminal justice system.

239 The Defence was of the view that despite the proviso in section 34 (2) (3) of the CLTPA being blatantly brushed aside and not considered at all, and through no fault of his own given the untrammelled prosecutorial discretion vested in the authorities, PW4's conviction was flawed given his satisfactory explanation under Sec 34(2)(3).

240 The Defence was of the view that in order for a person to be convicted for “consorting” under section 34 of the CLTPA, the consorting or association must be clothed with criminal character. In the present case, the gathering by the 3 persons was no unlawful because they were there to discuss B1’s request on how to apply for extension of his curfew so that he could work overtime to earn more money for his father’s medical expenses.

241 In view of the above, the Defence submitted that this Court should acquit both the accused persons of their charges. The accused persons had elected not to give evidence for the simple reason that the evidence adduced by the Prosecution did not justify a conviction under Sec 34(2)(1) with Sec 34(2)(3) staring at it.

My findings and decision

The law and elements of the charge

242 In order for the Prosecution to secure a conviction under section 34(1) of the CLTPA, the Prosecution would need to prove the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

(a) That B1, B2 and PW4 were persons subject to Police Supervision Orders under section 32 of the CLTPA;

(b) That they were found consorting with each other at about 9.50 am on 12 July 2018; and

(c) That they did consort with each other without the permission of the Commander of Clementi Police Division in which they resided.

243 I also noted that there was a defence available to anyone who had been charged for consorting under section 34(1) of the CLTPA, and the defence was if that person could prove that (1) he did not know that the person whom he was with was under a police supervision order or (2) he had no reason to suspect that the other person was a person subject to supervision under the Act.

Undisputed facts

244 The undisputed facts in the present case were as follows:

(a) At the material time, B1, B2 and PW4 were police supervisees under Police Supervision Orders made by the Minister of Home Affairs pursuant to section 32 of the CLTPA. B1 was subject to Police Supervision Order MHA (CL) 0031/2012 dated 5 December 2017, B2 was subject to Police Supervision Order MHA (CL) 004/2011 dated 1 March 2017 and PW4 was subject to Police Supervision Order MHA (CL) 0020/2010 dated 1 September 2016.

(b) On 12 July 2018, PW1 was the reporting officer at Clementi Police Division and his duty was to oversee the reporting of police supervisees at Clementi Police Division.

(c) B1, B2 and PW4 were at Clementi Police Division for their mandatory reporting at about 9 am on 12 July 2018. After the reporting, at around 9.30 am, PW1 had escorted the three of them out of Clementi Police Division.

(d) B1 had approached PW4 at the entrance of Clementi Police Division to asked him how to apply for an extension of the time curfew. B2 also joined them. B1 had explained that his father had been hospitalized after suffering a stroke and that he needed to work longer hours to pay for the hospital bills.

(e) PW4 had also testified that he could not explain to B1 in front of Clementi Police Division because police supervisees were not supposed to communicate or consort with one another as that would constitute a breach of their Police Supervision Order. So, they decided to go to a coffeeshop nearby to have breakfast and to discuss B1’s problem. That was the shared intention of all 3 of them.

(f) The 3 of them then agreed to go to a coffeeshop to have breakfast and to discuss B1’s problem. The 3 of them then made their way to the coffeeshop at Blk 449 Clementi Avenue 3 Singapore.

(g) When they were buying their food and drinks, they were spotted by PW1 who took a photograph of them together before informing them that they were not allowed to meet up and instructing them to report to the Secrets Societies Branch of the CID at Police Cantonment Complex.

(h) All 3 of them were subsequently charged under section 34(1) of the CLTPA for consorting with each other.

(i) PW4 had pleaded guilty to his charge, DAC-913190-2019, and he was convicted on 23 October 2019 in Court 8 and sentenced to 1 year’s imprisonment with effect from 23 October 2019.

Disputed facts

245 During the cross-examination of the Prosecution witnesses, I noted that both the 2 accused persons had disputed the fact that they were together with PW4 at the Blk 449 coffeeshop when they were spotted by PW1.

246 PW1 had testified that he had seen B1, B2 and PW4 walking together and talking to each other along the overhead bridge leading to Clementi MRT. PW1 was able to recognise them as they were wearing the standard reporting attire for police supervisees. However, PW1 lost sight of them due to the heavy human traffic. PW1 also said that he later found the 3 of them together at the Blk 449 Clementi Avenue 3 coffeeshop. PW1 had seen B1 and B2 seated together and PW4 was moving in their direction with a plate of food. PW1 then confronted them and he told PW4 to sit down and he proceeded to take a photograph of them together. PW1 then told them to report to his office. On this issue, I also noted that PW4 had also corroborated PW1’s evidence that B1 and B2 were already seated at the table when PW4 returned to the table with his food.

247 During the cross-examination of PW1 by B2’s counsel, B2’s counsel had suggested to PW1 that what had actually happened at the Blk 449 Clementi Avenue 3 coffeeshop was that when PW1 arrived at the coffeeshop, PW4 was already seated with his food and B1 had just purchased his drink when he saw PW1. B2 had also purchased his drink and food from the Malay stall when he saw PW1. PW1 then called to B1 and B2 and had asked B1 and B2 to sit down with PW4 before he proceeded to take the photograph Exhibit P12 which he subsequently sent to office. It was clear to me that B2’s counsel was telling PW1 that the 3 accused persons were not together when PW1 spotted them and PW1 had ordered them to come together and he had “staged” the photograph that was taken. PW1 denied all these allegations.

248 B1’s counsel, during his cross-examination of PW1, had also put it to PW1 that B1, B2 and PW4 were only at the same table because PW1 had directed them to sit at the same table. B1’s counsel also suggested to PW1 that B1 and B2 were moving around the coffeeshop when PW1 directed them to PW4’s table and asked them to sit down at the table with PW4. PW1 had denied and disagreed with what B1’s counsel had suggested.

249 I also noted that after the Prosecution had closed their case and I had called for the accused persons to enter into their defence, both B1 and B2 had elected to remain silent and they had decided not to call on any other witnesses to give evidence on their behalf.

The accused persons’ decision to remain silent after their defence was called

250 While it was trite law that an accused could not be compelled to give evidence on his own behalf, it was also clear that the Court could draw appropriate inferences from his refusal to take the witness stand or his refusal to answer any question without good cause when determining whether he was guilty of the offences charged.

251 According to the editors of Practitioners’ Library: Evidence in Criminal Trials, LexisNexis, 2002, at [Page 415]:

“The appropriate inferences will depend on the circumstances of the case, and will be determined by common sense: Haw Tua Tau v PP [1908-1981] SLR 73. The Privy Council in Haw Tua Tau also acknowledged that by virtue of …the Criminal Procedure Code, the law in Singapore permits adverse comment to be made in relation to a failure to answer questions before trial or to give evidence at trial: see also Taw Cheng Kong v PP [1993] 1 SLR 512 for further observations on the statutory qualifications to the right of silence. Apart from adverse inference, the accused’s silence may also result in a failure to raise a reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case. In cases where a statutory presumption is operative, it may mean that the accused has failed to discharge his burden of rebutting the presumption on a balance of probabilities. The approach taken by the court is to assess the totality of the evidence adduced by the prosecution together with any inference that could be properly drawn from the accused’s silence to determine whether guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt.

Thus, if the evidence taken alone or in combination with other facts clearly calls for an explanation which the accused ought to be in a position to give, his silence may lead to an inference that he has no explanation to offer. The inference that may be drawn includes ultimate inference that the accused is guilty of the offence charged.”

252 In PP v Gan Lim Soon [1993] 3 SLR 261, Yong Pung How CJ had held that if an accused who was called upon to enter his defence chose not to give evidence or call witnesses, the judge would have to assess the credibility of the witnesses before deciding whether the case was proved beyond reasonable doubt. However, there was one qualification to that, “if apart from the disputed facts and the credibility of the witnesses, there is hard evidence, whether in the shape of documents or photographs or what are known as “silent facts”, which is itself sufficient to constitute a prima facie case on the charge, the accused cannot choose to remain silent when called upon. If he does remain silent, the unavoidable result is that the case would then have been effectively proved against him beyond reasonable doubt by default”^{[note: 186]}.

253 In the present case, given that both B1 and B2 had elected to remain silent after their defence was called. As there was a factual dispute, I was of the view that adverse inference could be drawn from the silence of both B1 and B2 and what PW1 had testified as the events at the Blk 449 Clementi Avenue 3 coffeeshop should be taken as the truth. As such, I was prepared to accept the Prosecution’s evidence that B1, B2 and PW4 had formed the intention to meet up to discuss B1’s problems and they had agreed to go to the Blk 449 Clementi Avenue 3 coffeeshop to have breakfast and to discuss B1’s problems. PW1’s evidence was also supported by PW4 and further corroborated by Exhibits P7, P8, P17 and P18. In fact, in Exhibits P17 and P18, both B1 and B2 had admitted that they were seated together with PW4 when PW1 approached them at the coffeeshop. As such, I was prepared to accept PW1’s evidence that he had found them together when he spotted them at the Blk 449 Clementi Avenue 3 coffeeshop. It was also clear from the evidence adduced that the 3 of them did not obtain the permission of the Commander of Clementi Police Division prior to their gathering at the Blk 449 Clementi Avenue 3 coffeeshop to discuss B1’s personal problems.

254 I also noted that in the Defence’s Joint Closing submission, the Defence had submitted that there was no evidence tendered by the Prosecution that the 3 of them were consorting with each other. The Defence had submitted that there was no evidence to show that the 3 of them were walking together and heading towards the coffeeshop. The Defence also contended the 3 of them were having breakfast at the coffeeshop and PW1 was the one who had forced them to sit together. I was of the view that there was prima facie case against both B1 and B2 at the close of the Prosecution’s case. I would repeat my earlier position that given their election to remain silent and their refusal to take to witness stand to give their evidence, adverse inference should be drawn against both B1 and B2 for remaining silent and I did not accept their position that they were not heading towards the coffeeshop to discuss B1’s problems. I also disagreed with the accused persons’ contention that they were at the Blk 449 Clementi Avenue 3 coffeeshop to have breakfast and they were not consorting with each other when PW1 spotted them. It was clear from the evidence that the main reason why the 3 of them had made their way to the Blk 449 coffeeshop was to discuss B1’s problem. Having breakfast there was secondary to their plans. They knew that they were not supposed to be seen talking to each other and they had made plans to go as far away from the police station so that they would not be caught when they discussed B1’s problems together. It was clear to me that if there was no need to discuss B1’s problems, the 3 of them would not have gone to the Blk 449 Clementi Avenue 3 coffeeshop together at the same time.

255 I would also wish to address the following points raised by the Defence in their Joint Closing Submission:

(a) On the issue of the 3 of them consorting at the overhead bridge on their way to the coffeeshop, it was trite law that the Prosecution has a discretion as to what they would want to proceed with a case against an accused and how they would want to frame their charges against the accused. In the present case, I was of the view that the issue of the 3 of them consorting at the overhead bridge was a non-issue because the charges which the 3 of them were facing was for consorting with each other at the Blk 449 Clementi Avenue 3 coffeeshop without the permission of the Commander of the Clementi Police Division and not consorting at the overhead bridge leading to the Clementi MRT.

(b) On the issue of the CCTV evidence from the coffeeshop and PW1’s failure to properly record evidence of the offence as well as his failure to properly maintain a proper diary, I would wish to state that the burden of proof was on the Prosecution to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt and the onus was on the Prosecution to tender sufficient evidence to satisfy its evidential burden. As for the type of evidence that parties could tender to court to prove their case, evidence could include documentary evidence, oral testimonies, sound and video recordings, electronic records, or real evidence. It was up to the discretion of the Prosecution as to the type and nature of evidence that they would want to tender to court to satisfy their evidential burden and to prove their case beyond a reasonable doubt. There was nothing in the rules which dictated that the Prosecution had to tender any particular type evidence or evidence of a certain nature. In the present case, even without any CCTV footages from the coffeeshop or any of the evidence which PW1 ought to have obtained, I was of the view that the evidence tendered by the Prosecution was sufficient to prove their case against B1 and B2 beyond a reasonable doubt.

(c) On the issue of whether there was an argument between PW1 and B1 during B1’s statement recording, in the light of both B1 and B2’s decision to remain silent and not to give evidence from the witness box after I had called for their defence and given PW1 and PW2’s testimonies that no such arguments took place between PW1 and B1, I was prepared to accept the version by PW1 and PW2 that no such event had taken place during the recording of B1’s statement.

(d) On the issue of B1 and B2 having satisfactorily accounted for their presence at the coffeeshop, I noted that Defence was referring to section 36 of the CLTPA where it was provided that any person who was subject to supervision under this Act who was found in the company of 2 or more persons who were subject to supervision under this Act who was unable to satisfactorily account for his presence would be guilty of an offence. However, I was of the view that section 36 was not relevant to the present charge which was brought under section 34 of the CLTPA. Moreover, section 36 was meant to cover situations whereby persons subject to supervision under the Act were found loitering in public places and that was a totally different situation from the present case.

(e) As regards to the Defence’s attempt to cast aspersions on PW1, I would agree with the Prosecution that PW1’s version of events was not only corroborated by PW4, they were also corroborated by both B1 and B2 in their statements recorded which were admitted as Exhibits P7, P8, P17 and P18.

256 Given the above, I was of the view that the Prosecution had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that B1, B2 and PW4 were persons who were subject to police supervision orders and they did form the intention to meet up to discuss B1’s problems and they had arranged to meet up at the Blk 449 Clementi Avenue 3 coffeeshop to have breakfast and to discuss B1’s problems without first obtaining the permission of the Commander of Clementi Police Division.

257 In the present case, it was also clear to me that both B1 and B2 knew that both of them as well as PW4 were police supervisees and the defences of not knowing or having no reason to believe that the other parties were not subject to police supervision orders were not available to both of them.

Definition of “consorting” under the CLTPA

258 One of the key ingredients of a charge under section 34(1) of the CLTPA was that B1, B2 and PW4 should not consort with one another. In the present case, it was not disputed that the 3 of them had met up at the Blk 449 Clementi Avenue 3 coffeeshop to have breakfast and to discuss B1’s personal problems. The issue here was whether the accused persons’ and PW4’s acts of having breakfast and discussing B1’s personal problems would tantamount to them “consorting” with each other under section 34(1) of the CLTPA.

259 The Prosecution’s position was that so long as the 3 of them had formed the intention to meet up and had met up, it did not matter what the purpose of the meeting was for, and that in itself was sufficient to satisfy the meaning of “consorting” under section 34(1) of the CLTPA. The Prosecution was also of the view that “consort” could include one-off meetings.

260 The Defence, on the other hand, had argued that in order for the court to find the 3 of them be “consorting” with each other under section 34(1) of the CLTPA, the purpose of the meeting or gathering must be for something improper, illegal or criminal in nature. The Defence was also of the view that the gathering by B1, B2 and PW4 at Blk 449 Clementi Avenue 3 coffeeshop was a one-off occasion. The Defence had submitted that, in the present case, the 3 of them had met up for breakfast at the Blk 449 Clementi Avenue 3 coffeeshop to discuss B1’s father’s health issue and how B1 could ask for more time from his reporting officer as he needed to work longer hours to pay for the father’s hospital bills. The Defence submitted that the purpose for their meeting was not improper, illegal or criminal in nature and it was a one-off occasion. As such, the 3 of them could not be said to be “consorting” under section 34(1) of the CLTPA.

261 I noted that there was no definition of “consort” in the CLTPA. Section 34(1) of the CLTPA merely stated that no one subject to supervision under the CLTPA should “consort” or “habitually associate” with any other person subject to supervision under the CLTPA. Section 34(1) did not specify the nature of the “consorting” as to whether it could be for a legitimate reason or whether it must be for a purpose that was improper, illegal or criminal in nature.

262 However, it was clear from section 34(1) that there was a defence available to an offender and the defence was if the offender could prove that “he did not know and had no reason to suspect that the other person was a person subject to supervision under the Act”. In the present case, it was clear to me that such a defence was not available to B1 and B2 because they clearly knew that all 3 of them were subject to police supervision orders.

The proper approach to statutory interpretation was the purposive approach

263 I agreed with the Prosecution that the proper way to interpret statutes was to use the purposive approach. Sundaresh Menon CJ had in Ting Choo Mong laid down a 3-step framework for the courts to adopt when undertaking a purposive interpretation of a legislative text and this 3-step framework was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Tan Cheng Bock at [37]:

“37 The correct approach to purposive interpretation under s 9A was summarised following close analysis in the judgment of the minority in AG v Ting Choon Meng [2017] 1 SLR 373 (“Ting Choon Meng”), a recent decision of this court on which both the parties and the Judge relied heavily. Although we refer principally to the minority judgement, there was no disagreement on the broad steps to be taken in purposively interpreting a legislative provision. It was noted at [59] that the court’s task when undertaking a purposive interpretation of a legislative provision involves three steps:

(a) First, ascertain the possible interpretations of the provision, having regard not just to the text of the provision but also to the context of that provision within the written law as a whole.

(b) Second, ascertain the legislative purpose or object of the statute.

(c) Third, compare the possible interpretations of the text against the purposes or objects of the statute. These steps mirrored, and set out in greater specificity, the approach taken by the majority in Ting Choon Meng, which also began by interpreting the text of the legislative provision in question in the context of the statute as a whole before considering its legislative purpose (see Ting Choon Meng at [19]).

38 The first of these steps is fairly uncontroversial. It requires a court to ascertain the possible interpretations of the provision. A court does so by determining the ordinary meaning of the words of the legislative provision. It can be aided in this effort by a number of rules and canons of statutory construction, all of which are grounded in logic and common sense. We mention two rules which we will refer to in due course. One is that Parliament shuns tautology and does not legislate in vain; the court should therefore endeavour to give significance to every word in an enactment (see JD Ltd v Comptroller of Income Tax [2006] 1 SLR 484 at [43]). Another relevant rule is that Parliament is presumed not to have intended an unworkable or impracticable result, so an interpretation that leads to such a result would not be regarded as a possible one (see Hong Leong Bank Bhd v Soh Seow Poh [2009] 4 SLR(R) 525 at [40]).

Distinguishing between specific and general purposes

39 It is the second step of the analysis – formulating the legislative purpose of a provision – which tends to present difficulty. Casting the legislative purpose differently or at different levels of generality may result in varying and even conflicting interpretations. The articulation of purpose at different levels of generality could also result in the court describing the purpose in whatever terms would support its preferred interpretation (as was observed in Ting Choon Meng at [60]). Thus, properly identifying the legislative purpose is of paramount importance.

40 It is important here to distinguish between the specific purpose underlying a particular provision and the general purpose or purposes underlying the statute as a whole or the relevant part of the statute. As noted in Ting Choon Meng at [60], the words of s 9A of the IA are ambiguous as to which purpose is best considered in this context. This is because it refers both to the purpose underlying the “written law” (in s 9A(1)) and to that underlying the “provision of the written law” (in ss 9A(2)–9A(3)). As was observed in Ting Choon Meng at [61], “the purpose behind a particular provision may yet be distinct from the general purpose underlying the statute as a whole”, and it may therefore be necessary to separately consider the specific purpose of a particular provision when the court endeavours to ascertain the legislative intent. This is only logical given that different provisions may target different specific mischiefs.

41 The distinction between the specific purpose of a provision and the general purpose of a statute is a significant one. The same point was made by the Federal Court of Australia in Evans v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 276 when it observed at [16] that “[u]nder the umbrella of the general object is a multitude of objects of specific provisions”, and by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Edwards v AG [2004] NSWCA 272; (2004) 60 NSWLR 667 when it observed at [72] that “it may be said that there is an underlying object of the Act as a whole and there may be a separate object of discrete parts of it, subject of course to the purpose of the whole”. We note from the use of the phrases “[u]nder the umbrella of the general object” and “subject of course to the purpose of the whole”, that these cases appear to contemplate that the specific purpose can never be contrary to the general purpose. We need not go quite as far given that this issue does not arise in this case; for present purposes we prefer to leave it on the footing that in a truly exceptional case, it may be that the specific intention of Parliament is so clear that the court should give effect to it even if it appears to contradict, undermine, or go against the grain of the more general purpose. Such cases would, however, be rare (as noted in Ting Choon Meng at [60]), if they ever occurred at all. The court must begin by presuming that a statute is a coherent whole, and that any specific purpose does not go against the grain of the relevant general purpose, but rather is subsumed under, related or complementary to it. The statute’s individual provisions must then be read consistently with both the specific and general purposes, so far as it is possible.

Preferring internal to external sources in ascertaining purpose

42 The next question concerns how the relevant purposes may be discerned. There are two types of sources from which a court may draw to discern these purposes. The first and obvious source is the text of the relevant legislative provision itself and its statutory context. The second source is “any material not forming part of the written law” as set out in ss 9A(2)–9A(3) of the IA – this is what has come to be referred to as “extraneous material”.

43 Consideration of extraneous material can be very helpful and such material tends to be referred to extensively in aid of purposive interpretation. However, we emphasise that in seeking to draw out the legislative purpose behind a provision, primacy should be accorded to the text of the provision and its statutory context over any extraneous material. The law enacted by Parliament is the text which Parliament has chosen in order to embody and to give effect to its purposes and objects. In line with this, the meaning and purpose of a provision should, as far as possible, be derived from the statute first, based on the provision(s) in question read in the context of the statute as a whole. This approach also coheres with the language of s 9A(1), which suggests the possibility of the purpose or object of a statute being “expressly stated in the written law”.

44 There are three main textual sources from which one can derive the purpose of a particular legislative provision. First, the long title of a statute might give an indication of its purpose. If there is no contradiction between the general purpose of the statute and specific purpose of the legislative provision in question, the purpose stated in the long title may also shed light on the purpose of the specific legislative provision in question. Second, the words of the legislative provision in question will clearly be of critical importance. We agree with the Judge who noted (at [37(a)] of the Judgment) that if a provision is well-drafted, its purpose will emanate from its words. Third, other legislative provisions within the statute may be referred to, so far as they are relevant to ascertaining what Parliament was seeking to achieve and how. In particular, the structure of the statute as a whole and the location of the provision in question within the statute may be relevant considerations.

45 Furthermore, s 9A(4) of the IA expressly directs that when deciding whether any extraneous material should be referred to and/or what weight should be given to such material, consideration must be given to the desirability of persons being able to rely on the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text and to the need to avoid prolonging legal proceedings. This too suggests that the primary source of information as to the legislative intent should be the text itself. Consideration of extraneous material under s 9A(2) may then be had, but only in appropriate circumstances. It is to these we now turn.

Consideration of extraneous material

46 We start by observing that the word “consider” as used (in its various forms) in s 9A implies more than mere reference; it implies some degree of reliance on the material for the purposes stated under s 9A(2). Before deciding whether to “consider” the extraneous material, the court would necessarily refer to it to make a preliminary assessment of whether it is capable of giving assistance. If it is incapable of giving assistance, then there is no question of “considering” it because no useful reliance can be placed on it. Only if the material is capable of giving assistance will the court proceed to “consider” the material in its full depth and breadth. That is how the court avoids being cast adrift on a sea of irrelevant material (see Ting Choon Meng ([37] supra) at [63]–[64]).

47 In Ting Choon Meng, the three situations under which the court may consider extraneous material as set out under s 9A(2) were outlined as follows (at [65]):

(a) under s 9A(2)(a), to confirm that the ordinary meaning deduced is the correct and intended meaning having regard to any extraneous material that further elucidates the purpose or object of the written law;

(b) under s 9A(2)(b)(i), to ascertain the meaning of the text in question when the provision on its face is ambiguous or obscure; and

(c) under s 9A(2)(b)(ii), to ascertain the meaning of the text in question where having deduced the ordinary meaning of the text as aforesaid, and considering the underlying object and purpose of the written law, such ordinary meaning is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.

48 It may be asked, if extraneous material is being considered under s 9A(2)(a), whether there is a real point to considering such material. If the extraneous material does not confirm the ordinary meaning – or even calls that ordinary meaning into question – the court is not permitted to use that extraneous material as a basis for departing from the ordinary meaning, as that is only permissible when reference is made under s 9A(2)(b). If instead the extraneous material does confirm the ordinary meaning, that too would not alter the result: the court would have had to apply the ordinary meaning in any event since s 9A(2)(b) was not invoked. It may seem from this that there is no point in referring to the extraneous material either way.

49 In our judgment, the explanation for this is a practical one: even though extraneous material referred to under s 9A(2)(a) alone cannot alter the outcome of a decision, it is useful for demonstrating the soundness – as a matter of policy – of that outcome. This is an important function given that the law is not only meant to be applied but is also, ideally, meant to be understood and appreciated by the people who are governed by it. In that sense, the availability of s 9A(2)(a) advances the rule of law by assuring the governed that the court is applying the law in keeping with the policy imperatives for which it was enacted. There is thus utility in having a provision of the IA which legitimises the outcome of the court’s inquiry in such situations.

50 It also bears mentioning that extraneous material cannot be used “to give the statute a sense which is contrary to its express text” (Seow Wei Sin v PP [2011] 1 SLR 1199 at [21]) save perhaps in the very limited circumstances identified in s 9A(2)(b)(ii) of the IA (see [47(c)] above). This echoes the broader principle that the proper function of the judge when applying s 9A of the IA is to interpret a given statutory provision. Although purposive interpretation is an important and powerful tool, it is not an excuse for rewriting a statute (see [43] above). The authority to alter the text of a statute lies with Parliament, and judicial interpretation is generally confined to giving the text a meaning that its language can bear. Hence, purposive interpretation must be done with a view toward determining a provision’s or statute’s purpose and object “as reflected by and in harmony with the express wording of the legislation”: PP v Low Kok Heng [2007] 4 SLR(R) 183 at [50].

51 In our judgment, consideration of extraneous material should be tempered by these conditions set out in s 9A of the IA. Further, only material that is capable of assisting in ascertaining the meaning of the provision(s) by shedding light on the purpose of statute as a whole, or where applicable, on the purpose of particular provision(s) in question, should be referred to (Ting Choon Meng at [63]).

52 The extraneous material that is most commonly called in aid is the record of the Parliamentary debates on the Bill containing the legislative provision in question. This would comprise the speech made in Parliament by the Minister when the Bill containing that legislative provision was moved (s 9A(3)(c) of the IA) and other relevant material in any official record of debates in Parliament (s 9A(3)(d) of the IA). While the Parliamentary debates can often be a helpful source of information about the relevant legislative purpose, this does not mean that anything said in Parliament that could potentially touch on the purpose of the legislative provision in question is relevant. On this point, it is worth reiterating the following propositions noted in Ting Choon Meng ([37] supra) at [70]:

(a) The statements made in Parliament must be clear and unequivocal to be of any real use.

(b) The court should guard against the danger of finding itself construing and interpreting the statements made in Parliament rather than the legislative provision that Parliament has enacted.

(c) Therefore, the statements in question should disclose the mischief targeted by the enactment or the legislative intention lying behind any ambiguous or obscure words. In other words, the statements should be directed to the very point in question to be especially helpful.

53 These propositions are relevant at two stages of the inquiry: to determine whether Parliamentary debates are capable of giving assistance such that they should be “considered”; and if so, to determine what weight should be placed on them. Furthermore, although these propositions are particularly important when dealing with statements made in Parliamentary debates, there is no reason why they should not also apply to other types of extraneous material.

Purposive approach summarised

54 We summarise the legal principles that are applicable in the present case as follows:

(a) The purposive approach to statutory interpretation, which is mandated by s 9A of the IA, applies to the interpretation of provisions in the Constitution by virtue of Art 2(9) of the Constitution.

(b) The court must start by ascertaining the possible interpretations of the provision of the Constitution, having regard not just to its text but also to its context within the Constitution as a whole.

(c) The court must then ascertain the legislative purpose or object of the specific provision and the part of the Constitution in which the provision is situated. The court then compares the possible interpretations of the provision against the purpose of the relevant part of the Constitution. The interpretation which furthers the purpose of the written text should be preferred to the interpretation which does not.

(i) It may be necessary to distinguish between the specific purpose of the Constitutional provision in question, and the general purpose of the part of the Constitution in which it is found. If the general purpose sheds no light on the object of a given specific provision, it may be necessary to examine the specific purpose separately.

(ii) The purpose should ordinarily be gleaned from the text itself. The court must first determine the ordinary meaning of the provision in its context, which might give sufficient indication of the objects and purposes of the written law, before evaluating whether consideration of extraneous material is necessary.

(iii) Consideration of extraneous material may only be had in three situations:

(A) If the ordinary meaning of the provision (taking into account its context in the written law and purpose or object underlying the written law) is clear, extraneous material can only be used to confirm the ordinary meaning but not to alter it.

(B) If the provision is ambiguous or obscure on its face, extraneous material can be used to ascertain the meaning of the provision.

(C) If the ordinary meaning of the provision (taking into account its context in the written law and the purpose or object underlying the written law) leads to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable, extraneous material can be used to ascertain the meaning of the provision.

(iv) In deciding whether to consider extraneous material, and if so what weight to place on it, the court should have regard to the desirability of persons being able to rely on the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of the provision (taking into account its context in the written law and the purpose or object underlying the written law); and the need to avoid prolonging legal or other proceedings without compensating advantage. The court should also have regard to (A) whether the material is clear and unequivocal; (B) whether it discloses the mischief aimed at or the legislative intention underlying the statutory provision; and (C) whether it is directed to the very point of statutory interpretation in dispute.”

264 In summary, the 3-step framework was as follows:

(a) First, I would first need to ascertain the possible interpretation of “consort” as it had been enacted under the CLTPA.

(b) Second, I would need to ascertain the legislative purpose or object of the CLTPA. I would need to consider the general legislative purpose of the enactment by reference to any mischief that Parliament was seeking to address by it. In addition, I would need to be mindful of the possibility that section 34(1) might have been enacted to address some specific mischief that might have been distinct from, but not inconsistent with, the general legislative purpose underlying the CLTPA as a whole.

(c) Third, I would need to compare the possible interpretations of “consort” against the purpose or object of the CLTPA. For that, I was allowed to refer to extraneous materials such as the Hansard to confirm but not to alter the ordinary meaning of the provision as purposively ascertained.

(d) I also noted that I could only refer to extraneous material such as Parliamentary debates in 3 situations^{[note: 187]}:

(i) If the ordinary meaning of “consort” was clear, extraneous material could only be used to confirm the ordinary meaning but not to alter it.

(ii) If the word “consort” was ambiguous or obscure on its face, extraneous material could be used to ascertain the meaning of “consort”.

(iii) If the ordinary meaning of “consort” (taking into account its context in CLTPA and the purpose or object underlying the CLTPA) led to a result which was manifestly absurd or unreasonable, extraneous material could be used to ascertain the meaning of “consort”.

Applying the purposive approach to the definition of “consorting”

265 In the present case, I noted that there had been no judicial pronouncement of the definition of “consorting” in relation to section 34(1) of the CLTPA by the Singapore courts.

266 In applying the 3-step framework in Ting Choon Meng, I would agree with the Prosecution that the word “consort” in section 34(1) of the CLTPA should be interpreted to include intentional meetings (including one-off meetings) between police supervisees which need not involve any improper, illegal or criminal purpose.

i. Step 1 of the 3-step framework

267 Step 1 of the analysis was to find the plain and ordinary meaning of “consort”. In the present case I noted that the word “consort” was defined in a number of dictionaries as follows:

(a) In the Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary of Current English, “consort” was defined as “pass time in the company off”.

(b) In the Oxford Concise Dictionary, “consort” was defined as “class or bring together, keep company (with)”.

(c) In the Merriam Webster Dictionary, “consort” was defined as “to keep company or spend time with (someone)”.

268 As could be seen from above, “consort” simply meant “to keep company or spend time with someone”.

269 On the issue of whether section 34(1) of the CLTPA could be interpreted to refer to intentional, one-off meetings between police supervisees, I noted the Prosecution’s submission that section 34(1) not only criminalised “consorting” between police supervisees, the section had also criminalised “habitual association”. Section 36(b) of the CLTPA also made it an offence for any police supervisee to be “found in the company” of another police supervisee.

270 Given that 3 different terms were used in the CLTPA, namely “consorting”, “habitual associating” and “in the company of”, I would agree with the Prosecution that the starting point must be that all these 3 terms should have different meanings.

271 I also agreed with the Prosecution that the term “habitual associating” by its ordinary meaning would connote some regularity or frequency of meetings and the omission of the word “habitually” from “consorting” by Parliament would have been deliberate. I also agreed with the Prosecution that to interpret “consorting” to require regularity or frequency would render the offence of “habitually associating” otiose. That being the case, I would agree with the Prosecution that “consort” should be interpreted to include one-off meetings rather than frequent or regular meetings.

272 On the issue of intentional meeting, I agreed with the Prosecution that “habitual associating”, “consorting” and “being in the company of” would fall on different points on the spectrum of intentionality of association with “habitual associating” being at the highest end of intentionality and “being found in the company of” at the lowest end. I also agreed with the Prosecution that a mere chance encounter would satisfy “being in the company of” but would not cross the threshold of “consorting” and a more substantial prolonged interaction would bring the case over the threshold of “consorting”. I agreed with the Prosecution that the distinguishing factor would be parties’ intentional and continued association with one another as compared to a chance encounter.

273 Given the above, I would agree with the Prosecution that the only possible interpretation of “consorting” was intentional one-off meetings.

274 On the issue of whether one should require the meeting to be for an improper, illegal or criminal purpose for “consorting”, based on the ordinary meaning of the word “consorting”, it was clear to me that there was no requirement that the meeting must be for improper, illegal or criminal purpose. In applying the Ting Choon Meng framework, the starting point should be that if Parliament had omitted such a requirement in the CLTPA, one should presume that it was a deliberate omission unless shown otherwise.

275 And given that section 34(1) had laid down a defence to “consorting” and that a police supervisee could not be said to be consorting if he could prove that he did not know or had no reason to suspect that the other person was also subject to police supervision, I would agree with the Prosecution that it was clearly Parliament’s intention not to include the requirement of an improper, illegal or criminal purpose for an offence to be made out under section 34(1).

ii. Step 2 of the 3-step framework

276 In this part of my analysis, I would need to consider if there was any distinction between the specific purpose of section 34(1) as compared to the general purpose underlying the CLTPA as a whole. I should also be mindful that the specific purpose of section 34(1) might be distinct from the general purpose of the CLTPA.

277 I agreed with the Prosecution that looking at the history of the CLTPA, the original Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Ordinance (Ordinance 26 of 1955) was enacted with the purpose of combatting communism^{[note: 188]}. Thereafter, the CLTPA was targeted at gangsters who were not afraid of the police and more recently, it was used to address organised crime and gang members where victims and witnesses were unwilling or unable to testify against their attackers^{[note: 189]}. As such, it was clear that the general purpose of the CLTPA was to combat organised crime.

278 As to the specific purpose of section 34(1) of the CLTPA, it was clear to me that the specific purpose of section 34(1) was to impose restrictions on persons who were placed under police supervision and to create special penalties against such persons for breaking the restrictions or for being convicted of specified offences.

279 In this aspect, the Prosecution had greatly assisted the court by going through the legislative history of the CLTPA and pulling out the following extracts from the Parliamentary debates over the years:

(a) During the Second Reading of Bill No. 17 of 1959, the Minister of Home Affairs, Mr Ong Pang Boon had stated^{[note: 190]}:

“The Government, like any democratic Government, does not wish to lightly deprive the individual of his liberty by executive action, nor for that matter for a longer time than is absolutely necessary. But when we are dealing with unruly and unprincipled thugs and gangsters and because of the terrorism they have spread, the ordinary process of law is inadequate to deal with the crimes and misdeeds committed by them. Special powers such as those contained in this Bill are therefore necessary…

Coming now to the details of the Bill, the main provisions are (1) to extend the life of the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Ordinance which expires in October this year for another five years; …(4) to impose special restrictions on those persons placed under police supervision and special penalties on them for breaking the restrictions or for being convicted of specified offences”

(b) As regards to the legislative purpose behind supervision orders and the accompanying restrictions, Mr Ong Pang Boon had also stated^{[note: 191]}:

“Clause 10 [note: section 33 and section 34 CLTPA] makes persons directed to be under police supervision subject to other disabilities and provisions intended to make it easier to control their activities and to prevent or to deter them from committing crimes. If they break the restrictions imposed on them under these police supervision orders or if they consort with other persons subject to similar supervision orders without permission, or if they are found loitering in public places or are found at places where breaches of the peace have been committed, or are found in the company of two or more persons subject to supervision without being able to account for themselves satisfactorily, they are liable on conviction to be punished with imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years and not less than one year”.

(c) Minister Lim Kim San during the Second Reading of the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) (Amendment) Bill (Bill No. 20/1969) had also said^{[note: 192]}:

“Mr Speaker, Sir, Members will appreciate that it is necessary to rehabilitate and re-educate secret society gangsters while they are under detention in order that when they return to society on their release, we hope they would become law-abiding and useful citizens. Rehabilitation takes times and varies with the individual. Some may respond quickly to the rehabilitation programme, while others need a longer period.

Hon. Members are most probably aware that only the hard-core secret society members are put under detention orders. The others are placed under police supervision orders for a period of two years. This enables the less dangerous members of secret societies to earn their livelihood and, at the same time, enables the police to keep track of their movements outside their working hours in order to curb their anti-social activities.”

(d) More recently, Minister Mr K Shanmugam during the Second Reading of the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) (Amendment) Bill (No. 5 of 2018) stated^{[note: 193]}:

“So, likewise, for the supervisees. If you do not give them close attention – now, today, you make them report on a regular basis, that alone is not going to prevent them from getting back into bad company, going back into gangsterism. You need to do something more. And so, my directions to the Ministry has been: can we do something more? Can we tailor the changes such that the Police can impose certain conditions? I can imagine you have to spend some time doing this; you have to come for counselling; you have to do these things; basically it is to try and get you to break the habit”

280 Looking at the above excerpts from the various Parliamentary debates over the years, it was clear to me that the specific purpose of section 34(1) was to ensure that police supervisees did not mix around their peers so that they could be rehabilitated and put their previous ways of life behind them. How section 34(1) had sought to achieve its purpose was to create specific offences to deter the police supervisees from meeting up with one another and to put in place strict punishments on minimum 1 year to 3 years’ imprisonment deter them from doing so.

iii. Step 3 of the 3-step framework

281 I would agree with the Prosecution that comparing section 34(1) of the CLTPA with the general legislative purpose behind the CLTPA, it was clear that the specific purpose of section 34(1) was to ensure that police supervisees did not go back to their criminal ways and that served as a means to weaken criminal organisations and gangs. I agreed with the Prosecution that how section 34(1) had proposed to fulfil its object was by preventing police supervisees from meeting up with one another so that they are less likely to fall into bad company and further commit crimes.

282 In the circumstances, I would agree with the Prosecution that the definition of “consorting” as “intentional one-off meeting without any improper, illegal or criminal purpose” would further the legislative purpose by providing an effectual means of preventing organised crime and punishing those who attempted to reconnect with their criminal past and thereby deterring others from doing the same.

283 I also agreed with the Prosecution that adopting a different interpretation would lead to undesirable consequences that would detract from the legislative purpose of the CLTPA. I agreed with the Prosecution that offences under section 34(1) were hard to detect and that if police supervisees could not be prosecuted unless they met on multiple occasions or met in furtherance of an illegal purpose, then section 34(1) would lose its deterrent effect.

284 I noted that the CLTPA was amended on 1 January 2019 and the effect of the amendments was to repeal sections 33, 34 and 36. I also noted the reasons for the amendments as stated by Minister of Home Affairs Mr K Shanmugam during the Second Reading of Bill No. 5 of 2018^{[note: 194]}:

“By clause 4, we are seeking to make amendments relating to these persons who could be subject to PSOs. We want to remove them from the main Act and set them out in rules under section 49. Why? Because these conditions need to be tailored to meet the needs of the specific individual. For example, how do you rehabilitate them? To what extent is counselling necessary? It is very difficult to have these in the main legislation. So, we put them in the conditions, to tailor it according to the needs of the individual persons.

Section 33(1) and (2), which are repealed and re-enacted by clause 4, enables the Minister to impose different prescribed condition on each supervisee based on the different risks and needs of each supervisee.”

285 The words of Minister Mr K Shanmugam clearly supported the Prosecution’s contention that the specific purpose of section 34(1) was to ensure that police supervisees did not mix around their peers so that they could be rehabilitated and put their previous ways of life behind them. It was also clear from the Minister’s words that the intention was not to abolish sections 33 or 34 but place them in the rules under section 49 so that individualised plans could be formulated to meet the specific needs of every individual police supervisee.

286 I also noted that Rules 3(f) and 3(g)(ii) of the Criminal Law (Obligations on Person Subject to Supervision) Rules had spelt out the following:

“Obligations on person subject to supervision

3. For the purposes of section 33(1) and (2) of the Act, the obligations that the Minister may, by order in writing, direct a person subject to supervision to comply with are the following:

(f) the person must not communicate using any method with any other person whom the person knows, or has reason to suspect, is a person subject to supervision, unless the person has obtained permission from the Director or an authorised person;

…

(g) the person must not, without reasonable excuse –

...

(ii) be in the company of any other person subject to supervision, unless the person has obtained permission from the Director or an authorised person.”

[emphasis in bold]

287 I agreed with the Prosecution that although the words “consorting” and “habitual associating” were missing from the rules, Parliament had adopted the lowest degree of intentionality of “being in the company of” in Rule 3(g)(ii) and that Parliament had, through Rule 3(f), extended the scope of restrictions by making all forms of communication using any methods between police supervisees a crime.

288 Taking into account all the above, I would agree with the Prosecution that the word “consort” in section 34(1) of the CLTPA should be interpreted to include intentional meetings (including one-off meetings) between police supervisees which need not involve any improper, illegal or criminal purpose. This interpretation was in line with the general legislative purpose of the CLTPA as well as the specific purpose of section 34 of the CLTPA.

289 I also agreed with the Prosecution’s contention that the Defence’s argument that “consort” and “habitually associate” in section 34(1) of the CLTPA should be read together was bare assertion, and it was unsupported by any legal authorities. I also agreed with the Prosecution’s submission that the Defence’s interpretation clearly contradicted the trite principle that Parliament did not legislate in vain^{[note: 195]}.

290 Section 36 of the CLTPA had provided that if an accused who was police supervisee could satisfactorily account for his presence when he was found in the company of 2 or more persons who were subjected to supervision under the CLTPA, that could constitute a defence for the accused. The Defence had also submitted that because such a same defence was available to an accused in section 36, it should be read into section 34 that if B1 and B2 could satisfactorily account for their presence at the Blk 449 Clementi Avenue 2 coffeeshop, they should not be found guilty of an offence under section 34(1). I would humbly disagree with the Defence on this point. Section 36 was referring to a different offence. B1 and B2 were not charged under section 36 but section 34. There was no provision in section 34 that a police supervisee would not be guilty of an offence under section 34 if he could “satisfactorily account for his presence at that place or time or in that company”.

291 Accordingly, I found that the Prosecution had proven their case beyond a reasonable doubt against both B1 and B2 and I thereby convicted both B1 and B2 of their proceeded charges.

292 As to the Defence’s submission that both B1 and B2 had satisfactorily accounted for their meeting at the Blk 449 Clementi Avenue 3 coffeeshop, I was of the view that such a defence was not applicable to both B1 and B2 under section 34(1) of the CLTPA. Whilst such a defence was available to an accused who was charged under section 36 of the CLTPA, section 36 was an entirely different provision and the offence created under section 36 was a totally different offence.

293 As to the authorities referred to by the Defence, I was of the view that the 2 cased cited by the Defence were not useful in assisting us to interpret the meaning of “consorting” under section 34 of the CLTPA:

(a) As regards to Soo Sing’s case, the 2 appellants were found conversing with an armed bandit and all three of them were convicted for “consorting” under Reg 6A(1) of the Emergency Regulations. The Court of Appeal in Soo Sing’s case had held that the evidence only showed that the appellants were found “in the company of” an armed bandit and the offence of “consorting” required proof of “something more than mere presence”. The Court of Appeal had also stated that:

Where the only evidence for the Prosecution is that an accused person has been found in the company of an armed bandit, as was the case here, a conviction for consorting under reg 6A(1) is not justified. In order to justify a conviction for consorting under that regulation, the prosecution has to go further by establishing circumstances which entitle the Court to draw the conclusion that the association was something more than a casual meeting or conversation. On the other hand, in the absence of a satisfactory explanation by the accused, such evidence would, in our opinion, entitle the Court to convict under reg 5(1A). It follows, therefore, that our answer to the second question is in the negative.

(b) I agreed with the Prosecution that Soo Sing’s decision offered no assistance to the present case. Soo Sing was not a case on statutory interpretation. It was merely concluded that “consorting” under the Emergency Regulations required more than a casual meeting or conversation. It was also unclear from the decision as to what was the parliamentary intention behind the Emergency Regulations and what sort of mischief it was trying to address by the Emergency Regulations. In any event, Soo Sing was decided in 1951 and that was way before the decision of the Court of Appeal in Ting Choon Meng and Tan Cheng Bock which had laid down the 3-step framework on statutory interpretation.

(c) As regards to Tan Choon Huat, the appellant in Tan Choon Huat was convicted at trial for an offence under section 8(1) of the Corrosive and Explosive Substances and Offensive Weapons Act (Cap 65) (“CESOWA”), for consorting with a person in possession of an offensive weapon. Section 8(1) had provided that:

“Any person who consorts with, or is found in the company of, another person who is carrying or has in his possession or under his control any offensive weapon in contravention of s 6, in circumstances which raise a reasonable presumption that he knew that that other person was carrying or had in his possession or under his control any such weapon shall, unless he shall prove that he had reasonable grounds for believing that that other person was carrying or had in his possession or under his control any such weapon for a lawful purpose, be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to the like punishment as that other person with whom he was consorting with or in whose company he was found”

(d) At trial before the magistrate, the appellant’s police statement was admitted after a trial within a trial. After the appellant was convicted, he appealed against his conviction and sentence on the basis that his police statement was wrongly admitted, that the magistrate had erred in his analysis of section 8(1) of the CESOWA and that the prosecution had not proven his guilty intent on the totality of the evidence.

(e) The High Court on appeal in Tan Choon Huat had held that the High Court on appeal had held that while the magistrate had erred in certain aspects of his analysis of section 8(1), the error by the magistrate did not result in injustice which required the conviction to be set aside. The High Court therefore proceeded to the appeal against conviction but went on to vary the sentence imposed by the magistrate.

(f) I agreed with the Prosecution that Tan Choon Huat was dealing with the issue of burden of proof, and not statutory interpretation. Although, the High Court in Tan Choon Huat had affirmed he lower court’s conviction, the High Court observed that while the magistrate had erred in certain aspects of his analysis. However, the High Court was of the view that the error by the magistrate did not result in injustice which required the conviction to be set aside. MPH Rubin JC had at [8] stated that:

8. After a somewhat spirited trial within a trial, the learned magistrate admitted the statement and held that he was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the statement was given by the appellant voluntarily without any threat, inducement or promise held out to the appellant. The material part of the statement thus admitted reads as follows:

“3 On 8 October 1986, I was not working. I was at the rented room at 1200 hrs. On the same day at about 10.30pm my room-mates, namely, Suah Yee (refers to Goh Chong Chi) and Lau Shu (refers to Low Keau An) came home. They bought some beers. I then joined them in the drinking session. Three of us drank about eight cans of beers. Whilst drinking I don’t know who started to discuss about the topic of committing robbery. At that time I was rather drunk. I remembered that I agreed to join them in the robbery. At about 1am three of us left the rented room and walked to National Stadium. If I am not mistaken I think I heard Lau Shu suggesting going to National Stadium. So three of us went to National Stadium. Halfway walking along Lorong 6 Geylang junction, Lau Shu and Suah Yee told me that both of them carried a knife but they did not showed (sic) it to me. From then I know they are carrying a knife as I believed them. At about 0115 hrs whilst walking along National Stadium, I saw a police patrol car approaching and it shone its headlight on three of us. The policemen then say to Lau Shu what he had throwed (sic) and I saw the uniform policeman picking up a knife which I believed was thrown away by Lau Shu. The other policeman then searched me and Suah Yee. The policeman did not find anything on me but I saw the policeman found a knife from Suah Yee. Three of us were thus placed under arrest and subsequently brought back to Beach Road Police Station.

4 I admit that I followed the two of my friends, namely, Lau Shu and Suah Yee as three of us intends (sic) to commit a robbery around National Stadium.”

9 It is unfortunate that the learned magistrate seemed to have dealt with the defence objections summarily. He did not refer to or indicate anywhere in his grounds any aspects of the evidence given at the trial within a trial nor did he give any reasons why he chose to accept the version of the Prosecution as against the Defence though there were several unsatisfactory features in the prosecution evidence. Many an answer from the police witnesses was less than satisfactory and in some instances, glaringly perfunctory. There was uncontroverted evidence that the 18-year-old appellant was interrogated without rest or respite from 10.48am and was given no lunch even till 4.50pm on that date when he was supposed to have given a statement under s 122(5) of the CPC. The denial of lunch to the appellant is all the more troubling particularly when his interrogators knew that he did not consume his breakfast though the non-consumption had nothing to do with the police.

10 The statement thus recorded purportedly under s 122(5) of the CPC does not show that the appellant knew the charge against him nor does the record show anywhere that the appellant was invited to make any alteration, correction or amendment to the statement recorded.

11 It is settled law that a confession cannot be admitted unless it was made voluntarily and the elements of voluntariness must be proved by the Prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. This is provided for under ss 24 and 105 of our Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1990 Rev Ed). The expression “satisfied beyond reasonable doubt” would remain an elusive abstraction unless the court trying the contested issue sets out in its grounds some basis for its conclusions. An appeal court is generally disinclined to interfere with the finding of a trial court since the trial court has the advantage of hearing evidence and observing the demeanour of witnesses. But if the conclusion reached by the trial court is against the weight of evidence or that the inferences drawn by the trial court could not find support from the primary facts on the record, an appeal court would in the interests of justice intervene. See Goh Ah San v The King [1938] MLJ 95 at 99, Chang Lee Swee v PP [1985] 1 MLJ 75 at 84 and Mohamed Shariff v PP [1964] MLJ 64.

12 Quite apart from the unsatisfactory features of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses as to voluntariness, the statement recorded did not even conform with standard procedures usually adopted by the police in investigations of this nature. The investigating officer (“PW3”) said in answer to a question that he did invite the appellant to make amendments or alterations if the appellant so desired. But when it was put to the investigating officer that the statement recorded by him made no mention that he invited the appellant to make any alteration, amendment or correction, his answer was: “At the end of each statement, I would normally ask the accused whether he wanted to make any alteration.” By “normally asked” it does not necessarily mean that it was in fact asked in this case and that is what was required to satisfy the provisions of the law. The cumulative effect of all the unsatisfactory features tends to cast serious doubt on the prosecution’s evidence as to the voluntariness of the statement. The statement should not have been admitted.

13 Was the learned trial judge therefore wrong in calling the defence of the appellant? Even without regard to the said statement, the Prosecution had placed before the court the following evidence:

(a) that Low and Goh were in possession of offensive weapons, ie a knife each without lawful authority in a public place in contravention of s 6(1) of the Act;

(b) the appellant was found in their company;

(c) they were all found at 1.15am at the entrance of the National Stadium where courting couples frequented; and

(d) the three of them were behaving suspiciously and one was seen to be throwing away a knife.

14 Upon reception of such evidence, the question that remained to be answered by the court under s 8(1) of the Act was whether in the given circumstances, it was reasonable to presume or suppose that the appellant knew that either one of his companions had in his possession an offensive weapon. In the given circumstances, the evidential presumption that the appellant knew that his companions had with them those offensive weapons for unlawful purposes is compelling and calling the defence was therefore a logical sequence pursuant to s 180(f) of the CPC.

15 As the events unfolded, after the defence was called, the appellant elected to give evidence on oath. In his defence, the appellant said that on the night of 8 October 1986, he had been drinking beer after having earlier taken a sleeping tablet which he got from Low. After the drinking session, he joined Goh and Low for a walk. When the three of them reached a 24- hour coffee shop, Low suggested that they go to the National Stadium. They did so and when they reached the entrance of the National Stadium, Low told the appellant that he had a knife on him. Within minutes of Low telling him about the knife, a police patrol car appeared and they were all apprehended. The main plank of the appellant’s defence was that he did not learn about the knife until a few minutes before the police came and apprehended them. The appellant said that he did not have a clear picture of what was going on because of the effect of the drinks.

16 The learned magistrate in the result found the appellant guilty and his principal conclusions were as follows:

“In this case, at its best the defence might succeed in proving that when the accused left his quarters with Goh and Low he did not know about the knives. What the defence had to do next was not the rebuttal of the presumption that the accused knew about the knives, but to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that whilst he knew about the knives which he admitted he did he had reasonable grounds for believing that his companions had them in their possession for a lawful purpose, for example, that they had intended to use the knives to open up durians which they were going to purchase. This the defence did not do.

Instead, the accused’s purported defence was that he learnt about the knives too late for him to dissociate himself from his companions. He was too shocked on learning about the knives, too drunk, and had too little time to react in a manner which a reasonable person would if circumstances had not been so adverse. By reason of the foregoing, this defence, even if it were believed, fails for as soon as the accused knew about the knives he must have reasonable grounds for believing that his companions’ possession of them was (sic) for a lawful purpose. And anything short of that meant that he had the mens rea for the offence under s 8(1) of the Act. This, in my opinion, is the position in law with regard to the defence which the accused tried unsuccessfully to raise.”

17 Many grounds were advanced by counsel for the appellant on appeal but the main point of contention was that the analysis of s 8(1) of the Act by the learned magistrate was erroneous and that the Prosecution had not proven guilty intent on the totality of the evidence.

18 The learned magistrate’s analysis of s 8(1) of the Act and the reasons for his conclusions are somewhat delphic. The learned magistrate was in error as to what the Defence had to do to rebut the Prosecution’s case. Section 8(1) of the Act does not, in any way, limit the right of an accused to cast a reasonable doubt on any of the ingredients of the offence. The accused is entitled, apart from the statutory defence available to him, to negative the Prosecution’s case, if he could, by placing some evidence acceptable to the court for it to conclude that he did not know or could not have suspected that the others were in possession of offensive weapons.

19 But the appellant’s evidence or explanation in defence came nowhere near raising any reasonable doubt on the Prosecution’s case. The appellant was plainly unable to offer any plausible explanation why he was at the entrance of the National Stadium at 1.15am amidst armed companions. Worse still, his excuse for not withdrawing from the group soon after he learnt that one of them had a knife is wholly unsatisfactory. To my mind, the appellant has not raised any reasonable doubt on the Prosecution’s case.

(g) It was clear to me and I agreed with the Prosecution that Tan Choon Huat was dealing with the issue of an accused rebutting the prosecution’s case by rebutting the presumption of knowledge under section 8(1) of the CESOWA on a balance of probabilities or by casting reasonable doubts on any of the ingredients of the offence.

(h) The Defence has suggested that Tan Choon Huat was authority to the proposition that once an accused person had given a satisfactory account for consorting or associating with another, in the absence of any confession to some sort of criminality, an offence of consorting could not be made out under section 34(1) of the CLTPA be made out^{[note: 196]}.

(i) With due respect to the Defence, I would disagree with their reading of Tan Choon Huat and I was of the view that Tan Choon Huat did not assist me with the interpretation of section 34 of the CLTPA.

Antecedents

294 I noted that both B1 and B2 had criminal antecedents but they did not have any antecedents which were similar to the present offence:

(a) B1 had antecedents relating to voluntary causing hurt, drug trafficking, drug possession, drug consumption and theft.

(b) B2 had antecedents relating to unlawful assembly, theft, assisting in concealment/disposal of stolen property, voluntary causing hurt and criminal intimidation.

Sentencing

Prosecution’s Submission on Sentence

295 The Prosecution had submitted for the mandatory minimum sentence of at least 1 years’ imprisonment, leaving any uplift to the court’s discretion.

296 In addition to the aggravating factors already highlighted in the Prosecution’s Closing Submissions, the Prosecution also urged me to consider the following:

(a) On the issue of parity of sentencing, PW4 had pleaded guilty and was sentenced to one years’ imprisonment. The Prosecution was of the view that parity in sentencing was a relevant consideration.

(b) Both the accused persons had not demonstrated any remorse in the present case. Both of them had claimed trial to dispute material facts in the case. Despite this, they had chosen not to give evidence on the stand.

(c) There was no saving of resources in the present case. The trial had taken a total of 6 days of the courts’ time including the FM(Submissions) on 30 July 2021. Resources were expended in the prosecution of the case, with submissions totalling 59 pages and 7 prosecution witnesses and 20 prosecution exhibits.

Defence’ Mitigation and Position on Sentencing

297 Both Defence Counsels had informed me that their clients had disagreed with my decision to find them guilty and that they wished to appeal to the High Court against my decision.

298 Both Defence Counsels also submitted that their clients were entitled to claim trial to their charges as there had been no previous judicial pronouncement of the definition of “consort” by the High Court.

299 On the issue of sentencing, in view of parity of sentence, both Defence Counsels submitted that I should impose the minimum of 12 month’s imprisonment as PW4 had also been sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment for a similar offence.

My Sentence

300 The punishment prescribed under section 34(1) of the CLTPA and punishable under section 34(2) of the same Act was imprisonment for a term not less than 1 year and not exceeding three years.

The appropriate sentence in the present case

301 In the present case, I noted that PW4 had pleaded guilty to a similar charge and he was sentenced to the minimum 12 months’ imprisonment. Both the accused’s persons had claimed trial to the charges, and they were only convicted after 5 days of hearing. Whilst I accepted that both the accused persons had a right to claim trial and they were entitled to their day in court, I would agree with the Prosecution that they had unnecessary dragged the trial by disputing the material facts and challenging the Prosecution witnesses on what had purportedly taken place at the Blk 449 coffeeshop and then electing not to give evidence to the disputed facts and remaining silent after their defence was called.

302 As both the accused persons had claimed trial to both their charges, the usual sentencing discount which was applicable to an accused who had pleaded guilty to an offence was not applicable to both the accused persons.

303 Having considered all the above factors and taking into account the principle of parity of sentences between co-accused persons, I was of the view that a sentence of 13 months’ imprisonment was not unreasonable, and I accordingly imposed a sentence of 13 months’ imprisonment each on the both the accused persons.

304 Both the accused persons being dissatisfied with my decisions had filed their Notice of Appeal against my orders on conviction and sentence. I had also stayed both the sentences pending appeal. Both the accused persons had also been granted bail pending appeal.[Context] [Hide Context]

^{[note: 1]}See Exhibit P1

^{[note: 2]}See Exhibit P3

^{[note: 3]}See Exhibit P2

^{[note: 4]}See Exhibit P9 – PW4’s charge and Exhibit P10 - PW4’s Statement of Facts

^{[note: 5]}NE Day 1 Page 25

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^{[note: 14]}NE Day 1 Page 31, see Exhibit P14 which was extracted from Google Map showing the position of Clementi Police Division and the Clementi MRT

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^{[note: 140]}See Defendants’ Joint Response to Close of Prosecution’s Case dated 23 March 2021

^{[note: 141]}See Prosecution’s Closing Submissions filed on 15 June 2021 and Prosecution’s Reply Submissions filed on 9 July 2021

^{[note: 142]}Other statutes that use the term “consort” are: Arms Offences Act (Cap 14, 2008 Rev Ed), Corrosive and Explosive Substances and Offensive Weapons Act (Cap 65, 2013 Rev Ed), Public Order and Safety (Special Powers) Act 2018 (No. 26 of 2018) and Internal Security Act (Cap 143, 1985 Rev Ed). None of these statutes have defined what “consort” means.

^{[note: 143]}In a recent decision of PP v Suhaizad Bin Fadlilalaili [2020] SGDC 255 [TAB A], the accused pleaded guilty to, among other things, a charge for consorting with another police supervisee under section 34(1) of the CLTPA. The statement of facts reveals that the offender in that case had accepted the offer of a fellow supervisee who gave him a ride home. They were arrested after the car travelled for about fifty meters. The appeal against sentence was allowed to the extent that his global sentence was backdated to the date of his first remand. The co-accused, in PP v Muhammad Syafiq Bin Kwajah Fuhruddin Bismil (SC-908948-2018) was similarly charged and convicted. No appeal was filed in that case.

^{[note: 144]}NE Day 4 Page 51

^{[note: 145]}Oxford English Dictionary (Online version)

^{[note: 146]}Nadarajan s/o S Raman v PP [2001] SGDC 53 at [8]. The appeal against conviction and sentence was withdrawn.

^{[note: 147]}Tan Cheng Bock at [38]. See also, JD Ltd v Comptroller of Income Tax [2006] 1 SLR(R) 484 [TAB I] at [43]. These principles were affirmed in Yap Chen Hsiang Osborn v PP [2019] 2 SLR 319 [TAB J] at [32]

^{[note: 148]}Shanmugam Manohar v Attorney-General and anor [2021] 3 SLR 600 at [26]

^{[note: 149]}PP v Low Kok Heng [2007] 4 SLR(R) 183 at [57]

^{[note: 150]}See Arun Kaliamurthy and Ors v PP [2014] 3 SLR 1023 at [10] for this principle

^{[note: 151]}See Tan Cheng Bock at [38] for the principle that an absurd, unworkable or inconvenient result arising from statutory interpretation is not regarded as a possible one

^{[note: 152]}Woon Brothers Investments Pte Ltd v Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 461 and ors [2011] 4 SLR 77 at [22]

^{[note: 153]}Ting Choon Meng at [61]

^{[note: 154]}Ting Choon Meng at [61]

^{[note: 155]}Tan Cheng Bock at [40] – [41]

^{[note: 156]}Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (22 September 1955) vol 1 [TAB U] at col 761 – 762

^{[note: 157]}Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (13 August 1958) vol 7 [TAB V] at col 61

^{[note: 158]}Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (13 August 1958) vol 7 at col 609

^{[note: 159]}Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (6 Febrray 13 August 1958) vol 7 at col 60

^{[note: 160]}Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (2 September 1959) vol 11 [TAB X] at col 574 – 576

^{[note: 161]}Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (13 August 1958) vol 7 at col 606 – 607

^{[note: 162]}Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (15 October 1969) vol 29 [TAB Y] at col 108 – 109

^{[note: 163]}Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (6 February 2018) vol 94 at p 91

^{[note: 164]}CLTPA, section 34(1)

^{[note: 165]}CLTPA, section 36(b)

^{[note: 166]}Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) (Amendment) Act 2018 (No. 12 of 2018)

^{[note: 167]}Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) (Amendment) Act 2018 (No. 12 of 2018), sections 4 and 5

^{[note: 168]}Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (6 February 2018) vol 94 at p 45 – 46

^{[note: 169]}Tajjour v NSW [2014] HCA 35 (“Tajjour”) at [100]

^{[note: 170]}New South Wales, Legislative Council, Parliamentary Debates, 7 March 2012 [TAB EE] at 9091

^{[note: 171]}New South Wales, Legislative Council, Parliamentary Debates, 7 March 2012 at 9095

^{[note: 172]}New South Wales, Legislative Council, Parliamentary Debates, 7 March 2012 at 9095

^{[note: 173]}Vagrancy Act (Victoria) 1966 Act No. 7393/1966 (“Vagrancy Act”)

^{[note: 174]}Section 6(1)(c) of the Vagrancy Act stated: Any person who habitually consorts with reputed thieves or known prostitutes or persons who have been convicted of having no visible lawful means of support unless such person, on thereto being required by the court, gives to the satisfaction of the court a good account of his lawful means of support and also of his so consorting, shall be guilty of an offence

^{[note: 175]}Johanson v Dixon [1979] HCA 23; (1979) 143 CLR 376 at [9], per Mason J

^{[note: 176]}Tajjour at [209]

^{[note: 177]}Tajjour at [214]-[218]

^{[note: 178]}Tajjour at [215]-[216]

^{[note: 179]}CLTPA, section 30(a)

^{[note: 180]}Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2012 No 9 (“CCOC”)

^{[note: 181]}CCOC, section 26(1)

^{[note: 182]}CCOC, section 3(1)(a) and (b)

^{[note: 183]}Tajjour at [212]

^{[note: 184]}See Joint Defence Closing Submissions filed on 1 July 2021 and Defence Reply Submission filed on 12 July 2021

^{[note: 185]}See Defendants’ Joint Response at the Close of the Prosecution Case

^{[note: 186]}See Page 416 of Practitioners’ Library: Evidence in Criminal Trials, LexisNexis, 2002

^{[note: 187]}See Tan Cheng Bok at [54(c)(iii)]

^{[note: 188]}See Paragraphs 43-44 of the Prosecution’s Closing Submissions

^{[note: 189]}See Paragraphs 45-46 of the Prosecution’s Closing Submissions

^{[note: 190]}See Paragraph 48 of the Prosecution’s Closing Submissions

^{[note: 191]}See Paragraph 50 of the Prosecution’s Closing Submissions

^{[note: 192]}See Paragraph 51 of the Prosecution’s Closing Submissions

^{[note: 193]}See Paragraph 52 of the Prosecution’s Closing Submissions

^{[note: 194]}See Paragraphs 59-60 of Prosecution’s Closing Submissions

^{[note: 195]}See Paragraph 16 of Prosecution’s Reply Submissions

^{[note: 196]}See Paragraphs 71 to 75 of Defence Joint Closing Submissions