District Court of Singapore

Sarjit Singh s/o Sardara Singh v Panjit Kaur d/o Gurdev Singh
[2023] SGDC 171

Tort – Defamation – Defamatory statements

Tort – Defamation – Justification

Tort – Defamation – Fair Comment

8 August 2023

Judgment reserved.

District Judge Vince Gui:

Introduction

1 Khalsa Dharmak Sabha (“KDS”) is a place of worship for the Sikh community in Singapore. The Sikhs call it a Gurdwara.[note: 1] It is also known as a Sikh Temple.[note: 2]

2 In the morning of 6 December 2021, an altercation erupted at KDS. A bystander reportedly witnessed the Plaintiff berating a KDS cleaner. Seeing that the cleaner was almost in tears, the bystander intervened. He pleaded for the altercation to end.

3 After the altercation ended, the Plaintiff allegedly scolded the bystander for being a busybody. According to the bystander, the Plaintiff also used vulgar language on him.

4 The Plaintiff later found out from another KDS member that the bystander was an off-duty police officer. The Plaintiff lodged a police report against the bystander, alleging that the bystander had raised his voice at the Plaintiff and displayed acts of aggression. The bystander was called to provide a statement to the police.

5 The Defendant, a fellow member of KDS, took umbrage at the Plaintiff’s conduct upon learning of the incident. She circulated a notice calling for an extraordinary general meeting (“EGM”) to remove the Plaintiff from his position as a member of the management committee of KDS. The notice, amongst others, alleged that the Plaintiff had (1) uttered vulgarities at the bystander; and (2) humiliated and degraded the cleaner. Along with another act which I will elaborate below, the Defendant claimed that the Plaintiff had destroyed the sanctity of the temple.

6 The Plaintiff voluntarily stepped down from the management committee before the EGM was convened. After stepping down, he decided to sue the Defendant for defamation.

7 Parties gave divergent accounts of the incident at trial. I begin my judgment with a summary of the background facts.

Background facts

8 KDS, located at 18 Niven Road Singapore 238365, conducts regular worship and prayer sessions for the Sikh community in Singapore. The management committee of KDS manages the projects, subcommittees, employees and finances of KDS.[note: 3]

9 In addition to being a devotee and member, the Plaintiff was also a member of the KDS management committee. He was also the Chairman of its kitchen services, which vested him overall supervision of the kitchen, food hall and food service.[note: 4]

10 The kitchen, known as a “Langgar” to the Sikhs, served meals to its devotees free of charge. It was customary for devotees to donate a token sum to the cooks. Devotees would pass their donations to the cooks at the dining hall. This was because the cooks were paid a minimal wage by KDS (around $450 per month)[note: 5] and did not receive Central Provident Fund (“CPF”) contributions.[note: 6]

Shamoo allegedly taking money from devotees

11 The Plaintiff was upset that a KDS cleaner, Hardip Singh, known to the KDS members as “Shamoo”, had been seen appearing at the dining hall during meal service together with the cooks and collecting donations from devotees. He felt this was unbecoming. Unlike the cooks, Shamoo was drawing a salary of around $1,400 plus CPF contributions.[note: 7] The Plaintiff took the view that Shamoo did not deserve to collect donations.[note: 8]

12 Shamoo was, in fact, recruited by the Plaintiff. He first knew him when Shamoo was a waiter at a restaurant at Singapore Khalsa Association Club. He got retrenched when the Covid-19 pandemic hit. The Plaintiff recommended him to the KDS management committee. KDS eventually hired him as a cleaner.[note: 9]

13 The Plaintiff had spoken to Shamoo on various occasions to relay his concerns. He told him he should not be asking for money within KDS.[note: 10] According to the Plaintiff, he heard that Shamoo continued to ask for money.[note: 11]

The incident on 6 December 2021

14 Things came to a head on 6 December 2021. The Plaintiff and his wife visited KDS in the morning. The Plaintiff, upon seeing Shamoo, took the opportunity to confront him on whether he had been asking for money again.[note: 12]

15 Disparate accounts have been given as to what transpired thereafter. I will summarise the Plaintiff’s account and turn to discuss the other witnesses’ account.

16 According to the Plaintiff:[note: 13]

(a) Shamoo replied that he only asked for money from an individual named “Manjit”.

(b) The Plaintiff asked Shamoo to stop asking for money.

(c) Shamoo suddenly became aggressive and said “you and your family will die in the accident while travelling in your car”.

(d) Shamoo challenged him to a fight.

(e) The Plaintiff was shocked by the sudden, unprovoked behaviour.

(f) Zoravar Singh Bahadur (“Zoravar”), a fellow member of KDS, tried to calm Shamoo down.

(g) The Plaintiff decided to walk away.

(h) The Plaintiff’s wife was close by and witnessed the events above. She also walked away. They both went to the prayer hall at level 3.

(i) Zoravar suddenly shouted at the Plaintiff and asked why he was creating all these commotion. He did not give the Plaintiff a chance to explain himself. The Plaintiff decided to walk away. Just as he was walking towards the lift, Zoravar approached him aggressively and told him to “be careful”. The Plaintiff was caught off guard and decided to proceed to the prayer hall.

17 According to Zoravar:[note: 14]

(a) He attended KDS that morning to help with the morning prayer sessions. This was because KDS was shorthanded during the pandemic. At the end of the first prayer session, Zoravar was asked by one of the priests to stay on for the next prayer session at 10 am, and he agreed.

(b) At around 9.15 am, Zoravar heard a commotion at the shoe rack and wash basin area which was located near the main entrance of KDS. He saw Shamoo involved in an argument with the Plaintiff. At that time, he did not know who the Plaintiff was. He only found out who he was later.

(c) Zoravar did not want to get involved initially. He stood nearby to observe the argument.

(d) He observed the Plaintiff berating Shamoo, calling him, amongst others, a “bastard” and an “idiot”, and saying Shamoo did not know who he was. Shamoo retaliated saying that the Plaintiff did not know who Shamoo was. The Plaintiff threatened to call the police. Shamoo challenged the Plaintiff to do so as he did nothing wrong.

(e) Shamoo was almost in tears. Zoravar walked towards them and pulled Shamoo away. He tried to calm Shamoo down. However, the Plaintiff continued to berate Shamoo.

(f) Zoravar moved towards the Plaintiff and pleaded with him to stop. The Plaintiff refused and continued to shout at Shamoo.

(g) Zoravar eventually backed off. He did not want to escalate matters. He overheard the Plaintiff telling Shamoo that he knew Shamoo’s family and that Shamoo “got no money” and “go around asking for money”. Shamoo retorted that he had money. Shamoo also opened his wallet and showed it to the Plaintiff.

(h) The argument eventually died down. Zoravar entered the main building and sat next to the head priest. A few minutes later, the Plaintiff entered the main building and approached Zoravar. He tried to justify his actions. Zoravar told the Plaintiff that he did not want to get involved any further. The Plaintiff then asked Zoravar why he got involved in the first place. Zoravar told the Plaintiff that he felt such incidents should not take place in the temple.

(i) The Plaintiff turned aggressive. He asked, “who are you”. Zoravar gave him his name. The Plaintiff retorted, “so?” and called him” “stupid” and a “kaypoh”, which is a colloquial term for busybody.

(j) The Plaintiff walked away and stepped into the lift. As he was turned away, he cursed at him and said, “you go and die. You are a bastard”.

(k) Zoravar stood up and walked to the Plaintiff who was inside the lift. He told the Plaintiff to mind his words and that he had enough of him. The Plaintiff walked out of the lift, stared at him and challenged him by asking what he was “going to do about it”.

(l) He asked the Plaintiff who he was. The Plaintiff refused to reveal his name. Zoravar was really upset but did not wish to escalate matters. He walked away.

18 The Plaintiff’s wife, Sarjit Kaur d/o Atma Singh (the “Plaintiff’s wife”) filed an Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief (“AEIC”) corroborating the Plaintiff’s account. She concurred that Shamoo suddenly shouted “you and your family will die in the accident while travelling in your car”. She also testified that Shamoo challenged the Plaintiff to a fight. The Plaintiff’s wife was shocked by Shamoo’s behaviour. She did not want the confrontation to escalate and proceeded to the prayer hall. Shortly afterwards, the Plaintiff joined her at the prayer hall. According to her, the Plaintiff told her about his encounter with Zoravar.[note: 15]

19 Shamoo also testified at trial. His testimony was adduced orally because it transpired that he did not read the AEIC when he signed off on it. Parties agreed for him to give oral testimony in place of his AEIC. As he was proficient in neither English nor Punjabi, but more proficient in English than Punjabi, I proposed for him to give his evidence in English with a Punjabi interpreter on standby. Parties had no objections to this approach. In the end, he did not require the assistance of the Punjabi interpreter.

20 Shamoo’s testimony was largely consistent with Zoravar’s. Shamoo highlighted that the Plaintiff asked why he was taking money. Shamoo explained that there was nothing wrong with him taking money when people gave it to him. He said the Plaintiff called him a “bastard” and “idiot”. The Plaintiff threatened to call the police, to which Shamoo said he could do so since he did not do anything wrong.

21 After the incident, the Plaintiff lodged police reports against both Zoravar and Shamoo on the same day.

22 Against Zoravar, he alleged that:[note: 16]

(a) Zoravar suddenly raised his voice, and they had an argument.

(b) Zoravar “violently came towards [him] when [he] was taking the lift to prayers hall at level 3”.

(c) He understood Zoravar was from the “Marine police”.

(d) At that time, there was no reason for Zoravar to be “sitting at the counter with one of the priest without safe distancing”.

(e) What surprised him was as a police officer his behaviour was “uncalled for especially when he approached [him] violently and at that time causing an apprehension of fear (Which [sic] [he] understand is term as assault) in me [sic]”.

23 Against Shamoo, he alleged that:[note: 17]

(a) Shamoo had been asking money from several people in the temple.

(b) The Plaintiff had warned him against this practice before and warned him again on 6 December 2021.

(c) Shamoo became violent and challenged him to a fight.

(d) He understood that stopping him from doing this had made him hold a grudge against him.

24 Zoravar was called to the police station on 8 December 2021 and gave a statement. It was at this juncture that he found out that who the Plaintiff was.[note: 18]

25 Zoravar wrote an email to the President of KDS, Mr Satwant Singh (the “KDS President”) on 9 December 2021 to apprise him of the incident. He asked the KDS President to investigate the incident and let him know his findings. The KDS President acknowledged receipt and replied that he would raise this at the next management committee meeting. Zoravar however did not hear back from the KDS President.[note: 19]

26 The Defendant did not witness the incident on 6 December 2021. She heard about it from another member of the management committee called Sukhvir Singh. According to the Defendant, the Plaintiff’s actions infuriated many members and devotees. As the KDS President did not take action against the Plaintiff, she alleged that several members wanted to call for an EGM and vote on the removal of the Plaintiff from his position in the management committee.[note: 20]

The request to convene an EGM

27 According to the Defendant, she received a document titled “Notice for Extra-ordinary General Meeting” via her mailbox.[note: 21] The said notice called for an EGM to remove the Plaintiff from the management committee. It cited two instances to justify the removal. First was the Plaintiff having uttered “vulgarities” at Zorawar as well as having “humiliated” and “degraded” Shamoo. Second was him having invited a “non-member” to attend and speak at an Annual General Meeting (“AGM”) held on 27 November 2021.

28 I should also add that the said notice called for the removal of another committee member who is not a party to this action. As far as the Plaintiff is concerned, the relevant segment of the said notice reads as follows:[note: 22]

… We also wish to remove Sarjit Singh for filing a police report against Zorawar Singh. Zorwar [sic] Singh had been performing selfless sewa at [KDS]. Sarjit uttered vulgarities at Zorawar Singh. Sarjit also humiliated and degraded the staff Shamoo. He has invited a non-member, a sewadar, to attend the AGM meant for members and even asked the sewadar to speak at the AGM. Why is a sewadar attending the AGM. Sarjit has insulted every member of the temple by calling a non-member by calling a sewadar to attend the AGM.

We cannot condone their behaviour and they have destroyed the sanctity of the temple and we want them to be removed immediately.

I will refer to this passage hereinafter as the “Notice”.

29 The Defendant did not know who wrote the Notice and sent it to her. But she agreed with its contents. She decided to support the motion by collecting signatures from KDS members. She went to the Central Sikh Temple and Yishun Sikh Temple on or around 17 December 2021 and handed out copies of the notices by hand. A total of 73 signatures were gathered in support of the motion. This surpassed the 50 signatures required under the KDS rules and regulations required to convene an EGM. [note: 23]

30 An EGM was scheduled on 30 January 2022 and members were informed of this by way of a notice dated 14 January 2022. Before the EGM took place however, the Plaintiff voluntarily tendered a resignation notice. His resignation rendered the EGM moot. The EGM was not convened eventually.[note: 24]

31 Apart from the incident on 6 December 2021, the Notice also alleged that the Plaintiff invited a non-member to attend and speak at the AGM. I will now summarise the salient facts of this allegation.

Incident on 27 November 2021

32 It is undisputed that the KDS rules and regulations provided that only members can attend and vote at the general meeting. Non-members, known as “sewadar” to the Sikhs, are not allowed to attend general meetings, including an AGM.

33 It is also undisputed that a non-member, Jatinder Singh s/o Jasvir Singh (“Jatinder”) attended the AGM on 27 November 2021. Jatinder wanted to attend the AGM to address some allegations that were made about him during the AGM. The Plaintiff’s witness, Malkit Kaur d/o Karnam Singh (“Malkit”) testified that Jatinder was watching a live broadcast of the AGM from a television set located outside the AGM venue. When he tried to enter the AGM venue, he was denied entry.[note: 25]

34 The Plaintiff denied inviting Jatinder to the AGM. He alleged that Jatinder showed up on his own accord. But he testified that he did request that Jatinder be given a chance to explain himself at the AGM.[note: 26] This request was recorded in the minutes of meeting of the AGM. The KDS President did not accede to the request as Jatinder was not a member.[note: 27]

35 At trial, the Defendant clarified that as between the incident on 6 December 2021 and 27 November 2021, the incident on 6 December 2021 was the more serious one that prompted her to circulate the Notice.

36 Before I proceed further, I should caveat at the outset that out of the four days of trial, parties only extracted the transcripts of the audio recording for the first day of the trial. As the transcripts for the remaining three days were not extracted, I relied on my own notes to prepare this judgment. With that aside, I turn now to discuss the parties’ submissions.

Parties’ submissions

The Plaintiff’s submissions

37 The Plaintiff pleaded and submitted that the Notice was defamatory. He pleaded that the natural and ordinary meaning of the Notice are as follows:[note: 28]

(a) The Plaintiff had behaved in an unbecoming and disparaging manner by verbally abusing and humiliating Zoravar and Shamoo.

(b) The Plaintiff had abused his position as a member of the management committee by inappropriately inviting a non-member to attend and speak at the AGM.

(c) The Plaintiff had behaved in a sacrilegious manner and disrespected the customs of KDS and its members.

(d) The Plaintiff was not a fit and proper person to be a member of the management committee.

38 The Plaintiff submitted that the allegations pertaining to both incidents were untrue.[note: 29]

39 As regards the incident on 27 November 2021, the Plaintiff did not invite Jatinder to the AGM.

40 As regards the incident on 6 December 2021, the Plaintiff submitted that the Defendant did not prove the events panned out as alleged. He submitted that he did not call Shamoo a “bastard” or an “idiot”.

41 The Plaintiff submitted that the Defendant was the author of the Notice.

42 The Plaintiff also submitted that the Defendant, Zoravar and Shamoo were not credible witnesses.

The Defendant’s submissions

43 The Defendant conceded that she had circulated the Notice by collecting signatures for the requisition for EGM.

44 The Defendant submitted that the Notice was not defamatory. Reasonably well-informed members, according to the Defendant, would reserve judgment until the EGM when the complaints would be discussed and voted on. The sting of the Notice had been neutralised by the circumspection called for when viewing the Notice.[note: 30]

45 The Defendant further submitted that, in any event, the defence of justification and fair comment applied.

46 As regards the incident on 27 November 2021, the Plaintiff does not dispute that Jatinder attended the AGM and the Plaintiff asked him to speak at the AGM.

47 As regards the incident on 6 December 2021, the Defendant submitted that the Plaintiff could not give an explanation as to why Zoravar would become aggressive towards him, when he had met him for the first time that day. The Plaintiff also did not challenge Shamoo’s testimony that the Plaintiff called him a “bastard” and an “idiot” during the confrontation.

Issues

48 Based on the parties’ submissions, two main issues fall for consideration.

(a) First, whether the Notice is defamatory.

(b) Second, if the Notice was defamatory, whether the Defendant can avail to any defences.

Whether the Notice is defamatory

49 To succeed in a defamation claim, the Plaintiff must show that there was a statement (a) bearing a defamatory meaning; (b) published by the Defendant to a third party; and (c) referring to the Plaintiff (Golden Season Pte Ltd and others v Kairos Singapore Holdings Pte Ltd and another [2015] 2 SLR 751 (“Golden Season”) at [35]).

50 It is not disputed that the Defendant published the Notice to third parties and the Notice referred to the Plaintiff. The dispute centres on whether the Notice bore a defamatory meaning. Defamatory meaning is made out when the Plaintiff shows that the words tend to lower the Plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of the society (Aaron Anne Joseph v Cheong Yip Seng [1996] 1 SLR(R) 258 at [51]).

51 The Plaintiff submitted that the natural and ordinary meaning of the words are defamatory. The general principles applicable to the construction of statements based on natural and ordinary meanings are as follows (Chan Cheng Wah Bernard and others v Koh Sin Chong Freddie and another appeal [2012] 1 SLR 506 at [18]):

(a) the natural and ordinary meaning of a word is that which is conveyed to an ordinary reasonable person;

(b) as the test is objective, the meaning which the defendant intended to convey is irrelevant;

(c) the ordinary reasonable reader is not avid for scandal but can read between the lines and draw inferences;

(d) where there are a number of possible interpretations, some of which may be non-defamatory, such a reader will not seize on only the defamatory one;

(e) the ordinary reasonable reader is treated as having read the publication as a whole in determining its meaning, thus “the bane and the antidote must be taken together”; and

(f) the ordinary reasonable reader will take note of the circumstances and manner of the publication.

52 The Plaintiff submitted that the allegations would make a reasonable reader think that the Plaintiff had “disrespected valued members of KDS, disrespected KDS’ rules and acted irrationally in a scared place of worship”.[note: 31] The Defendant did not advance a competing interpretation in her written submissions.

53 In my view, the natural and ordinary meaning of the Notice is as follows:

(a) The Plaintiff used vulgar language on Zoravar, who was doing service (known as “sewa” to the Sikhs)[note: 32] out of goodwill, at that time.

(b) The Plaintiff was rude and condescending towards Shamoo, who was a staff at KDS.

(c) The Plaintiff had invited a non-member to attend and speak at the AGM, thereby insulting members of KDS.

(d) The Plaintiff’s conduct was unbecoming and had destroyed the sanctity of the temple.

54 The Defendant submitted that the Notice would not lower the Plaintiff in the estimation of KDS members. This was because the sting of the publication had been neutralised by the circumstances in which it was published.

55 The Defendant cited the case of Terrence Fernandez v Lim Shao Ying Genevieve [2020] SGHC 278 (“Terrence Fernandez”) for this proposition. Terrence Fernandez involved a workplace complaint filed by an employee against her supervisor. The supervisor sued the employee for defamation, alleging that the complaint was defamatory. The court held that the allegations in the complaint were not defamatory in the context of the publication because the readers, being members of the disciplinary committee, would have understood it to be “unsettled until due process has been accorded to it” as “part of a larger disciplinary framework”. In other words, the readers were expected to reserve judgment on the veracity of the allegations (at [39]-[40]). In these circumstances, the court held that the sting of the publication would have been neutralised by the context in which it was published.

56 The Defendant also relied on Fang Yiqiang and others v Goh Siong Heng Benson [2023] SGDC 11 (“Fang”) for the same proposition. In Fang, the plaintiffs sued the defendants for publishing a letter seeking to requisite an EGM at a condominium. In the letter, the defendant proposed to table a motion of no confidence against the management council and select a new management council. The court held that the letter comprised “complaints” to be put before the EGM, and subsidiary proprietors would “reserve judgment until [the EGM] when the complaints would be discussed and voted on” (at [21]). In arriving at this decision, the court cited Terrence Fernandez for the following proposition (at [20]):

… where the nature of an allegedly defamatory document was a complaint and where it was going to be part of a disciplinary process, the sting of any insult was neutralised by the context of the publication because a complaint necessarily entailed levving [sic] allegations which in turn would necessarily attract a certain degree of fair-minded scepticism from the original reasonable reader.

57 In the present case, I am not persuaded that the holding in Terrence Fernandez is directly applicable. The present facts are distinguishable on at least two counts.

(a) First, the allegations were not made in the context of a “disciplinary framework”.

(b) Second, the readers were not members of disciplinary committee but rather ordinary members of KDS.

58 It is not clear to me that KDS members would view the allegations with the same perspective as did the members of the disciplinary committee in Terrence Fernandez.

(a) Unlike members of a disciplinary committee, the ordinary members were neither required nor expected to investigate the allegations and reserve judgment. They were free to pass judgment on the allegations made.

(b) The ordinary members were not expected to even attend the EGM. The readers could be disinterested members who refused to sign off the requisition. Even for those who signed off the requisition, there was no assurance that they would show up at the EGM to hear the Plaintiff’s account.

(c) There was no “disciplinary committee” to adjudicate the allegations at the EGM. Instead, members attending the EGM could cast their votes, based on their own judgment. But the votes themselves are not necessarily a good indicator of the veracity of the allegations, since members are not expected to provide reasons for their voting decision. Votes may be casted for other reasons and not solely based on the members’ perception of the incident.

59 In my view, the holding in Terrence Fernandez should be read in the context that the readers were members of the disciplinary committee who were expected to reserve judgment on the allegations pending investigation and/or adjudication. While the court in Terrence Fernandez characterised the allegations as a “complaint”, that was not the main or sole basis for finding that they were non-defamatory.

60 Indeed, a separate High Court decision has held that a complaint can give rise to defamation. In Quantum Automation Pte Ltd v Saravanan Apparsamy [2019] 3 SLR 1383, the High Court explained as follows at [50]:

In my view, SA had confused different aspects of the case. A person may make a complaint whether to a government body or to a private body. However, his complaint may defame another person who is the subject of the complaint. In other words, defamation may occur even though it is part of a complaint. This does not mean that no one will dare to make a complaint. It means that a complainant has to be careful when he makes a complaint. If his complaint may defame an individual or some other entity, he has to be ready to defend himself if the need arises. There are various possible defences, eg, justification, qualified privilege and fair comment.

61 Does the fact that the allegations were made to requisite an EGM remove its sting? In my view, it does not necessarily do so. A broad analogy can be drawn with lawsuits involving remarks made by politicians during election rallies. Courts have found them to be defamatory (see for instance, Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v Lee Kuan Yew [1981-1982] SLR(R) 353 and Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v Lee Kuan Yew [1992] 1 SLR(R) 791). If that is correct, then it stands to reason that allegations made against the Plaintiff as a member of the KDS management committee, for the purposes of gathering signatures to call for an EGM to vote in favour of removing him from his position, should similarly be capable of being defamatory.

62 In summary, the natural and ordinary meaning of the Notice is defamatory. The Defendant did not manage to persuade me that the ordinary KDS member would attribute a different meaning to the Notice. In these circumstances, I find that the Notice would, on a balance of probabilities, lower the Plaintiff’s standing in the estimation of ordinary KDS members.

63 For completeness, I address one of the arguments raised by the Plaintiff briefly. The Plaintiff submitted that, for the purposes of publication, the Defendant was the one who authored the Notice. I make no specific finding on authorship for three reasons. First, the allegation was not pleaded in the Statement of Claim. Second, the Plaintiff did not lead credible evidence to prove that the Defendant was the author of the Notice. The evidence shows that there were others who knew about the incidents mentioned in the Notice. Third, it is undisputed that the Defendant did circulate the Notice and collected signatures for the motion, and that alone is sufficient to meet the requirement of publication for the purposes of finding defamation.

Defences

64 Having found that the Notice is likely defamatory, I now discuss whether the Defendant could avail herself to any defences.

65 The Defendant advanced the defences of (1) justification; and (2) fair comment. The Plaintiff did not raise opposing arguments on these defences in his closing submissions.

66 With that in mind, I first address the defence of justification.

Defence of Justification

67 The basis for the defence is truth. To succeed in the defence of justification, the Defendant must prove that the statement is true or substantially true. The Defendant only needs to prove the “sting” of the charge. Some leeway for exaggeration and error may be given (Golden Season at [85]-[87]).

68 According to the Defendant, she decided to approach members to sign the Notice to requisite an EGM for the purposes of removing the Plaintiff from the management committee because she was not optimistic that the KDS President would take steps to investigate and resolve the matter, in particular the incident of the Plaintiff humiliating and degrading Shamoo as well as insulting Zoravar. She felt this was unbecoming behaviour and wanted to send a signal that such conduct had no place in a place of worship like KDS. She came to learn of the incident on 6 December 2021 through someone else, and subsequently verified the narrative with Shamoo and Zoravar personally. She knew Shamoo personally. While she did not know Zoravar, she knew Zoravar’s mother.

69 I now express my views on whether the allegations on each of the two incident are true or substantially true.

Incident on 6 December 2021

(1) Analysis of the evidence

70 There is little documentary evidence to corroborate each party’s allegations. The issue turns on the witnesses’ testimony.

71 It is undisputed that there was an exchange between the Plaintiff and Shamoo first, and subsequently with Zoravar. It is also undisputed that the exchange between the Plaintiff and Shamoo became heated. When Zoravar noticed that the dispute had become heated, he stepped in to intervene and calm down parties. It is also undisputed that Zoravar did not know the Plaintiff or Shamoo personally. He was at KDS to perform voluntary service when he overhead the commotion.

72 It is also undisputed that the Plaintiff spoke to Shamoo during the incident. He lectured him for asking or taking money from KDS devotees. The Plaintiff felt this was unbecoming of Shamoo, who was paid a proper salary and came from a financially stable family.

73 The subsequent exchange between the Plaintiff and Shamoo is where parties depart.

74 According to the Plaintiff, Shamoo suddenly became aggressive and cursed his family to die in an accident while driving. The Plaintiff also alleged that Shamoo challenged him to a fight. The Plaintiff’s wife, upon witnessing this, walked away.

75 Shamoo’s account is that the Plaintiff berated him, calling him a “bastard” and “idiot”, for taking money from devotees. Zoravar gave a similar account, saying that the Plaintiff called Shamoo “bastard” and “idiot”, and accused Shamoo of “asking for money”.

76 I am inclined to believe Shamoo and Zoravar’s version of events. They both gave a largely consistent narrative which accords with logic and human behaviour. Conversely, I find the Plaintiff’s account to be contrived and illogical.

(a) For starters, I find it unbelievable that Shamoo would react so drastically to the Plaintiff’s simple suggestion that he stop asking for money from devotees. Why would Shamoo curse his family and challenge him to a fight? The normal reaction would have been to ignore the Plaintiff, tell the Plaintiff not to mind his business or simply pay lip service.

(b) Equally bizarre is Shamoo allegedly challenging the Plaintiff to a fight. Shamoo, in my observation, was of a much smaller and skinnier build than the Plaintiff. He also walked with a slight gait. He was clearly in advanced age. Conversely, the Plaintiff was of a sizeable build and likely much younger. I find it unlikely that Shamoo would challenge the Plaintiff to a fight in these circumstances.

(c) I also find it illogical that the Plaintiff’s wife, upon witnessing the dramatic escalation of events, would decidedly walk off, leaving his husband to fend for himself. The natural reaction would have been to either intervene the dispute and deescalate it, or offer to lend his husband support, be it in physical or at the very least in emotional form. I find it heard to believe that the Plaintiff’s wife had witnessed Shamoo challenging the Plaintiff to a fight.

77 The circumstantial evidence leans in favour of Shamoo’s and Zoravar’s account of events.

78 By his own account, the Plaintiff had already lectured Shamoo several times on his habit of taking donations prior to the incident. The Plaintiff was obviously upset with Shamoo, especially so when the Plaintiff was the one who introduced Shamoo to the job at KDS. By repeatedly taking money from devotees, Shamoo had let the Plaintiff down. On that day, the Plaintiff decided to up the ante in his lecture. He ended up berating Shamoo. In doing so, he let his emotions get the better of him.

79 Shamoo’s evidence was that Plaintiff called him a “bastard” and “idiot”. This was not challenged during cross-examination. This is also corroborated by Zoravar’s evidence which was that he heard the Plaintiff utter those words. Zoravar also witnessed Shamoo breaking down in tears. The verbal altercation must have gotten quite serious for Zoravar to intervene.

80 I am inclined to accord significant weight to Zoravar’s evidence not only because his testimony made sense but also because he is an independent witness who is not affiliated with either the Plaintiff or Shamoo. He did not know either of them. He intervened out of goodwill. While his efforts did help to calm down the dispute, the Plaintiff did not take his intervention kindly. He must have felt that Zoravar had no business to disrupt his lecture of Shamoo and decided to tell Zoravar why he was wrong to intervene.

81 The Plaintiff walked up to him minutes later to justify his actions. Zoravar did not want to get involved any further. The Plaintiff, upset that he did not get to explain himself, questioned Zoravar for getting involved in the first place. Zoravar explained that he was of the view that such acts of aggression should not take place in a place of worship. The Plaintiff must have taken that as a criticism of him. Unhappy with Zoravar’s response, he turned aggressive. He questioned Zoravar, “who are you”, and called him “stupid” and “kaypoh”. The Plaintiff also called Zoravar a “bastard”. Zoravar then told the Plaintiff to mind his words and that he had enough of the Plaintiff.

82 The Plaintiff, on the other hand, alleged that Zoravar “suddenly shouted” and asked him why he was creating all these commotion. He also alleged that Zoravar approached him “aggressively and told him to be careful”. Once again, I find his narrative bizarre. Why would Zoravar, who has had no dealings with the Plaintiff, shout at the Plaintiff and threaten him? Zoravar’s sole intention in the intervention was to calm things down. He was not present long enough to adjudicate who was in the right or wrong. That being the case, it made no sense for him to lecture the Plaintiff in the way he allegedly did. The Plaintiff likely filed the police report against Zoravar out of spite and anger, as he was unhappy with Zoravar meddling in his exchange with Shamoo and subsequently not allowing him a chance to justify his actions.

(2) Credibility of Shamoo and Zoravar

83 In the Plaintiff’s written submissions, the Plaintiff criticised the credibility of Shamoo and Zoravar.

(a) As regards Shamoo, the Plaintiff submitted that that his evidence is unreliable for two reasons. First, he affirmed the AEIC even though he did not read and understand its contents. Second, he was unable to provide a consistent recollection of the events on 6 December 2021.

(b) As regards Zoravar, the Plaintiff submitted that he embellished matters in response to the police report filed against him. Zoravar also did not mention that the Plaintiff called him “stupid” in his email to the KDS President on 9 December 2021.

84 I do not think that the criticisms are warranted.

85 I found Shamoo to be a credible witness. He was forthcoming in his answers. Although Shamoo’s account was abbreviated and scant on details, he was not articulate. He had a palpable stutter, which might have affected his ability and confidence in expressing himself. His educational qualifications were also rudimentary. Shamoo only had primary school education. But he could understand most of the questions posed and express himself adequately. Though the expression came in short sentences, it was still broadly understandable. He had no major difficulty conversing in simple English with counsel at trial. He was also largely able to understand and answer the questions that I had posed to him.

86 To be clear, while I struck out Shamoo’s AEIC at trial, that was not because he lacked credibility. It transpired that he did not read the AEIC which he had signed off. When I queried him on the contents of his AEIC, he could only understand bits and pieces of it. The AEIC was clearly drafted by someone else. His failure to read and understand the AEIC before signing off on it could, in part, be attributed to the Defendant’s solicitors and/or the Commissioner for Oaths before whom he affirmed the AEIC. I make no specific finding on why this came to be because these persons were not called to testify on this issue. Suffice to say, Shamoo’s failure to read and understand the AEIC should be understood in the context that he had a rudimentary understanding of the English language and the court process. Indeed, when asked at trial why he was in court, he said he did not know why. He said the Defendant only told him to attend court. I asked parties to submit on the consequences of Shamoo not having read and understood the AEIC that he had affirmed. I also indicated that I would like to hear his evidence as he was a material witness. In the end, counsel for the Plaintiff submitted that the prudent approach would be to expunge his AEIC and adduce his evidence orally. Counsel for the Defendant was on board with this approach.

87 As for Zoravar, I am of the view that he had mentioned the salient facts in his email to the KDS President on 9 December 2021. The mere omission of the word “stupid” which the Plaintiff had allegedly said to him does not, by itself, destroy his credibility. The email sufficiently captures the gist of what happened. While the email was sent after the Plaintiff filed a police report, that does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that he had embellished matters.

(3) Conclusion

88 I therefore find that the Defendant was justified in making the allegations she did. The Plaintiff likely used vulgar language on Zoravar. It is also likely that the Plaintiff was rude and condescending towards Shamoo. It is not disputed that such conduct was unbecoming in a place of worship like KDS.

Incident on 27 November 2021

89 This issue can be disposed of more easily. It is undisputed that the Plaintiff did ask the KDS President for permission for Jatinder, a non-member, to speak at the AGM. It is also undisputed that the KDS rules only allows members to speak at the AGM.

90 While the evidence revealed that, prior to the AGM, the Plaintiff likely did not invite Jatinder to the AGM in that Jatinder went up to the meeting hall on his own accord after hearing the broadcast downstairs, the fact of the matter is that the Plaintiff did invite him to speak during the AGM, and that is what matters. The invitation was made through the KDS President. If the President had granted permission, Jatinder would have formally attended the AGM and speak at the same. Both the Plaintiff and his witness, Malkit, testified that Jatinder had only appeared at the meeting hall and had not formally attended the AGM yet, because he was denied entry.[note: 33] By requesting for Jatinder to speak, the Plaintiff was essentially inviting him to formally attend the AGM.

91 I therefore find that the Defendant was justified in alleging that the Plaintiff had invited a non-member to attend and speak at the AGM. This contravened the KDS rules which restricted AGM attendance to members. Though I am not certain the invitation would necessarily constitute an “insult” to KDS members in the literal sense of the word, it would have undermined the membership rights of KDS members, and KDS members reading the Notice would have likely understood it in that context.

The Defendant’s credibility

92 For completeness, I deal with the Plaintiff’s submissions on the Defendant’s credibility. Much was made about the Defendant not being a credible witness. For the purposes of this judgment, it is not necessary for me to do a blow-by-blow analysis of every single allegation. I say so principally because the Defendant was not even present during the incident on 6 December 2021. It is more important to analyse the evidence of persons present during the incident, which I have done above.

93 As for the incident on 27 November 2021 at the AGM, my findings are made based on the Plaintiff’s witnesses’ testimony which was corroborated by the minutes of meeting of the AGM.

94 In any event, I would remark that I disagree with the Plaintiff’s submission that the Defendant was not a credible witness. In my view, the Plaintiff was nit picking at her evidence. Even if her evidence was not perfect, the Plaintiff failed to demonstrate how such imperfection would bear on the issues in dispute or that such imperfection was so material as to destroy her credibility.

Conclusion

95 In sum, I find that the Defendant was justified in making the statements in the Notice in relation to both incidents.

96 Given my finding that the defence of justification prevails, it is not necessary for me to address the other defence of fair comment. I will however address it for completeness, in the event that I am wrong on the defence of justification.

Defence of Fair Comment

97 To succeed in the defence of fair comment, the Defendant must prove that the following elements (Golden Season at [93]):

(a) the words complained of are comment;

(b) the comment is on a matter of public interest;

(c) the comment is based on facts; and

(d) the comment is one which a fair-minded person can honestly make on the facts proved.

Whether the words complained of are comments

98 The defence applies to comments and opinions but not allegations of fact (Golden Season at [94]). The test is an objective one, namely, whether an ordinary, reasonable reader on reading the article as a whole would construe it to be a comment or statement of fact. When the reader cannot readily distinguish whether the defendant is stating a fact or making a comment, the proper approach would be to deny the defendant of the defence (Golden Season at [94]).

99 A comment is “something which is or can reasonably be inferred to be a deduction, inference, conclusion, criticism, judgment, remark, observance, etc” (Review Publishing Co Ltd and another v Lee Hsien Loong and another appeal [2010] 1 SLR 52 at [141]).

100 In the present case, I am of the view that the Notice largely comprises statements of fact. The comments arising from the statements of facts are as follows:

(a) The Plaintiff has “insulted every member of the temple by calling a non-member … to attend the AGM”.

(b) The Plaintiff has “destroyed the sanctity of the temple”.

Whether the comments are on matters of public interest

101 What constitutes “public interest”? The Court of Appeal gave this phrase an expansive reading in Aaron Anne Joseph and others v Cheong Yip Seng and others [1996] 1 SLR(R) 258 (“Aaron Anne Joseph”) at [75], adopting the following passage in London Artists Ltd v Littler [1968] EWCA Civ 3; [1969] 2 QB 375, at 391:

Whenever a matter is such as to affect people at large, so that they may be legitimately interested in, or concerned at, what is going on; or what may happen to them or to others; then it is a matter of public interest on which everyone is entitled to make fair comment.

102 The Court of Appeal went on to find that the matter in that case concerning “a religious sect” was of legitimate public interest (at [76]).

103 In Loh Siew Hock and others v Lang Chin Ngau [2014] 4 SLR 1117 (“Loh Siew Hock”), the High Court further clarified that public interest is not confined to “matters of national importance, but also matters in which a significant number of people would have a legitimate interest in”. In that case, the court went on to find that the statements concerning funds held on trust for a clan association and the conduct of members of the management council was “understandably of concern to the members of [that clan association]”. The statements in that case were made in the run-up to the election of candidates into the next management council. The court was of the view that the statements referred to matters of public interest given that “many clan associations in Singapore run charitable initiatives” (at [90]).

104 In the present case, the Defendant submitted that the Notice was of public interest, since KDS had more than 1,000 members and the members ought to be appraised of what happened and decide whether the Plaintiff’s conduct renders him suitable to remain as a member of the management committee.[note: 34] The Plaintiff did not raise opposing arguments in his closing submissions, even though he had flagged this as one of the defences.[note: 35]

105 Like Aaron Anne Joseph, the statements in the Notice were made in the context of KDS which is a religious entity.

106 Though the statements were directed at the Plaintiff who was not in overall control of KDS, he was nevertheless a member of the management committee which is a significant matter as can be seen in the case of Loh Siew Hock. The Plaintiff’s evidence was that the management committee manages “all projects, subcommittees, employees and finances of KDS”.[note: 36] The Notice concerns his conduct and in turn suitability to remain on the management committee of KDS.

107 I should also add that it was common ground that KDS was a place of worship to not just its members but also the Sikh community in Singapore. The (peaceful) conduct of worship services, the general decorum of the temple’s personnel and the incidence of undesirable ruckus within the temple premises can be said to be of legitimate interest to devotees at large.

108 Considering the circumstances described above, and the fact that the Plaintiff did not challenge that the matter was of public interest, I find in favour of the Defendant on this issue.

Whether the comments are based on facts

109 I have found that the facts on which the comments are made are likely true for the reasons explained above in relation to the defence of justification.

Whether the comments are one which a fair-minded person can honestly make on the facts proved

110 In Aaron Anne Joseph, the Court of Appeal endorsed the following passage in in Silkin v Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd [1958] 1 WLR 743, at 749 (at [77]):

I will remind you of the test once more. Could a fair-minded man, holding a strong view, holding perhaps an obstinate view, holding perhaps a prejudiced view – could a fair-minded man have been capable of writing this? That is a totally different question from the question: Do you agree with what he said?

111 In my view, the Defendant was justified in making these comments. As I have explained above, readers would likely understand the Notice to mean that the Plaintiff had undermined the standing of KDS members by inviting a non-member to speak at the AGM. The Defendant was also justified in saying that the Plaintiff, by berating Zoravar and Shamoo near the main entrance of KDS, had violated the sanctity of the temple.

Conclusion

112 In sum, the Defendant has met all four requirements to invoke the defence of fair comment.

Conclusion

113 In summary, I find that the Notice is defamatory. But the Defendant is entitled to rely on the defences of justification and fair comment. These defences defeat the claim.

114 I dismiss the claim and will hear parties on costs and consequential orders, if any.[Context] [Hide Context]

^{[note: 1]}Defendant’s AEIC, para 1.

^{[note: 2]}Plaintiff’s AEIC, para 7.

^{[note: 3]}Plaintiff’s AEIC, para 7.

^{[note: 4]}Plaintiff’s AEIC, para 11.

^{[note: 5]}CT 27/03/2023, 62(15-19).

^{[note: 6]}Malkit Kaur d/o Karnam Singh (“Malkit”)’s AEIC, para 16.

^{[note: 7]}CT 27/03/2023, 62(15-19).

^{[note: 8]}Plaintiff’s AEIC, paras 51-52.

^{[note: 9]}Plaintiff’s AEIC, para 32.

^{[note: 10]}Plaintiff’s AEIC, para 53.

^{[note: 11]}CT 27/03/2023, 99(11-22).

^{[note: 12]}Plaintiff’s AEIC, para 54.

^{[note: 13]}Plaintiff’s AEIC, paras 54-61.

^{[note: 14]}Zoravar Singh Bahadur (“Zoravar”)’s AEIC, paras 6-21.

^{[note: 15]}Sarjit Kaur d/o Atma Singh (“Sarjit”)’s AEIC, paras 6-22.

^{[note: 16]}Agreed Bundle (“AB”) 8-9.

^{[note: 17]}AB 11-12.

^{[note: 18]}Zoravar’s AEIC, para 22.

^{[note: 19]}Zoravar’s AEIC, paras 24-26.

^{[note: 20]}Defendant’s AEIC, paras 12-15.

^{[note: 21]}Defendant’s AEIC, para 17.

^{[note: 22]}Plaintiff’s AEIC, p 53.

^{[note: 23]}Defendant’s AEIC, para 20.

^{[note: 24]}AB 16-19.

^{[note: 25]}Malkit’s AEIC, paras 24-25.

^{[note: 26]}CT 27/03/2021, 109(7-14).

^{[note: 27]}Hardeep Singh s/o Mokhtiar Singh (“Hardeep”)’s AEIC, p 21, AGM minutes, para 67.

^{[note: 28]}Statement of Claim, para 6.

^{[note: 29]}Plaintiff’s written submissions dated 12 July 2023, para 2.

^{[note: 30]}Defendant’s written submissions dated 12 July 2023, paras 21-27.

^{[note: 31]}Plaintiff’s written submissions dated 12 July 2023, para 6.

^{[note: 32]}CT 27/03/2023, 25(1).

^{[note: 33]}Malkit’s AEIC, para 25 and CT 27/03/2023, 18(9-13); 19(6-9) and 107(12-27).

^{[note: 34]}Defendant’s written submissions dated 12 July 2023, para 48(a).

^{[note: 35]}Plaintiff’s written submissions dated 12 July 2023, para 2(b).

^{[note: 36]}Plaintiff’s AEIC, para 7.