District Court of Singapore

Concept Math Education Centre Pte Ltd v Aw Bixi, Charlotte
[2023] SGDC 194

Intellectual Property – Copyright – Whether copyright subsists in tuition worksheets

Intellectual Property – Copyright – Infringement – Injunction – Principles governing the grant of permanent injunction

28 August 2023

District Judge Vince Gui:

Introduction

1 The Plaintiff ran a highly acclaimed primary school mathematics tuition business. It made its first million-dollar revenue within just two years of its launch in 2013. Two years later in 2015, around 600 students enrolled in its tuition classes. The number swelled to almost 1,000 by 2016. Its successes attracted significant media coverage for the Plaintiff and its founder, Ms Chuah Geok Lin (“Ms Chuah”) both in Singapore and abroad. The media dubbed her a “Super Tutor”.[note: 1]

2 The Defendant is the mother of a primary school student enrolled in the Plaintiff’s classes. Like all other students, her daughter received worksheets during the tuition classes for her enrichment. The Defendant however had other ideas. Realising its worth, the Defendant decided to run a side hustle. She made copies and sold them on an online marketplace called Carousell. To avoid detection, she hid behind various pseudonyms.

3 The Plaintiff eventually caught wind of the antics. Through investigations, it traced the pseudonyms to the Defendant. It issued cease-and-desist letters to the Defendant, demanding, amongst others, that the Defendant pay damages and issue written undertakings. As the Defendant did not meet the Plaintiff’s demands, the Plaintiff commenced this action for legal recourse.

4 After reviewing the Defendant’s pleadings, the Plaintiff applied for summary judgment. I was of the view that the Plaintiff was justified in seeking summary judgment as the Defendant’s pleadings and affidavit disclosed no reasonable defence to warrant a trial. In trying to dissuade me from granting a permanent injunction, counsel for the Defendant revealed during the hearing that the Defendant was in fact a teacher with the Ministry of Education (“MOE”) and had no intention of repeating the wrongs as she did not want to lose her job. I was not persuaded by this submission. In fact, I was of the view that it had quite the opposite effect of enhancing her culpability, as she had committed the wrongs despite her qualifications which would have acquainted her with the importance of academic integrity. I was also of the view that the infringements were systematic and premeditated. For additional reasons which I will elaborate later, I ordered a permanent injunction against her.

5 At the end of the hearing, I remarked that I would likely issue written grounds for my decision. This was principally because the parties’ submissions engaged an interesting issue of when a permanent injunction ought to be granted for copyright infringement. While Singapore courts frequently granted permanent injunctions against copyright infringement, the reasons for why and when such injunctions were granted have not been explored in our case law. Counsel for both parties turned to foreign authorities for guidance. I found the submissions and authorities on the foreign authorities to be of great assistance. In this written grounds, I hope to build on them and contribute to the jurisprudential discourse in this domain.

6 I begin with the background facts.

Background facts

7 The Plaintiff is the brainchild of Ms Chuah. Prior to starting the business, Ms Chuah had an accomplished teaching career with the MOE. In her 10-year tenure, she won various awards for her teaching excellence, including the Outstanding Contribution Award in 2001, 2004 and 2006.[note: 2] But her teaching endeavours took a toll on her personal time, and in 2009, she decided to quit her job to spend more time with her three children. Shortly thereafter came the birth of the idea to start of her own tuition business.

8 She started giving tuition at home while her children were at school. She started with five students, earning her about $1,000 a month. Her home tuition business grew rapidly. By the end of the first year, she had over 50 students, earning her up to $15,000 a month.[note: 3]

9 In 2011, Ms Chuah decided to open a tuition centre teaching primary school mathematics. Her business grew by leaps and bounds in the subsequent years. In 2015, the Plaintiff had 600 students. It ran 70 classes with six to seven students in each class. The student enrolment grew to 1,000 in 2016.[note: 4] Her tuition centre became popular through word of mouth. In a media interview, she mentioned that the waiting period for Primary 1 students was about a year. She credited the tuition centre’s success not to her business acumen but her passion for teaching. It was that passion that propelled the business to success.[note: 5]

10 At the heart of that passion was the Ms Chuah’s endeavour to curate a solid teaching pedagogy. The teaching pedagogy emphasised on developing students’ understanding of mathematical concepts and equipping them with the means to solve mathematical problems confidently and accurately. In keeping with that pedagogy, Ms Chuah decided to independently design and curate lesson worksheets and teaching materials. According to her, the Plaintiff does not follow the sequence of topics prescribed in the MOE syllabus. To her mind, the focus on concepts was the Plaintiff’s unique selling proposition.[note: 6]

The Plaintiff’s worksheets

11 As the Head of Curriculum of the Plaintiff, Ms Chuah first curated the lesson worksheets in 2010. Building on her earlier works, the Plaintiff’s curriculum team curated the worksheets that formed the subject matter of the present action between 1 September 2020 to 1 June 2021. The team comprised of Ms Chuah and five other individuals.[note: 7]

12 In April 2021, it came to the Plaintiff’s attention that someone was selling the Plaintiff’s worksheets on Carousell. The items listed for sale comprises 30 worksheets distributed to the Plaintiff’s Primary 2 students over the course of 30 lessons in three school terms in 2021 (the “Worksheets”).[note: 8]

13 The Worksheets incorporated most, if not all, of the following structure:[note: 9]

(a) Concept Notes: An overview of the concepts covered in the worksheet followed by short-answer questions.

(b) Guided Problem Sums: Problem sums requiring the application of the relevant concepts. Guidelines are given on how to complete them. These are to be completed under the guidance of the Plaintiff’s teaching staff.

(c) Higher-order Thinking Problem Sums: These problem sums are generally of higher level of difficulty.

(d) DIY Problem Sums: These problem sums are to be completed by the student on their own time.

(e) Optional Activity: An optional mathematics activity relevant to the concepts covered in the worksheet.

14 The Worksheets also sought to impart to the students a five-step framework that was created by Ms Chuah in 2017, which teaches students to (1) simplify the question; (2) use models to visualise the question; (3) analyse the question and identify the applicable concepts; (4) resolve the question using equations; and (5) test their answers.[note: 10]

15 In addition, the Worksheets featured problem-solving models, methodologies and frameworks which Ms Chuah independently created for specific concepts. Notable examples include: (1) the “GET” framework which teaches students how to use concepts like “grouping” and “sharing and giving” to solve questions regarding multiplication and division; (2) the “Naughty Ones” model which teaches students how to use concepts like the “comparison” concept to solve questions across topics like subtraction and division; and (3) the “Brick Layer” model, which teaches students how to use “simultaneous” concept to solve questions regarding the topic of mass.[note: 11]

16 While the Plaintiff took credit for the structure and framework of the Worksheets, it did not take credit for the individual questions and activities found therein. The Plaintiff selected and adapted these questions and activities from various public sources such as past-year Singapore school examination papers, websites and books.[note: 12]

17 Having said that, the Plaintiff took credit for the selection and arrangement of these questions and activities. According to the Plaintiff, this process involved various considerations such as (1) the relevancy to the concepts covered in the Worksheets; and (2) the degree of difficulty and suitability. This undertook significant time, effort and analysis on the part of its curriculum team. To this end, the Plaintiff highlighted that the final structure and contents of the Worksheets did not replicate any of the original sources from which the questions and activities were adapted.

18 Beyond the selection and arrangement of the questions and activities, the Plaintiff intentionally placed various teaching prompts nearby, to guide students on completing them. Ms Chuah was responsible for the design, layout and contents of these teaching prompts.[note: 13]

19 Ms Chuah explained that the Plaintiff was the rightful copyright owner of the Worksheets. In this regard, each member of its curriculum team had entered into contracts with the Plaintiff undertaking to vest in the Plaintiff copyright to authorial works generated during their employment.

20 I have spent some time narrating the contents of the Worksheets because the Defendant argued that the Worksheets were not original enough to attract copyright protection. I will come back to this point later.

Unauthorised sale

21 As mentioned above, the Plaintiff discovered that someone was selling the Plaintiff’s Worksheets on Carousell in or around April 2021. The Worksheets were listed for sale under an account with the username “Charsuu” (the “Carousell Account”).

22 The Plaintiff suspected that the Carousell Account belonged to a student who was enrolled in the Plaintiff’s classes at the material time. This was because the worksheets listed for sale were Worksheets that had been distributed to its students in or around 30 December 2020 and 29 March 2021.[note: 14]

23 The Plaintiff decided to find out the identity of this student. Between 5 May 2021 and 10 May 2021, the Plaintiff engaged someone to contact the Carousell Account via the Carousell messaging platform, indicating interest to purchase the Worksheets, specifically, the 2021 Primary 2 Term 1 worksheets. The buyer specifically asked for those “with notes already”. Based on the information provided by the Carousell Account, the buyer paid $30 to a PayNow account whose name was stated as “Serlin”. The next day, the buyer received the worksheets from an email address “wgjq2019@xxxxxxxxx [redacted]”. The sender’s name was indicated as “Wilbur Goh”.[note: 15]

24 The Worksheets supplied to the Plaintiff contained handwritten notes by both the student and the teacher. Based on these markings, the Plaintiff conducted internal investigations on the student from whom the Worksheets originated. The Plaintiff noticed the teacher’s markings contained a unique chop used by one “Ms Jeslyn”. It approached her to find out who the student was.

25 Ms Jesyln was of the view that the Worksheets belonged to a student whom I will refer to by the moniker of “Beatrice”.[note: 16] Beatrice was not the real name of the student. While parties did not apply for redaction or sealing orders, I decided not to reveal her real name as she is a minor. I should also state for the record that the Plaintiff did not allege that Beatrice was involved in the unauthorised sale of the Worksheets. The allegations were made against the Defendant alone.

26 The Plaintiff compared the supplied Worksheets against Beatrice’s worksheets in its original form. They were identical. This confirmed Ms Jeslyn’s view that the supplied Worksheets indeed originated from Beatrice.[note: 17]

27 The Plaintiff decided to make another purchase of the Worksheets. On or around 6 September 2021, the Plaintiff engaged someone to contact “Serlin” directly via Whatsapp messenger, using the mobile number previously provided by the Carousell Account. Serlin agreed to sell Worksheets for the 2021 Term 1, 2 and 3 that came with answers. When the Plaintiff’s agent asked to verify that the Worksheets were sourced from a student in the Plaintiff’s classes, Serlin mentioned that they came from her daughter called “Eunice” and that the agent was free to direct questions to Eunice. The Plaintiff’s agent made a bank transfer of $120 to Selin for this transaction. This time, the Worksheets were sent via email from another account called “galoreperfume@xxxxxxxxx [redacted]”. The name of the sender was indicated as “---”. Once again, the Plaintiff cross-referenced the Worksheets supplied by Serlin against Beatrice’s worksheets, and they turned out to be identical.[note: 18]

The confrontation

28 Armed with the compelling evidence, the Plaintiff decided to confront the Defendant. On 24 September 2021, the Plaintiff’s former solicitors issued a demand letter alleging that the Defendant had infringed the Plaintiff’s copyright by reproducing and selling the Worksheets. The Plaintiff also alleged that the Defendant had breached the terms of the tuition contract and that the Defendant was acting in concert with third parties as part of a syndicate, which included Serlin and Eunice.[note: 19]

29 On 25 September 2021, the Defendant replied via email taking responsibility for the copyright infringement. She said:[note: 20]

I have asked my friend whom I send the soft copy to remove all and she only sold to 1 person online. We are sorry for the matter and will take full responsibility of this matter. …

30 As the Defendant did not respond to the Plaintiff’s demands for her to rectify the wrongs, the Plaintiff’s former solicitors repeated the allegations in another letter dated 30 September 2021. Further reminder letters were sent on 6 and 11 October 2021.[note: 21]

31 On 15 October 2021, the Defendant’s solicitors wrote back saying that the Defendant had used the names “Eunice” and “Serlin” to “avoid revealing her true identity to strangers online”. Her solicitors admitted that the infringing Worksheets originated from Beatrice.[note: 22]

32 In the demand letters, the Plaintiff also demanded the Defendant to make amends. They requested the Defendant to, amongst others, issue an undertaking not to commit further infringements, issue a letter of apology, pay damages and make a statutory declaration that she has complied with the above requests. As the Defendant did not meet the Plaintiff’s demands, the Plaintiff commenced legal action, alleging copyright infringement and breach of the tuition enrolment contract that the Defendant had signed. Clause 9 of the said contract stated:[note: 23]

Parents and students undertake not to make copies or allow copies to be made of materials and/or documents used during lessons or provided outside lessons. Any reproduction or disclosure of such materials and/or documents requires prior written consent of [the Plaintiff].

Parties’ pleaded case and submissions

33 I now summarise the parties’ respective claims.

34 The Plaintiff pleaded and alleged that the Defendant infringed its copyright as well as breached the tuition contract. The Plaintiff further pleaded that copyright subsists in the Plaintiff’s selection and arrangement of the Worksheets.

35 The Defendant pleaded that the Plaintiff was not the copyright owner. The contents of the Worksheets, she alleged, were drawn from publicly available sources which belonged to third parties. She further alleged that the Plaintiff’s selection and arrangement of the contents were not original, in that the same or similar compilations can be found in published textbooks and assessment books.

36 The Defendant further mounted a claim of harassment. The Defendant alleged that the Plaintiff used “threatening, abusive and/or insulting words or behaviour” in its demand letters. The Defendant alleged that the Plaintiff threatened to disclosure the Defendant’s admissions of the copyright infringement to third parties, and such threat caused the Defendant harassment, alarm and/or distress.

37 In the summary judgment application, the Plaintiff submitted that the Defendant had no real defence. The Plaintiff alleged that the Worksheets were independent created by its curriculum team. It sought the following orders:

(a) a declaration that the Defendant had infringed its copyright and breached the contract;

(b) an injunction against the Defendant for future infringements; and

(c) an order for delivery up of all infringing copies of the Worksheets.

38 The Defendant did not challenge that copyright infringement was made out by reason of her selling the Worksheets.

39 The Defendant resisted the injunctive relief but did not resist the other reliefs sought.

Law on Summary Judgment

40 The purpose of summary judgment is to enable a plaintiff to obtain quick judgment – without trial – if the defendant has no defence to the claim (Samsonite IP Holdings Sarl v An Sheng Trading Pte Ltd [2017] 4 SLR 99 at [152]). To obtain summary judgment, the plaintiff has to show a prima facie case, upon which the tactical burden shifts to the defendant to show that there is a fair or reasonable probability that he has a real or bona fide defence (M2B World Asia Pacific Pte Ltd v Matsumura Akihiko [2015] 1 SLR 325 (“M2B”) at [17]-[18]). To do so, the defendant must produce some evidence. The court will not grant leave to defend if the defendant provides bare assertions or if the assertions are unequivocal, lacking in precision, inconsistent or inherently improbable (M2B at [19]).

Issues for determination

41 Based on the parties’ submissions, two main issues arose for consideration.

42 First, whether copyright subsists in the Plaintiff’s compilation of the Worksheets.

43 Second, if the compilation warrants copyright protection, whether a permanent injunction ought to be granted against the Defendant.

Whether copyright subsists in the Worksheets

The originality requirement

44 Copyright law protects authorial expressions (Global Yellow Pages Ltd v Promedia Directories Pte Ltd [2017] 2 SLR 185 (“Global Yellow Pages”) at [15]). To obtain copyright protection, the claimant must show that the authorial expression is original.

45 The threshold for establishing originality is low. It does not require the claimant to show that the expression is novel or inventive. It requires the claimant to show that the authorial expression originated from the author, in that it must not be slavishly copied from another source (Asia Pacific Publishing Pte Ltd v Pioneers & Leaders (Publishers) Pte Ltd [2011] 4 SLR 381 (“Asia Pacific Publishing”) at [101]). In addition, there must be a modicum of creativity or the exercise of sufficient mental labour, skill or judgment towards the authorial creation (Global Yellow Pages at [24]).

46 Authorial expressions manifest in all shapes and forms. In the present case, the authorial expression is the compilation of educational materials. When it comes to compilations, the underlying facts and data are not copyrightable. It is the authorial presentation of the facts and data that warrants copyright protection. To obtain protection, the author must display some “identifiable element of skill and labour” or creativity (Asia Pacific Publishing at [102]). What is sufficiently creative depends on the facts of each case. It is however clear and undeniable that the presentation must be “more than a bare recital” of the data (Asia Pacific Publishing at [102]).

47 The principle that the presentation must demonstrate a modicum of creativity is illustrated in the case of Global Yellow Pages. In that case, the Court of Appeal found that copyright did not subsist in the selection of the business listings because it was not creative. However, the court found that the arrangement of the listings exhibited sufficient creativity, albeit barely. The court took the view that the claimant arranging names beginning with numerals were immediately in front of entries bearing the first letter of the alphabet of the first digit was creative enough to warrant copyright protection. It is also apparent from this holding that the originality requirement is not difficult to satisfy.

48 The originality requirement is not unique to Singapore. It is widely used by courts across many jurisdictions. Applying this yardstick, courts have granted copyright protection to compilation of educational or academic materials. Due to the lack of Singapore case law on such compilations, counsel for the Plaintiff cited various cases from abroad. I will discuss them to illustrate how the originality requirement is applied to such compilations.

49 In Boyapati v Rockefeller Management Corporation [2008] FCA 995, the claimants operated a business which prepared practice exams sold as part of a preparation course for candidates for the Undergraduate Medicine and Health Sciences Admission Test (“UMAT”). The claimants sued the defendants for reproducing 800 of its practice questions and answers. The Federal Court of Australia found that the claimants had contributed sufficient independent skill, judgment and labour to satisfy the requirement of originality (at [44]). They had created about half the questions and answers from scratch. As for the remaining questions and answers that were derived from third party sources, the claimants (at [45]):

(a) used these sources in different ways, selecting, adapting and modifying them to vary degrees to suit her purpose of compiling sets of practice exams that simulated the UMAT;

(b) exercised skill and judgment in selecting the questions and including them in one of the two sections, depending on whether it concerned logical reasoning or interaction skills, even where they made minimal modification to the pre-existing questions; and

(c) exercised a degree of skill and judgment in organising the sequences and the number of questions in each section so as to simulate the UMAT.

50 In Assessment Technologies Institute, LLC v Cathy Parkes, 2022, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70421, the United States District Court (“USDC”) for the District of Kansas held that while the underlying facts in the modules of a nursing textbook were not protectable, the claimant’s choice of which facts to include, the order in which to include them and how they are arranged were original (at 24). Further, the defendant in that case pointed to no evidence demonstrating that the claimant copied the exact selection from another source or that there was but one way to arrange and collect the nursing facts.

51 In Educational Testing Service v Simon, 95 F.Supp. 2d 1081 (C.D.Ca. 1999), the claimant developed standardised tests, including the Multiple Subjects Assessments for Teachers (“MSAT”) used for licensing teachers in California. The USDC for the Central District of California held that the claimant’s selection of topics to be covered in a particular MSAT form and questions to test those topics easily met the originality threshold. It was an exercise requiring judgment and creativity (at [51]-[52]).

52 In Faulkner Press, LLC v Class Notes, LLC 756 F.Supp.2d 1352 (2010), the USDC for the Northen District Court of Florida reached a similar conclusion in respect of film study questions. Although the facts were copied from other sources, the claimant picked only a few facts from each film to include in his film study questions. And while there may be nothing innovating or surprising about his selection, the selection was nevertheless original because it was “not a mechanical or routine arrangement”. The selection was unique to the claimant and unlikely to be duplicated by someone else. Some creativity was involved. The court therefore granted copyright protection to the questions (at 3).

Present facts

53 In the present case, it was clear to me that there was at least a modicum of creativity, skill or judgment involved in the selection and arrangement of the Worksheets. My reasons are as follows.

54 First, the Plaintiff’s curriculum team independently shortlisted and selected questions to include in the Worksheets. They had to trawl through over 50 test papers in deciding which questions to include in the Worksheets.[note: 24] Indeed, it was not disputed that the public domain contained a plethora of test papers and worksheets pertaining to primary school mathematics. In selecting which questions to include in the Worksheets, the Plaintiff would have exercised skill and judgment. While the questions may have been sourced elsewhere, the Defendant did not show that the Plaintiff reproduced the questions wholesale from a single source.

55 Second, the Plaintiff’s curriculum team independently created the conceptual structure for the Worksheets. As explained above, the Worksheets mostly incorporated a five-step framework to guide students through the questions, starting from an explanation of the concepts, followed by guided problem sums, and then more difficult questions to be done both in and outside class and finally an optional activity. The Defendant asserted that this framework was copied from other assessment books. But counsel for the Defendant was unable to make good this assertion at the hearing when a side-by-side comparison was made to these assessment books. The assessment books cited by the Defendant did not contain the same five-step framework.[note: 25]

56 Third, the Plaintiff included independently created content within the Worksheets. The Plaintiff explained that the Worksheets also featured:[note: 26]

(a) notes explaining the concepts that were independently created by Ms Chuah;

(b) problem-solving models, methodologies and frameworks which Ms Chuah had independently created for specific concepts;

(c) Ms Chuah’s avatar which was used for pictorial illustrations and cartoon images; and

(d) teaching prompts which Ms Chuah was responsible for creating in terms of the design, layout and contents.

57 Fourth, the Plaintiff independently determined the order in which the questions would appear in the Worksheets. The Plaintiff explained that the questions were arranged in order of difficulty, from basic to intermediate to advanced. The Defendant asserted that arrangements based on difficulty is commonplace and nothing new. While that may well be true, the Plaintiff still had to exercise independent skill and judgment to assess the difficulty of the questions and categorise them based on their difficulty.

58 For these reasons, I was satisfied that the compilation of the Worksheets was the product of skill and judgment of the Plaintiff’s curriculum team. They were also sufficiently creative. The Defendant led no evidence to show that they were slavishly copied from another source or that there was only one way to present the questions.

59 I therefore found that copyright subsists in the compilation of the Worksheets.

60 The Defendant did not dispute that she had infringed the Plaintiff’s copyright by reproducing and selling the Worksheets without permission. Indeed, she had admitted to the infringement in the pre-trial correspondence.

61 For the purposes of the summary judgment, the Plaintiff sought both declaratory and injunctive reliefs. The Defendant’s counterclaim for harassment could not prevent the Plaintiff from entering summary judgment by way of a set-off since the Plaintiff was not seeking damages in this action. In any event, the Defendant did not establish that the harassment claim was plausible. Even assuming the Plaintiff were claiming damages, the Defendant still had to quantify the value of the counterclaim to prevent the Plaintiff from entering summary judgment (see Barun Electronics Co Ltd v EZY Infotech Pte Ltd [2020] SGHC 154 at [62]). She did not do so.

62 The Defendant also did not challenge the declaratory reliefs sought from the Plaintiff. She did however challenge the injunctive relief. Her opposition was founded on the premise that she had no intention to continue the infringements. I will now discuss whether injunctive relief ought to be granted.

Whether permanent injunction should be granted

63 A quick survey of the case law shows that Singapore courts have readily granted permanent injunctions (also known as final injunctions) for copyright infringement.

64 This can be seen in cases such as PH Hydraulics & Engineering Pte Ltd v Intrepid Offshore Construction Pte Ltd and another [2012] 4 SLR 36 (“PH Hydraulics”) at [95]; Nanofilm Technologies International Pte Ltd v Semivac International Pte Ltd and others [2018] 5 SLR 956 at [206]; New Line Productions, Inc and another v Aglow Video Pte Ltd and others and other suits [2005] 3 SLR(R) 660 at [113]; The Wave Studio Pte Ltd and others v General Hotel Management (Singapore) Pte Ltd and another [2022] SGHC 142 at [207]; FUJIFILM Business Innovation Asia Pacific Pte Ltd and others v PTC Business Systems Pte Ltd [2022] 4 SLR 737 at [224(b)]; and Pioneers & Leaders (Publishers) Pte Ltd v Asia Pacific Publishing Pte Ltd [2010] 4 SLR 744 (“Pioneers”) at [88].

65 These cases however did not discuss the requirements for granting the injunctive relief. Injunction was simply granted as a matter of course upon a finding of copyright infringement. To better understand the jurisprudential basis of the injunctive relief, I directed parties to do further research and address this issue by way of supplemental submissions.

66 Three distinct approaches can be gleaned from the Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s submissions. They were as follows.

(a) Injunctions are predicated on the continued used of the copyrighted material. The court should be slow to grant injunctions where the infringement has stopped. I will refer to this as the “Continued Use Approach”.

(b) Injunctions are predicated on the threat or likelihood of future infringements. The claimant must establish this to obtain injunctive relief. I will refer to this as the “Likelihood of Future Infringement Approach”.

(c) Injunctions are predicated on copyright being a property right. That being the case, injunctions should be granted upon infringement in the absence of special circumstances. I will refer to this as the “Property Approach”.

67 It would be apparent that the three approaches call upon different evidential requirements.

(a) The Continued Use Approach is the most onerous of them all for the claimant. To obtain injunctive relief, the claimant must show that infringement is ongoing at the time of the hearing.

(b) The Likelihood of Future Infringement Approach poses a lower threshold in requiring the claimant to only show that the infringement is likely to recur or continue in the future.

(c) Finally, the Property Approach is the most lenient of them all as the claimant is prima facie entitled to injunctive relief barring special circumstances.

68 Before I proceed further, I should also clarify that these three approaches are separate and distinct from the equitable defences that the defendant may raise to resist the relief sought. Injunctions may be refused on equitable grounds such as the claimant’s acquiescence or laches (George Wei, The Law of Copyright in Singapore (SNP Editions, 2nd Ed, 2000) (“George Wei”) at [10.87]-[10.89]).

69 In the present case, the Defendant advocated for the Continued Use Approach and the Likelihood of Future Infringement Approach. She submitted that injunction was not necessary since there was no evidence of continued infringements at the time of the hearing. She further submitted that she had no intention to commit future infringements since she did not want to lose her job as a MOE teacher.

Continued Use Approach

70 I first discuss the Continued Use Approach.

71 In my view, the Continued Use Approach has no merit. To begin with, the Continued Use Approach finds no support in the case law. The Defendant cited two precedents in support of this proposition (PH Hydraulics at [79] and Pioneer at [88]. While the court in those cases granted injunction because there were continued infringements, the court did not say that continued infringement was a prerequisite for granting injunctions. As I mentioned above, the cases did not discuss the requirements for granting injunctions. It is significant that the court in those two cases did not restrict injunctive relief to continued or ongoing infringements. It seems to me that the court was more than ready to grant injunctions on the facts of those cases, particularly because there were ongoing infringements. The court did not say that injunction would not be warranted in cases where the infringements have stopped or paused at the time of the hearing. In any event, courts have granted injunctive relief in the absence of continuing infringements, a point which I will illustrate by reference to other cases shortly.

72 Precedents aside, the Continued Use Approach is also prone to abuse. Defendants can easily skirt injunctions by pausing infringements close to the hearing, only to resume after the claim has been disposed of. Claimants may well be forced to start proceedings afresh to obtain injunctive relief. This not only results in wasted time and costs but also provides the defendant with opportunities to continue infringing the claimant’s rights until the court orders an injunction. Predicating injunctive relief on continued infringements seems incongruous with the purpose of injunctions, which is to prevent future breaches. If a defendant subjectively desires to commit future infringements or if there is a threat of future infringements, it is difficult to understand why the claimant should be deprived of an injunction to protect its rights. For these reasons, I was of the view that the Continued Use Approach presents an overly high threshold that does not resonate with the principles and policy for granting injunctive relief in copyright infringement cases.

Property Approach

73 I turn now to discuss the Property Approach. I propose to discuss this next as the Property Approach finds support in a long line of authorities dating back over a century.

74 One of the first cases that pronounced the Property Approach was Weatherby & Sons v International Horse Agency and Exchange Ltd [1910] UKLawRpCh 83; [1910] 2 Ch 297 (“Weatherby”). In that case, the defendants compiled a book which contained practically the whole of the claimant’s previously published authorial work. The claimant sought an injunction to restrain the defendants from infringing its copyright. Parker J readily granted an injunction to restrain future infringements. He explained (at 305):

After all copyright is property, and an action to restrain the infringement of a right of property will lie even if no damage be shewn.

75 The court’s readiness to grant injunctive relief is also evident in Performing Right Society Ltd v Mitchell [1924] 1 KB 762 (“Mitchell”). In this case, the defendants engaged a band to play music in a hall that they were occupiers of. The agreement with the band provided that the band should not infringe copyright in the music that they were to play. There was also a notice posted in the hall that states “only such music as may be played without fee or licence is allowed to be played in this hall”. The band, on one occasion, played music of which the copyright belonged to the claimants without licence. The defendants did not know of the copyright infringement and had no reason to suspect that the infringement would take place. The court nevertheless felt that an injunction was warranted against the defendants. In explaining his decision, McCardle J gave three reasons (at 774). First, injunction was the normal remedy for infringement. Second, the defendants not only denied infringement in their defence but also denied the claimants’ copyright. Third, although the claimants before trial offered to accept an undertaking, the defendant refused to give it. Although the court stopped short of grounding the remedy to copyright being a property right, its reasoning evinces a clear intention to grant injunction upon a finding of infringement in the absence of compelling circumstances. Crucially, the court was prepared to grant an injunction even though the defendants had taken various measures to prevent infringement and even reminded the band not to infringe copyright in their music.

76 The same readiness to grant an injunction was in full display in the subsequent decision of Samuelson v Producers’ Distributing Co Ltd [1932] 1 Ch 201 (“Samuelson”). The infringement here concerned a sketch made by the claimant which had achieved considerable success in stage plays. The defendants infringed the copyright in advertisements issued to promote its own film. In delivering his decision, Romer LJ remarked that the court “will always interfere by injunction to restrain irreparable injury being done to the [claimant’s] property” and on the facts of that case, the sketch was the claimant’s property, and “how it can be said that these advertisements might not cause irreparable damage to that property … passes [his] comprehension” (at 210).

77 Fast forwarding to more recent decisions, Lightman J held in Banier v News Group Newspapers Limited [1997] FSR 812 (“Banier”) that the claimant is prima facie entitled to an injunction upon establishing an infringement of his copyright. The claimant in this case took a photograph of the Princess Caroline of Monaco which was published in The Times newspaper under a license. The defendant tried to obtain a similar licence but was not able to contact the claimant before its publication deadline. It went ahead and published the photograph without permission. Upon seeing the publication, the claimant sued and sought summary judgment. The English High Court had no difficulty granting the injunction sought. While the defendant offered an undertaking prior to the commencement of the action, the court was not persuaded by it because it contained a “totally false justification” of the infringement. Further, the defendants continued to dispute the claimant’s entitlement to copyright and maintained a hopeless justification of its conduct (at 24).

78 The Property Approach was further expounded in the case of MacMillan Publishers Ltd v Thomas Reed Publications Ltd [1993] FSR 455 (“MacMillan”). The claimants and the defendants were both publishers of almanacs for the use of yachtsmen and others. A common feature of almanacs was small charts (called “chartlets”) depicting specific areas of the coastline. The claimants sued the defendants for infringing their chartlets. In the action, the claimants applied for summary judgment, claiming a permanent injunction in respect of 22 chartlets. In granting the permanent injunction, Mummery LJ explained that “copyright is a property right; it has been infringed” and it was no trivial matter to infringe the copyright in the 22 chartlets (at 467). He also endorsed the rationale for this approach. Withholding an injunction is essentially sanctioning future infringements of a property right on payment of damages. To do so, he explained, would “in many cases amount to granting a compulsory licence … to the defendant to do what the defendant should not have done” (at 465).

79 The Property Approach was also endorsed in similar terms in Colgate Palmolive Ltd v Markwell Finance Ltd [1990] RPC 197 (“Colgate”). The court held at 200:

… It is a well-settled principle, supported by an abundance of authority that, in respect of property rights, in particular intellectual property rights such as patents, copyrights, trade marks and the right to protect goodwill against passing off, a person whose right has been infringed is entitled to come to court to have his right pronounced upon and vindicated and to an injunction against the infringer …

80 Similarly, in Ludlow Music Inc v Williams and others [2000] IP & T 1440, the English High Court endorsed the proprietary rationale and the need to protect the claimant against being forced to sell his property to the defendant by way of payment of damages. It is worth reproducing the relevant passages in the judgment (at 1446):

Although the remedy is discretionary, in the absence of special circumstances, the law will protect property rights; a person is not to be forced to sell his property for its reasonable market value, and a defendant is not to be permitted to buy the ability to infringe rights by the payment of damages: see for example, in copyright cases, MacMillan Publishers Ltd v Thomas Reed Publications Ltd [1993] FSR 455 at 465–467 per Mummery J, Phonographic Performance Ltd v Maitra [1998] EWCA Civ 137; [1998] 2 All ER 638 at 645, 646c–647c[1998] EWCA Civ 137; , [1998] 1 WLR 870 at 877, 878D–879D per Lord Woolf MR, and more generally 24 Halsbury’s Laws (4th edn reissue) para 836.

81 The court concluded that the right approach was to “start with a strong bias in favour of granting an injunction, to be dispelled only if the circumstances of the case clearly make it unjust to do so” (at 1449).

82 The Property Approach has been endorsed by the highest court in England. In Fisher v Brooker and another [2009] UKHL 41; [2009] 4 All ER 789, Lord Hope of the House of Lords explained that “where there is trespass to land or goods, or a comparable invasion of intangible property rights, the court’s natural response is to grant injunctive relief, and not to leave the claimant to his remedy in damages” (at [17]). She also cited another decision that held that the claimant is “prima facie entitled to an injunction”.

83 In Singapore, some support for the Property Approach can be found in Siemens Industry Software Inc. (formerly known as Siemens Product Lifecycle Management Software Inc) v Inzign Pte Ltd [2023] SGHC 50 (“Inzign”), a decision which was issued after I had delivered oral judgment in the present case. In Inzign, the High Court granted a permanent injunction, explaining that it is “generally accepted that a claimant will be entitled to a permanent injunction if he succeeds at the trial in establishing copyright infringement” (at [77]). The case concerned copyright infringement committed by an employee for which the employer was sued. The court found that while the defendant-employer had managed to put a stop to the infringement, its management and information technology assets may not be entirely effective in preventing acts of copyright infringement. The court therefore granted a permanent injunction against the defendant-employer.

84 Apart from case law, the Property Approach is well recognised in academic literature. In George Wei, the learned author explained as follows at 645:

Final injunctions are quite frequently granted in copyright infringement actions. That this is so is not surprising given that copyright like most other intellectual property rights is a property right. An injunction is often needed to protect property rights because a hallmark of property and ownership is the right to exclusive enjoyment of the thing in issue. Damages, or other forms of monetary relief, may not be enough to protect such a right of exclusivity. …

85 A similar explanation was given in Cornish, Llewelyn & Aplin, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights (Sweet & Maxwell, 8th Ed, 2013) (“Cornish”) at 2-36:

… Against proven infringement of patent, design, copyright, trade mark and any other right that has acquired the status of “property” at common law, an injunction will be granted in the absence of something special in the case—such as imminent expiry of the right, no likelihood of repetition by the defendant, or some conduct on the claimant’s part that leaves him with unclean hands, such as a representation that he would not seek an injunction. To leave the claimant to a remedy in damages would in effect be to compel him to license his right to all comers.

[footnotes excluded]

Likelihood of Future Infringement Approach

86 Finally, I come to the Likelihood of Future Infringement Approach. To recap, this approach requires the claimant to show a threat or likelihood of future infringement before it can obtain injunctive relief.

87 Some support for this approach can be found in the case of Phonographic Performance Ltd v Maitra and others (Performing Right Society Ltd intervening) [1998] EWCA Civ 137; [1998] 2 All ER 638 (“Maitra”). The claimant in this case discovered that the defendants made unlicensed use of its sound recordings and sued them for copyright infringement. In their application for default judgments, the claimant sought injunctions against the defendants. The court at first instance granted a limited injunction that lasted only seven months from the date of the order or until the defendants obtained a licence, whichever was the earlier. The claimant appealed against the restriction. On appeal, the English Court of Appeal lifted the restriction. The court accepted that (at 646):

… when a person establishes infringement of copyright and a threat to continue infringement, an injunction will in the ordinary case be granted without restriction. …

I will refer to this as the “Maitra holding”.

88 On the facts, the court saw no reason not to grant the injunction, considering that the defendants did not contest the allegations in the statement of claim, was well aware of the claimant’s rights and showed an intention to continue to infringe.

89 While the reference to a “threat to continue infringement” may be construed as a pre-condition to obtaining injunctive relief, it is, in my view, equally possible to confine that holding to the specific facts of the case. I say so for three reasons.

90 First, it is significant that Maitra was a default judgment case, involving defendants who did not appear to contest the claimant’s claims. By reason of their failure to do so, the court considered that they had admitted to the plea that they intended to continue to infringe the claimant’s rights (at 647). In my view, the Maitra holding should therefore be understood in the specific facts of that case, where the court had no difficulty finding that the defendants professed an intention to continue infringing the claimant’s rights, unless properly restrained. An injunction was therefore justified on the facts of that case.

91 Second, the court explicitly recognised that the claimants are “owners of a statutory property right” (at 647). Further, the court mentioned in another part of the judgment a statement that bears closer resemblance to the Property Approach, as follows (at 646):

A person who exploits his property right by licensing is entitled, unless there are special circumstances, to prevent another from using that property right without his licence and to refuse to grant a licence save on his terms and conditions as to payment and use.

92 Third, the copyright authorities cited by the claimant’s counsel in support of the Maitra holding did not actually require the claimant to positively prove a threat of further infringement. I reproduce the relevant passage in the judgment:

Mr Goldsmith QC, who appeared for [the claimant], submitted that where, as in this case, a [claimant] establishes that his copyright has been infringed and there is a threat of further infringement, he is entitled as a matter of course to an injunction to prevent the defendant from carrying out further infringements (see Weatherby & Sons v International Horse Agency and Exchange Ltd [1910] UKLawRpCh 83; [1910] 2 Ch 297, Performing Right Society Ltd v Ciryl Theatrical Syndicate Ltd [1923] 2 KB 146, Samuelson v Producers’ Distributing Co Ltd [1932] 1 Ch 201 at 210, [1931] All ER Rep 74 at 82, Performing Right Society Ltd v Mitchell [1924] 1 KB 762 at 774, Pride of Derby and Derbyshire Angling Association Ltd v British Celanese Ltd [1953] 1 All ER 179 at 197 and 205, [1953] Ch 149 at 181 and 194, Redland Bricks Ltd v Morris [1969] 2 All ER 576 at 578 and 579, [1970] AC 652 at 664 and 665, Colgate Palmolive Ltd v Markwell Finance Ltd [1990] RPC 197 at 200 and Performing Right Society Ltd v Berman [1975] FSR 400 at 403).

93 I have discussed many of these authorities in this written decision. Weatherby, for instance, unequivocally stated an injunction was justified because copyright was a property right. There was no mention of the need to prove a threat of further infringement. The same goes for the other authorities which I have discussed above (Samuelson, Mitchell and Colgate).

94 As for the case of Performing Right Society Ltd v Ciryl Theatrical Syndicate Ltd [1923] 2 KB 146, that appears to be quite irrelevant as the decision was overturned on appeal (Performing Right Society Ltd v Ciryl Theatrical Syndicate Ltd [1924] 1 KB 1). In any event, the lower court decision did not expressly state that a threat to continue the infringement was required to obtain injunctive relief.

95 The authority that did mention this requirement was the case of Pride of Derby and Derbyshire Angling Association Ltd v British Celanese Ltd [1953] 1 All ER 179 (“Pride of Derby”) at 197. Pride of Derby, however, was not a copyright infringement case. The claim in that case was founded on nuisance. The claimants included owners of a fishery who sought an injunction against companies that polluted the river with injurious effluents and insufficiently treated sewage.

96 That said, the holding in Pride of Derby was cited approvingly by the Court of Appeal in I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting and others [2020] 1 SLR 1130 (“I-Admin”). In the context of a breach of confidence claim, the court held that (at [69]):

Where a plaintiff establishes that (a) there has been a wrongful interference with their legal or equitable rights; and (b) the defendant intends to continue this wrong, then, barring any special circumstances, he is prima facie entitled to an injunction ….

97 An argument can be made that this principle should be extended to copyright infringement claims since the principle is broad enough to encompass proprietary claims. But the counterargument is that confidential information does not attain the status of a property right, whereas copyright is a property right that has been codified in statute (Lek Gwee Noi v Humming Flowers & Gifts Pte Ltd [2014] 3 SLR 27 at [57]; Copyright Act (Cap 63, 2006 Rev Ed), s 194; and Copyright Act 2021, s 137). It remains to be seen whether the Court of Appeal would extend the requirement to copyright infringements.

98 Even assuming the requirement applies to copyright infringements, I should point out that in practical terms claimants can establish a likelihood of future infringement by reference to past conduct. In this regard, counsel for the Plaintiff referred to analogous jurisprudence on other areas of the law.

(a) In Colin Birss et al, Terrell on the Law of Patents (Sweet & Maxwell, 18th Ed, 2016) at [21-06], the learned authors opined that an inference can be drawn from proven infringements that infringement is likely to continue unless restrained, save for cases where there is clear evidence that there is no intention to continue the infringement. In support of this proposition, the learned authors cited the following statement in Losh v Hague (1838) 1 WPC 200:

If a threat had been issued, and the defendant revokes the threat, that I can understand as making the plaintiff satisfied; but if once the thing complained of has been done, I apprehend this court interferes, notwithstanding any promise the defendant may make not to do the same thing again.

(b) In Snell’s Equity (John McGhee and Steven Elliott gen eds) (Sweet & Maxwell, 34th Ed, 2020), the learned authors opined that “where the defendant has already infringed the claimant’s rights, it will normally be appropriate to infer that the infringement will continue unless restrained: a defendant will not avoid an injunction merely by denying any intention of repeating wrongful acts”. In support of this proposition, the learned authors cited Proctor v Bayley [1889] UKLawRpCh 138; (1889) 42 Ch. D. 390. Proctor v Bayley was a patent infringement case where Cotton LJ said as follows (at 398):

Where a patent is infringed the patentee has a prima facie case for an injunction, for it is to be presumed that an infringer intends to go on infringing, and that the patentee has a right to an injunction to prevent his doing so. Again if there has not been any infringement, but an intention to infringe is shewn, an injunction will be granted. In the present case the Defendants have infringed the patent, but we must look at all the circumstances to see whether there is any ground for inferring that they intend to continue to infringe it.

99 It has also been observed that the requirement should not be unduly onerous. In Performing Right Society Ltd v Berman [1975] FSR 400, the High Court of Rhodesia observed that in many cases it might be very difficult for a claimant to prove that future infringement is likely to take place. The court was of the view that the requirement that a claimant must show likelihood of future infringements refers to the situation where the infringement “has occurred once and for all” and “is finished and done with”. The court explained (at 402-403):

As regards the interdict sought by the plaintiff, this is the normal remedy for infringement where the plaintiff's rights and the breach of them are clearly established, where the defendant does not claim to be entitled to perform the musical works without a licence from the plaintiff and the payment of the royalty, and where, as here, the defendant has given no undertaking not to repeat the infringement, provided that the circumstances are not such that there is no likelihood of a future infringement occurring. See Halsbury, vol. 8, pp. 444-5, para. 808; Copinger and Skone James on Copyright, 10th ed., paras. 556 and 558. In the latter paragraph, the learned authors say:

If the plaintiff proves that his copyright has been infringed, the court will grant an injunction without proof of actual damage, but he must show that there is a probability of damage, and that the defendant is likely to continue his infringement, and that this is not simply trivial."

The learned authors then refer, in support of this paragraph, to two cases, one decided in 1818 and the other in 1830, the reports of which are unfortunately not available here. The third case to which they refer is that of Cox v. Land and Water Journal Co. [1869] UKLawRpEq 240; (1869) L.R. 9 Eq. 324. A perusal of the judgment in this case, however, shows that the refusal of the injunction was based upon the triviality of the infringement concerned. Halsbury, in the passage cited above, does not stipulate that positive proof by the plaintiff of a likelihood of repetition of the infringement is an essential prerequisite to the granting of what he describes as “a peculiarly suitable, and, indeed, the normal remedy.” In the majority of cases it might be very difficult for a plaintiff whose rights have been infringed, to prove positively a definite likelihood of a repetition of the infringement.

The decision in the case of Football League, Ltd. v. Littlewoods Pools, Ltd. [1959] Ch.D. 637, to which the learned authors of Copinger and Skone James also refer in that same paragraph. in which an injunction in respect of future copyright was refused, was based simply on the fact that the pirating by the defendant of the football fixtures list compiled by the plaintiff was finished and done with because the football season in question was over. Any future lists had still to be compiled for the forthcoming football seasons. That is not the position in the present case. The injunction sought by the plaintiff here relates to all musical works in respect of which it presently holds rights of copyright.

It seems to me that the statement of the learned authors that the plaintiff must show positively that the defendant is likely to continue his infringement, refers to the type of case where the prima facie position is that the infringement has occurred once and for all, and is finished and done with; and if, in addition, the defendant has given a bona fide undertaking not to repeat the infringement, that is an important factor which will influence the court in refusing an interdict. …

100 In my view, the commission of past infringements can give rise to an inference that future infringements might occur. But that alone is not conclusive. In conducting the assessment, the court would have to look at all the circumstances of the case. If the court is satisfied that future infringements is quite unlikely, the court may refuse to grant an injunction (Coflexio S.A. v Stolt Comex Seaway MS Ltd [2001] RPC 9 at [13]).

101 Viewed in this light, the Likelihood of Future Infringement Approach may not be all that different from the Property Approach. Under the Property Approach, the court may also refuse an injunction if it is clear that infringement will not continue (see for instance Cornish at 2-36). The difference mainly lies in who bears the burden of proof. The Property Approach starts with a strong bias towards granting the injunction, though it is open to the defendant to establish special circumstances to persuade the court against granting the injunction. The Likelihood of Future Infringement Approach requires the claimant to establish that infringement is likely to continue unless properly restrained. But if claimants can establish that likelihood by reference past infringements, this might not pose a real hurdle in many cases. In that sense, the dichotomy between the two approaches may be more academic than practical.

Application of the law to the present case

102 In the present case, it was not necessary for me to decide whether to adopt the Property Approach or the Likelihood of Future Infringement Approach. I was of the view that an injunction was justified even based on the more onerous Likelihood of Future Infringement Approach. In other words, I was satisfied that there was a likelihood of future infringement unless the Defendant was properly restrained by way of an injunction. In arriving at this decision, I considered the following.

103 First, this was not a “once and done” infringement. The Defendant’s infringements were systematic and repetitive. She had sold multiple copies of the Worksheets to the Plaintiff’s agents between May to September 2021. Her listing was made on Carousell in April 2021, and possibly earlier, before the Plaintiff took notice. But for the Plaintiff’s intervention, the Defendant would likely have continued selling the Worksheets. It is also possible that the Defendant had sold the Worksheets to third parties.

104 Second, the infringement was intentional and premeditated. The Defendant offered not only the completed Worksheets but also blank copies. This suggested that the Defendant had embarked on this plan when the Worksheets were first distributed to her daughter in December 2020. I also note that the Worksheets were marked with the sentence “Unauthorized copying, resale or distribution prohibited”. The Defendant committed the infringements despite being put on notice that it was prohibited.

105 Third, the Defendant took elaborate steps to avoid detection, hiding behind pseudonyms which are hard to trace on the internet. But for the handwritten notes and markings, the Defendant’s infringements may have remained uncovered.

106 Fourth, the misdeeds were aggravated by her counsel’s revelation that the Defendant was a MOE teacher. The revelation was made to persuade the court not to grant an injunction as she did not want to lose her job. That implied that she understood the importance of academic integrity to her profession. The fact that she went to great lengths to hide her identity behind various pseudonyms and email addresses shows that she knew the gravity of the infringing acts.

107 Fifth, she refused to provide an undertaking not to repeat the infringements. This was despite the Plaintiff’s offer to redact her identity when the undertaking is disclosed to third parties. No good reason was given for her refusal. Courts have repeatedly held that a refusal (or failure) to give an undertaking is a factor in favour of granting an injunction (see for instance, Mitchell; MacMillan; and Berman).

108 Sixth, the Defendant did not show contrition. She also did not give any assurance in her affidavit that the infringements would end. Quite the contrary, she vigorously disputed the Plaintiff’s claims. As it turned out, her defences were unmeritorious. The conduct of the defendant in resisting the claim was similarly considered by the courts in Mitchell and Banier when they granted the injunction.

109 For completeness, I should also say that the Defendant did not plead or raise equitable defences to defeat the injunction.

110 In these circumstances, I was of the view that a permanent injunction was appropriate to restrain the Defendant from committing further acts of infringement.

Conclusion

111 In summary, I granted a declaratory order that the Defendant had infringed upon the Plaintiff’s copyright in the Worksheets. I granted a permanent injunction (also known as final injunction) against the Defendant against further infringements of that copyright.

112 I also found that the Defendant breached clause 9 of the tuition contract. The Defendant did not resist this relief sought by the Plaintiff.

113 I ordered the Defendant to provide a written undertaking that all versions of the Worksheets in her possession would be destroyed within 7 days of my order. I also ordered her to pay the Plaintiff costs of this application.

114 It remains for me to thank counsel for their assistance. The effort undertaken by the Plaintiff’s counsel deserves special mention. His submissions were clear and concise, and his research was thorough and relevant.[Context] [Hide Context]

^{[note: 1]}Affidavit of Chuah Geok Lin dated 19 April 2022 (“Affidavit of Chuah”), p 73-74.

^{[note: 2]}Affidavit of Chuah, para 10.

^{[note: 3]}Affidavit of Chuah, p 72.

^{[note: 4]}Affidavit of Chuah, para 11.

^{[note: 5]}Affidavit of Chuah, p 85-86.

^{[note: 6]}Affidavit of Chuah, para 13-14.

^{[note: 7]}Affidavit of Chuah, para 15.

^{[note: 8]}Affidavit of Chuah, para 48.

^{[note: 9]}Affidavit of Chuah, para 21.

^{[note: 10]}Affidavit of Chuah, para 24.

^{[note: 11]}Affidavit of Chuah, para 26.

^{[note: 12]}Affidavit of Chuah, para 28-33.

^{[note: 13]}Affidavit of Chuah, para 34.

^{[note: 14]}Affidavit of Chuah, para 49.

^{[note: 15]}Affidavit of Chuah, para 50-53.

^{[note: 16]}Affidavit of Chuah, para 54.

^{[note: 17]}Affidavit of Chuah, para 54.

^{[note: 18]}Affidavit of Chuah, para 55-59.

^{[note: 19]}Affidavit of Chuah, para 60.

^{[note: 20]}Affidavit of Chuah, para 62.

^{[note: 21]}Affidavit of Chuah, para 65-66.

^{[note: 22]}Affidavit of Chuah, para 67.

^{[note: 23]}Affidavit of Chuah, para 68.

^{[note: 24]}Affidavit of Chuah, para 30.

^{[note: 25]}Affidavit of Aw Bixi, Charlotte (“Affidavit of Charlotte”), para 8-11.

^{[note: 26]}Affidavit of Chuah, para 26, 29, 34.