District Court of Singapore

Public Prosecutor v Lee Wee Yen
[2024] SGDC 225

Criminal Law – Offences – Criminal breach of trust by employee

Criminal Procedure and Sentencing – Sentencing

[LawNet Editorial Note: An appeal to this decision has been filed in MA 9228/2023/01.]

2 September 2024

District Judge Kamala Ponnampalam:

Introduction

1 The accused person, Mr Lee Wee Yen, (“the Accused”) claimed trial to one charge under section 44(1)(a) and punishable under section 44(5)(a) of the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act (Chapter 65A) (“CDSA”) (“the offence”). For ease of reference, the charge is reproduced below:

You…are charged that you, sometime between the 25^th to the 31^st day of January 2020, in Singapore, did enter into an arrangement with one Gee Ming Li Jaromel (“Jaromel”), to wit, by using your Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) bank account (no. [xxx]) (“ICBC account”) to receive and transfer out RMB 1,518,000 (approximately SGD $300,000) on behalf of Jaromel between 30^th January 2020 and 31^st January 2020, having reasonable grounds to believe that by the said arrangement, the retention by Jaromel of his benefits from criminal conduct would be facilitated, and having reasonable grounds to believe that Jaromel had engaged in criminal conduct, to wit, offences of cheating under section 420 of the Penal Code (Cap 224), and you have thereby committed an offence under section 44(1)(a) and punishable under section 44(5)(a) of the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act (Chapter 65A).

2 At the conclusion of the trial, I was satisfied that the Prosecution had proven its case against the Accused beyond a reasonable doubt. I found the Accused guilty and convicted him on the charge. He was sentenced to 27 months’ imprisonment. The Accused being dissatisfied with the outcome, has appealed against the conviction and the sentence.

Background facts

3 The Accused is a Singapore citizen, aged 43 years, who works as a regional operations manager for Aivo Asia. He is also known as Vince. The Accused was the account holder of an International Commercial Bank of China (“ICBC”) bank account bearing the number [xxx]. This account was solely owned and operated by the Accused (“the Accused’s ICBC account”).[note: 1]

4 Sometime in January 2020, Gee Ming Li Jaromel (“Jaromel”) and Kato Hitoshi (“Kato”) conspired to deceive one Dominic Chen Jiajie (“Dominic”) into transferring the equivalent of SGD$300,000 in Renminbi into the Accused’s ICBC account. Their plan was to find a Bitcoin buyer in Singapore and for Kato to pose as a Bitcoin seller. The transaction amount was to be set at SGD$300,000. When the Bitcoin buyer produces the cash amount of SGD$300,000 for the purchase of the Bitcoins, they would deceive Dominic into believing that they were performing a genuine Bitcoin transaction, when in fact Kato had no Bitcoins for sale. They would then request Dominic to transfer the equivalent of SGD$300,000 in Renminbi into the Accused’s ICBC account in return for the cash amount of SGD$300,000 by saying that the Bitcoin owner resides in China and needs to be paid in Renminbi. However, once the money was transferred into the Accused’s ICBC account, Kato would claim that the money had not been received, and Jaromel and Kato would then make a hasty exit. Thereafter, Jaromel and Kato would take the Renminbi which was received into the Accused’s ICBC account and split it equally between the two of them.[note: 2]

5 As planned, sometime between 25th to 30th January 2020, Jaromel approached the Accused and requested for the use of his ICBC account to receive the Renminbi and thereafter for the Accused to transfer out the Renminbi. The Accused was told that these were monies involved in a Bitcoin transaction.[note: 3] The Accused agreed and provided his ICBC account number in the WhatsApp chatgroup which he shared with Jaromel and Kato.

6 On 30 January 2020, sometime in the afternoon, Jaromel and Kato arrived at an office unit located at 1 Commonwealth Lane, #04-20, One Commonwealth, Singapore. There, they met the Bitcoin buyer who showed them the cash amount of SGD$300,000 which was to be used for the purchase of the Bitcoins.[note: 4] The Bitcoin buyer placed the cash on the table. Dominic too arrived at the location and saw the cash on the table. When Kato confirmed to Dominic that the Bitcoin transaction would proceed, Dominic instructed his counterparts in China to transfer RMB 1,518,000 (equivalent to approximately SGD$300,000) to the Accused’s ICBC bank account. The bank account number was given to Dominic by Kato.[note: 5]

7 After the money was transferred into the Accused’s ICBC account, Kato left the office unit and did not perform any Bitcoin transfer. The Bitcoin buyer did not allow Dominic to take the SGD$300,000 which was on the table. A heated argument ensued and the police was summoned. Jaromel was arrested a few hours later. Kato too was arrested on the same day.[note: 6]

8 Prior to his arrest, Jaromel had called the Accused on the phone and told the Accused that the monies had been transferred into the Accused’s ICBC account. The Accused logged into his ICBC bank and saw that a total of RMB 1,518,000 had been transferred into his bank account from four different accounts. The Accused became worried that his ICBC bank account would be frozen and told Jaromel to take back the money.[note: 7] Jaromel offered to split the money with the Accused in an attempt to get the Accused to cooperate. Thereafter, Jaromel was arrested and the Accused was unable to contact him.

9 Subsequently, one Lao Ying contacted the Accused via WeChat and instructed the Accused to transfer the monies into three different bank accounts. Pursuant to the instructions which he received from Lao Ying, between 30th to 31st January 2020, the Accused made six outgoing transfers from his ICBC account amounting to RMB 1,518,000.[note: 8] The six outgoing transfers were made to three separate accounts[note: 9] which were different from the four accounts from which the monies were received[note: 10]. The Accused was subsequently arrested by the police on 8 February 2020.

10 Jaromel and Kato were each charged with the offence of cheating in furtherance of their common intention under section 420 read with section 34 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) (“the cheating offence”). Kato pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced to 40 months’ imprisonment. Jaromel faced other charges to which he pleaded guilty. The cheating offence was taken into consideration for purposes of sentencing. He was sentenced to a total of 66 months’ and 2 days’ imprisonment.

The Prosecution’s Case

11 The Prosecution’s case was that the sum of RMB 1,518,000 received into the Accused’s ICBC account represented the benefits of Jaromel’s criminal conduct, which was the cheating offence perpetrated against Dominic. When the Accused agreed to receive these monies into his ICBC account and then to transfer out the same, he had facilitated Jaromel’s retention of the benefits of his criminal conduct. The Accused had done so having reasonable grounds to believe that Jaromel was engaged in criminal conduct and that the monies to be received into his ICBC account constituted Jaromel’s benefits from this criminal conduct. The offence was completed when the Accused transferred out the entire sum from his account into three different accounts as instructed by a person known to him only as Lao Ying.

12 The Prosecution led evidence from the three persons involved in the cheating offence – Kato, Jaromel, and Dominic. They also adduced in evidence the three statements recorded from the Accused during police investigations as well as the transaction records of the monies transferred into and out of the Accused’s ICBC account .

The Defence’s Case

13 The Defence denied any involvement by the Accused in the cheating offence. It was asserted that the Accused was not aware of Jaromel’s and Kato’s plan to deceive Dominic into transferring the Renminbi into the Accused’s ICBC account. The Accused had given his ICBC bank account number to Jaromel in good faith and never suspected that Jaromel would use the account to receive the benefits of his criminal conduct. Jaromel was a friend whom he trusted and the Accused had no reason to believe that by receiving and transferring the monies into and out of his ICBC account, he would be facilitating Jaromel’s retention of his ill-gotten gains. The Accused was the sole witness for the Defence.

The applicable law

14 The relevant statutory provision reads as follows:

Assisting another to retain benefits from criminal conduct

44.—(1) Subject to subsection (3), a person who enters into or is otherwise concerned in an arrangement, knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that, by the arrangement —

(a) the retention or control by or on behalf of another (referred to in this section as that other person) of that other person’s benefits from criminal conduct is facilitated (whether by concealment, removal from jurisdiction, transfer to nominees or otherwise); or

(b) that other person’s benefits from criminal conduct —

(i) are used to secure funds that are placed at that other person’s disposal, directly or indirectly; or

(ii) are used for that other person’s benefit to acquire property by way of investment or otherwise,

and knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that that other person is a person who engages in or has engaged in criminal conduct or has benefited from criminal conduct shall be guilty of an offence.

(2) In this section, references to any person’s benefits from criminal conduct include a reference to any property which, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, represented in his hands his benefits from criminal conduct.

(3) Where a person discloses to an authorised officer his knowledge or belief that any property, funds or investments are derived from or used in connection with criminal conduct or any matter on which such knowledge or belief is based —

(a) if he does any act in contravention of subsection (1) and the disclosure relates to the arrangement concerned, he shall not be guilty of an offence under this section if the disclosure is made in accordance with this paragraph, that is —

(i) it is made before he does the act concerned, being an act done with the consent of the authorised officer; or

(ii) it is made after he does the act, but is made on his initiative and as soon as it is reasonable for him to make it;

(b) the disclosure shall not be treated as a breach of any restriction upon the disclosure of information imposed by law, contract or rules of professional conduct; and

(c) he shall not be liable in damages for any loss arising out of —

(i) the disclosure; or

(ii) any act done or omitted to be done in relation to the property, funds or investments in consequence of the disclosure.

(4) In any proceedings against a person for an offence under this section, it is a defence to prove —

(a) that he did not know and had no reasonable ground to believe that the arrangement related to any person’s proceeds derived from criminal conduct;

(b) that he did not know and had no reasonable ground to believe that, by the arrangement, the retention or control by or on behalf of the relevant person of any property was facilitated or, as the case may be, that, by the arrangement, any property was used as mentioned in subsection (1);

(c) that —

(i) he intended to disclose to an authorised officer such knowledge, belief or matter as is mentioned in subsection (3) in relation to the arrangement; and

(ii) there is reasonable excuse for his failure to make disclosure in accordance with subsection (3)(a);

(d) that, in the case of a person who was in employment at the time in question and he enters or is otherwise concerned in the arrangement in the course of his employment, he disclosed the knowledge, belief or matter as is mentioned in subsection (3) to the appropriate person in accordance with the procedure established by his employer for the making of such disclosures.

(5) Any person who commits an offence under this section shall be liable on conviction —

(a) if the person is an individual, to a fine not exceeding $500,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or to both; or

(b) if the person is not an individual, to a fine not exceeding $1 million or twice the value of the benefits from criminal conduct in respect of which the offence was committed, whichever is higher.

[applicable subsections in bold]

15 It was agreed between parties that the elements required to be established under this provision are set out in the High Court case of Ang Jeanette v PP [2011] SGHC 100; [2011] 4 SLR 1. The Court held at [49] that to make out an offence under section 44(1)(a), the Prosecution must prove as part of the actus reus the following:

a) the accused has entered or is otherwise concerned in an arrangement;

b) which (i) facilitates the retention or control by or on behalf of another (“that other person”) of (ii) that other person’s benefits of criminal conduct; and

c) that other person is a person who engages in or has engaged in criminal conduct or has benefited from criminal conduct.

16 The Court further held at [56] that the Prosecution has to show that there was some criminal conduct from which the moneys were derived. If the conduct occurred in Singapore, it has to constitute an offence listed under the Second Schedule in order to come within the meaning of “criminal conduct”.

17 As for the mens rea element of having reasonable grounds to believe, the Court at [70] adopted the meaning ascribed to the phrase in Ong Yew Beng v PP [2003] 1 SLR(R) 536 that having “reason to believe” involved a “lesser degree of conviction than certainty but a higher one than speculation”. In applying the test, the court must assume the position of the actual individual involved (ie, including his knowledge and experience), but must reason (ie, infer from the facts known to such individual) from that position like an objective reasonable man.

18 On the issue of proof of “criminal conduct”, the Court had elaborated at [58] that circumstances could well arise where the only logical inference to any reasonable person is that the moneys involved in the arrangement are criminal property, and that the other person engages in, or has engaged in, or has benefited from, criminal conduct.

19 The Court in Ang Jeanette v PP concluded at [71] that the offender in that case clearly had reasonable grounds to believe that the moneys she was dealing with were the benefits of criminal conduct. The circumstances under which she received the money and her instructions were highly suspicious. Her unwillingness to remit any more money after her last assignment clearly indicated that she thought that she was aiding in the retention of what she reasonably believed were benefits of criminal conduct.

Issues to be determined

20 The key issues to be determined at this trial are as follows:

a) whether the Accused had entered into an arrangement with Jaromel to receive and transfer out Renminbi from his ICBC account;

b) whether Jaromel had engaged in criminal conduct;

c) if Jaromel had engaged in criminal conduct, whether the arrangement with the Accused had facilitated the retention or control by Jaromel of Jaromel’s benefits of his criminal conduct; and

d) when the Accused entered into the arrangement with Jaromel, whether the Accused had reasonable grounds to believe that Jaromel had engaged in criminal conduct and that the Renminbi were the benefits of his criminal conduct.

21 The first three issues deal with the actus reus of the offence while the last issue concerns the mens rea requirement for the offence.

The actus reus is undisputed

22 The Accused does not deny that he had an agreement with Jaromel pursuant to which he received and transferred out Renminbi through his ICBC account. Sometime between 25th and 30th January 2020, Jaromel had approached him and asked him for the use of his ICBC account. The Accused readily agreed and furnished his account details to Jaromel. On 30 January 2020, the Accused received a total of RMB $1,518,000 into his ICBC account. Hours later, on the same day and in the early hours of the following day, the Accused transferred out the entire sum. The transaction records, Exhibits P2, P3, and P4, show that monies were received from four separate accounts into the Accused’s ICBC account and were later transferred out into three different accounts.

23 Jaromel does not dispute that the sum of RMB 1,518,000 channelled through the Accused’s ICBC account constituted his benefits from criminal conduct. Jaromel admitted that together with Kato, they had deceived Dominic into believing that they were involved in a genuine Bitcoin transaction and that they would receive the cash amount of S$300,000 produced by the Bitcoin buyer which would be given to Dominic in exchange for Renminbi. By such manner of deception, Jaromel had dishonestly induced Dominic to transfer RMB 1,518,000 into the Accused’s ICBC account.

24 The RMB 1,518,000 which went through the Accused’s ICBC account constituted Jaromel’s benefits from the cheating offence which is listed as a “serious offence” under the Second Schedule to the CDSA and therefore satisfies the statutory definition of “criminal conduct” under the CDSA. The Accused had through his arrangement with Jaromel, facilitated Jaromel’s retention and control of the benefits of Jaromel’s criminal conduct.

The Accused had the requisite men rea

25 The mens rea element specified in the charge is “having reasonable grounds to believe”. The Court in Ang Jeanette v PP defined this element as the “lesser degree of conviction than certainty but a higher one than speculation”. The Court elaborated that in assessing whether the Accused possessed the requisite mens rea, the court needs to assume the position of the actual individual involved (ie, including his knowledge and experience), but must reason (ie, infer from the facts known to such individual) from that position like an objective reasonable man. Applying this test, the Court in Ang Jeanette v PP held that the offender in that case clearly would have found the circumstances of the transaction highly suspicious and would have had reasonable grounds to believe that the moneys she was dealing with were the benefits of criminal conduct.

26 The evidence in the present case similarly pointed to highly suspicious circumstances which would have given the Accused reasonable grounds to believe that Jaromel was engaged in criminal conduct and the monies to be received into his ICBC account were derived from Jaromel’s criminal conduct.

The suspicious circumstances

27 The Accused had past work experience in different areas of business. He had worked as a night club operator. He had set up an F&B business venture with Jaromel. The business venture known as Epic F&B failed and resulted in a police report being lodged against him. The Accused had also opened and operated his China bank account, ie the ICBC account, to carry out business with people in China.[note: 11] In short, the Accused was a seasoned businessman and not a naïve or gullible individual inexperienced in the ways of business and commerce. He would be familiar with how a transaction in foreign currency would typically be conducted.

28 In the present case, there were several red flags which should have indicated to the Accused that the request from Jaromel was not only unusual but downright suspicious and warranted caution and further enquiry. It was not how a normal foreign currency transaction would be carried out. The Accused ignored all the warning signs.

Jaromel’s request to use the ICBC account was suspicious on several levels

29 Sometime between 25th and 30th January 2020, Jaromel met the Accused and asked for the use of his ICBC account to receive and transfer out Renminbi. Jaromel made some vague and passing reference to a Bitcoin deal but provided no details.[note: 12] Neither did he specify the amount of money to be channelled through the account beyond stating that it would be ji wan in Chinese, meaning a few tens of thousands of Singapore dollars.[note: 13] This lack of details should immediately have caused the Accused to be wary. He had acknowledged during cross-examination, that Bitcoin was a cross-border currency and the source of funds for a Bitcoin transaction could potentially be ‘dirty’.[note: 14] Such awareness ought to have prompted the Accused to enquire further, but he did not. He immediately agreed to Jaromel’s request.[note: 15] His reason was that Jaromel was a friend whom he trusted.[note: 16]

30 I agreed with the Prosecution that an unsolicited request to “lend” your bank account to receive and transfer out funds, regardless of the purpose, would objectively be suspicious to any reasonable person.[note: 17] It begs the question of why the monies could not be converted into Singapore dollars before they were remitted to Jaromel or, why Jaromel could not have opened his own foreign currency account/Renminbi bank account to receive the monies. These would have been the logical ways to receive funds from a legitimate business transaction. Not the circuitous route proposed by Jaromel to funnel the funds into an account belonging to a person who was unrelated to the transaction. These were clearly suspicious circumstances which should have alerted the Accused.

31 It is baffling why the Accused readily agreed to Jaromel’s request without enquiring further. This was the first time that Jaromel had made such a request.[note: 18] There was no similar prior request or transaction for the Accused to reference or rely on. If there had been a similar previous arrangement with Jaromel which had been concluded without incident, the Accused could then cite that as a basis for his unquestioning trust, but there was none. A reasonable man in similar circumstances would minimally have asked Jaromel: 1) who was sending the money, 2) where was the money coming from, 3) how much was to be received into the account, and 4) how and when should the monies be transferred out. The Accused’s stock answer for why he made no enquiries was that Jaromel was a friend and he trusted him.

32 It was also the Accused’s testimony that his ICBC account was obtained with much difficulty and he was careful not to do anything to jeopardize the account as it was important to him.[note: 19] Yet he willingly provided his account to Jaromel without verifying how exactly his account would be used.

33 When Jaromel asked to use his ICBC account, he had mentioned that the amount involved was a few tens of thousands of Singapore dollars without specifying the exact amount. The Accused initially claimed that he took this to mean anything less than SGD $50,000 but later conceded that “a few tens of thousands of Singapore dollars” could be as much as SGD$100,000 which is equivalent to about RMB 500,000, an amount which had shocked him when he found it deposited into his account. He became afraid that his account would be frozen. Given his concern for his ICBC account, it bears repeating that it is puzzling why the Accused agreed to Jaromel’s request without first enquiring and verifying the exact amount of Renminbi to be received into the ICBC account.

34 The only conclusion to be drawn is that the Accused chose to be wilfully blind to the suspicious nature of the transaction. There were clear signs which cast doubts on the legitimacy of Jaromel’s Bitcoin transaction. The deliberately vague request from Jaromel devoid of details was a clear red flag. The only reasonable response in this situation would be to enquire further and get more details, something which the Accused omitted to do.

The Accused’s problematic past experience with Jaromel

35 The Accused’s sole defence was that he trusted Jaromel. He maintained that Jaromel was a good friend whom he trusted implicitly. Yet, this defence of blind faith was not stated in any of the three statements which were recorded from him in the course of investigations. These statements, Exhibits P5, P6, and P7, were admitted in evidence without any challenge to their accuracy and voluntariness.

36 In his second statement, P6, which was recorded on 30 April 2020, about three months after the transaction, the Accused was confronted with information obtained from Jaromel:

Q18: Jaro informed Police that there was a plot between himself, Kato and yourself to cheat the money changer. What do you have to say?

A18: No. I want to say that if I have the intention or if I really wanted to cheat people, I will not use my own bank account because it will trace to me.

37 Here, the Accused was quick to defend himself and assert that he had no intention to cheat. Earlier on in the same statement, the Accused was asked:

Q10: Did you provide your bank account to other people other than Jaro?

A10: No.

38 This question would have been the perfect opportunity for the Accused to state his defence of well-held trust in Jaromel, but he failed to do so. Clearly, this defence was an afterthought which had occurred to him long after the statements were recorded. It was something which he had conjured up to explain away his ready acceptance of Jaromel’s request.

39 The other plank of the Accused’s defence was that Jaromel was quite a reputable guy .. was a PAP member, .. accountant .. and his knowledge on business is quite respectful.[note: 20] This gave him further reason to trust Jaromel. Once again I accepted the Prosecution’s arguments that being a “reputable guy” and a “popular guy” does not in any way remedy the suspicious nature of Jaromel’s request. If anything, it invites more questions as to why a “reputable guy” would be making such a suspicious request. It is trite that being a grassroots member, an accountant or even someone with business experience is not an assurance that the individual would not engage in criminal activity.

40 Beyond these bare assertions, the Accused did not produce any evidence to show that Jaromel was indeed trustworthy. In fact, the converse appeared to be true. Apart from casual social interactions, the Accused’s only other interaction with Jaromel in the past was his failed business venture with him. This ended with the Accused being investigated by the police on suspicions of cheating. The Accused had declared in his first statement that Jaromel gave me a lot of problems. In his third statement recorded almost one and a half years later on 2 August 2021, when the Accused was asked about this claim, the Accused said that after he was investigated for cheating the company, he was not close to Jaromel anymore. The Accused said, I also do not want to join him in any other business that he approaches me. But I still on talking terms purely as a friend. This is in direct contrast to the Accused’s defence at the trial that he trusted Jaromel completely.

41 The Accused had gone through a difficult relationship with Jaromel. It had understandably made him cautious of any further business involvement with Jaromel. The objective reasonable man in the Accused’s shoes would have been slow to agree to any request from Jaromel which was remotely associated with a business transaction such as a Bitcoin deal. He would have made further enquiries to allay his concerns. The Accused however did the opposite. He ignored all signs which pointed to a dubious proposal and promptly acceded to Jaromel’s request. The Accused’s omission to make the enquiries to verify strongly suggests that he had wilfully ignored the signs indicating that Jaromel was engaged in criminal conduct and that the Renminbi represented the benefits of his criminal conduct.

Jaromel’s offer of money for the bank account

42 Jaromel testified that he had made a monetary offer to the Accused to entice him to allow the use of his ICBC account.[note: 21] The extract from Jaromel’s evidence-in-chief is reproduced below:[note: 22]

Q	And I’m not sure if I asked you this previously, but what did you---what, if anything, did you offer the accused for using his bank account? Did you offer him any commission or reward?
A	Yes, I did.
Q	What did you offer him?
A	I---I remember that---what was spoken was the---the---the majority of the share would go to Kato, and then the---the---remember whether was it $50,000, I told him that “I’ll give you $50,000 for just using your account. ”Yah.
Court:	You said “what was spoken”. What do you mean by “spoken”?
Witness:	I’m sorry, what I meant was the---this---what I told him was that I will give him $50,000 for using his bank account. That’s just to make things simple. Yes.
Q	And how did you communicate this to him, was it in person, or was it over the phone?
A	I can’t remember specific---specifically.
Q	Okay. Was this reward and commission offered to him before or after he agreed to lend you the bank account?
A	That would be before, yah, because I had to entice him to let me use his account, right? So, I told him I---suppose it’s before.
Q	And was Kato present when you made this offer to Vince?
A	Can’t recall.
Q	Okay. So, if I summarise, the arrangement was that majority of the share would go to Kato and you said you offered Vince $50,000 to use his bank account?
A	Yes, I did.

43 During cross-examination, Jaromel qualified that he couldn’t be certain whether he was earnest when he made such an offer or of the amount which he had offered.[note: 23]

Q	Alright. Now, I am going to ask you questions regarding this alleged payment, offer of $50,000 to Vince to entice him to open the account. I’m just going to ask you some questions there.
A	Go ahead.
Q	Is your memory a bit sketchy about what happened there?
A	Yah, I told---I---I mentioned before this that, you know, everything was done recklessly. So, this offer also was done in desperation, I would suppose.
Q	Now, there is---is there some thought as to whether you could have even made that offer, considering the fact that you have---you haven’t told him anything about any plan, or any amount of money, to that extent? You haven’t mentioned 300,000 to him, right?
A	No, I haven’t.
Q	So---
A	And I would suppose that---
Q	It doesn’t make sense---sorry, it doesn’t make sense to suddenly say “I offer you $50,000”, correct? And you are---
A	In---
Court:	Sorry. At which point did you offer him $50,000?
Singh:	Yes. Maybe I should---thank you, Your Honour.
Q	Maybe I should establish---there is some confusion about the $50,000, right---
Court:	No.
Q	---so at what point of time do you actually make this offer, if at all, or are you mistaken?
A	I could be mistaken, but I think I---I made this offer when I desperately needed an account. But, you know, when I made this offer, I don’t think Vince even believed it, this thing would---like, I would give him $50,000. You get what I mean? It’s just like, “Hey, can you give me your account and I will pay you $50,000?” We are at that level of closeness as friends, I would suppose he was just thinking that I was just jesting.
Q	Right, now, I’m still on this $50,000, right. Think carefully; could you be mistaken when you say that you actually had to entice him, given the fact that he trusted you and he was quite happy to lend you his bank account? Why would you even offer him anything? He was quite cooperative, he wanted to---
A	Yes, I agree. Perhaps it was just me being a loudmouth, I just, “Hey, I’m going to give you $50,000”. Yah.
Q	Perhaps you never said it, you are mistaken now. Is that a possibility?
A	As I mentioned, the---my memory is a bit sketchy. So, it might be a possibility.
Q	A possibility, right. In fact, when the learned DPP cross-examined you, the figure of 50,000 somehow came down to 5 or 10,000 as well, right?
A	As I mentioned, my memory is not 100% clear---
Q	Yes.
A	---so I would agree with what you just said.
Q	See, what it appears to me is this, correct me if I’m wrong. You may have had this intention of rewarding him 50,000 or 10,000 or 5,000, whatever the figure was, look, it was in your mind, but never communicated to him at the time when you asked him to give you the account. Is that possible? It was really in your mind. Because you did not know how much you were going to make.
A	I would agree with you. But I really can’t remember---can’t remember.
Q	Alright. So now your position on the 50,000, as an enticement, is something that you can’t really remember. Correct?
A	I would agree with you.
Q	Thank you.

44 Following re-examination by the Prosecution, the Defence posed more questions by way of cross-examination to Jaromel. Jaromel responded that he may have made the monetary offer to the Accused to persuade the Accused, but perhaps not in a serious way.[note: 24]

Q Now, Mr Jaromel, I just---I just want to put it to you, because there is a lot of confusion about your evidence, but I want to put it to you that my instructions are that you did not entice my client with any monetary reward. You can agree or disagree. That’s my case. You did not offer him any money.

A I need to say that even if I did, I wasn’t serious about it. It was something that I said in desperation. So I wouldn’t put it---I want to put it on record that it would be something that I might have said, I might not have said, but even if I said it, it wouldn’t be something serious, it would be like “Hey, please give me your bank account, I will give you $50,000, I really need your bank account”, and him being reluctant, I tried everything under the sun to ask him for his bank account. So yes, that---I---I would put it just---that would be my position, your Honour.

45 It is evident that Jaromel did not retract his initial testimony that he had made a monetary offer to the Accused because he had tried everything under the sun to ask him for his bank account. He simply clarified that it may have been something which he had said in jest. As pointed out by the Prosecution, Jaromel had no reason to lie. He never tried to implicate the Accused. If anything, he went to great lengths to absolve the Accused of any involvement in the plot to cheat Dominic.

46 The Accused on the other hand flip-flopped on whether Jaromel had made such an offer. During his evidence-in-chief, the Accused denied that Jaromel had offered him an incentive to provide his ICBC account.[note: 25] In cross-examination he merely said that he can’t recall if Jaromel had made such an offer.[note: 26] He no longer refuted the possibility of a monetary offer. In the final assessment, I was persuaded that there may have been some mention of a financial reward for the Accused’s ICBC account. It may not have been a serious offer. Such an offer for a personal favour would have made the already suspicious request from Jaromel even more suspect.

The shared WhatsApp chatgroup

47 There was a common WhatsApp chatgroup involving Kato, Jaromel and the Accused. This chatgroup was created “for the purpose”[note: 27] of corresponding about the transaction using the Accused’s ICBC account. The Accused had provided his ICBC bank account details on this chatgroup. The Accused further testified that Kato and Jaromel discussed their Bitcoin deal in this chatgroup.[note: 28] There was a suggestion that it was possible that the Accused may have received information about the cheating plot during the chatgroup discussions between Kato and Jaromel. However, this was mere speculation with no actual evidence of the fact. I therefore placed no weight on the evidence relating to the shared WhatsApp chatgroup and the possibility of the Accused deriving information relating to the cheating plot from the chatgroup.

The Prosecution witnesses were reliable

48 The prosecution witnesses were reliable and I accepted their evidence without reservation. Jaromel in particular, was keen to exonerate the Accused of any blame in the cheating offence. At the end of his testimony, Jaromel addressed the Court and pleaded for leniency on behalf of the Accused.[note: 29] That said, Jaromel did not exaggerate or embellish his evidence in order exculpate the Accused. If he did not know or could not recall, he stated as much. Likewise, Kato candidly admitted to his role in the cheating scam. He did not shift the blame to Jaromel or to the Accused. Similarly, Dominic gave a straightforward account which corroborated Kato’s and Jaromel’s evidence that he was dishonestly induced by the two of them to transfer RMB 1,518,000 into the Accused’s ICBC account. The Defence accepted the evidence of the prosecution witnesses without challenge. It was never the Defence’s position that the witnesses were untruthful or unreliable.

The Accused was an unreliable witness

49 By contrast, the Accused was an unreliable witness. His account was fraught with inconsistencies. It began with the statements recorded from him in the course of investigations.

50 The first statement, P5, was recorded on 8 February 2020, about a week after the Accused had transferred the monies out of his ICBC account. In this statement, the Accused stated that it was Kato who had requested for his ICBC account and not Jaromel. He had agreed to Kato’s request because he knew that Kato dealt with Bitcoins when he was in Taiwan. So, he thought that it was okay for Kato to use his account. The Accused claimed that he later became worried when he discovered that the amounts deposited into his ICBC account were large, but he did not think to report the matter to the police because he believed that Kato will not do anything illegal – Kato will tell A is A, B is B, meaning that Kato does not lie. This account that Kato had approached him for his ICBC account and his firm belief in Kato’s integrity were abandoned in the subsequent statements.

51 The second statement was recorded more than two months later on 30 April 2020. In this statement, the Accused claimed that it was Jaromel who had approached him and had requested for the use of his ICBC account for some Bitcoin business. When he was confronted with the previous statement, the Accused merely said, I confirmed Jaro is the one who approached me. He added that he was aware that both Kato and Jaromel were involved in a Bitcoin deal but it was Jaromel who contacted him. The Accused gave no clear reason for why he had named Kato in his first statement.

52 His attempts to explain away the discrepancy during his cross-examination by the DPP were not any more successful. The Accused testified that he was injured and lying in bed in hospital when the first statement was recorded from him.[note: 30] Kato was then at the forefront of his mind because someone had mentioned Bitcoin and then kept mentioning Kato’s name. That is why he used Kato’s name.[note: 31] The Accused’s reasons were plainly absurd. First, there was no evidence to support the Accused’s claim that someone kept mentioning Kato’s name. Second, the Accused’s explanation made no sense at all. The mere mention of Bitcoin and Kato’s name should not influence him to make a false statement. The question asked of him was a simple one – who approached you to use bank account [xxx]. What was the purpose to use this bank account? There is no reason why he could not have responded truthfully and given Jaromel’s name.

53 His injuries had not constrained him from accurately providing his personal particulars and the background facts. He could have similarly given an accurate account of who had approached him for his ICBC account. I accepted the Prosecution’s submission that the Accused had given Kato’s name in his first statement because he thought that it would make for a more convincing story given Kato’s prior history with Bitcoin deals. He sought to rely on Kato’s Bitcoin experience to justify his ready agreement to the request for his ICBC account.

54 Another example of the Accused’s inconsistent testimony was when he gave evidence in relation to Jaromel’s monetary offer for his ICBC bank account. During his evidence-in-chief, the Accused denied that Jaromel had offered him an incentive to provide his ICBC account. In cross-examination he changed his stance and said that he can’t recall if Jaromel had made such an offer.

55 The Accused also exhibited a tendency to embellish his evidence. When questioned about his transfer of the Renminbi to three separate bank accounts, the Accused initially claimed that his intention was to return the money to the rightful owner or the victim. After he was confronted with the transaction slips showing that the monies were not transferred to the accounts from which they were received but to a different set of bank accounts, the Accused conceded that his only intention was to get the money out of his ICBC account. He did not care who received the monies.[note: 32]

56 The Accused was evasive even when answering straightforward questions. When asked about whether Kato was involved, he did not give a direct answer, at times suggesting “not really” but eventually admitting that he “did not know” and “never asked him”. When asked about why Jaromel wanted a bank account in China to receive Renminbi, the accused claimed that there was “nothing to ask”, only to later admit that he “did not know” and “did not ask”.[note: 33]

57 On the whole, the Accused had shown himself to be an unreliable witness who was fast and loose with the truth. I treated his evidence with caution and placed little weight on it.

Conclusion on conviction

58 The evidence at this trial overwhelmingly pointed to the Accused’s guilty mind. He had a bad history with Jaromel. His previous business venture with Jaromel failed and resulted in the police investigating him for criminal offences. The Accused declared in his statements that he would not want to have any other business related dealings with Jaromel. Despite this, when Jaromel requested for his bank account, he agreed without hesitation. It was a bare request with no details beyond the fact that it was monies to be received from a Bitcoin deal. It was a request to use his ICBC account which according to the Accused was very important to him and he was careful not to do anything to compromise the account. It was a request from someone he no longer wished to have any business dealings with. Any reasonable man in the Accused’s position would have made enquiries and sought some verification before handing over his account details. The Accused did none of that.

59 At trial, the Accused proffered an improbable defence of well-held trust in Jaromel. It was a defence which was devoid of logic and did not stand up to scrutiny. It was at odds with his statements recorded during investigations. The Accused was unable to provide a satisfactory explanation for the inconsistencies. The only conclusion to be drawn from these circumstances was that the Accused was being untruthful. His defence of a bare trust in Jaromel was a fabricated afterthought invented to mask the fact that he had been wilfully blind to the clandestine nature of Jaromel’s request. The Accused had reasonable grounds to believe that Jaromel was engaged in criminal conduct and the monies to be received into his account were the benefits of that criminal conduct.

60 At the close of the trial, I was satisfied that the Prosecution had proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt. I found the Accused guilty and convicted him on the charge.

Sentence

Antecedents

61 The Accused was untraced for prior criminal convictions.

Prosecution’s submission on sentence

62 The Prosecution submitted that the dominant sentencing consideration for offences under section 44(1)(a) CDSA is general deterrence. They relied on the five-step sentencing framework in Huang Ying-Chun v PP [2019] 3 SLR 6062 (“Huang Ying-Chun”). Huang Ying-Chun dealt with section 44(1)(a) CDSA offences which involved the laundering of cash proceeds of cheating offences committed in Singapore. The offender in Huang Ying-Chun collected cash from victim-mules before handing the monies over to other runners, who would eventually carry the monies out of Singapore. In total, the offender collected and handed over a total of S$957,000 over two weeks. He was sentenced to 66 months’ imprisonment.

63 The five-step sentencing framework in Huang Ying-Chun was as follows:

a) First, the court should identify the level of harm, and the level of culpability.

b) Second, the court should identify the applicable indicative sentencing range.

c) Third, the court should identify the appropriate starting point within the indicative sentencing range.

d) Fourth, adjustments should be made to the starting point to take into account offender-specific factors.

e) Fifth, further adjustments should be made to take into account the totality principle

64 The Prosecution argued that the principal factual elements identified in the Huang Ying-Chun framework were found in the present case:

a) The laundering of cash or monies amounting to RMB 1,518,000,

b) which cash and monies are the proceeds of the cheating offences committed in Singapore by Jaromel and Kato, and

c) the involvement of a runner who collects cash in Singapore and dissipates the monies, for example, by remitting the monies or handing them to other persons to remove the monies from the jurisdiction. Here the Accused had used his ICBC account to dissipate the sum of RMB 1,518,000.

65 In assessing the harm and culpability for each offence, the High Court identified a few offence-specific and offender-specific factors:

Offence-specific factors
Factors going towards harm (a) the amount cheated (b) involvement of a syndicate (c) involvement of a transnational element (d) the seriousness of the predicate offence (e) harm done to confidence in public administration	Factors going towards culpability (a) the degree of planning and premeditation (b) the level of sophistication (c) the duration of offending (d) the offender’s role (e) abuse of position and breach of trust (f) the mental state of the offender (g) whether commission of offence was the offender’s sole purpose for being in Singapore (h) the offender’s knowledge of the underlying predicate offence (i) the prospect of a large reward
Offender-specific factors
Aggravating factors (a) offences taken into consideration for sentencing purposes (b) relevant antecedents (c) evident lack of remorse	Mitigating factors (a) a guilty plea (b) voluntary restitution (c) cooperation with the authorities

66 The Prosecution submitted that the harm caused by the Accused’s offences must be pegged closer to the top of the moderate band in view of the significant amounts of criminal proceeds that were laundered through his bank accounts. The predicate offence of cheating under section 420 of the Penal Code (Cap 224) was a serious offence that attracts a maximum punishment of 10 years’ imprisonment. The Prosecution cited the following case precedent.

S/N	Case Name	Amount	Harm
1	PP v Ng Siew Wai Carole [2021] SGDC 1483 (“Carole Ng”)	S$27,600	Slight
		S$72,050	Moderate
2	PP v Ng Koon Lay [2020] SGDC 1964 (“Ng Koon Lay”)	S$174,750	Moderate
3	PP v Chow Zhi Hong and anor [2020] SGDC 2795 (“Chow Zhi Hong”)	S$369,900	Moderate
4	PP v Cheng Peng-Yu [2019] SGDC 1216 (“Cheng Peng-Yu”)	S$803,000	Severe
5	Huang Ying-Chun	S$957,000	Severe

67 The Prosecution argued that the Accused’s culpability should be pegged at the lower end of the medium band for the following reasons:

a) The importance of the Accused’s role: The Accused played a critical role in the dissipation of funds by offering his ICBC account for Jaromel’s use, failing which Jaromel would not have been able to retain his criminal proceeds.

b) Transnational element: The Accused was aware that he was helping an individual based in Singapore, Jaromel, to facilitate a transaction based in China.

c) The Accused’s mental state: The Accused admitted to having suspicions about the transactions he was performing. In fact, he admitted that he suspected that he was dealing with scam proceeds. Furthermore, despite the warning signs of Jaromel giving him the “barest minimum of details, or lack thereof” when requesting him to serve as a conduit to receive and transfer monies to accounts given by an unknown third party ‘Lao Ying’, he did not make any enquiries as any reasonable person would. By his own admission, he chose to remain wilfully blind to the circumstances.

d) The prospect of personal gain: Jaromel made a monetary offer to the Accused to entice him to let him use the ICBC account. The evidence showed that an offer was made although whether a specific amount was offered was unclear (there were mentions of S$50,000, $10,000, and $5,000). In fact, it was Jaromel’s evidence that he “tried everything under the sun to ask him for his bank account” out of “desperation”. The inference is that there was a prospect of personal gain or reward that motivated the Accused to assist Jaromel with his ICBC account. It is undisputed that there is no evidence of the Accused actually receiving any monetary reward, and that the promised reward did not materialize. Nonetheless, the High Court in Huang Ying-Chun held that the fact that the offender did not ultimately receive his reward is not to be considered a mitigating factor warranting a reduction in sentence.

68 The Prosecution concluded that for offences falling within the moderate harm and medium culpability, the indicative sentencing range would be 30 to 60 months’ imprisonment. The indicative starting point is 30 to 40 months’ imprisonment. The indicative starting sentence will then have to be adjusted to take into account the offender-specific factors.

69 The Prosecution stated that there were no significant aggravating factors. The Accused was generally cooperative with the authorities during investigations save for the instance when he lied in his initial statement that it was Kato whom he trusted, only to later switch to Jaromel. The fact that the Accused had claimed trial and not taken responsibility for his criminal acts is a relevant consideration, even if not to be taken as an aggravating factor. Some credit may be afforded for his general cooperation with the investigations.

70 The Prosecution submitted that a sentence in the range of 27 to 30 months’ imprisonment is fair and appropriate. It is in line with the post Huang Ying-Chun reported case precedents.

S/N	Case Name	Antecedents	CT/PG	Amount	Sentence
1	Carole Ng (Appeal dismissed)	Untraced	CT	S$27,600	4 months’ and 2 weeks’ imprisonment (concurrent)
				S$72,050	9 months’ imprisonment (concurrent)
2	Ng Koon Lay (Appeal dismissed)	Untraced	PG	S$47,050	6 months’ imprisonment (consecutive)
				S$174,750	12 months’ imprisonment (consecutive)
3	Chow Zhi Hong (Appeal dismissed)	Untraced	CT	S$369,900	45 months’ imprisonment (consecutive)

71 The Prosecution stated that the closest comparators by virtue of quantum are the cases of Ng Koon Lay and Chow Zhi Hong. The sentencing range of 27 to 30 months’ imprisonment was derived by applying an uplift to the sentence imposed in Ng Koon Lay (18 months’ imprisonment for S$221,800 collectively) given the higher quantum and the fact that the Accused was not entitled to any discount for a plea of guilt. The sentencing range of 27 to 30 months’ imprisonment was also derived by applying a downward adjustment from Chow Zhi Hong (45 months’ imprisonment for S$369,900) given the lower quantum and the absence of the offence-specific factors which were present in Chow Zhi Hong that warranted a higher indicative sentence).

Mitigation

72 The Mitigation Plea set out the Accused’s personal circumstances and pleaded for leniency stating that he had a clean record and was unlikely to reoffend. It was highlighted that the Accused did not ask for nor did he receive any financial incentive.

Defence’s submission on sentence

73 The Defence submitted for a sentence of a fine only and/or a short custodial sentence. It was argued that the harm was slight and the culpability was low. The Defence relied on the following factors.

74 The harm caused was low as it was not entirely clear what eventually happened to the sum of RMB 1,518,000 that was received in the Accused’s ICBC account. The evidence adduced showed that neither Kato nor Jaromel received the proceeds of the crime. Dominic, was unable to clarify what had eventually happened to the money. The loss was not borne by him either The monies may not have been dissipated but could have been returned to the original accounts as stated by Jaromel. As such, the harm is slight.

75 In terms of culpability, the Defence argued that it was low. The Accused was not offered any monetary reward for the use of his ICBC account. There was no syndicate involvement, no runner involved, no sophisticated planning, and no vulnerable victims involved. The duration of the offending was very short and there was no provable loss to anyone.

76 The Defence argued that this case was similar to the “love scam” cases as it involved an element of friendship and trust bordering on foolishness and vulnerability. There were no aggravating factors here, and the Accused had fully cooperated with the police. The Defence reiterated that the harm is slight and the culpability is low thereby falling into the category of a fine and /or a short custodian sentence.

The reply submission on sentence

77 The Prosecution highlighted that the Defence had pegged the harm as slight, primarily on the basis that there is no clear evidence of loss and thus giving rise to the possibility that the money was in fact returned to the rightful owner which is tantamount to making full restitution. The Prosecution argued that this is a mischaracterisation. In Huang Ying-Chun, the Court at [98] stated that the factor to be considered for harm is the amount cheated and not the specific loss being caused. So, it is not about proving the loss. In this case, evidence has been adduced to show that the sum of RMB 1,518,000 which is roughly equivalent to SGD 300,000 was cheated and thereafter dissipated through the ICBC account by the Accused. The Prosecution submitted that while it is correct to say that harm is not exclusively about the amount cheated, it does remain an important factor.

78 In the same vein, the evidence adduced cannot be stretched to mean that restitution has been made. While Dominic testified he did not personally bear the loss but that it was his Chinese counterpart that he was working with who did so, it does not mean that the monies should be taken as having been returned to the original owner or that restitution has been made. There was no evidence of this. The onus is on the Defence to prove on a balance of probabilities that restitution was attempted or made.

79 The Prosecution further argued that the fact that the funds were not recovered or allocated to a particular person precisely proves the point that there was loss and there was dissipation. If there was evidence that the money was recovered or it had gone to a certain party, that would be the basis to then assert that there was some kind of tracing and possibly even restitution. The lack of tracing actually is in fact evidence that there was dissipation and by extension, that would be the loss or the amount cheated that has to be considered by the Court for the CDSA offence.

80 The Prosecution disagreed that the form of culpability in the present case was similar to the genus of cases that relate to love scams. In those cases, there was some element of entrapment, exploitation, and cultivation of trust that was subsequently abused. That was not the case here. Entrapment and exploitation of trust was not present in this case. It was an active and voluntary decision by the Accused to let Jaromel use his ICBC account. There is even some evidence of some promise or prospect of gain from this enterprise. The Prosecution added that the love scam cases were cited to distinguish the present case from those cases in terms of the uplift in the sentence sought.

81 The Defence in their reply submissions reiterated that the Accused was not a party to the cheating plan which was the predicate offence. As for the dissipation of the monies, the Defence argued that the Prosecution’s own witness, Jaromel, had testified that his mother told him that the money had been returned to the source. This evidence was not challenged by the Prosecution. They appeared to be satisfied with that answer. So, the Accused is now entitled to rely on Jaromel’s evidence and to submit that restitution has indeed been made. In these circumstances, the onus is on the Prosecution to show that no restitution was made.

Court’s decision on sentence

82 The prescribed punishment for the offence under section 44(1)(a) of the CDSA is a fine not exceeding $500,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or both. I agreed with the parties that the five-step sentencing framework in Huang Ying-Chun applied to the present case. The factual elements were similar. The predicate offence was a cheating scam committed in Singapore. The monies derived from this offence, RMB 1,518,000 which is equivalent to about SGD 300,000, was laundered through the Accused’s ICBC account and thereafter dissipated by the Accused, acting on instructions received from one Lao Ying, into various Renminbi bank accounts. Lao Ying was unknown to the Accused and in conveying those instructions to the Accused, Lao Ying was effectively operating as a runner.

83 Applying the five-step sentencing framework in Huang Ying-Chun, the first step was to determine the level of harm and the level of culpability.

84 I agreed with the Prosecution that the amount cheated was the chief indicator of the level of harm involved. The amount involved here was about SGD 300,000. The Prosecution relied on five case precedents for an indication of the level harm, and I accepted this approach. The case precedents, save for Huang Ying-Chun, involved love scams and police impersonation scams. I found that these cases while having a different factual matrix were still relevant and provided a useful gauge. An amount of S$27,600 was held to be in the slight harm range. Amounts of S$72,050, S$174,750, and S$369,900 fell within the moderate harm range. Amounts of S$803,000 and S$957,000 were assessed to be in the severe harm range. The amount in the present case was about SGD 300,000 and it falls squarely within the moderate harm range. Additionally, the predicate offence of cheating was a serious offence and there was clearly a transnational element there as the monies were received from Dominic’s Chinese counterparts.

85 In assessing the Accused’s culpability, I agreed with the Prosecution that the Accused played a pivotal role in the plot to cheat. Without his ICBC bank account, the plot would have failed. The Accused was aware of the transnational nature of the transaction. He was helping Jaromel in Singapore to receive monies from China purportedly for a Bitcoin deal in China. There was also some evidence of a promise of a monetary reward which the Accused did not deny. When probed under cross-examination, he simply said that he could not recall. I accepted the Prosecution’s argument that the Accused’s culpability was not reduced merely because he did not receive the reward. All considered, I accepted the Prosecution’s submission that the Accused’s culpability fell within the Medium range. The indicative sentences for the various levels of harm and culpability were set out in Huang Ying-Chun.

86 The present case of moderate harm and medium culpability fell within the range of 30 to 60 months’ imprisonment. Having considered the Accused’s level of involvement which was limited to agreeing to Jaromel’s request on a single occasion and with no further participation in the cheating scam, I agreed with the Prosecution that the indicative starting point within the sentencing range is 30 to 40 months’ imprisonment.

87 The next step was to take into account the offender-specific factors to make the appropriate adjustments to the indicative starting sentence.

88 In terms of the offender-specific considerations, there were no significant aggravating factors. As for the mitigating circumstances, it was noted that the Accused had a clean record and apart from this charge, he was not involved in any other offences. The Accused’s lack of antecedents and lack of TIC charges merited a downward adjustment to 27 months’ imprisonment. This sentence was in accordance with the sentencing precedents cited.

Conclusion

89 The evidence led at this trial unequivocally pointed to the Accused’s guilty mind. His lack of enquiries which any reasonable man in his position would have made showed that he had deliberately ignored the illicit nature of the transaction. His feeble defence of absolute trust in Jaromel failed dismally in the face of evidence to the contrary. The only inference to be drawn from these circumstances is that the Accused had been wilfully blind when there were reasonable grounds to believe that the monies constituted Jaromel’s benefits from his criminal conduct. Having regard to the severity of the offences, the sentence of 27 months’ imprisonment meted out to the Accused is just and appropriate. It is not a crushing sentence.[Context] [Hide Context]

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