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Trinidad and Tobago High Court |
] [Hide Context] Sub Registry, San Fernando
H.C.A. No. S1341 of 2004
IN THE MATTER OF CHAPTER 1 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
AND
IN THE MATTER OF THE RULES OF THE
SUPREME COURT
AND
IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION
Between
BARBARA JEAN HAMEL-SMITH
LUZETTE HAMEL-SMITH
Applicants
And
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
Respondent
****************
Appearances:
Sir Fenton Ramsahoye S.C., Mr. Anand Ramlogan instructed by Mr. Sheldon Ramanan for the Applicants
Mr. Kerwin Garcia instructed by Rehana Hosein for the Respondent
1. Introduction:
1.1 In this case complaint is being made of the unexplained delay by an Assistant Registrar of the Supreme Court in the delivery of a certificate of taxation and the reasons for her decision, following upon her review of a bill of costs filed by the Applicants herein. Many judgments preceding this one have bemoaned the incidence of delay in our judicial system. Be it as a result of a party’s inactivity or the sheer weight of matters that are engaging the court’s limited resources, it is undisputed that delay is the bugbear of the judicial system. It is not an uncommon complaint that litigants suffer the scourge of the “laws delay” in their search for justice.
1.2 In constitutional motions there are a plethora of cases in which the Courts have recognized that the “laws delay” broadly speaking may constitute a breach of an applicant’s constitutional right. [1] The Courts have also recognized that the delay in the delivery of a judgment of a court may amount to the violation of a party’s constitutional right to the protection of the law. [2]
1.3 Recently efforts such as the introduction of the Civil Proceeding Rules have been made to minimize delay in litigation and the litigants access to justice. However, although unfortunate and undesirable, not every incident of delay can have the effect of breaching the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. The assessment by the Court of the effect of delay in determining the Applicant’s right to invoke constitutional relief is a balancing exercise not weighed in vaccuo. There is no single answer to the question when is delay unreasonable or when does it give rise to a breach of a constitutional right. These are answers not given in the abstract but are to be adjudged against a sliding scale of factors and in the context of the facts of the particular case.
2. Background Facts:
2.1 By an order of Master Doyle dated 28 th January 2003 the Plaintiff in HCA 3341 of 1999 [3] was ordered to provide further and better particulars of its Statement of Claim in the main action and to pay to the Defendants, the Applicants herein, their costs of the application for further and better particulars certified fit for Senior Counsel, unless agreed by the parties. The Applicants herein presented their bill of costs for taxation pursuant to the said order on 17 th February 2003 [4] . On 3 rd June 2003 the Assistant Registrar Burgess taxed the Applicants bill of costs. [5]
2.2 The taxation was conducted on 3 rd June 2003. On that taxation the Assistant Registrar taxed the sum of $25,000.00 off of the fee on brief for Senior Counsel claimed in the sum of $50,000.00. Further the sum of $5,000 was taxed off the sum claimed by the Applicants for its Instructing Attorney fee in the amount of $10,000.00.
2.3 Upon completion of the taxation, the Plaintiffs in the action filed a review of the Assistant’s Registrar’s decision with respect to those two items. This application was dated 6 th June 2003 and filed on 25 th June 2003. The Applicants herein delivered their own objections to the taxation. This was filed on 15 th July 2003. It is of interest to note that the Applicants herein sought by their said notice to also raise the objection to the review on the basis that the Plaintiff had not filed her objections within 14 days of the date of taxation as prescribed by Order 62 rule 35 (2) of the RSC. [6]
2.4 By the said notice the Applicants also requested that the “reasons for any decision on the application for review upon the objection to the review and the complaint that the sums awarded were too low be stated in writing by the taxing officer pursuant to Order 62 rule 34(4).”
2.5 This review took place before Assistant Registrar Burgess on 22 nd July 2003 when the fees to Counsel were even further reduced [7] . A request was also made on that day by the Applicant for the reasons for the decision on review. [8]
2.6 However despite the requests of the Applicants, the Assistant Registrar failed, up to the time of filing this application, to deliver a certificate of taxation and her reasons for the decision on the review. The Applicants deposes in paragraph 20 of their affidavit: “ if the Assistant Registrar had reasons for the decisions made in the taxation proceedings they could have been given in writing immediately afterwards and the failure and refusal to issue the certificate of taxation or reasons despite requests orally at the Registrar’s office…and correspondence from Messrs Roopnarine and Company seeking the certificate and the reasons, all of which have been to no avail, point to a failure of the legal system to provide me with justice in contravention of Chapter 1 of the Constitution which guarantees fundamental human rights and freedoms.”
2.7 In the present application the Applicants filed an originating motion seeking relief in relation to the alleged unreasonable delay and/or failure of the Assistant Registrar Burgess to deliver pursuant to Order 62 of the Rules of Supreme Court (1975) [9] her certificate of taxation and the reasons for a review of taxation conducted by her in relation to a bill of costs filed on 22 nd July 2003 by the Applicants.
2.8 The relief sought include inter alia:
“a. A declaration that the Applicants have suffered a contravention by the State of due process of law, equality before the law the protection of the law and equal treatment by a public authority by reason of the unreasonable delay and/or failure of Assistant Registrar Burgess to deliver pursuant to Order 62 of the Rules of the Supreme Court reasons for a review on taxation of the Applicants’ bill of costs made by her on 22 nd July 2003 in proceedings brought against the Applicants in Action No, 3341 of 1999 by Michael Hamel-Smith as Plaintiff thereby denying the Applicants aright of review before a Judge of the decision upon the said taxation and contravening the Applicant’s guaranteed fundamental rights and freedoms contrary to sections 4(a), 4(b), 4 (d), 5(e) and 5 (h) of the Constitution;
b. An order declaring that no reasons of the Assistant Registrar which were requested on 22 nd July, 2003 and on diverse occasions thereafter to no avail exist and a further declaration that the system of taxation of costs under Order 62 of the Rules of the Supreme Court has failed the applicants causing them severe loss and damages;
c. An order for payment by the State of costs payable to the Applicants pursuant to the Master’s Order as the Court may determine;
d. Alternatively, an order and/or direction that a proper taxation be undertaken and concluded by the Court by the exercise of its powers in these proceedings upon notice to the Plaintiff in the said action by a determination of items in the bill of costs concerning fees to Counsel so as to avoid further delay further legal proceedings and/or a multiplicity of proceedings and/or further stultification of the judicial process;
e. Compensation and/or damages for distress inconvenience and loss suffered by the Applicants as a result of the failure of the judicial system to determine costs payable to them;
f. An order directing that he award of costs be dated to become effective in favour of the Applicants from the date of the filing of the bills of costs or such other date as may be appropriate;
g. All such further orders and directions as may be appropriate to enable the rights of the Applicant concerning costs which are the subject of failed taxation procedures to be resolved;”
2.9 The Applicants claim that this omission and/or delay has “disabled” then from having a further review of this decision before a Judge in Chambers pursuant to Order 62 rule 35 of the RSC thereby contravening their fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in sections 4(a) 4(b) 4(d) 5(e) and 5(h) of the Constitution. [10]
2.10 Interestingly they also seek in this motion from the Respondent the costs that are payable to the Applicants from the Plaintiff in the main action.
2.11 There is no affidavit in reply by the Respondent. There is no explanation for the Assistant Registrar’s delay of approximately one year prior to the commencement of these proceedings for issuing her certificate and reasons which in this Court’s view a relatively simple exercise.
3. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES:
Both parties filed and refiled upon their respective written submissions. In addition to these submissions the parties made oral submissions. In the main the Applicants thrust forwarded the following submissions:
(a) The Respondent acting through its judicial arm stymied the Applicants’ recovery of costs. The Registrar stultified the legal process by not giving the reasons and the certificate of taxation.
(b) As a result no costs can be paid to the Applicants.
(c) There is no explanation for the delay by the Respondent.
(d) The Applicants are denied the protection of the law because it cannot get the enforcement of its costs.
(e) The certificate must be signed immediately upon the taxation being made. Without the certificate there can be no review. The allocatur should be made right away. The judge has no jurisdiction to extend the time.
(f) The judge’s jurisdiction is invoked only upon the signing of the certificate.
(g) The Registrar did not delay but gave her reasons and refused to put it into writing thereby stunting the Applicants’ resort to the Judge in Chambers.
(h) The Applicants are entitled to a review.
The Respondent counteracted by submitting inter alia:
(d) The Applicant has not lost the right to obtain a review of the bill of costs.
(e) Any prejudice that may be suffered from the delayed payment in costs is compensated by an award of interest that runs on the award for costs from the date of the delivery of the judgment of Master Doyle.
4. ISSUES:
The issues to be resolved are relatively simple. They are as follows:
(a) Whether the delay complained of against the Assistant Registrar constitute a breach of the fundamental human rights set out in section 4 of the Constitution as articulated by the Applicants.
(b) Whether in any event the Applicants’ right to a review has been extinguished or has been stultified as alleged.
(c) Whether the Applicants’ motion constitute an abuse of the process.
5. THE REVIEW OF TAXATION:
5.1 The rules that govern the taxation of a Bill of Costs and review are set out in Order 62 R.S.C. rules 21 to 27 inclusive set out the procedure for a taxation. The procedure for the review of a decision of a taxing officer are set out in Order 62 rules 33 to 35 inclusive. Generally this review is done in two stages. Upon completion of the taxation, if necessary, any party may apply for a review of the Registrar’s decision (Stage I Review). Thereafter recourse to a further review is provided before a Judge in Chambers (Stage II review). In this instant application the complaint that is being made by the Applicants is that their right to access the Stage II review, at the date of filing of this application, was denied as a result of the failure or delay of the Assistant Registrar to deliver her reasons and certificate of taxation.
Stage I review:
5.2 At this stage, the Registrar can conduct a review of his/her own taxation subsequent to the making of a decision allowing or disallowing any item on the bill of costs. This stage is conducted in accordance with the procedure set out in Order 62 rules 33 and 34 R.S.C.
5.3 For the purposes of this motion the relevant effect of these sections are as follows:
(a) The review is of the decision of the Registrar in relation to the amounts allowed or disallowed by him/her in respect of any item. See Order 62 r 33(1). R.S.C.
(b) The applicant for the review must file the objections identifying the disputed items. It is therefore not necessary for the entire bill to be under review before the taxing officer.
(c) These objections must be delivered at the time of making the application for review.
(d) An application for a review at this stage must be done within 14 days after the decision is made or such shorter period as fixed by the taxing officer.
(e) In any event the application must be made before the Registrar signs the certificate dealing finally with that item. “Provided that no application under this rule for a review of a decision in respect of any item is made after the signing of the taxing officer’s certificate dealing finally with that item” See Order 62 rule 33(2) R.S.C. This appears to be an absolute injunction. There is no right in any party to initiate a review after the signing of the Registrar’s certificate.
(f) The taxation is therefore brought to an end by the issuing of the Registrar’s certificate. The Registrar becomes functus thereafter in relation to those items to which the certificate relates.
(g) Accordingly, the Registrar may issue an interim certificate in relation to those costs in which there is no review.
(h) There is no time limit for the issuing of a certificate after the completion of taxation and for that matter after the completion of a Stage I review. The trigger to the jurisdiction of the Registrar in the Stage I review is that a decision is made on the taxation; this is distinct from the signing of a taxing officer’s certificate. The issuing of a certificate is therefore only important in terminating the right to a Stage 1 review.
(i) There is no obligation on a Registrar to provide reasons for his/her review of taxation. These reasons are only provided upon the request of any party to the proceedings. This request for reasons is an important procedural step as this is a condition precedent to triggering the jurisdiction of the Judge in Chambers with respect to the Stage II review, if any.
(j) The statement of reasons can exist independently of the Registrar’s certificate.
The Stage II Review:
5.4 At this stage, the review is conducted by a Judge in Chambers. The relevant provision governing this review is set out in Order 62 rule 35 R.S.C. The effect of this provision is as follows:
(a) As in the Stage I review, the review is against the decision of the taxing officer and not the certificate.
(b) A condition precedent for making an application for review is that the party making the request for a review at this stage must have requested that the Registrar state his reasons in respect of that item or part of the review. See Order 62 rule 35(1) R.S.C.
(c) The application for the review is made by summons and heard by a Judge in Chambers.
(d) However this Court the obtaining of a certificate, is not without significance. Order 62 Rule 35 is intituled “Review of Taxing Officer’s Certificate by a Judge” . By Order 62 rule 35(2) R.S.C. the time limit for the making of an application for a review at this stage is affixed in relation to the delivery of the certificate. Furthermore the power that may be exercised by the Judge at a Stage II review includes an order that the certificate be amended. See Order 62 rule 35(6) R.S.C.
(e) Although at this stage the application for the review of the Registrar’s decision is to be made within 14 days after the certificate is signed, the existence of the certificate itself is not a pre requisite to trigger the jurisdiction of the Court as it has the power to extend the time for the making of a review before it. See Order 62 rule 35 (2) R.S.C. The absence of the certificate is therefore not an absolute injunction against invoking this stage of the review. For that matter the Applicant has recourse to the Registrar to seek an extension of time for the delivery of the certificate.
(f) The Court also exercises “all such powers and discretion as are vested in the taxing officer in relation to the subject matter of the application” and can make “such order as the circumstances require”. These powers have been construed to be “no limitation on the court’s power to review any decision of a taxing officer whether on quantum fact or otherwise.” See HCA 5234 of 1985 Elias v Elias . The judgment of Jamadar J confirms that the absence of reasons does not deprive the Judge of jurisdiction from embarking upon the taxation afresh and it can be similarly argued that the same prevails in relation to the absence of a certificate.
(g) A review can be conducted before the Judge even in the absence of reasons from the Registrar. See Elias v Elias (ibid)
(h) The desirability of having a certificate before conducting a review there can be no doubt. But in the same manner a review can be conducted even without the reasons from the Registrar, given the proper circumstances, such can be the case in the absence of a certificate where an application will be entertained by the Court to extend the time for the making of the review.
(i) Accordingly, the Defendant’s right to access the Stage II review in the absence of reasons and a certificate does not evaporate. It is not stymied. It is not extinguished. At best it can be pursued. At worst it is recoverable.
6. INVOKING THE CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDY:
6.1 Against this backdrop the issue remains whether the Applicants can validly complain that their constitutional rights have been infringed. Constitutional motions are to be sparingly used.
6.2 The mere allegation that a human right has been contravened is not of itself sufficient to entitle an applicant to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court to seek redress under the Constitution. One of the principles that will guide the Court in sifting out unmeritous constitutional motions was elucidated by Lord Diplock in Khemraj Harrikissoon V The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (1979) 31 WIR 348.
“The notion that whenever there is a failure by an organ of government or a public authority or public officer to comply with the law this necessarily entails the contravention of some human right or fundamental freedom guaranteed to individuals by Chapter 1 of the Constitution is fallacious. The right to apply to the High Court under section 6 of the Constitution for redress when any human right or fundamental freedom is or is likely to be contravened, is an important safeguard of those rights and freedoms; but its value will be diminished if it is allowed to be misused as a general substitute for the normal procedures for invoking judicial control of administrative action. In an originating application to the High Court under section 6 (1), the mere allegation that a human right or fundamental freedom of the applicant has been or is likely to be contravened is not of itself sufficient to entitle the applicant to invoke the jurisdiction of the court under the subsection if it is apparent that the allegation is frivolous or vexatious or an abuse of the process of the court as being made solely for the purpose of avoiding the necessity of applying in the normal way for the appropriate judicial remedy for unlawful administrative action which involves contravention of any human right or fundamental freedom.”
6.3 Lord Diplock in Maharaj v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago [11] reminds us “The fundamental human right is not to a legal system that is infallible but to one that is fair.”
6.4 Indeed building on this proposition the Law Lords recently reiterated the exclusivity of the invocation of constitutional remedies in the context of delays in delivery of judgments:
“ Citizens who are engaged in litigation have to face a number of possible hazards. The members of a court consisting of an even number of judges may divide evenly, so giving rise to the need for rehearing A jury may have to be discharged or a judge to recuse himself at an advanced stage of a trial without anyone having been at fault. A judge may die or take ill before concluding the hearing of a case or before judgment is given. These constitute ordinary risks inseparable from litigation, which cannot be laid at the door of the State or be regarded as breaches of the constitutional rights. There are limits to the obligation of a state to provide for misfortunes of this kind.”
See PC 8/2003 Jerome Boodoo and Khemkaran Jagram vs A.G . per Lord Carswell para 12.
6.5 There is no unconditional and irrevocable license to any citizen to utilize this constitutional remedy where they have suffered the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune caused by the laws delay.
6.6 The Privy Council has given the final word on this issue:
“In their Lordships opinion delay in producing a judgment would be capable of depriving an individual of his right to the protection of the law as provided for in section 4(b) of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago, but only in circumstances where by reason thereof the judge could no longer produce a proper judgment or the parties were unable to obtain from the decision the benefit which they should...For example, on an application to prevent the threatened abduction of a child any delay in giving judgment might deprive both the applicant and the child of the benefit, which the legal remedy, was there to provide. Their Lordships do not think it profitable to attempt to define more precisely the circumstances in which this may occur or to specify the periods of delay which may bring about such a result since case vary infinitely and each has to be considered on its merits.” [12]
6.7 The breach of a litigant’s constitutional rights occasioned by the delay in the delivery of judgment can only arise therefore if the delay renders nugatory the right pursued by the litigant or deprives the litigant of the benefit of the decision or makes a mockery of the person’s right to have a determination of the matter by the competent court.
6.8 Such a complaint cannot legitimately arise on the facts of this case. The right to review is not lost. The Applicants are not without remedy as the framers of Order 62 r 35 have catered for the incidence of delay by conferring powers on the Registrar and the Judge in Chambers to grant extensions of time for the review. Arguably a Judge in Chambers can also hear a review afresh without the reasons of the Registrar or her certificate. There is in any event no issue of the problems experienced by delay that may dilute the quality of a judgment such as the impairment of the judge’s assessment of the demeanor of witnesses over time, the finding of facts, or the assessment of evidence. This is simply a mathematical calculation and assessment of a money award representing costs awarded based on traditional principles of a party-to-party taxation. It is difficult to foresee circumstances in which a taxing officer is unable to render a proper decision despite the delay in this case of one year.
6.9 Moreover, the Applicants themselves recognize that in this case their “loss” caused by the alleged delay in the provision of the certificate and reasons can be compensated for by way of interest [13] . Indeed interest runs from the date of judgment and not the date of taxation.
6.10 There is no case of mala fides or the singling out of the Applicants for special treatment. There is no deprivation save for delayed payment, which is compensated for by the normal award of interest from the date of delivery of the judgment. There are no special circumstances in this case such as the denial of a fair hearing or arbitrary exercise of state power. It will be dangerous to simply categorize this delay in the factual matrix of this case, without more, as a breach of the Applicants’ constitutional rights.
7. WHAT DOES THE JUSTICE OF THE CASE REQUIRE?
7.1 It is not uncommon that the Court will ask the question: what does the justice of the case require to determine the most expeditious and just resolution of a matter. Indeed in the very recent pronouncements of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council it will appear that there is a leaning towards substance rather than form reluctance to expel litigants from the system based on irregularities in procedure. The source of this curative jurisdiction can be found in Order 2 R.S.C. or as was submitted by the parties in this case the court’s inherent jurisdiction.
7.2 These instances where a Court will remedy a defect in procedure are of course determined on a case by case basis. But resort should not be made readily to the use of such powers without good cause as it defeats the purpose of insisting on litigants making informed choices as to the commencement of litigation. Justice is not served, therefore, in these extenuating circumstances to simply evict the Applicants from this Court. In the attempt to exorcise the ghosts of delay already attendant on these proceedings this Court will proceed to hear the review of the bill of costs in accordance with the direction hereunder given. In this case there are some mitigating factors to support such an approach: there is the unexplained delay by the Respondent, [14] the objections in the substantive matter are before the Court, the Court is seized of the bill of costs, the submissions, the items that are the subject of the review and the amount that were taxed off.
7.3 At the heart of the Applicants’ concern is the recovery of their costs in the main action. To simply strike out the entire action without more will merely occasion a new application before another judge for a review. Moreover, and to the credit of the Respondent’s Attorney-at-Law, the Respondent has no objection to the review proceeding before this Court.
7.4 Such an approach is in line with the recent statements of the Court of Appeal and the Privy Council. In AG v Ramanoop [15] the Law Lords stated:
“If the second of these two events happen and constitutional relief is no longer appropriate, it would be an abuse if process of the applicant continues to seek constitutional relief. In such a case the applicant should either abandon the motion entirely or seek a direction that the proceedings continue as through by writ…. the applicant will also need to amend the relief he seek so as to abandon his claim to constitutional relief and instead seek to pursue his parallel remedy. Needless to say on all such applications the court will exercise its discretion as it sees fit in all the circumstances. Moreover the Court may of its own motion give any of these directions.”
7.5 In Belafont e [16] the learned Chief Justice S Sharma stated:
“A trial judge in my view should make every effort to save the proceedings where it is just and reasonable to do so. Matters of procedure are to be kept flexible in order to do justice between the parties. The exercise of her discretion in that manner at such a late stage of the proceedings also defeated the objective of all learning which it to dispose of matters such as this in the most just and convenient manner and to avoid a multiplicity of actions/ All the evidence has already been heard and she was in a position to make findings of fact. There was no point in requiring the applicant to file new proceedings and present the case all over against before a different judge”.
7.6 This Court concurs with and applies these principles to the special features of this cases co that it can now proceed with a Stage II review of the taxation.
8. CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER:
8.1 There is no compelling case for the infringement of the constitutional rights of the Applicants as alleged. There is no deprivation of the right to the award of costs merely delayed payment for which the Applicants will be compensated in the normal scheme of Order 62 R.S.C. This Court is not of the view that the delay complained of is so protracted that it could properly be said to have rendered the right to a Stage II review nugatory or make a mockery of the Applicants’ right to a review by a Judge in Chambers. Indeed ultimately at the review the Judge in Chambers may be even further reduce the costs to the Applicants’ detriment. There is therefore no deprivation of a certain and ascertainable benefit.
8.2 In the premises, the Applicants have not established a case for constitutional relief. The Court therefore dismisses the Applicant’s claim in paragraphs (a) to (f) inclusive of the Applicant’s motion.
8.3 However for the reasons outlined above the Court is not prepared to say that it is duty bound to be such a martinet as to dismiss the entire motion out of hand without addressing in a real way the controversy that lies beneath: the hearing of a Stage II review. The question for decision in the review lies in the smallest compass in relation to two items on the Applicants bill of costs. This Court is seized of all the material for determining that issue. The parties have informed the Court that the reason and certificate are prepared. There is no reason why this Court cannot pronounce on the substantive issue as to the disallowance of the sums claimed on the Applicant’s bill of costs. Although this Court disapproves of the procedure adopted by the Applicants it expresses the hope that the orders made to expedite the review will not be construed as setting any future precedent but are confined strictly to the factual matrix of this case.
8.4 This Court will proceed to a hearing of a Stage II review based upon the material presently before it with the appropriate amendments by the Applicant seeking a review of the decision of Assistant Registrar Burgess made on 22 nd July 2003 and subject to the filing and service on the Plaintiff in the main action of an application for an extension of time for the hearing of this review. This review will be heard by this Court on 28 th June 2006 subject to the following conditions:
(a) The Applicants shall file and serve on the Plaintiff in the main action the said application together with the necessary amendments seeking a Stage II review and the reasons and certificate now available, on or before 5 th June 2006, failing which this application and the application for the review of the decision of Assistant Registrar Burgess made on 22 nd July 2003 will stand automatically dismissed.
(b) Costs usually follow the event and normally the Court in this case would have awarded to the Respondent its costs of this application. However in the highest traditions of the bar, Attorney for the Respondent indicated that the Respondent will not insist on its costs of this action. This Court therefore orders that there be no order as to costs.
Dated this 12 th day of May, 2006.
Vasheist Kokaram
Judge (Ag.)
[Context] [Hide Context] [1] Such a complaint of the violation of an applicant’s constitutional rights has frequently been made in the context of the delay in criminal prosecutions. See Sookermany v D.P. P. (1996) 48 W.I.R. 346 D.P.P. v Tookai [1996] UKPC 2; (1996) AC 856 Bell v D.P.P [1985] 3 W.L.R. 73
[2] See HCA 2048 of 1994 and CA 144 of 19991 Ramnarine Jorsingh v The A.G ., HCA 412 of 1989 Anthony Ferreira v the A.G .; HCA 433 of 1995 Alfred Charles v AG; HCA 859 of 1996 William Duncan v AG
[3] Hereinafter referred to as “the main action”
[4] See Exhibit SHS 9
[5] The Applicants bill of costs is annexed to the application.
[6] For that matter and in any event the Applicants themselves did not file their objections within 14 days of the delivery of the Plaintiffs objections as prescribed by Order 62 r 33(4) RSC.
[7] See paragraph 17 of the Applicants’ affidavit sworn and filed on 16 th July 2004
[8] See paragraph 17 of the Applicants affidavit.
[9] As amended, hereinafter referred to as “RSC”
[10] See paragraph (a) of the motion filed on 16 th July 2004 and paragraphs 1, 3, 7 and 8 of the Applicants’ grounds of its motion. The gamut of constitutional rights relied on by the Applicants are the rights to enjoyment of property, the right to equality before the law, the right to protection of the law, the right to equality of treatment, the right to such procedural provisions necessary to give effect and protection to the aforesaid right and freedoms.
[11] Maharaj v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (No 2) [1978] UKPC 3; [1979] AC 385 at 399
[12] See PC 8 of 2003 Boodoo v AG
[13] See paragraph 8 of the Applicants affidavit.
[14] Although the Court was informed by the parties that the reasons and certificate have been obtained since the filing of the action
[15]
The A.G. of Trinidad and Tobago vs Siewchand Ramanoop [
2005] UKPC 15
[16] CA 84 of 2000 Damien Belafonte vs The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago.
[Context] [Hide Context]
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