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Constitution of Kenya Review Commission |
By Macharia Munene United States International University
19-07-2001
A look at the last 100 years of Kenyan history reveals a pattern of a tendency towards political coalitions to serve particular short-term interests of the key players involved. The coalition is often aimed at strengthening the executive by co-opting selected individuals or groups of people by making them feel as if they are part of the administration. In the process, they are used for the purposes of pushing through official agenda that would otherwise have problems getting accepted. In return, the co-opted people receive a few official positions like ministerial and other high sounding appointments to seal the deal. The recent appointment of Raila Odinga, and three of his NDP followers to serve in Moi's Kanu administration, falls into this category. It is just the latest manifestation of this pattern of short-term political manouvering.
It started with the British Government letting William MacKinnon's Imperial British East African Company do its work only to take over the whole operation with the collapse of IBEA after which its officers became government officials. To reach its claims at the source of the Nile, the British decided to construct a railroad from Mombasa to the Great Lake and imported from India skilled labourers to build the rail because Africans would not do it and soldiers to be used for punitive expeditions against uncooperative Africans. This made some Indians, and one or two officials in London, to think of East Africa as a natural outlet for excessive Indian population. Another group of people for whom East Africa appeared like a convenient outlet was the European Jews who were increasingly vocal in demanding a homeland in Palestine. This was through the World Zionist Organisation that was formed following the Dreyfus Affair in France that convinced Jews they could not be accepted as equals in Europe and hence the need to have a place of their own. The attempted co-optation of the Jews to serve British interests in East Africa failed because the Zionists insisted on going to Palestine and considered East Africa to be unsuitable. But while the Jews would not cooperate, white settlers from South Africa and Britain did and they were opposed to the idea of making the region a preserve for Jews.
These white settlers were noisy. After taking over the administration of the East African territory from IBEA and building a railroad, British officials had mounted recruitment campaigns for white people from South Africa and Britain to settle in the region, and made land taken from Africans accessible to them. As the number of the white settlers increased, they became rowdy and started organising to demand services such as labour from the government. They came together in the Convention of Association and created political pressure on the then government.
To make it easier for the government to operate without worrying about settler political agitation, the government created a Legislative Council (LegCo) that first met in 1907. Three settler representatives were nominated to sit with five official advisors to the governor in meetings presided by the governor. In this way, the settlers were co-opted into the system to support government policies. Among these nominees was Hugh Cholmondeley, 3rd Baron Delamere, better known as Lord Delamere. Ewart Grogan, failed to get the nomination because of his indiscretion in publicly whipping one of his servants before a crowd of excited whites which had earned him a few days in the cooler for displaying open contempt of the colonial judicial system. Delamere and Grogan would collaborate and then become rivals for leadership of the settler interests.
When World War I broke out in 1914, settler response was not as enthusiastic as some would have expected. With some Africans hoping that the war meant that white people were packing their bags and go back to Europe and being reluctant to serve as members of the Carrier Corps, the slow response from the white settlers was worrying. The government therefore formed a War Council in 1915 and co-opted leading settlers such as Grogan to boost support for the war effort. It did not make the colonial officials and settlers in East Africa look good when they had to be bailed out by South Africans, the participation, however, enabled settlers to demand more say and to hope that they would be given self-government and a governor who was strong enough to support and push for their objective in London. They just differed on how they should go about it.
Led by Lord Delamere's Reform Party, the settler elite in the LegCo hoped to show great cooperation with the government in order to convince London that they were responsible enough to be allowed to have self-government. Self-Government was in the vogue for white settler colonies and Southern Rhodesia achieved it in 1923 after deciding not to join South Africa as one of the provinces in the union. There was therefore a lot of expectation that settlers in Kenya would be granted self-government by entering into a coalition with the government. Grogan, believing that the purpose of the opposition in the legislature is to offer realistic alternatives to government policies and to point out the wrong things that the official side was involved in, was skeptical of Delamere's coalition obsession. He thought that Delamere had boxed himself and risked becoming a hostage to fortune swings. To Grogan, self-government for the settlers could not be achieved by cohabiting with a government that was doing everything wrongly both in policy and in practice.
Delamere's obsession persisted even after the British had made it clear in 1923, the same year that Southern Rhodesia settlers were allowed self-
government, that as far as it was concerned African interests were to be paramount in case of a conflict with the immigrant communities. Termed the Devonshire White Paper, it had been necessitated by the conflict between white settlers and Indians as to whose interests should take priority in colonial administration with both claiming to be the best defenders of African interests. Knowing that the pronouncement was meant to bail out the government in Britain out of a dilemma between the settlers and the Indians, Delamere still hoped to get his self-government through a closer union project bringing together British colonies in Eastern Africa with Nairobi as the base. He hoped to get the support of Edward Grigg, the new governor who was appointed after the death of General Edward Northey in 1925, by supporting an increase in the governor's salary and other benefits as well as the construction of a large governor's mansion in Nairobi that would act as the headquarters of the proposed union. Delamere died in 1931 before there was any closer union or any prospects for self-government for the settlers in Kenya. A thoroughfare in Nairobi was named after him as a tribute.
The settler's hope for an eventual self-government was dealt a permanent blow by the Mau Mau War which forced the British government to take tighter control of events in Kenya and to seek coalitions with Africans willing to cooperate. Having failed to defeat the Mau Mau fighters as expected in three months, one year, or even two years, the government decided to co-opt selected Africans into the government machinery as a way of diffusing grievances while at the same time generating intense hostility toward those largely involved in the Mau Mau War. It adopted new policy of promoting and encouraging members of "loyal tribes" to take up African leadership. "The Kenya Government's policy," according to a 1954 government analysis, "is to assist the emergence of responsible African leaders." Among the Kikuyu, those encouraged would be "home guard leaders." Political concessions were then to be given to such leaders. Sir Michael Blundell's prescription was to reward the Kalenjins and the Kamba tribesmen who had loyally helped the government to suppress Mau Mau by having some loyalists among them appointed to the Legislative Council. One such Kalenjin that was, in 1955, appointed to the Legislative Council, Daniel arap Moi, a school teacher who recognized "how much Africans owe to her Majesty's Government" that had "done so much in the darkest years-days when Africans were in the dark."
Other tribes were rewarded in different ways. A Luo, B.A.Ohanga, was appointed minister of Community Development and some rewards were granted to the cooperating tribes. And in the same year that Moi was appointed to the Legislative Council, the government sent a young Luo trade unionist, Thomas Joseph Mboya, to Oxford University for a year to be taught governance and labor relations. Determined to have Jomo Kenyatta forgotten as an African leader and to sideline the Kikuyu, according to newsman Smith Hempstone, later American ambassador to Kenya, the government built up Mboya in its effort "to create a new and, hopefully, more pliant leader." It was to produce such pliant leaders that a limited franchise, with appropriate rigging mechanism in place, was granted and elections were held for the first time in 1957. As contrived by the colonial state, no Kikuyu was elected
The colonial strategy of producing new leaders for Africans who would be receptive to colonial wishes, who accepted that British colonialism was good for natives in Kenya, and would therefore support colonial policies eventually backfired. The co-optation had worked for a while since the new Africans in the LegCo tended to think they were the real leaders of the natives. The only problem was that these leaders could not agree on which of them was the leader of the other leaders in the effort to cooperate with colonial officials in ensuring that bad Mau Mau leaders were completely forgotten. Their cooperating confusion was removed when one of them, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, pointed out that they were all deluding themselves because the real leaders of the Africans were in prison because of Mau Mau activities. With Odinga's assertion which amounted to a sabotage of colonial designs to create a good alternative African leader, and
with mounting pressure from Africans, Britain called a meeting in London and told the settlers essentially to cut a deal with the selected African leaders as to how they would fare in a self-governing Kenya in which they were not in official control.
With that official pronouncement in 1960, British subjects in Kenya, whether white, black or yellow were forced to create new coalition systems. At first, some African leaders sought to revive the old Kenya African Union, KAU, and appoint Jomo Kenyatta, the man sent to jail for organising the Mau Mau War as their president. Colonial officials, with authority to refuse registration of the new organisation, reportedly advised that they stick an "N" for "National" between "A" and "U" so as to read KANU or Kenya African National Union. Also advised to remove Kenyatta's name, they replaced it with that of JG or James Gichuru, similarly suspected of having Mau Mau sympathies, in an acting capacity. Odinga, Gichuru's former student, was to be vice-president, Ronald Ngala was to be treasurer, Daniel Moi was to be assistant treasurer, and Tom Mboya was to be general secretary.
But these organisers of KANU were not the only ones who were regrouping given that the settlers had also regrouped and reconstituted themselves into a white tribe that was numerically very small. Led by Michael Blundell, Reginald Alexander, and Wilfred Havelock, the small white tribe sought to create a new coalition of small tribes to oppose the supposedly two large tribes, the Kikuyu and the Luo. One of the white tribesman called Charles Markham wanted to link up what he described as " the unlimited number of tribes who do not wish to be ruled by the doctorate," meaning Julius Kiano, a Kikuyu, and Mboya, a Luo. Markham then suggested that a "coalition ... with Muliro and the pastoral and nomadic tribes might well result in us obtaining an absolute majority in LegCo." KANU was then portrayed as a Kikuyu-Luo affair led by two terrible people namely Kenyatta, the Mau Mau chief, and Odinga, the Communist.
The effort succeeded in creating a political alternative to KANU and the two political coalition systems that emerged as a result then competed for the biggest prize to be obtained from the departing Britons, the government of an independent Kenya. Opposed to KANU were the anti-Mau Mau and anti-
Communist forces comprising the white tribe in coalition with "the unlimited number of tribes without doctorate," that coalesced into a rival political party, the Kenya African Democratic Union or KADU. Blundell, one of the KADU masterminds thought of Moi "as an emotional man who is determined to ensure that his people, who were caught at a disadvantage by the imminent advent of independence as they had not equipped themselves in educational or technical fields for it, are not subordinated to the ambitions of more acquisitive and educated tribes." He, and the other white tribesmen, had appealed to the emotions of the leaders of the small tribes and had succeeded in luring both Ngala and Moi from KANU to KADU. Ngala and Moi had then been given party positions as president and chairman respectively and so the two men did not take up their allotted positions in KANU. KADU then mounted an anti-unity campaign in the name of majimbo in competition to KANU's call for a national outlook.
The colonial officials had tried as much as possible to stack the deck against KANU but still KADU never managed to attract sufficient support from ordinary Africans. As a result, it was KANU that emerged the winner in the May 1963 elections. Defeated at the polls and KANU determined to implements its policies, KADU disbanded and merged with KANU. Its various officials were appointed cabinet ministers in an independent African government.
In that merger, KANU appears to have swallowed KADU but those were simply appearances because the successful KANU had itself been a coalition of ambitious prima donors who hoped to put their stamp on the Kenyan scene once Kenyatta was dead. The existence of KADU had actually helped them to stick together but with KADU officially out of the picture, new coalition forces came into being. Within KANU, an ideological divide was simmering with some identified as being pro or anti-Communist. The co-optation of KADU officials strengthened the anti-communist side and intensified the division that came out in the open and actually split the pre-merger KANU. With Odinga leaving KANU and creating his own socialistic political party, the Kenya Peoples Union, KPU, former KADU officials became so well entrenched in KANU that one of them, Daniel arap Moi, was vice-president of Kenya within three years of Kenya becoming a republic. A brilliant political tactician, he stayed in the background, feigning ignorance and weakness, arranging for believers in his KADU policies to be placed in strategic positions within the KANU machinery, and biding his time. When Kenyatta eventually died in 1978, it was Moi the former KADU chairman who became president on a KANU ticket.
Moi had attained the presidency through building tactical and strategic coalitions that could be discarded once he was in power, after a respectable transition period that ended in 1982. Right from the start, however, he made it clear that he would break from the past, reorganise everything politically and economically, and impose his own policies. Many who were in his transition coalition team appear to have missed the warning until it was too late. One member of that transition coalition, GG Kariuki, recently lamented about the shifting realignment in 1982 and said: "I noted some very powerful forces determined to shake off the President's old friends."
He should not have been surprised since signs were clear even before the election of November 1979. Within a month of taking office, September 1978, Moi made it clear that he would be calling the shots and that everyone and every institution, the media included, should toe his line. He did this after receiving pledges of loyalty from Nairobi's delegation in September 1978 as he assured Kenyans that he would protect them and then he emphasised: "All Kenyans, including ministers and civil servants are answerable to me but I am answerable to God." He went on to warn the media, local and foreign, to be careful in what they wrote and not to write articles that can destroy Kenya's reputation abroad. Accusing some journalists of getting their stories from 'drunkards', Moi asserted: "Kenya's reputation in the world continues to shine despite the fact that these journalists have written nasty things about us.... Whatever they say and write, these people know they cannot find a happier country like Kenya." And he was determined to transform that happy country through a Nyayo revolution.
The election of November 1979 was an indicator. That election had the effect of weeding out some pre-independence political heavyweights and giving a chance to Moi to start restructuring the country. The pre-
independence prima donnas who lost the election included Mbiyu Koinange, Julius Gikonyo Kiano, Jean Marie Seroney, Taaita Toweett, Oginga Odinga, and Masinde Muliro. Some of those who lost had been Moi's partners in the old KADU but they had failed to recognise Moi's pre-eminence. In their place, new players who seemingly had received presidential endorsement in the election were introduced to the national political arena. These included Nicholas Kipyator Kiprono arap Biwott, whom Moi had in 1964 described as "a young man from home," Henry Kosgey, Jonathan arap Ng'eno, and in Kitale Frederick Fedelis Gumo, previously a Muliro protege. With the election results out, Moi felt ready to reorganise his government to include people who would help him reshape the country. He announced the changes on November 28 1979 and said: "Since independence, the structure of our Government machinery has remained more or less unchanged. After looking ahead and considering the great challenges our nation will face in the 1980s, I came to the conclusion that the Government machinery was in need of substantial restructuring." To help him mount "substantial restructuring" in the country members of the new cabinet included Biwott, Ngeno, Kosgey, Moses Mudavadi, and John Joseph Kamotho. There were also key appointments at the level of permanent secretaries that included Simeon Nyachae and Joseph A. Leting.
Between 1982 and 1988, it became clear that the transition coalition was dead and that Moi's restructuring of the country had succeeded to the point that he did not need "old friends" or coalitions anymore. With a well polished fimbo that came to symbolise his rule, or what can be termed a fimbo ideology, Moi's discarding of previous political and economic policies was pronounced under the banner of Nyayo philosophy. He described these in his book, Kenya African Nationalism: Nyayo Philosophy and Principles as "dramatic revolutions of the Nyayo Era" as he pointed out that "Nyayoism ... superimposed revolutions upon" the Kenyan scene. One of those revolutionary superimpositions was the imposition of Section 2A to the Kenyan constitution that decreed that political plurality was prohibited in Kenya. Kenyans, Moi later wrote, wanted this superimposition. He wrote, "I found it necessary to give expression to the people's will and wishes for a one party state .... I have no regrets for having taken this decisive step." There then followed the unfortunate attempted coup that tended to intensify the process of weeding out potential prima donnas and the need to eliminate free thought from "old friends" or anyone else in Kenya.
Subsequently, thinking was made a preserve of the presidency meaning that divergence of views even within the new political monolith was not acceptable for that would imply that the thinkers were usurping a presidential prerogative. For those who had problems understanding that only Moi was supposed to think for the country while the rest just did what he ordered, he went out of his way in September 1984 to make sure he was not misunderstood. He, therefore, ordered Kenyans to stop thinking and sing after him: "I would like ministers, assistant ministers and others to sing like a parrot after me .... During Kenyatta's time, I sang only 'Kenyatta' .... I didn't have ideas of my own. Who was I to have my own ideas?... So you play my tune. Where I put a full stop, you put a full stop." He repeated the theme of people singing to his tune in October while addressing parents of Kabarnet Boys High School on October 16, 1984, as he emphasised that the era of transition from the Kenyatta regime to the Nyayo era was over. His was an era of action "with a difference" and that he would not tolerate nonsense. Anyone who had spent the past six years unreformed, Moi pointed out, was unacceptable. Moi, reported Emman Omari of the Kenya Times, "emphasised that every Kenyan must enter the seventh year of the Nyayo era knowing things had changed and 'everybody must dance to the president's tune.'" In this and other ways, the "old friends" who thought they had helped the president were made to know that they were irrelevant as the new system that did not need coalitions became solidified. The process of letting the old friends to know that they were irrelevant culminated in the Mlulongo fiasco of 1988 that tried to sideline the remnants of the transition coalition since they were not needed.
With time, those weeded out of the political system through the new political monolith gradually came together and created a new coalition to press for change and an end to the political monopoly held by the new KANU. They started a build up to multipartyism with tables on coalition formation curiously turned from what they had been before independence. Before independence, the anti-KANU forces, one of the leaders being Moi, had ganged up in KADU. In the build up to multipartyism, however, Moi was controlling KANU and he was the focal point of the new political coalition. The new anti-KANU coalition comprised some of Moi's old comrades in KADU as well as disgruntled founder members of KANU. Since Section 2A of the constitution prohibited the forming of political parties other than KANU, these people called themselves the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy in Kenya or FORD. They had one objective in common, to end KANU's political monopoly, meaning Moi's political monopoly. They succeeded in 1991.
Other than ending KANU's political monopoly, the anti-KANU coalition had hoped to remove Moi from office but they failed and this created space for new versions of coalition politics. Their coalition had fragmented as soon as Section 2A was repealed with each prima donna hoping to replace Moi. They had been encouraged by the election results in Zambia where Kenneth Kaunda's party had also monopolised power until it was forced to go multi-
party. In the Zambian election, it had been assumed that Kaunda would win but he lost. This encouraged each of the prima donnas to believe that Moi would also lose and the issue at hand for each of the presidential hopeful was simply the timing of Moi's departure from State House so that he could get in. When asked about structural problems in the constitution and electoral machinery, these men failed to see it in their drive to replace Moi; and they goofed badly.
These presidential aspirants ignored the fact that the structure that Moi had built had not changed, underestimated Moi's political craftiness, and they paid for it and one of them ended up being co-opted into Moi's camp. As a result, Moi succeeded in retaining his position and started creating new coalitions in the form of defections from various opposition parties to KANU or in the form of political cooperation between KANU and FORD-Kenya, President Daniel Moi and Jaramogi Oginga Odinga. Soon after coming officially fourth in the 1992 election, Odinga and one of his vice-
chairmen, Michael Wamalwa Kijana, approached the United States Ambassador to Kenya, Smith Hempstone, and asked him for some money to enable them to file petitions against election outcomes in various constituencies. They, according to Hempstone, claimed that theirs was a proletarian party and did not have as much money as DP or FORD-Asili. He advised them to seek the money from either FORD-Asili or DP but they replied that they could not because they wanted to file petitions against those two parties, not against KANU. They got nothing from Hempstone. It was not long before an innocent looking young man, Kamlesh Pattni, showed up to donate two million shillings to help Odinga's party. The donation may have created friction within FORD-Kenya but it did not interfere with possible cooperation between Moi and Odinga. By the time of Jaramogi's death in 1994 a Moi-
Odinga coalition was in the open.
Odinga's death interrupted the cementing of KANU-FORD-Kenya coalition and made it possible for a new type of coalition to come up, one based on demands for serious political structural changes. As Odinga's party became fragmented, some of its followers joined others who had become disillusioned with the general political climate in which none of the political parties appeared to support genuine political reforms. It was this general disillusionment that opened the way for a new type of political coalition in the name of the NCEC led by people whose main attraction was professionalism and lack of interests in holding political office. As the NCEC became an alternative centre of authority in the public mind in competition with the political class, fear spread across the political spectrum. To reclaim leadership lost to the NCEC, the political class created a new coalition aimed at undermining the NCEC. This was the IPPG set of resolutions that were hurriedly lumped together to enable the politicians to hold on to their followers as they went into the 1997 election. What the NCEC coalition did was to force Moi to seek a new coalition within the political class in order to maintain authority in the eyes of the public.
The IPPG was therefore not a genuine thing, simply a patchwork that could not last but one that succeeded in diverting attention and enabled Moi to go ahead and win the 1997 general election after which a more systematic political coalition with selected political parties could be organised. Two opposition parties were competing to be co-opted into the KANU web. These were FORD-Kenya, led by Kijana Wamalwa and NDP led by Raila Odinga. Wamalwa had been Jaramogi's deputy but Raila had been Jaramogi's biological son and they were competing to continue with Jaramogi's cooperation with Moi. Moi's pleasant problem was to decide which of these two he should favour and he leaned on Raila. A new, more intense and serious political coalition developed through which NDP could be trusted to defend and promote the KANU agenda while claiming to be an opposition party. There were numerous little rewards for this cooperation including the post of Deputy Speaker, appointments to assorted offices, and accompanying the president in various local and foreign trips. The big reward was the appointment of Raila into the cabinet so that he can articulate government policies with some stamp of authority. There is nothing unusual about the appointment of Raila and NDP officials to propagate KANU policies for they can do it better in some instances than some KANU men.
Political coalitions, therefore, are usually short-term and are designed to achieve certain goals. While some players succeed in their calculations, most of them end up being used and dumped or not achieving whatever their supposed objective is. Delamere never got self-government for the settlers but he helped the colonial government accomplish some things in the hope that he would get his self-government. Among the best players in the game of coalition making in Kenya is Daniel Moi. He is politically brilliant, crafty, and manages to stay ahead of the people he enters into coalitions with. Once their usefulness is over, he gets rid of them. Moi knows that Raila is after his job, despite recent implied Raila campaigns for the post of prime minister that he would like thrust into the constitution. In the Moi-Raila political coalition, the main question is, Who will be the first to dump the other and when? This coalition cannot last.
SUGGESTED READINGS:
Books
George Bennett, Kenya: A Political History, The Colonial Period(0xford: Oxford University Press, 1963)
Robert Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Kenya Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989)
Sir Michael Blundell, So Rough a Wind: The Kenya Memoirs of Sir Michael Blundell (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964)
Sir Michael Blundell, A Love Affair With the Sun: A Memoir of Seventy Years in Kenva (Nairobi: Kenway Publications, 1994).
David Cohen and E.S. Atieno Odhiambo, Burying SM: The Politics of Knowledge and the Sociology of Power in Africa (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1992)
Peter Evans, Law and Disorder or Scenes of Life in Kenya (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1956)
Richard Frost, Race Against Time: Human Relations and Politics in Kenya Before Independence (Nairobi :Transafrica Book Distributors, 1978).
Cherry Gertzel, The Politics of Independent Kenya. 1963-1968 (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1970)
David Goldsworthy, Mbova: The Man Kenya Wanted to Forget (Nairobi: Heinemann, 1982)
Blaine Harden, Africa: Dispatches From a Fragile Continent(New York: W.W. Norton, 1990)
Smith Hempstone, Rogue Ambassador: An African Memoir(Swanee. TN: University of the South Press, 1997)
Joseph Karimi and Philip Ochieng. The Kenvatta Siiccession(Nairobi: Transafrica, 1980)
Keith Kyle, The Politics of the Independence of Kenvat (London: MacMillan Press, 1999)
David Lamb, The Africans(New York: Random House, 1983)
David K. Leonard, African Successes: Four Public Managers of Kenyan Rural Development(Berkelev: University of California Press, 1991)
Robert M. Maxon, Struggle for Kenva:The Loss and Reassertion of Imperial Initiative. 1912-1923(London: Associated University Press, 1993)
Daniel T. arap Moi, Kenya African Nationalism: Nyayo Philosophy and Principles Nairobi: Macmillan, 1986)
Andrew Morton, Moi: The Making of an African Statesman London: Michael O'Mara Books, 1998)
Macharia Munene, The Politics of Transition in Kenya 1995-1998 Nairobi: forthcoming
Kiraiutu Murungi, In the Mud of Politics
Nairobi: Acacia Stantex Publishers, 2000)
Philip Ochieng, I Accuse the Press: An Insider's View of the Media and Politics in Africa (Nairobi: ACTS Press, 1992).
Oginga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru: An Autobiography Nairobi: Heinemann, 1967)
Edward Paiee, Lost Lion of Empire: The Life of Cape to Cairo' Grogant
London: Harper Collins Publishers)
Jack R. Roelker, Mathu of Kenya: A Political Study Stanford. California: Hoover Institution Press, 1976)
Roger Tangri, The Politics of Patronage in Africa: Parastatals. Privatization and Private Enterprise Oxford: James Currey, 1999)
Richard D. Wolff, Britain and Kenya: The Economics of Colonialism(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974)
Chapters in Books
Michael Chege, "The Return to Multiparty Politics," in Joel D. Barkan, editor. Beyond Capitalism and Socialism in Kenya and Tanzania(Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1994), pp.47-74
Macharia Munene, "Constitutional Development in Kenya:A Historical Perspective," in Yash Vyas, Kivutha Kibwana, Okech-Owiti, Smokin Wanjala, editors. Law and Development in the Third WorldfNairobi: Faculty of Law, University ofNairobi: 1994), pp 51-63.
Macharia Munene, "Crisis and the State in Kenya: An Appraisal," in P.Godfrey Okoth and Bethwell A. Ogot, editors, Conflict in Contemporary Africa(Nairobi: Jomo Kenyatta Foundation, 2000), pp. 152-176
Bethwell A. Ogot, "The Siege of Ramogi, From National Coalition to Ethnic Coalition," in Bethwell A. Ogot, Building on the Indigenous: Selected Essays 1981-199i{(Kisumu, Kenya, Anyange Press, 1998), pp. 277-287
David Throup, "Daniel arap Moi," in Harvey Glickman, editor. Political Leaders of Contemporary Africa: A Biographical DictionarytWestport. Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1992)
Articles in Journals:
Gikonyo Kiano, "Victory for Democracy, Elections in Kenya", Africa Today. Vol. 4, No. 3, May-June 1957, pp. 3-6;
Macharia Munene, "Changing Ideologies in Kenyan Foreign Policy, 1960-1997," African Review of Foreign Policy. August 2000, Volume 2 Number 1
Macharia Munene, "Culture and Religion in Conflict Management," African Media Review Volume 11, Number 3,1997
Macharia Munene, "United States and Anti-Colonialism in Kenya, 1895-1963," African Review of Foreign Policy. Vol. 1, No. 1, March 1999
Conference/Seminar Papers
"The Colonial Origins of Kikuyu Bashing", Seminar on Media and Conflict in Africa, United States International University-Africa,
Nairobi, Kenya, December 20, 1996.